GHANA: FROM FRAGILITY TO RESILIENCE?

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Understanding the formation of a new political settlement from a critical political economy perspective

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ABSTRACT

Keywords: Critical political economy; electoral politics; Ghana; political settlement; power relations; social change; statebuilding and state formation

During the late 1970s Ghana was described as a collapsed and failed state. In contrast, today it is hailed internationally as beacon of democracy and stability in West Africa. In light of Ghana's drastic image change from a fragile and even collapsed polity to a resilient state, this thesis contributes to the statebuilding debate by analysing the social change that occurred.

Grounded in a critical theory approach the thesis applies a political settlement analysis to explore how power is distributed and changed over time between contending social groups; exploring the extent to which this is embedded in formal and informal institutional arrangements.

Ghana's 2012 elections serve as an empirical basis and lens to observe the country's current settlement. This approach enables a fine grained within-case comparison with Ghana's collapsed post-independent settlement. The analysis illustrates that while there has been no transformation of the Ghanaian state, however, continuous incremental structural change has occurred within it, as demonstrated by a structurally altered constellation of power.

While internationally propagated (neo-)liberal economic and political reforms had a vital impact on the reconstruction process of state-society relations, Ghana's labelling as "success story" evokes the distorted idea of a resilient liberal state. The sustainability of Ghana's current settlement characterised by electoral competitive clientelism depends on a continued inflow of foreign capital. So far the mutually beneficial interest of portraying Ghana as a resilient state by its elites and donors ensures the flow of needed financial assistance to preserve the settlement.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	Action Congress Party
AFAG	Alliance for Accountable Governance
AFDC	Defence Committees within the Armed Forces
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APP	All People´s Party
APRP	All Peoples´Republican Party
ARPB	Association of Recognized Professional Bodies
ARPS	African Peer Review Scheme
AWU	Agricultural Workers Union
AYO	Anlo Youth Organisation
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
BNI	Bureau of National Investigation
BOPS	Balance of Payments Statistics (IMF)
BVV	Biometric Voter Verification
CA	Consultative Assembly
CADA	Centre for African Democratic Affairs
CC	Carter Center
CDD	Ghana's Centre for Democratic Development
CDR	Committees for the Defence of the Revolution
CFA	Centre for Freedom and Accuracy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMB	Cocoa Marketing Board
CODEO	Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
CPC	Cocoa Purchasing Company
CPE	Critical Political Economy
CPP	Convention People´s Party
PFP	Popular Front Party
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CVC	Citizen´s Vetting Committee
CW	Commonwealth
CYO	Commitee of Youth Organisation

DACF	District Assemblies Common Fund
DAG	Democratic Alliance of Ghana
DCE	District Chief Executive
DFID	Department for International Development
DIIS	Danish Institute for International Studies
DWM	31st December Women´s Movement
EC	Electoral Commision
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
E-Day	Election Day
EGLE	Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere Party
EOM	Election Observation Mission
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
ESDS	Economic and Social Data Service
et al.	et alia (lat.): and others
EU	European Union
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FM	Frequency Modulation (referring to FM radio stations)
fn.	footnote
FPD	Front for the Prevention of Dictatorship
GAF	Ghana Armed Forces
GAP	Ghana Action Party
GBA	Ghana Bar Association
GCP	Ghana Congress Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFG	Good Financial Governance
GFN-SSR	Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform
GFP	Ghana Freedom Party
GFS	Goverment Finance Statistics
GGEA	Ghanaian-German Economic Association
GIBA	Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association
GIHOC	GIHOC Distilleries Company Limited
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNP	Ghana National Party

GNPC	Ghana National Petroleum Corporation
GNU	Goverment of National Unity
GPRS I	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I
GPRTU	Ghana Private Road Transport Union
GPSC	Ghana Peace and Solidarity Council
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
GTV	Ghana TV
GTZ	Deutschen Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HPO	Hybrid Political Orders
ibid.	ibidem (lat.): in the same place
ICL	Industrials Chemicals Limited
ICWU	Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDEG	Institute of Democratic Governance
i.e.	id est (lat.):– that is
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IFS	International Finance Statistic
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCC	Interim National Coordinating Commitee
INEC	Interim National Electoral Commission
IPAC	Inter-Party Advisory Committee
IPPG	Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (Research Programme Consortium for Improving IPPG)
IR	International Relations
IRI	International Republican Institute
ITG	International Tabacco Ghana Limited
JFM	June Fourth Movement
JPC	Joint Provincial Council
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Training Centre
KNRG	Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Group
KVIP	Kumasi Ventilated-Improved Pit (sanitation facilities)
LBA	Licensed Buying Agent

LRC	Legal Resource Centre
LSE	London School of Economics and Political Sciences
MAP	Muslim Association Party
MFJ	Movement for Freedom and Justice
MfWA	Media Foundation for West Africa
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
N.K.G.H.	Location description in Accra/Ghana
NAL	National Alliance of Liberals
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
NCD	National Commission for Democracy
NCGW	National Council of Ghana Women
NCP	National Convention Party
NDC	National Defence Commitees
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDI	National Democratic Institue
NDM	New Democratic Movement
NDP	National Democratic Party
NERC	National Economic Review Committee
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIB	National Investment Bank
NIC	National Investigation Commission
NIP	National Independence Party
NLC	National Liberation Council
NLM	National Liberation Movement
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NPP	Northern People´s Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
NSC	National Service Corp
NUGS	National Union of Ghana Students
ODI	Oversea Development Institute
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFY	Operation Feed Yourself
OSCE	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PAMSCAD	Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment

PAP	People´s Action Party
PDC	Peoples Defence Committee
PFP	Popular Front Party
PHP	People´s Heritage Party
PMFJ	People´s Movement for Freedom and Justice
PNC	People's National Convention
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP	People´s National Party
PP	Progress Party
PPP	Progressive People's Party
PRLG	People´s Revolutionary League of Ghana
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans
RCC	Regional Coordinating Councils
ROPAA	Representation of People´s Amendment Act
RWU	Railway Workers Union
SAIS	School of Advanced International Studies of John Hopkins University
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SDF	Social Democratic Front
SMC	Supreme Military Council
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies
SOE	State Owned Enterprises
SPN	Selection from the Prison Notebook
STL	Superlock Technologies Limited
TC	Togoland Congress
TCP	Togoland Congress Party
TUC	Trade Union Congress
TV	Television
UF	United Front
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UGFC	United Ghana Farmer´s Council
UGFCC	United Ghana Farmers´ Cooperative Council
UGM	United Ghana Movement
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

UNC	United National Convention
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
Unigov	Union Goverment
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UP	United Party
URF	United Revolutionary Front
USAID	Name of United States' Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VAT	Value Added Tax
VIASAT	Name of a Ghanaian television channel
VRA	Volta River Authority
WDC	Workers Defence Commitees
WDI	World Development Indicators
WTI	World Trade Indicators (World Bank)
WWII	Second World War

The danger of a single story:

The single story creates stereotypes and the problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one story become the only story.

Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (2009)

I. INTRODUCTION

Intrastate violent conflict emerged as the dominant and most deadly type of conflict after the end of World War II (Davenport and Gates 2014). With the fall of the Berlin Wall and a general demise of state socialism developed a widely shared conviction amongst international actors how to address intrastate post-conflict situations. Throughout the 1990s statebuilding, based on the Western liberal state model, became the new standard approach to conflict resolution. The emphasis on the state was reinforced by the fact that interrelated fields like Security Studies – particularly after 9/11 –, Development Research and Peace and Conflict Studies identified "weak states" especially in Africa[1] and Asia no longer merely as regional security threats (Tull 2011: 5). Rather they came to be considered as problematic in two ways. First, they are seen as being less capable of providing security, order and socio-economic development for their own citizens. Secondly, unstable states do not appear suited for serving as building blocks of the current international system and are perceived in an era of international terrorism as a challenge to global security (Boege et al. 2008: 2). As a consequence, the promotion of liberal statebuilding – conceptualized as liberal democracy with a free market economy – has become the remedy for development and global peace (Chandler and Sisk 2013: xx; Tull 2011: 5).

International peace support operations became without further ado the main instrument for international actors to dabble with the statebuilding strategy which focused on institutional reforms with the aim of strengthening democracy, security and economic growth. In response to these developments, academia produced plenty of studies scrutinizing the operational details of interventions of external actors in conflict-ridden states and their efforts of liberal peacebuilding. Soon this "problem-solving" strand of research was complemented by critical scholars arguing that statebuilding is not merely a technical exercise in conflict management limited to enhancing the capacities and effectiveness of state institutions. Rather, they pointed out that the endeavour is inherently political and power-based. According to critical scholars, the liberal peace project represents the globalization of a particular model of domestic governance, whereby the core determines the acceptable international standards on how states should

[1] For brevity "Africa" will be used interchangeably with "Sub-Saharan Africa" in this thesis to refer to the region of countries south of the Sahara.

organize themselves internally (Pugh (2005); Bain (2006) and Chandler (2006) and Pugh and Turner (2006)). Spreading the liberal peace with its emphasis on establishing Weberian states reaffirms the state as the central political unit and thereby also the current order of the international system. Put differently, critical scholars have focused on how the liberal peace project is reproducing the prevailing global order with all its inherent power relations and imbalances.

The practice of liberal peace operations however does not only impact on power relations *between* states. The externally driven implementation and reforms of state institutions primarily and abruptly affect – although possibly only temporarily – relations of power between different societal groups *within* states. For institutions are not neutral structures; they embody and cast relations of power between contending politicized societal groups. This in turn has grave ramifications on a state, its base in society, and thus the general workings of the state. So far Peace and Conflict Research – and in particular the academic literature on statebuilding – has paid very little attention to understanding processes of change with regards to power relations *within* states of the Global South, and African states in particular. In addition, African Studies and its focus on the state has paid much attention to patterns of continuity. It has focused significantly less on identifying and analysing social change that has actually occurred, whether this change has been caused by outside interventions, or by more "organic" processes, or interplay of the two.

Against this background, the thesis focuses on the case study of Ghana. Post-independence, the Ghanaian state had been quite fragile, plagued by economic woes and frequent, reoccurring military coups. Just within fifteen years, Ghanaians had undergone five coups d'états each resulting in regime change. Besides, the steadily growing fiscal and trade deficits coupled with price increases for some goods of over 1000% reflected the country's economic volatility. Due to aggravating economic crises and the persisting political fragility, by the late 1970s, the Ghanaian state was considered a collapsed and failed polity (Hutchful 2002: 101; Chazan 1983: 320; Rothchild 1995: 50).

In contrast, today Ghana is hailed internationally as a beacon of democracy and stability in West Africa (Osafo-Danso 2015; Tietaah 2012: 210; Handley 2008: 3). The country's remarkable macroeconomic recovery and (re-)democratization process form the basis of the currently dominant narrative of

Ghana's image as 'African success story'. Since Ghana's return to multiparty democracy in 1992, each president has been abiding by constitutional term limits, and Ghanaians have held six consecutive, tightly contested, yet (relatively) peaceful general elections. As a result, voters succeeded in changing their governments twice through the ballot box. These achievements are not only exceptional given Ghana's history; they make the country also stand out in regional comparison and suggest indeed a rather resilient polity.

Given Ghana's drastic image change from a fragile and even collapsed polity towards a resilient state, this thesis aims to contribute to the statebuilding debate by evaluating occurred social change in Ghana. Founded in a critical theory approach and a fine grained within-case comparison, the thesis' main objective is to understand the social changes Ghana has undergone throughout the late 1970s till today. It will explore whether one can speak of any structural changes or transformation of the Ghanaian state and if so, to what extent and how this has taken place. Whether the changes are procedural or structural, profound or temporary is crucial to understanding the future dynamics of the Ghanaian state, and indeed potentially further afield. The two main research questions guiding the analysis in this thesis are therefore as follows:

1) **Has the Ghanaian state undergone any fundamental structural change, and if so, to what extent?**
2) **If applicable, how did Ghanaian society manage to undergo this process of social change?**

To address these two main research questions the thesis applies a Gramscian inspired political settlement analysis. Thereby the thesis assumes that state institutions are not neutral structures per se, but rather shape and are characterized themselves by power relations between contending politicized societal groups of unique context-specific processes. Resting on a critical political economy approach a political settlement is therefore defined as the distribution of power in a given society between contending social forces and how this is embedded in and reflected by formal and informal institutional arrangements of the state. Following Gramsci the thesis argues that the nature of the constellation of power between contending politicized societal groups and how this is embedded in formal and informal institutional arrangements of the state determines the workings and therefore form of a state. Thus, to evaluate from a critical political economy perspective whether the Ghanaian state has undergone

any structural social change over the last few decades, the thesis explores if constellations of power within Ghanaian society have shifted; and how far this has impacted on the workings of the Ghanaian state. To tackle this endeavour the thesis proceeds as follows.

Chapter two outlines the Gramscian tinted political settlement framework allowing for a nuanced and in-depth case study analysis incorporating state-building and societal dynamics to evaluate social change in Ghana. The chapter moves on to contextualize the endeavor of a political settlement analysis in an African context by outlining the broader historical context of state formation in Sub-Saharan Africa. It concludes with sketching out and critically reflecting on the methodological approach applied for the thesis.

Based on the theoretical framework developed in chapter two, which emphasizes the importance of historically grown structures and power relationships between politicized societal groups, chapter three outlines Ghanaian political settlements in historical perspective. To grasp the historical roots of societal and elite conflict in Ghana, the first part outlines key social dynamics under colonial rule. These have shaped Ghana's politicized societal cleavages most of which continue to form the basis of political and social conflict until today. Building on these key prerequisites, the subsequent section sketches out the emerging constellation of power in Ghana's immediate post-independent state and how these have been embedded and reflected in formal and informal institutions. It will be argued that due to the leading role of the state in the economy, Ghana's post-independence settlement was characterized by an entanglement of the political and economic sphere causing capital accumulation to occur mainly through access to the state. This structure led to fierce elite competition over the state and shaped its neopatrimonial character. Ghana's elites' competition was reinforced by the highly fragmented nature of its society along ethnic lines as one of its key politicized societal cleavage. It was further amplified by a lack of elite consensus – fuelled by systemic rivalry at the international level – with regards to ideological and thus institutional set up, in particular for Ghana's economic sphere. A high rotation of fiercely competing civilian ruling coalitions was the consequence. Despite competing ruling coalitions' ideological differences and varying support bases in society, neither civilian nor military ruling coalitions till the early 1980s managed to alter the historically grown and deeply en-

trenched power constellations in Ghana institutionally embodied by an over-taxation of the productive entrepreneurs in the rural areas in favour of the state's urban masses' consumption. Hence, while ruling elites fluctuated rather frequently in Ghana's post-independence settlement, the power constellation embedded in the structures was characterized by continuity. By the end of the 1970s Ghana's post-independence institutionalized "urban vampire state" (see Frimpong-Ansah 1991) eroded the state's economic base. In fact, it led to Ghana's fiscal and economic breakdown and resulted in the disintegration and collapse of the entire state system. In contrast, the last section of chapter three will illustrate that Ghana's more recent historical developments provide the building blocks for the currently dominant narrative of its image as "African success story". Ghana's remarkable macroeconomic recovery coupled with its (re-)democratization process including incumbent presidents abiding by term limits and two relatively peaceful turnovers of power through the ballot box, are not only exceptional in view of Ghana's history. These achievements make Ghana also stand out in regional comparison and suggest, albeit rather simplistically, that the country has arrived at a profoundly new place. In line with the research questions, chapters four to six are devoted to critique this narrative and aim to present a more nuanced analysis of achieved social change in Ghana.

To empirically ground the fine grained within-case comparison between Ghana's post-independence and current political settlement, chapter four zooms in on Ghana's 2012 elections as a lens to observe the workings of the current Ghanaian state and lays the foundation for a detailed outline of Ghana's current political settlement presented in chapter five. Why do elections matter in the context of analysing constellation of powers in Ghana? Elections are crucial events in political cycles, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they embody the struggle over political power and the distribution of mostly scarce resources. Consequently, in most states of the Global South there is an imperative to win elections. During election times politicized societal cleavages come to light more clearly. Moreover, informal institutions like political patronage networks manifest themselves and are decisive for comprehending the general workings of the current Ghanaian state. Elections generally pose an opportunity for change – at least of actors and therefore of who might get what of the national cake – so that stakes tend to be high. In the case of Ghana analysing the

electoral framework provided a reasonable starting point with regards to which formal institutions to focus on while grasping their inherent distribution of power. Since elections have for most of Ghana's post-independence period been a constant institutional feature, using elections as a lens also provided a reference point to assess in how far there has been any structural change with regard to the working of the Ghanaian state.

Based on Ghana's 2012 electoral politics outlined in chapter four, chapter five illustrates that the workings of the Ghanaian state of today are in fact very reminiscent of those of Ghana's post-colonial state. However, the thesis argues that despite these continuities it would be misleading to assert nothing has changed at all in Ghanaian society. It will be argued that while there has not (yet) been a transformation *of* the Ghanaian state, continuous incremental structural change has occurred *within* it. For the thesis claims that the constellation of power within the Ghanaian state has been altered in three different dimensions: namely the (1) relationship between the elites, (2) between the elite and non-elite as well as (3) amongst the non-elite.

Chapter six as last substantial chapter of this thesis analyses how Ghanaian society has managed this process of social change and hence arrived at a new constellation of internal relations of power. The analysis acknowledges that internationally propagated (neo-)liberal economic and political reforms had a vital impact on the reconstruction process of state-society relations in Ghana and that it is remarkable that this process of social change has been achieved. At the same time the thesis points out that Ghana's labelling as an "African success story" evokes a distorted idea of a resilient liberal state. For the sustainability of Ghana's current political settlement characterised by electoral competitive clientelism depends on a continued inflow of foreign capital. So far the mutually beneficial interest of portraying Ghana as a resilient state by its elites and donors ensures the flow of needed financial assistance to preserve the settlement. If this form of state might be able to provide a path to long-term political stability and economic prosperity remains to be seen.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, CONTEXTUALIZATION AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

[T]here is a need to provide an analytical framework that does justice to the process of social change actually taking place in Africa today.
Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling

This chapter aims to develop a theoretical framework allowing for a nuanced and in-depth case study analysis incorporating statebuilding and societal dynamics to evaluate social change in Ghana. To begin, the chapter traces the main concepts of Antonio Gramsci in relation to state formation and changes of forms of states. It illustrates why Gramsci's ideas are fruitful in relation to a critical statebuilding debate and, in particular, with regards to analysing states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Subsequently, it outlines the analytical framework of a political settlement developed from a Gramscian perspective. The chapter moves on to highlighting relevant aspects of Africa's history evolving around state formation and statebuilding. Thereby, it links the theoretical approach to the setting of state formation in Sub-Sahara Africa and contextualizes the previously developed analytical framework as well as the subsequent context-specific chapters on state formation in Ghana. The chapter concludes with substantiating the choice to rely on Ghana's 2012 elections as a window to observe the country's current political settlement, before outlining in more detail and critically reflecting on the applied methods used for data collection and interpretation.

2.1 Theoretical framework

The first section of the chapter presents the rationale for a Gramscian-tinted analytical framework for a fine-grained case study analysis of social structural change in Ghana and addresses the main points of critique of such an endeavour. It outlines Gramsci's thoughts on forms of states and opportunities of social change before moving on to translate his work into a political settlement approach used as the analytical framework for this thesis.

2.1.1 Engaging Gramsci in the field of statebuilding

Over the past decade, the academic fields of peace and conflict studies, security, as well as development research, have been concerned with the relationship between violent conflict, the performance of states and global security. Weak states have been identified as problematic in two ways. First, they are seen as

being less capable of providing security and order for their own citizens; second, unstable states do not appear suited for serving as building blocks of the current international system (Boege et al. 2008: 2). As a result, the promotion of statebuilding based on the Westphalian state model – conceptualized as liberal democracy with a free market economy – has become the remedy for development and global peace (Chandler and Sisk 2013: xx; Call and Wyeth 2008).

In this context, critical peace scholarship has grappled with the ideological assumptions of peace support operations which have become a main instrument of international actors to dabble with the statebuilding strategy. The critical strand of academic work on statebuilding evolved as a response to the initial scholarly work focusing on the operational details of peace operations. The main argument brought forward by critical scholars has been that liberal statebuilding is not merely a technical exercise in conflict management limited to enhancing the capacities and effectiveness of state institutions. Rather, it is political and power-based. The liberal peace project is seen as the globalization of a particular model of domestic governance, whereby the core determines the acceptable international standards on how states should organize themselves internally (Pugh 2005; Bain 2006; Chandler 2006; Pugh and Turner 2006). Spreading the liberal peace with its emphasis on establishing Weberian states reaffirms the state as the central political unit and thereby reproduces the prevailing global order with all its power relations and imbalances.

The practice of peace operations, however, does not only impact on power relations *between* states. The externally driven implementation and adjustment of state institutions primarily and abruptly affect – although possibly only temporarily – relations of power between different social groups *within* states. This, in turn, has grave ramifications on a state, its base in society, and thus the general workings of the state.

Meanwhile, the statebuilding discourse has shifted its focus from external actors and their impact on state institutions towards the role of grassroots developments and bottom-up approaches including actors from civil society, the private sector and the elite. This shift from “outside to inside” has added key variables to explaining the promotion or frustration of peace and stability. However, so far, the debate on pathways out of fragility fails to bridge and carve out the interplay between a variety of actors and institutions. The academic litera-

ture on statebuilding has paid little attention to scrutinizing power relations within states of the Global South, and African states in particular, and to understanding processes of its change. A further-reaching and holistic approach, taking the historical development of political and economic institutions into account, as well as their link to the society in which they are embedded, could enable us to engage in a better understanding of political orders in the Global South and identify their opportunities for change. This is where Gramsci comes in.

Antonio Gramsci engages in his writings *Quaderni del Carcere (The Prison Notebooks)* with the process and challenges of the formation of the Italian nation state. He explores how the form of the Italian state could change, and analyses the role of the relationship between civil society and the state in this opportunity for change. Guided by his desire to develop thoughts for political action, Gramsci stresses two points which are interrelated and crucial in relation to the statebuilding discourse today. First, his writings echo the recognition that each state is unique. He writes:

> **[T]he internal relations of any nation are the result of a combination which is 'original' and (in a certain sense) unique: these relations must be understood and conceived in their originality and uniqueness if one wishes to […] direct them (Forgacs 2000: 230-31).**

By shifting the attention to the internal relations – relations of power between different social groups – of a state, Gramsci enables us to recognize different forms of states and to analyse their social basis. This brings us to Gramsci's second key point in the context of the debate on statebuilding. For Gramsci, the state is not solely made up of political institutions, government, top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities (Morton 2003: 158) or what he identifies as "political society". Approaches limiting themselves to "political society" have been derogatorily labelled by Gramsci as *statolatry* (Forgacs 2000: 237-38). According to him, the state includes as well:

> **[…] the entire complex or practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules (Morton 2003: 158).**

Thus, political society and civil society together form Gramsci's concept of the *integral state* which is set in contrast to a statolatry one. With his focus on state-society complexes, Gramsci presents a much wider theory of state (ibid.). Instead of taking the state and its institutions as given, he focuses on the political struggles of unique social forces within a state and how these relate to the development of its specific form (Morton 2003: 157). Gramsci's reflections on different forms of states, power

and social transformation provide a reasonable starting point to engage more profoundly with existing realities in the Global South.

One might rightly point out that Gramsci's writings reflect a particular time and set of circumstances and, therefore, demur the broader applicability of his ideas to today's time and the context of statebuilding in the Global South (see Burnham 1991, Germain and Kenny 1998). Yet, engaging Gramsci in the discourse on statebuilding is not a matter of exporting his analytical framework one-to-one to temporal or geographical contexts different from his own. Nothing could be further from the spirit of Gramsci's thought than developing an analytical framework that claims to present a timeless set of concepts to explain the world (Cox 1983: 163). As Robert Cox (1983: 162) points out, Gramsci continuously adjusts his own ideas according to specific historical circumstances. This is illustrated by the fact that some of his theoretical concepts, such as the *passive revolution* vary slightly throughout his writings. The idea behind claiming Gramsci for the discourse of statebuilding and state formation in the context of Ghana is to engage with his ideas and to develop them with further adjustments to the time and context where and when they are applied. Gramsci himself drew on writings of authors such as Machiavelli, Marx and Sorel who developed their concepts in different times and contexts. Moreover, Gramsci's concepts which were originally developed for and on the level of the state have been transferred and applied to the global level (see Cox 1981; Cox 1983; Gill 1993; Murphy 1998; Van der Pijl 1997; Bieler and Morton 2001). They form today a fundamental strand of critical IR theory. Gramsci's ideas also feed into the fields of development and peace and conflict studies, yet so far, not explicitly, as will be demonstrated later (see section 2.1.3).

Before turning to an attempt to engage Gramsci for an analytical framework for the statebuilding discourse in today's Global South, and Ghana in particular, the following section outlines a brief summary of his main ideas and concepts related to forms of states, power and social transformation.

2.1.2 Gramsci: On forms of states, power and social transformation

Relations of forces, hegemony and historic bloc

Gramsci dedicates his political analyses to understanding the resilience of capitalist states in Europe. He scrutinizes why the socialist movement had failed in Italy, and

how the fascist regime succeeded to rule the Italian state. Gramsci seeks to present an analysis of social change that informs a novel strategy of political action to change the form of the Italian state (Forgacs 2000: 189; Simon 1991: 23).

Even though his political thought was greatly influenced by Marxist tradition, he critiques Marx's proclaimed link between economic crises and political transformation as too automatic (Moolakkattu 2009: 441). Gramsci disagrees with Marx's mechanistic form of historical materialism which implies a theoretical separation of the economic dimension from the social and political ensemble and as the reduction of this ensemble to its economic causes (Forgacs 2000: 422). In his view, Marx's "historical economism" (Forgacs 2000: 189) is neither a suitable theoretical basis to understand differences between forms of states, nor does it represent an adequate basis for a novel strategy on how to change the form of the Italian state.

According to Gramsci (Forgacs 2000: 190) "changing socio-economic circumstances do not of themselves 'produce' political changes." They only set the conditions in which such changes become possible. What is crucial, in bringing about these changes, are the *'relations of force[s]*' […]". Put differently, the configuration of social forces is characterizing the form of a state and key for comprehending social change in any society (Simon 1991: 69). Civil society is hereby the sphere in which diverse social forces compete with one another over influence and dominance (Simon 1991: 27). Thus, relations of social forces within civil society are also relations of power, so that power is diffused throughout civil society (Simon 1991: 29).

According to Gramsci, certain social forces, e.g., a class, can become hegemonic in the sphere of civil society. In this context, *hegemony* means the leadership of an alliance of various social forces (Forgacs 2000: 422). Gramsci does not limit the concept of relations of forces to the relationship of power between the working class (labour) and the bourgeoisie (capital). In fact, he underlines the importance of other social forces not arising directly out of the relations of production (Simon 1991: 24-29). This is important because social class differences – created through industrialization in Europe – still are much less deep and sharp in Africa than in Europe (Davidson 1994: 212-13). Once a group has managed to gain the consent of other social forces through creating and maintaining a system of alliances by means of political and ideological struggle, it

achieves leadership and thereby state power (Simon 1991: 23-24; Germain and Kenny 1998: 17). Gramsci points out that this leadership is based on the economically central role of the leading force. It is secured politically by that group making economic concessions and sacrifices to its allies in civil society (Forgacs 2000: 422).

However, Gramsci evenly stresses the role of ideas, norms and values in the process of gaining a hegemonic position in civil society (Forgacs 2000: 205). For an alliance between social forces to become hegemonic in the sphere of civil society it needs to disseminate its ideas, and other social forces must embrace those. Gramsci considers an "intellectual and moral reform" – a transformation of popular consciousness, of people's way of thinking and feeling – necessary, in order to establish hegemony in any given society (Simon 1991: 26). Therefore, one would be falling short to restrict Gramsci's concept of hegemony to pure economic dominance and power in a neo-realist understanding. Rather, hegemony in a Gramscian sense should be understood as being based on coercion as well as consent. A dominant group rules over, but effectively also with, rather than against all subordinate groups in civil society (Germain and Kenny 1998: 17). Hence, in Gramsci's historical materialism, ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing one another and not reducible one to the other (Cox 1983: 168). When a dominant force succeeds in becoming hegemonic in civil society and control of the state, this constellation is described by Gramsci as an *historic bloc*. It is a constellation of a temporary hegemonic alliance of a broad bloc of social forces in a society under the leadership of a currently dominant social force in the economic, cultural and political sphere (Germain and Kenny 1998: 10).

Gramsci's concept of the historic bloc implies vital consequences for the socialist struggle. First, the political struggle of the working class for socialism could not be restricted to winning state power. It has to be extended to the whole of civil society (Simon 1991: 28-29). In order to gain control over a state it is, according to Gramsci, necessary to win a substantial measure of hegemony in the state's civil society (Simon 1991: 29). Robert Cox (1983: 167) describes this entanglement between state and society as a "solid structure". Gramsci himself refers to it as the integral state: political society plus civil society (Forgacs 2000: 235; Simon 1991: 72-73). With power being diffused throughout civil

society, it follows that power constellations are as well embodied in the coercive apparatuses of the state (Simon 1991: 73).

In brief, for Gramsci the constellation of power between different social forces in civil society is key for understanding the form of a state and its possibility for change. Civil society is hereby the sphere in which a dominant social group organizes consent and hegemony. It is also the sphere where subordinate social forces may organize their opposition and construct an alternative hegemony (Simon 1991: 27). According to Gramsci, a coalition of social forces can achieve a firm grip on state power if it manages to combine its leadership in the economic sphere with the leadership in civil society (Simon 1991: 28). The interconnection between political society, civil society and the economic sphere implies that power constellations between social forces are embedded in institutions (Simon 1991: 74), including political institutions such as electoral frameworks governing political representation and access to allocation of resources in democratic polities. For Gramsci, the notion of the state only becomes meaningful if it includes the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society (Cox 1983: 164), and takes into account the position of social forces in the economic sphere. In this regard he can be deemed a pioneer of critical political economy.

How forms of states change – or not

Besides understanding different forms of states, Gramsci is interested in pathways to alternative orders; how forms of state can change over time. In this context his concept of *organic crisis* is significant. An organic crisis is a crisis of the entire state system. It occurs when the hegemony of the ruling forces is at risk and likely to disintegrate (Forgacs 2000: 218; Simon 1991: 38). Thus an organic crisis is a crisis of hegemony (Forgacs 2000: 218). The previously hegemonic social group is challenged from below and loses its ability to hold together a cohesive bloc of social alliances (Forgacs 2000: 427). As a consequence, a struggle aiming at establishing a new balance of social forces will erupt leading to a reshaping of institutions as well as the formation of new ideologies (Simon 1991: 39). In such a situation, formerly subordinate social forces have an opportunity to build up a broad movement challenging the existing order. They will try to shift the previous balance of forces in their favour and establish their counter-hegemony. Former hegemonic social forces however will strive to build a new system of alliances which will re-establish their hegemony (Simon 1991: 39).

Gramsci refers to the formerly ruling forces as traditional or conservative forces. In contrast, forces striving to change the existing order are labelled as progressive (Forgacs 2000: 218-221).

A common outcome of an organic crisis is that traditional ruling forces manage to re-establish a new hegemony under their leadership (Forgacs 2000: 218). For previously hegemonic forces are much quicker in reorganizing themselves than rival subordinate forces. They may make sacrifices to slightly adjust to the new situation by reshuffling their personnel from their pool of numerous trained cadres and by adapting their programmes. To reconstitute their hegemony, former ruling forces might also resort to a strategy which Gramsci calls *transformism*. It implies co-opting of (potential) leaders of subaltern forces, either individuals or even the absorption of entire groups (Cox 1983: 166; Forgacs 2000: 430).

Cox (1983: 166-67) points out that transformism is not restricted to human beings, but might as well be applied to ideas. Thus, transformism can also be used as a strategy to assimilate and domesticate potentially "challenging" ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition. This obstructs the formation of organized opposition to the existing order (Cox 1983: 167).

In a nutshell, in an organic crisis former ruling forces have an edge over subordinate forces which allow them to reabsorb the power slipping from their grasp (Forgacs 2000: 218). An organic crisis can therefore result in an historic situation in which a new political formation comes to power through changes mainly arranged by former hegemonic forces (from above) without leading to a fundamental reordering of social relations. Forgacs (2000: 428) describes such a situation as a *passive revolution* in Gramscian terms.

However, other scholars interpret Gramsci's concept of a passive revolution differently. This inconsistent understanding of Gramsci's concept might follow from the fact that he applies it to different historical situations. First, Gramsci uses it to describe the *Risorgimento*, an historical epoch during which the Italian bourgeoisie achieved power without relying on the masses (from below), similar to the French Revolution. Gramsci then extends his concept of the passive revolution to other liberal movements of the post-1815 restoration. Eventually he also includes fascism, which modernized the economy "from above" by penetrating the political power of the laissez-faire bourgeoisie and the organized working class in Italy (Forgacs 2000: 428).

In contrast to Forgacs, Simon (1991: 26), therefore, defines a passive revolution as “relatively far-reaching modifications […] to a county’s social and economic structure from above, through the agency of the state, and without relying on the active participation of the people.” The tenor of academics regarding the interpretation of Gramsci’s concept of the passive revolution seems to be, that it evolves around the introduction of changes – to whatever degree – by ruling coalitions, rather than these changes being driven by popular masses. Thus a passive revolution is also described as a “revolution from above” (Simon 1991: 25; Cox 1983: 166).

Coming back to the possible outcomes of an organic crisis, there is a third potential option besides the successful establishment of a counter-hegemony or the re-creation of hegemony under the leadership of the previous hegemonic forces. According to Gramsci (Forgacs 2000: 270), a dialectic of revolution-restoration can occur, resulting in a situation where neither the new nor the old forces can triumph. None is capable of establishing a new hegemony. The opposing forces balance each other in such a way that a continuation of the conflict can only end in their mutual destruction. In the wake of such a stalemate a third force might intervene – Robert W. Cox (1983: 166) speaks about a “strong man” – subjugating what is left of the conflicting forces (Forgacs 2000: 269). Gramsci calls this *Caesarism*. He distinguishes between progressive and reactionary forms of Caesarism. Reactionary Caesarism describes a situation in which the intervening force supports the regressive – former hegemonic – forces to triumph (Forgacs 2000: 270), whereas progressive Caesarism refers to the third force aiding the progressive force – previously subordinated groups – to succeed (Forgacs 2000: 269).

The various concepts and thoughts Gramsci recorded in his *Prison Notebooks* relate to state formation and change of forms of states and do not represent a coherent or fine-tuned theory of state. However, Gramsci’s work does provide a very valuable basis for developing a theoretical framework aimed at understanding different forms of states even today and how these have, and might change, over time. The next section aims at developing an analytical framework from a Gramscian perspective which can assist in engaging with particularities of states in Sub-Saharan Africa today and their opportunities for change.

2.1.3 A political settlement approach – a derivation from Gramsci's thought

A critical political economy (CPE), or a Gramscian inspired approach, is not new to debates about statebuilding. However, few scholars explicitly draw on Gramsci's thoughts. In the emergent literature on statebuilding from a CPE perspective, the concept of political settlement is given a prominent place. Mushtaq Khan (1995) developed this concept in the academic area of development economics and has shaped the concept of political settlement as it tends to be referred to in today's policy discourse on statebuilding. It resembles strongly Gramsci's concept of the historic bloc. Leading scholars, practitioners and institutions in the fields of development and peace and conflict studies, i.e., Fritz and Menocal (2007), Whaites (2008), Barnes (2009), DFID (2009, 2010), Di John and Putzel (2009), Parks and Cole (2010), Brown and Grävingholt (2011), advance Khan's concept of political settlement and redefine it for the statebuilding discourse. While there remains conceptual ambiguity as to what constitute political settlements, most authors share the viewpoint that relations of power within a state are crucial because they shape the character and performance of formal state institutions. Moreover, all draw attention to the fact that state-society relations matter. Despite acknowledging this fact, most authors tend to conceptualize political settlements as the product of negotiations or rather bargains between elites (see Whaites (2008), Di John and Putzel (2009) DFID (2009; 2010) Parks and Cole (2010), Gleason et al. (2011), Sharan (2011)). Thus, they focus primarily on horizontal quarrels between elite factions. Also David Hulme (2015) critiques that today's political settlement analysis tends to be elite-centered and lacks integration of civil society conceptually. With current political settlement analysis tilting to neglect vertical struggles, which are decisive for linking elites to the wider society, these current political settlement approaches stand in stark contrast to Gramsci's emphasized concept of an integral state.

The next sections will sketch out a rough analytical framework closely based on Gramsci's thought which aims to address this shortcoming. Despite its proximity to Gramsci's work, the presented framework will incorporate phrasings used by more recent CPE approaches to statebuilding. It will suggest a definition of political settlement; address which aspects to look into while analysing a particular settlement and present thoughts on how a settlement might change – or not. Since the

main objective of this thesis rests on analysing social change in Ghana, the question when to speak of a new political settlement also will be addressed.

What is a political settlement?

This thesis conceptualises political settlement as the distribution of power in a society between contending social groups and to what extent it is embedded in formal and informal institutional arrangements of the state. Khan (2010: 4) in contrast defines a political settlement as:

> **a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability.**

Hence for Khan a political settlement only exists once a balance has been achieved between the distribution of power in society and the distribution of economic benefits upheld through state institutions. My definition deviates from Khan's in that it does not require a balance between the power in society and the power emanating from state institutions. Rather several constellations are possible within a political settlement: matching, not matching, partly matching/adapting to changes. A political settlement with a mutually compatible combination of power and institutions is likely to be more stable, but not decisive for constellations of power to exist. In Gramscian terminology, a stable political settlement is synonymous with an historic bloc.

The constellation of power within society embedded in its formal and informal institutions of a state characterizes the form of a state. This in turn is decisive for how this particular state is working. Political settlements evolve through historical, ongoing political processes in which elite factions – Khan (2010) and Whitfield (2011) refer to them as higher-level factions – compete for political power to guarantee an acceptable distribution of economic benefits for themselves. The term 'faction' is in this thesis understood as a social group or sub-group formed along politicized societal cleavages. These societal fissures have been engendered by country specific historical social dynamics and in the African context form along, for example, ethnic, religious and/or socio-economic lines. The horizontal quarrel between higher-level factions is however just one aspect of this process. The vertical relations between higher-level factions and their support bases amongst ordinary citizens – lower-level factions (see Khan (2010) and Whitfield (2011)) – is another important aspect shaping a political settlement.

According to Whaites (2008: 4), elites can rarely take their constituencies for granted. Thus higher-level factions compete for political power to gain access to resources for themselves *and* their support base amongst the lower-level factions. To highlight the importance of state-society relations, the development literature refers to a "two-level game" (Parks and Cole 2010: viii; Whaites 2008: 4).

Following Khan (2010), I will define distribution of power as "the relative holding power of different social groups and organizations contesting the distribution of resources". Holding power is partly based on income and wealth – or as Gramsci would phrase it, the economic role of groups in society and their material capabilities –, but also on historically rooted capacities of different groups to organize and mobilize individuals in society (Khan 2010). Hereby social groups' capacity to disseminate ideas in society, and ensure that other social factions embrace them, plays a crucial role. This reflects Gramsci's concept of forging hegemony – an historic bloc – based on coercion and consent consisting of higher and lower level factions (see section 2.1.2). It is perpetuated by the critical masses' contentment with distribution of resources based on the existing power relations in the political, economic and cultural sphere.

It is crucial to point out that different ruling coalitions can reign within the same political settlement or even historic bloc. In the case of Ghana, "hegemonic elites" are made up of different higher-level factions holding up together one historic bloc. In the subsequent sections, I will therefore use the term "ruling coalition" to conceptualise competing higher-level factions who represent key actors forging the same historic bloc. A change of the ruling coalition as embodied by another political party coming to power through an election should not be equated with a crisis of, or decline of, hegemony.

Another key aspect which needs to be included in an analysis of Ghana's political settlement is the global level. Gramsci does not identify the global level as a crucial dimension in his writings on state trans- and formation. This is probably the case since Italy, the state Gramsci primarily focused on, had a completely different position in the international system than Ghana. Furthermore, globalization has taken on a different magnitude since Gramsci's era.

Robert Cox applies Gramsci's ideas on hegemony to the global level in the 1980s. He argues that power constellations of social forces at the national level can transcend the level of the state (Cox and Sinclair 1996: 137). By exceeding

the national level, these constellations can form hegemonies at the global level. Thereby national power constellations are impacting on power relations within the global arena (ibid; Morton 2003: 160).

With regards to different forms of states in today's globalized world, it seems apt to pick up on Cox's approach and to turn it upside down, and to take external influences on political settlements into account (see Cox 1983: 171). Thus, the analysis presented in this thesis looks also at how external actors and global structures have impacted on Ghana's internal constellation of powers. Again, it appears adequate to give attention to the question as to how far external actors and global structures have been impacting on material capabilities as well as the dominance of ideas and norms within Ghanaian society and state. Based on Gramsci's work and his emphasis on the interplay between actors, institutions and ideas at different levels, the analytical framework guiding the analysis of Ghana's political settlement will orient itself on the rough categories outlined in the figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Gramscian inspired reference points for the analysis of a political settlement



How do settlements change – or not?

Given the fact that this thesis aims at analysing social change in Ghana through a political settlement framework, the question arises "How do settlements alter?". Based on the definition laid out above, a settlement changes, if relations

of power within society change. This could occur in different dimensions: (1) the relationship between higher-level factions can change, (2) between higher-level and lower-level factions and (3) amongst lower-level factions. So a toehold is to focus on the context specific, dominant social groups at these different levels. The prime question is when does an historic bloc lose its capability to hold together its cohesive cross-higher-level faction and societal alliances?

According to Gramsci, the hegemony of ruling forces is at risk or likely to disintegrate if higher-level factions do not live up to the economic and/or ideological expectations of those lower-level factions building the elite's support base in civil society (Forgacs 2000: 218). Certain lower-level factions previously propping up the ruling forces might break away and realign with other forces in civil society. Going a step further, it is also possible that the entirety of lower-level factions building the ruling coalition's support base revoke their backing for the higher-level factions. Discontent might be expressed through non-compliance with rules at different levels of intensity, organization of strikes, blockage of the implementation of particular policies and, in some cases, violence can be the consequence (Khan 2010: 31-32) (see section 3.3.2 for the case of Ghana).

Another scenario Gramsci envisions is that formerly subordinate groups might succeed in organizing a significant coalition in civil society challenging the position of hegemonic elites (Forgacs 2000: 218). This might be the case when formerly subordinate groups become economically more important or evolve as a stronger ideological force within civil society. In a situation where hegemonic elites are challenged in their position from below, they are likely to slightly adjust to the new situation. Challenged hegemonic elites will try to co-opt leaders of subaltern forces. By including leaders of lower-level factions previously excluded from the hegemonic elite, they will try to absorb entire groups to conserve their hegemonic position (see section 3.3.3 for the case of Ghana).

As Cox (1983: 166-67) has pointed out, hegemonic forces can also simply co-opt the ideas brought forward by social groups gaining strength, in order to maintain their position (Gramsci's concept of transformism). Either way, these situations are likely to result in a new political formation coming to power – possibly more inclusive higher and lower-level factions – without necessarily resulting in fundamental changes of the political order and its workings.

Besides challenges from the lower-level factions, there also might evolve discontent or changes of power amongst and within higher-level factions (see section 3.3.3 for the case of Ghana). The recent literature on statebuilding from a critical political economy perspective takes this into account by putting inter-elite and intra-elite quarrels at the centre of discussions on political settlements (Laws 2012: 8-11). Disaffection of powerful higher-level factions with the current settlement could manifest itself in attempts to push for institutional change aiming at redistributing power and benefits. Strong groups could strive for legal attempts to reverse institutions (Khan 2010: 31), or also resort to violence. If lower-level factions are very weak in relative terms to higher-level factions, changes to a country's social and economic structure can be driven largely by elites (see chapter 6 for the case of Ghana). Hence change can be imposed from above (Gramsci's concept of passive revolution) and not only generated, demanded or supported from below.

Gramsci also mentions the constellation in which neither old nor new forces – originating from above or below – manage to become dominant. In such a stalemate a "big man" might intervene, subjugating what is left of the conflicting forces (Caesarism) and supporting either the former hegemonic forces or the newly-risen ones to prevail eventually (see section 3.4 for the case of Ghana). The specific case study of Ghana presented throughout the subsequent chapters will demonstrate how different elements of the scenarios described above can feature simultaneously and consecutively in a given society.

When to speak of a new political settlement?

Closely linked to the question how a political settlement changes is the question "How to identify a new political settlement from a previous one?" and hence identify structural change. Relations of power are subject to constant change. Therefore every analysis of a settlement will be limited to a snapshot of a current constellation of power relations. The potential fluidity of settlements makes it difficult to determine their end or beginning. To tackle this issue, Laws (2012: 24) suggests drawing on formal institutional arrangements and particular events such as peace agreements, elite pacts and constitutional change. While all of these certainly point to possible changes in a political settlement, not each transfer of government within a given political system represents necessarily the beginning of a new settlement. As Whaites (2008: 7) points out, changes of

government can also be a reshuffling of elites where structures and rules of power remain the same. Thus, the question when to speak of a new political settlement comes down to “To what degree power relations have to change and in which domain?”.

Following Gramsci’s concept of an ‘integral state’, relations of power can change amongst higher-level factions, between higher-level and lower-level factions, as well as amongst lower-level factions. Eventually any change of power constellation will be reflected in formal and informal institutions of the state and their inherent distribution of resources and benefits to different social factions. Based on this interlinkage between actors and institutions one might roughly think of three different possible scenarios: (1) distribution of power in society matches the power embedded in institutions of the state; (2) distribution of power in society diverges severely from the distributional benefits allocated by institutions and (3) distribution of power in society differs slightly from those embedded in institutions of the state, but political society is in the process of adapting to these changes.

Case one represents a political settlement as envisioned by Khan in which a balance between forces in civil society and political society has been achieved and these are mutually reinforcing each other through their content with the institutions and their embedded distributive effects. This scenario describes a rather stable constellation of power relations or as Gramsci would say an historic bloc. Yet, the question is how can such a settlement remain sustainable over time if power dynamics are subject to constant flux? Building upon the theoretical concepts outlined so far, a political settlement seems likely to be sustainable, if the following different aspects apply:

- higher-level factions bargain over and agreement on, as well as acceptance of institutions reflecting given power constellation – homegrown horizontal pact rather than externally prescribed institutions. Higher-level factions’ bargain is thereby not purely understood as formal negotiations, but includes as well the informal ongoing quarrel to change formal institutions (e.g., the electoral framework in the case of Ghana; see chapter 4 and 6);
- higher-level factions have support of their followers based on fulfilling their expectations (vertical pact in economic and ideological terms/responsiveness as characteristic of state-society relations) (e.g., the provision of a minimum of macroeconomic stability in the case of Ghana; see chapter 6);

– horizontal and vertical pact must be economically and ideologically viable over time;
– political settlement needs to be adaptable, meaning institutions are malleable. They adjust or rather are altered according to changed power relations in society through constant higher-level factions' bargain/continuous informal quarrel.

By addressing the characteristic of adaptability of a sustainable settlement, it becomes evident that each long-term viable settlement will go through phases of slight transitions (scenario 3). At the same time a settlement is not infinitely malleable, so that eventually a new settlement will occur.

I believe it is important to emphasize and to acknowledge also accumulated incremental changes within a state. Therefore I will speak about a new settlement when a series of smaller and/or larger changes in the constellation of power in both spheres – political society and civil society – have taken place which are going in a similar direction. However, these changes might not be so severe that they transform the political order, the form of the state, and thereby revolutionize its workings (see figure 2.2). A new political settlement can suggest changes within the system or it can imply a transformation of the system. Obviously, any boundary one might draw in this context is more or less vague and contestable. Conceptualizing a political settlement as relations of power which are subject to constant change makes this inevitable. The breakdown of a settlement seems slightly easier to identify than determining the starting point of a new one. Hence the first Ghana-specific chapter of this thesis not only sets the vital historic context for the analysis, but also narrates the organic crisis and collapse of Ghana's (old) post-independence settlement.

Figure 2.2 Change within and of a form of state



2.2 Contextualization: African states' historical trajectories

Resulting from the choice of a critical theory approach, I share the view that the world does not radically reinvent itself, but rather evolves. A polity or society is not born on an entirely clean slate because there is no absolute revolution eradicating all that has been before. Ideas, institutions and relationships be-tween actors survive and adapt from one era to another. Following Gramsci, I ascribe historically grown structures great importance and believe that a scholar who wishes to understand the present must know something about the past. The second section of this chapter is therefore devoted to sketching out the broader historical context of state formation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thereby it contextualises the above outlined analytical framework of political settlement as well as the subsequent case study of the Ghanaian state. What follows does neither aim at providing a brief outline of African history, nor a critical summary of the state of the art of the academic discourse on the "African state". Given the variation and complexity of African states and societies, the following section simply aspires to extract relevant themes and patterns of African history that help to understand the development of salient social cleavages and dynamics of state formation and their repercussions on statebuilding processes in Africa today.

2.2.1 Structures and institutions

Many contemporary challenges of statebuilding in Africa stem from changes associated with the establishment of colonial rule (Iliffe 2007: 267). As far-reaching as colonial legacies are, socioenvironmental structures, institutions, ideas and dominant groups of actors, which have evolved over millennia of pre-colonial African history, influenced the colonial experience and continue to be a powerful force shaping postcolonial African states (Reid 2012: 297; Iliffe 2007: 267; Herbst 2000: 28-29).

Prior to European colonization, Africa had an extensive history of precolonial polity formation (Iliffe 2007: 71-82). Historians and anthropologists demonstrate the vast variety and complexity of precolonial African political systems and challenge the notion that political complexity only exists in hierarchical, centralized polities (see McIntosh 1999). Despite significant diversity of precolonial African polities, scholars tend to distinguish broadly between two types of precolonial political organization: (1) so called decentralized, amorphous, segmented or "stateless" political systems; and (2) centralized polities (Reid 2012: 25; Iliffe 2007: 71-82).

Low population densities combined with the production of relatively small economic surpluses, led to the fact that during most of Africa's precolonial history a significant portion of African people lived in social formations based on lineage (kinship) with no single centre of power (Shumway 2013; Iliffe 2007: 71). Rather, decentralized precolonial political systems were characterized by diffuse and multicentric power structures. Examples of such precolonial polities are the one of the Igbo people, who live in today's Southeast Nigeria (Reid 2012: 25; Mamdani 1996: 41), or the precolonial Bunyoro-Kitara polity based in today's Western Uganda (Robertshaw 1999: 124). Africa's heterarchical precolonial political structures indicate pathways to political organisation, in which overlapping and decentralized political institutions are integrated by forms of corporate power that withstand, or at least curb, the evolution of social hierarchy (Monroe 2013: 20; Crumley 1995). Many of these polities were characterized by independent village governments led by groups of elders (Davidson 1994: 70). The strength of kinship (family-ties), combined with a shared language and beliefs that bound people to their rulers – or to their ancestral shrines and spirits – as well as age-grades, served as "cement" uniting a community's numerous

families or family-groups into one polity (ibid). Shared ritual practice and symbolism – which scholars label as “creative power” – were vital elements for fostering and maintaining social cohesion within segmented political systems (see Monroe 2013: 20; Maret 2012: 315-318).

At the same time, the continent was also home to centralized precolonial political systems like the kingdoms of the Asante (parts of today’s Ghana), Luba (today’s Southern Democratic Republic of Congo) and Great Zimbabwe (de Maret 2012: 316). Some heterarchical polities evolved over time into more centralized political organizations such as the Zulu state (Reid 2012: 65-71). Long-distance and transcontinental trade enabled Africans in some cases to recast segmented polities into hierarchical (militaristic) empires (Iliffe 2007: 188). Also the adoption of Christianity and Islam – which provided a unifying religious ideology, e.g., for the empire of Aksum (situated in today’s Ethiopia) or the kingdoms of Mali and Songhay – triggered occasionally a reconfiguration of precolonial polities (see Monroe 2013: 23-27).

While external influence introduced new forces to the process of state formation in Africa, these did not supersede the old. Rather they interacted, collided, and sometimes coalesced with the old forces into a new political order (Iliffe 2007: 189). The incorporation of ideas and resources acquired through transcontinental trade into African elites’ indigenous political strategies was a vital, but not the only, path towards centralized African polities (Monroe 2013: 20). There are undeniably autochthonous origins of centralised polities across the continent (Monroe 2013: 17). The vast amount of diverse socio-political and environmental circumstances gave birth to different state forms in Africa. These differed not only amongst each other, but also immensely from their European counterparts at the time.

Today’s notion of the concept of the state is strongly linked with control of territory (Herbst 2000: 36). From a European historical perspective, this emphasis is unsurprising. In the 15th century, population density began to increase significantly in Europe. As a result, land became scarce and European nations began to fight for it (Herbst 2000: 15). The continuous aggressive competition for territory compelled leaders to maintain a secure area – the political core (cities) – plus a fortified buffer zone (rural areas), which would in case of loss, help to protect the centre. Through establishing direct rule in the buffer zones, Euro-

pean leaders were capable of securing, but also of expanding, the borders of their states. This approach not only helped to protect the state from its external competitors, but contributed at the same time to the internal consolidation of an hegemonic state (Herbst 2000: 14). The increase of population density altered the European political geography and made it crucial for the core political areas to physically control their hinterland. Successful European statebuilding was accordingly characterized by far-reaching links between the cities and their surrounding rural territories (ibid.). This Eurocentric conceptualization of the state as a centralized, hierarchical bureaucracy tends to dominate the current discourse on statebuilding processes and related policy debates.

In contrast, land was plentiful in pre-colonial Africa and compared to Europe, China or Japan the continent was sparsely populated (Iliffe 2007: 1-2 and 71; Herbst 2000: 37). Consequently, territorial competition was not a main concern. In addition to the abundance of land, African farmers mainly relied on rain-fed agriculture for cultivation rather than irrigation systems (Iliffe 2007: 1). Thus, they hardly invested in any specific piece of farmland (Herbst 2000: 38). The combination of large amounts of open land and rain-fed agriculture meant that control of territory was often uncontested because it was easier and cheaper to flee from rulers than to fight them (Herbst 2000: 39; Iliffe 2007: 71; Clapham 1999: 29). Africa's divergent political geography had a significant impact on the formation of its pre-colonial polities (Herbst 2000: 57). Rather than broadcasting power from the core to the hinterland, power was perceived as a series of concentric circles radiating out from the core (Herbst 2000: 45; Clapham 1999: 29). Emphasis was placed on the political centre and physical control tended to diminish over distance (Herbst 2000: 56; Iliffe 2007: 72). Permanent, precisely defined boundaries were therefore rare for precolonial African polities and constant movement in terms of population resettlement was common practice.

Opposing political geographies have resulted in different state forms in Africa and Europe. A Eurocentric conceptualization of the state tends to ignore the diverse array of political contours of precolonial African polities (Monroe 2013: 21; Davidson 1994: 69). It fails to acknowledge that precolonial African elites drove the process of state formation by adapting to and manoeuvring divergent socio-environmental conditions (Monroe 2013: 20). They resorted to various modes of power which shaped the form of their polities (Monroe 2013: 17). The Eurocentric

conceptualisation of the state which is shaping the model of statebuilding policies today, misses implied repercussions vital for understanding processes of statebuilding in contemporary Africa (see also Herbst 2000).

2.2.2 Norms and ideas

Because our emphasis on agency was to the exclusion of institutions, we failed to historicize agency, to understand the extent to which colonial institutions did shape the agency of the colonized
Mamdani, Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism

From precolonial to colonial times there was no fundamental break in the way power was exercised on the African continent (Herbst 2000: 61). Colonial rulers faced the same political geography as African rulers had centuries before (Iliffe 2007: 193; Herbst 2000: 29-30). However, the colonialists' strategy to rule in and over the African continent engendered long-lasting identities which shaped and amplified social cleavages in Africa (Reid 2012: 218-221).

After the slow European intrusion into Africa during the 19th century, European powers had partitioned the continent into demarcated territorial spheres of interests by the early 1900s (Davidson 1994: 5). Driven by expectations to gain long-term advantages from acquired colonies, European powers strove to establish territorial hegemony within the political units they had created through fixed and arbitrary frontiers (Reid 2012: 117; Iliffe 2007: 203). Because Europeans focused on maximizing their own benefits, colonial administration was established as cost-effectively as possible. The resulting modes of colonial governance differed considerably across the continent (see Reid 2012). Yet, with a comparatively small physical presence on the continent and faced with the task to exert authority over vast, inhospitable territories marked by low population density, colonial officials could not avoid relying on African agents (Iliffe 2007: 205).

The British established "indirect rule" as the mode of colonial governance, which relied on chiefs as vital pillars of the administrative structure. But not only British colonial states' needed fixed, delineated identities for administrative purposes. Hence, colonial powers strove to develop "tribes" as rigid categories for Africans (Reid 2012: 219; Davidson 1994: 70). Often, such tribal identities became formalized, e.g., by attributing peoples' particular characteristics and grouping them to live in territorially demarcated areas (Reid 2012: 219). This created – while far from being entirely identical – a strong overlap of regional settlements and ethnic identity in postcolonial states.

Many invented tribal identities – Akan, Fulani or Yoruba – were extensions of groupings which had their roots in the precolonial past (ibid.). From the early 1900s, the Akan of the Gold Coast was an opportune meta-ethnicity. It consisted of several precolonial peoples – amongst them Asante, Akyem, Fante – whose members would not have recognized the denotation "Akan" just a few decades earlier (Reid 2012: 220). Also the Fulani had been (re)invented as a tribe in the early 20th century. Colonial powers defined the "Fulani tribe" to span various smaller amorphous and highly fluid identity groups, scattered across the West African Savannah, who had never perceived themselves as one community sharing a polity (ibid.). Missionaries who reduced numerous dialects into fewer written languages, each of which allegedly defining a tribe, were also influential in (re)forming identities (Iliffe 2007: 239). Thus, people "became" Yoruba or Ewe through shared language (Reid 2012: 220). By combining communities to a few tribes under invented paramount chiefs – examples are the Igbo (today's Eastern Nigeria) and Nyakyusa people (today's Southern Tanzania and Northern Malawi) (see Davidson 1994: 70-71) – through which colonial powers sought to govern, colonialism lastingly invented or re-shaped African ethnic identities (Reid 2012: 218). However, in this process African agency was crucial as well.

Indigenous elites saw the advantages of adopting the tribal idea because they could use the larger group identity as a means of gaining access to resources and political power within colonial systems (Reid 2012: 219). As a result, Africans formed tribes to belong and constructed identities which could be shared within defined groups (Iliffe 1979: 324). The colonial policy of (re)inventing chiefs as well as Africans' adaptive response manipulated and transformed the political institution of 'traditional' authority (Herbst 2000: 91). In addition, ethnic identities which had been fluid and pragmatic in precolonial times had become rigid and codified (Reid 2012: 221). Africans' diverse precolonial identities had blended into each other. For people speaking the same language might belong to different chiefdoms, while one chiefdom might span people speaking several languages. These highly complex social orders were simplified by recurrently stressing one identity over others depending on the context (Reid 2012: 218; Iliffe 2007: 239). The stiffening of ethnic identities combined with colonial divide and rule tactics significantly strengthened Africans' political group consciousness along (re)invented ethnic lines.

In Rwanda, colonial powers had bolstered a perceived socioeconomic and political dominance of the minority Tutsi over the majority Hutu by establishing a hierarchical Tutsi monarchy to administer the Hutu (Reid 2012: 221; Iliffe 2007: 208.). The fostering of power imbalances and socioeconomic stratification between (re)invented ethnic groups, intensified political rivalry which has shaped lastingly postcolonial politicized societal cleavages in Africa. Yet, (re)devised ethnic identities were not the only way colonial rule had impacted deeply on the continent's social fabric.

Primarily concerned with extracting natural resources for home based industries and agricultural goods, which could not be acquired within Europe, colonial rule also deeply impacted the economic structures of the African continent (Reid 2012: 194; Iliffe 2007: 209). In fact, the economic dimension of colonial systems was another instrument of social reorganization (Davidson 1994: 27). European industries were craving agricultural raw materials such as cotton, cocoa and coffee, as well as natural resources like copper, gold and manganese (DeLancey 2007: 112). As a result, mines were established in resource rich colonial territories, mainly based in Central and Southern Africa (DeLancey 2007: 112), while African farmers or white settlers were encouraged by colonial powers to produce cash crops for exports (Reid 2012: 196). Pushing for the specialization in one or a few products led to the development of African mono-crop and mono-mineral economies. This structure implied the legacy for post-colonial African states' revenue to depend heavily on export revenues which were highly vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity prices. Many traditional subsistence farmers in West Africa switched to producing key export crops (Gordon 2007: 61). In parts of Kenya, Tanganyika (today's Tanzania) and Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe, colonial authorities supported European settlers in expropriating fertile land from African farmers to set up plantations for the production of agricultural exports (Gordon 2007: 61-62; Davidson 1994: 16; Reid 2012: 200). The demand for labour in mines and on plantations was met by colonies which had few easily exploitable natural resources or limited potential for commercial agriculture. Therefore, colonies such as Malawi, Mozambique and Burkina Faso became reservoirs of labour "migrants" (Gordon 2007: 61).

Initially colonial rulers forced Africans to work in mines and on plantations by using chiefs, appointed headmen or the colonial police to round up people

and bring them to work (Davidson 1994: 16). After the First World War, however, African men were pressured into working for European entrepreneurs by introducing taxation (Iliffe 2007: 225; Davidson 1994: 17). Faced with the obligation to pay taxes in money, which could only be acquired by working for wages, plenty of young African men left home and migrated across borders to work in the mines run by foreign companies or on coastal plantations (DeLancey 2007: 112). Thereby African independent producers were turned into wage-workers (Davidson 1994: 27). They formed a new social group that had never existed before on such scale on the continent (Davidson 1994: 29).

Most African migrant workers had land rights at home and were therefore not proletarians forming an integrated class as the working class which had developed in Europe (Iliffe 2007: 225). As migrants, they had one foot in the wage-work of the mines or plantations, but another foot in their village to which colonial governments encouraged them to periodically return (Iliffe 2007: 225-26; Davidson 1994: 29). Over time, short-term contracts gave way to longer-term ones strengthening not only the development of an exploitative regional economy forming a distinct part of the global trade system, but also set the basis of an urban settled African labour force (Reid 2012: 203 and 226). Steered by colonial powers' economic interests, job opportunities attracted rural dwellers and led to the steady growth of towns and cities across the continent, such as Johannesburg which was built on gold (Reid 2012: 226; Iliffe 2007: 226). In fact, Reid (ibid.) considers the rural-urban migration as perhaps "the single most important theme in Africa's modern social history."

The focus on commercial agriculture created – especially in territories with few Europeans such as in West Africa – another novel social group (Davidson 1994: 29; Rhodie 1968: 105). While a majority of Africans farmed their own land with family labour producing for home consumption and the domestic market, a minority of Africans was able to employ wage-workers, cultivating primarily for export and reinvesting profits (Reid 2012: 204-05; Iliffe 2007: 223). The colonial socioeconomic environment generated a differentiation among Africans which gave rise to small groups of new economic elites dominating production in, for example, the Gold Coast and Nigeria (Reid 2012: 205). Concerned that the evolving new economic elite might develop too much market strength, Europeans were generally hostile to increasingly wealthy and powerful African entre-

preneurs. Moreover, colonial powers were wary that this new group of actors might increasingly dabble in politics because they were progressively in a position to challenge the existing colonial system (ibid.). Colonial rulers strove to curtail the influence of this new social group by emphasizing the instrumental role of “traditional” leaders in colonial power structures (Iliffe 2007: 240).

Indirect-rule colonialism impacted deeply on the power relations between traditional leaders and their citizens. By reorganizing traditional authority on the basis of a fusion of power (merging legislative, executive and judiciary power), colonial rulers dissolved the mechanisms and social structures that had provided the basis for a balance of precolonial power relationships between ruled and rulers (Mamdani 1994: 41-49). Making chiefs accountable to the colonial state, rather than to their people, laid the basis of what Mamdani (1994: 43) has coined “decentralized despotism”. Moreover, colonial rule had created a segregation based on indirect rule in the rural areas and direct rule in urban centres. This “bifurcated state” (Mamdani 1994: 18) was not only characterized by “two forms of power (rural decentralised despotism versus urban centralised despotism) under a single hegemonic authority”, but also by a division of spatially defined rights turning urbanites into citizens with expansive rights and rural dwellers into subjects with fewer granted rights and extensive obligations (see Mamdani 1994).

These colonial structures and the introduction of capitalism into the countryside planted the seed of further social cleavages: One emerged between new elites and ‘traditional’ rulers, as the former gradually rejected the authority of the latter and challenged chiefs’ symbiotic relationship with colonial rulers. Another evolved between farmers and chiefs (Reid 2012: 205; Mamdani 1994: 19), who were less and less capable of reconciling their group-based interests (Reid 2012: 228). High rents charged by a chiefly class of absentee landlords fuelled, for example, economic grievances of cotton farmers in Uganda and strengthened politicized farmer consciousness (ibid.; Iliffe 2007: 240). In addition, chiefs, whose position of power depended on colonial rulers, were perceived by rural producers to uphold commercial oligopolies controlled by expatriates who dictated product prices and excluded local producers from the marketing of exports (ibid.; for the case of Ghana see Rhodie 1968: 115-16).

Another layer of social differentiation in African societies was produced by the colonialists’ need for trained African subordinates sustaining colonial admin-

istration (Iliffe 2007: 229-230). For that purpose, a few elitist secondary high schools were established in several colonies such as “Achimota” in the Gold Coast, the “Alliance High School” in Kenya and the “Ecole William Ponty” near Dakar (Iliffe 2007: 230). The elitist nature of colonial education produced further divisions within African societies (Reid 2012: 209). In fact, Foster (1965) argues that British policy in the Gold Coast was counting on education’s homogenizing function for it had promoted the enrolment of the sons of chiefs in the hope of co-opting them to the colonial ruler’s side (Svanikier 2007: 120). Yet, the British had failed to realize that the “Akan” matrilineal system of inher-itance barred sons of chiefs from the assumption of office (ibid.). Besides West-ern-style education had not only a homogenizing function and sympathising effect on Africa’s younger generation.

A few Africans graduated from universities abroad, mainly in the US and in Europe (Iliffe 2007: 230). It was largely amongst them, that Western-style education sowed the seed of political discontent (Reid 2012: 209), leading to a rising African self-awareness. A younger intellectual elite developed, who challenged the notion of colonial rule and began to spread the ideas of African nationalism and led the anti-colonial liberation struggle. Many young intellectuals, who began to form a ‘modern’ political elite were striving to build alliances with traditional rulers to defend and advance their homelands (Iliffe 2007: 240). However, alarmed by nationalist movements and anxious to prevent urban politicians from mobilizing rural support, colonial rulers stressed the role of chiefs in the colonial systems pitting them against the emerging younger, modern elites (Iliffe 2007: 240-41). In the case of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, an Achimota graduate, managed to forge a comprehensive social alliance to oust the British. In fact younger, discontented unemployed, which were products of the expansion of Western style education during colonial rule, became a significant force in the nationalist struggle (Svanikier 2007: 123).

Hence, Western-style education was transforming African politics (Iliffe 2007: 237). For it provided a key dynamic of social change not only as a reservoir of skilled workers, but also as a differentiating agent. The resulting social stratification introduced new politicized social cleavages and socio-political conflict (Iliffe 2007: 229).

This section has briefly highlighted some broader trends regarding how colonialism has reshaped and created new forms of identity on the African continent through its mode of governance (ethnicity; urban/rural; old/young), impact on economic structures (labour/capitalist; modern/traditional elite) and establishment of Western-style education (modern elite/traditional elite). The production of social stratification – or group inequalities – has had a lasting impact on the formation of salient social cleavages in postcolonial Africa. Sali-ent lines of social differentiation are relevant for understanding statebuilding processes because today's political parties, interest groups, etc., tend to be organized along the lines of segmental cleavages which may be of religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic nature (Lijphart 1977: 3-4). It is along these political divisions or politicized societal fissures that distributional conflicts and conflicts of interests tend to take place in states and societies.

2.2.3 Actors

The previous two sections present how actors and ideas have shaped institutions; and how institutions and actors have formed norms and ideas relevant for statebuilding processes in the historical context of Africa. In doing so key social protagonists – in the broadest sense and in a narrow one – have already been introduced. The last section furthermore outlines how the creation and reforming of identities (ideas and norms) through actors and institutions has led to the formation of new social groups (actors). Hence, it has been sketched out how institutions, ideas and actors have a reciprocal moulding impact on each other. While state formation processes are driven by power struggles within societies (Boone 1998: 139), this section highlights how ideas and structures emanating from the global level have influenced African actors' position of power within their respective societies and statebuilding processes in postcolonial Africa.

Ideas of nationalism and self-rule had taken shape among African elites long before the end of the Second World War (Davidson 1994: 74). Yet, the struggles for independence were spurred by the weakening of the main colonial powers as a result of World War II and by the rising influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. Both had taken an anti-imperial stance and had an interest in the demise of old colonial empires (Reid 2012: 251-258; Davidson 1994: 66 and 80). The promise of the Atlantic Charter of self-determination for all nations eroded European imperialism and fuelled African elites' anti-colonial

struggle. New, young elites – some of whom had been schooled at higher education institutions in Europe and the US – had recognized and capitalized on the changed situation. They played leading parts in forming new political organisations pushing for independence through mass politics. Eventually, the new global power structures and international norms paved the way for Africa's nationalist leaders to achieve independence, through compromise and conflict, negotiation and violence, occasionally simultaneously (Reid 2012: 249).

The globally dominant idea of sovereign nation states led to the creation of independent African states. Yet, these new internationally recognized states were not characterised by internal cohesion and regime viability (Boone 1998: 129). Africa's post-colonial polities were marked and maintained by juridical rather than empirical statehood (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Clapham 1999: 15), with the latter commonly being conceptualized as a hierarchical, quasi-bureaucratic institution exercising control over most of its territory defined by formal borders (Boone 1998: 130).

For a few decades the post-colonial international order was defined by the fight for political and ideological supremacy between the two new superpowers. The US-Soviet rivalry and the ideological contest between liberalism and Marxism-Leninism broadly split the continent between the two blocs and impacted on Africa in a variety of ways. Despite the US's antipathy to colonialism, the Cold War provided a justification for initiating a neo-colonial era for the European powers portrayed their old empires as a bulwark against the spread of communism (Reid 2012: 321). Perceived as a second front, African states became the location of many "proxy wars" (Reid 2012: 324). Depending on perspective, some African governments fell victim to such superpower rivalry, while others also exploited the array of international patronage for their own purposes. In either case, external powers were neither concerned with the challenges of state and nationbuilding faced by post-colonial African states, nor their empirical statehood at the time. Instead, both blocs were primarily concerned with expanding and maintaining their sphere of influence, even by actively supporting authoritarian regimes which systematically suppressed domestic opposition (Reid 2012: 326). These external interferences in domestic power struggles impacted on internal constellations of power within African societies and on pro-

cesses of African post-colonial state formation because they often suppressed a reconfiguration of domestic power- and state-society relations.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolised the shifts in global power dynamics which changed the international order significantly. With the dwindling power of the Soviet Union, the ideology of socialism, which had shaped political and economic institutions in its adapted form in Africa, lost its significance (Lösch 1990; Metz 1982). During the post-Cold War period, Western powers became more concerned with human rights, political structures and sound economic systems (Reid 2012: 339).

Economic liberalisation has been a conditionality for loans from international financial institutions since the 1950s, but amplified in the 1980s. Since liberalism has ascended as the new hegemonic international paradigm, international aid has been increasingly tied not merely to economic liberalization, but also to democratic reforms. Most recently since 11/9, weak states or states lacking empirical statehood, are perceived and also framed as a security threat. As a result, the promotion of statebuilding based on the Westphalian state model and further defined as liberal democracy and free market economy, has become the remedy for global peace and development (Chandler and Sisk 2013: xx).

Domestic pressure groups within African states seized the moment of this changed international context to challenge prevalent single-party systems and ruling elites in the early 1990s (see Iliffe 2007: 299-309). Widespread severe economic stagnation since the 1970s had caused crises of accumulation in many African states. This impacted significantly on neo-patrimonial rule, a system of personal rule held together by the distribution of economic rents to clients or cronies (Kelsall 2011). The lack of resources was exacerbated by the loss of international patronage which previously had been provided largely by the rivalling superpowers. Hence, both factors undermined incumbent African elites' abilities to use co-optation and coercion, so that African state authority was in many places in dramatic decline. While domestic opposition groups demanded political liberalization to open up political space at home to strengthen their positions of power within their political systems, incumbent elites embraced the re-introduction of multi-party democracy to address their crises of authority and to re-legitimize their rule, both domestically and internationally. Soon multi-party elections that lived up to internationally specified standards were consid-

ered to be a prime indicator for democratization; and in several African states the rebirth of multipartyism marked a change of formal political institutions.

This process was accompanied by the re-emergence of issues and societal cleavages that had characterised multi-partyism shortly after independence (Boone 1998: 135). For the continent's economic and social structures had not transformed enough to make democracy easier to entrench (Iliffe 2007: 301). As the thesis demonstrates, the process of liberalizing economic and political institutions had a significant impact on the constellation of power between different social forces in Ghana. In fact, it had vital repercussions on Ghana's post-colonial state formation process by reconfiguring domestic power- and state-society relations.

2.3 Methodological approach

The following section substantiates the choice to rely on Ghana's 2012 elections as a window to observe the country's current political settlement. Moreover, the concluding part of this chapter outlines in more detail and critically reflects on the applied methods used for data collection and interpretation.

2.3.1 Analysing social change in Ghana through a political settlement framework

By choosing a political settlement approach to analyse social change in Ghana, one main challenge arose: any outline of Ghana's political settlement would be a snapshot of the country's internal power relations at a specific point in time. This seems to be at odds with my research interest in social change understood as a process evolving over a longer period. To reconcile this contrariety, I decided to first address the issue of how to analyse Ghana's current internal constellation of power relations. To do so, I was looking for an entry point which would allow me to more firmly ground the analysis of Ghana's current political settlement and my knowledge about the workings of the Ghanaian state as of today.

Throughout my desk research it became apparent that elections are crucial events in political cycles, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, because they embody the struggle over the allocation of political power and distribution of mostly scarce resources. Since recent election times in Ghana have brought the country's politicized social fissures clearly to light and have made mobilization capabilities of social groups explicit, I decided that Ghana's 2012 general elections

would provide a reasonable starting point for me as a political scientist to grasp current power dynamics in Ghanaian society.

Scrutinizing the electoral framework provided a starting point with regards to which formal institutions to focus on while grasping their inherent distribution of power. To evaluate groups' holding power, it seemed also useful to investigate which groups have been successful in blocking, resisting or delaying political decisions, reform processes and their implementations. Moreover, I explored how these formal institutions assign distributional advantages to elites and their support base in society: Who benefits from the existing formal structure?

Electoral politics in Ghana are also clearly permeated by informal institutions such as political patronage. These need to be taken into account to fully comprehend the distributive benefits of Ghana's institutions, power relationships and the workings of the Ghanaian state (see Bratton 2010: 104) for patronage systems are characterized by mutually beneficial relationships of exchange between unequal actors. They provide a political advantage to the more powerful actor and a material advantage to the less powerful one (van de Walle 2012: 113; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981). Patron-client networks can represent a limited form of political exchange by constituting a selective trickle-down system linking higher-level factions to lower-level ones, or at least factions of it.

The approach of using elections as a window to observe a political settlement however won't be suitable for every society. In Kazakhstan, e.g, election times do not openly uncover social cleavages because the country's cultural sphere is marked by a rather muted and stiff public debate around election time, as I experienced as an OSCE short-term election observer in April 2015. Hence elections do not per se bring to light existing subliminal, simmering politicized social fissures. Rather this is highly context-dependent. With Ghana being currently characterized by a vibrant and vocal cultural sphere, primary research focusing on the country's 2012 electoral politics provided an adequate empirical foundation to analyse Ghana's current political settlement. Because elections have for most of Ghana's post-independence period been a constant institutional feature, using them as a lens provided me furthermore with a reference point to assess how far there has been any structural change over a broader timespan.

To evaluate social change conceptualized as a process through a political settlement framework, more complexity was added by zooming out and broad-

ening the analysis. Various institutions across the different spheres (political, economic and cultural) – and actors featured at different levels (global – national (higher- and lower-level factions) were included. By scrutinizing identified actors, institutions and themes in a widened-time dimension, eventually Ghana's old (post-independent) settlement could be analysed and sketched out. This approach allowed for a qualitative within-case comparison of Ghana's old and new settlement. Engaging with the complex "bigger picture" enabled me to explore larger societal relationships and to evaluate, in a nuanced way, in how far these have structurally changed over a broader timespan. In the end different knots and dimensions of the political settlement analysis were tied together to form the narrative presented in the subsequent chapters.

After having addressed the thesis' general approach of how the political settlement approach has been grounded in Ghana's 2012 elections, the remaining part of the methodology section addresses in more detail which data has been used for the analysis, how this data has been obtained, how it has been analysed and what claims are made with the data. Furthermore, I will reflect on why the applied methods of data collection and interpretation have been chosen. The methodology section concludes by critically setting out the challenges faced during the process of data collection and analysis, and engages with limitations of the applied approach.

2.3.2 What type of data has been used for the analysis and which techniques have been applied to gather it?

The narrative presented in this thesis is based on an analysis of a mix of different sources of qualitative and quantitative data, both primary and secondary in nature. The collected primary data has been used first and foremost as foundational for the analysis of Ghana's current political settlement. Secondary sources (see bibliography) have primarily informed the analysis covering the historical dimension of the thesis.

Semi-structured interviews

The main source of primary qualitative data gathered for the analysis is based on 41 face-to-face, semi-structured interviews conducted during two fieldwork trips to Ghana in 2011 and 2012. The first stay in Ghana served as an exploratory trip to get to know the country and its people and to establish a network of

contacts in the field. Furthermore, it allowed gathering of some data a year ahead of the 2012 polls and set the foundation for a basic under-standing of the Ghanaian state, its workings and society.

Most of the 41 interviews have been conducted however during the second fieldwork trip, which overlapped with Ghana's 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections. Interviewees included members across the political, economic and cultural spheres, such as current members of Ghana's political parties, business experts, employees of Ghana's Electoral Commission, Ghanaian citizens working for the EC during the elections, representatives of churches, national NGOs, think thanks and academic scholars, agents of national media (print and radio), political youth groups, voters, members of international observer groups and individuals of the international community present in Ghana as well as Ghanaians working for them.

The semi-structured interviews focused mainly on events, processes and political developments linked to Ghana's 2012 elections. Questions guiding the interviews were adjusted according to the interlocutors' expertise, so that interview schedules tended to differ slightly for each interview. In addition to questions covering the interviewees' area of expertise, topical issues related to electoral politics have been raised with all interlocutors. Another reason for interview schedules to be rather malleable was that the procedural character of the election itself demanded adaptation. Issues heatedly debated ahead of the actual polling day were different from those discussed during and after the elections. In order to verify information provided by interviewees, subsequent interlocutors were confronted with similar questions. This approach also allowed following up on new issues raised by interview partners.

Personal communications

In addition to semi-structured interviews, numerous personal communications during fieldwork in Ghana as well as before and afterwards in Europe (predominantly in the UK and Belgium) complemented the gathered primary qualitative data. Dialogue partners of these informal conversations included members of the political elite such as contesting MPs, members and representatives of Ghana's political parties, business men, taxi drivers, citizens in trotros (minibuses for public transport), traders and customers at markets, voters during election time, security personnel and Ghanaians living and working in Europe. In-

formal conversations have been another important technique for collecting primary qualitative data. Furthermore, this method proved to be particularly fruitful for triangulating data received through semi-structured interviews.

Newspaper articles published by Ghanaian publishing houses in print and online throughout Ghana's 2012 electoral cycle and blogs run by Ghanaians covering developments in Ghanaian politics more widely, have both been further rich sources of primary data. In addition, government documents such as bills regulating Ghanaian elections have been referred to, reports of domestic and international election observer missions and records of the Electoral Commission giving information about the process of delimitation of constituencies have been taken into account.

Unstructured observation

Besides collecting primary data in written documentation and through oral communication/inter-action, further data has been gathered through unstructured observation (McKechnie 2008: 907-908). Attending rallies of both dominant parties, press conferences of a presidential aspirant and local and international observer groups, lectures organized by various societal groups and of course the observation of the election days itself, have enriched my understanding of electoral politics in Ghana. Contemplating election posters and banners, listening to radio broadcasts and TV shows such as the IEA presidential and vice presidential debates ahead of the 2012 polls also fed into the unstructured observations made during fieldwork. Participating in voter education seminars run by political parties in Ghana and training sessions for the media ahead of the elections, as well as in a workshop for political youth, provided further insights into Ghanaian society and politics.

Quantitative data

A few sources of primary quantitative data have complemented the primary qualitative data acquired through a variety of different techniques. These include records of Ghana's Electoral Commission covering detailed election results for 2012, detailed election results of previous elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic published by civil society organizations (e.g., Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) 2010), reports published by Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) (2012) covering 2010 cen-

sus data as well as opinion polls conducted by Afrobarometer (2012) capturing Ghanaians' views on society and politics in 2012.

To substantiate the economic and historical dimension of the analysis, primary quantitative data in the form of time series has been gathered from international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank. These include amongst others IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS), IMF International Finance Statistic (IFS), IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS) and World Bank Word Trade Indicators (WTI).

2.3.3 Data access and documentation of collected primary data

Based on my desk research before travelling to Ghana, I identified key groups on whose views my analysis and narrative was going to build. Guided by the theoretical framework and purposive sampling I focused on stakeholders in Ghana's electoral politics (Palys 2008: 697) comprising members of the three different spheres – political, economic and cultural. Informants were supposed to include members of political parties, representatives of faith organizations, the media, think thanks, women and youth groups, business people, traditional leaders, individuals involved in the security apparatus of the Ghanaian state and representatives of the international community.

Ahead of and during my first trip to Ghana, I contacted institutions in Accra representing mainly the international community. These included British and German NGOs, such as political foundations, and diplomatic missions, to which I assumed to have, due to my nationality and institutional research affiliation, easier access. Most individuals I contacted responded positively and granted me meetings and first interviews. These first interactions with members of the international community in Ghana paved the way for gaining access to their Ghanaian counterparts and project partners.

Returning to Ghana a year after my first visit allowed me to reactivate contacts established during my first trip. In fact, the core of my interview partners was made up of individuals belonging to the previously established network. Yet, since my second stay overlapped with Ghana's immediate pre-election period in 2012, identifying new relevant interviewees to discuss electoral politics was straightforward. Several interlocutors have therefore been chosen more randomly outside the previously established network. Attending events organized by Ghanaian civil society organizations, which had been advertised

in the local newspapers or that I had been made aware of through my contacts, enabled me to establish further contacts. Workshops, lectures, rallies of political parties and press conferences provided numerous opportunities for personal informal conversations, but also to arrange dates for several semi-structured interviews.

Collected textual qualitative primary data included newspaper articles covering the electoral cycle in Ghana as well as electoral laws passed by the Ghanaian legislature. Copies of the legislative documents were bought from Ghana Publishing Company Limited (Assembly Press) in Accra. Some texts and reports were provided by interview partners to photocopy or occasionally to keep. A collection of newspaper articles covering Ghana's 2012 election cycle was obtained by buying a range of Ghanaian daily newspapers during both field trips covering editions from *The Daily Graphic; The Mirror; The Daily Guide; The Ghanaian Chronicle* and *The New Statesman* (Statesman). Different newspapers have been chosen to ensure a balance in input because most Ghanaian papers tend to lean towards one of the two dominant political parties.

The majority of the primary quantitative data has been gathered online. With regards to time series published by the IMF and the World Bank, access has been provided by the UK data service (2014), whereas data from Ghana's Electoral Commission (2012) was accessible directly through its webpage in 2012.
Even though I had not planned to transcribe my interviews and to analyse them in detail with regards to nuances in the language used by interviewees, I digitally recorded the first few semi-structured interviews. I thought this was the best and for me easiest way to document what my interviewees said. Very soon I realized however, that interviewees were much less conscious of what they were saying when there was no voice recorder present during the interviews, even though my topic is not per se a sensitive one. I decided to stop recording my conversations and opted instead for taking jottings. In order to keep track of my scribbling made during conversations, I tried to summarize key points made by the interviewees after each meeting and captured my thoughts and comments by writing "field note diaries". Data gained through informal conversations and unstructured observation was documented in the same way. After each insightful and thought provoking conversation – or observation –, I documented them in my field notebooks, capturing as well the

time, date and context of the conversation and usually a few notes on the individual I had spoken with. The documentation of the qualitative primary data filled about four DIN A5 notebooks.

2.3.4 Data analysis

Thinking is also research.
Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics

After returning from the field, I was faced with a few recordings of interviews, books full of jottings, newspaper articles, reports, legislative texts, figures, pictures and a few video clips. In the beginning the amount of data seemed overwhelming and finding a starting point where and how to engage with the collected data was challenging. Re-engaging with the theory underpinning my research reminded me of the core issues I was looking for in my data: constellation of power relations, institutions and actors at different levels and within different, while overlapping spheres.

At first I was focusing exclusively on the 2012 elections to set a foundation for outlining Ghana's current political settlement. Engaging with the data I was looking for reoccurring issues and themes throughout the different stages of the electoral cycle: Which groups seemed to be significant; what did their members and other Ghanaians say about them; what had been my perceptions? Which institutions related to the elections had been altered, why and how? Who was involved in these reform processes and what was the view of different groups of actors on the implemented changes, etc.?

The method of data analysis I applied for my primary qualitative data can best be described as thematic coding or thematic analysis. After focusing initially merely on Ghana's 2012 elections for the political settlement analysis, over time I was able to link identified themes and patterns with my general ideas and reflections on the workings of the Ghanaian state. I came up with what Miles et al. (2014: 95) call "analytical memos". These are brief or extended narratives which document the researcher's reflections and thinking process about the data. Analytical memos aim to synthesize themes into higher-level analytical meanings and thereby tie different pieces of data into recognizable clusters (ibid.).

Zooming out to broaden the historical dimension of the thesis, my analytical memos incorporated with time my different sources and types of data into a broader historical perspective and cohesive whole. A colleague once aptly de-

scribed them as “little conceptual epiphanies”. I captured them in conceptual mappings sketched in notebooks. The knowledge organizer in Citavi was a great tool to document and keep track of my analytical memos because it allowed me to link them digitally with my primary and secondary data.

The process of data analysis has been by no means linear, nor did it seem straightforward at the initial stages. Rather it took several attempts, detours and one or other meanderings to put the pieces embedded in the collected primary and secondary data together, to form the narrative presented in the following chapters.

2.3.5 Reasoning for applied approaches and their limitations

Having spent time in Ghana immediately before, during and after the elections allowed me to observe firsthand Ghana’s electoral politics. The trip a year ahead of the polls provided me with the opportunity to witness and experience Ghanaian political and social life also in a non-election year. I chose to collect the primary data for my thesis through semi-structured interviews, numerous informal conversations and unstructured observation because this com-bination of data collection methods allowed me to discover key issues and relations. These methods provided sufficient flexibility so that conversations could – if needed – be redirected by interlocutors to subjects they regarded as most significant. Moreover, the applied data collection methods granted me direct interaction with interviewees, to dig deeper and address uncertainties whenever applicable. A predetermined approach such as the survey method would not have given me the flexibility and openness needed to engage meaningfully with the perceptions of informants towards the Ghanaian state and electoral politics. The applied methods guaranteed high content-related validity and increased subjectivity which suited the epistemological underpinning of the theoretical framework guiding my analysis best.

The main disadvantage of the chosen approach is that it was rather time and cost intensive. Moreover, the fruitfulness of the content collected through interviews depended not only on the informant, but to a large extent also on my own experience and knowledge as interviewer. Therefore, the first field trip provided an important opportunity to gather first experiences in conducting interviews in the field. The downside coming along with the flexibility of the approach is that I ended up with plenty of data covering a huge range of issues. As a consequence the process of data analysis was, particularly in the beginning, a chal-

lenge (see section 2.3.3). The comprehensive and rich data was yet indispensable for the hermeneutic qualitative research I intended to conduct, and to understand the bigger picture of state (re-)formation in Ghana.

To tackle the challenge of vast amount of data, I relied on thematic analysis as the analytical tool (see section 2.3.3). Mills et al. (2010: 2.) ascribe five purposes to thematic analysis:

> **It is a means (1) of seeing, (2) of finding relationships, (3) of analysing, (4) of systematically observing a case and (5) of quantifying data. As sense making approach, thematic analysis is a tactic for reducing and managing large volumes of data without losing the context, for getting close to or immersing oneself in the data, for organising and summarizing, and for focusing the interpretation.**

The analytical strategy applied in thematic analysis is “gross coding”. It is a process of engaging with the data and looking for recurrent topics, themes or relationships, and categorizing similarities into analytical memos (see section 2.3.3). These analytical memos reflect the themes emerging from and grounded in the data; the result of the analyses is the narrative presented in this thesis. This approach seemed powerful to yield insightful interpretations that are contextually grounded (Mills et al. 2010: 4).

Academics critical of thematic analysis as an analytical tool argue the approach poses a concern with regards to reliability. Following them, thematic analysis is susceptible to observer bias as investigators choose how to process and analyse the information. This critique however is made from a different meta-theoretical viewpoint than the one underpinning this thesis. As researcher with a reflectivist attitude to scholarship, I am neither claiming to conduct absolute value-free research, nor do I strive to present a narrative which claims absolute truth. Rather, I recognize that what I observe may change as experience is gained in the setting. Therefore I acknowledge that with experience the process of data analysis will change or even needs to be adapted. The researchers’ understanding of the whole is continuously revised in view of the reinterpretation of the parts. Prejudice, pre-judgment and prior knowledge plays a crucial part in researchers’ understanding and interpretation of data. As a critical hermeneutist, my task is to make sense of situations and to judge between alternative explanations in order to present what I deem a reasonable narrative of the issue under scrutiny. With the aim of my research project in mind – offering nothing more and nothing less than a narrative based on critical interpretation of historical and contemporary political, social and economic developments in

Ghana with regards to social and structural change – the applied methods of data collection and analysis were most suitable. At the same time the applied approach entailed a variety of challenges.

2.3.6 Reflections on the process of data collection and analysis

Choosing the time of Ghana's 2012 elections as the main period for my fieldwork had the advantage that the topic was extremely fashionable and widely talked about at the time. Therefore, finding people from a wide spectrum of Ghanaian society who were interested in talking to me about events and developments related to the elections was fairly easy. Yet, it was challenging to arrange meetings in particular with higher ranking individuals involved in one way or the other in the electoral process – mainly individuals working for state institutions such as politicians, members of the electoral commission in management positions, etc., because they were incredibly busy throughout the election cycle. Even when meetings could be arranged with e.g., members of political parties, understandably there was always the issue of time constraints.

On polling day accessing polling stations, observing the counting as well as the tabulating process was simple. Due to my gender as well as the colour of my skin, my presence and observation of the election process was not questioned, whereas several Ghanaian voters had been asked to leave polling stations after they had cast their votes. Only once was I harshly verbally challenged by a slightly drunk voter asking what right I had to be there. I indicated that I would leave the polling station because I did not mean to stir up any trouble. Queuing voters however intervened so that the man left the premises and surrounding voters convinced me to stay.

As a foreigner not fluent in any of the local languages, there was a set limit on my understanding of Ghanaian society and political issues. Most heated political debates in chops bars, the countryside and on radio programmes were held in local languages. Having been fluent at least in Twi would have allowed me to further deepen my understanding of observed events and processes.

The biggest challenge however was how to treat the information I was confronted with. Coming from a society in which news is mainly diffused through some kind of "official channel", dealing with mainly oral, assailing and often contradicting pieces of information was a completely new experience. In order to somehow distinguish "facts" from "rumours" I tried to verify, or triangulate, in-

formation whenever possible. When somebody claimed e.g., at a chop bar police officers had raided the NPP headquarters, I asked a variety of people from different strata about their version of the events. Furthermore, I tried to cross-check the information I had obtained with what had been – if at all – reported by different media and publishing houses. As a result of this experience, I am aware that my thesis simply presents a narrative based on a mix of various perceptions – obviously also strongly shaped by my own – of political and societal events, developments and processes in Ghana.

I already mentioned that I struggled finding an entry point to the process of analysing the collected data and how this has been addressed. Another challenge arose – which might come as a surprise – with the analysis of secondary sources used to cover the historical dimension of the thesis. The majority of secondary sources used for this thesis have been authored by Ghanaians. Strikingly, plenty of them have been involved directly in politics in one way or another such as Afrifa; Asamoah; Ahwoi; Oquaye; Frimpong-Ansah, etc. While their writings have provided invaluable insights, due to the authors' direct involvement in Ghanaian politics, their narratives featured subliminal biases reflecting the authors' political sympathies. Sometimes I was confronted with opposing narratives, so that deciding on the historical narrative presented in this thesis was not always easy.

2.4 Chapter summary

Chapter two outlines a Gramscian-inspired theoretical framework of a political settlement to guide the in-depth case study analysis of this thesis incorporating statebuilding and societal dynamics to evaluate social change in Ghana. With its focus on historically grown and the unique constellation of relations of power within society – which characterize the form of a state – the political settlement approach allows for a much more nuanced analysis and evaluation of social change. Thereby it enriches the current academic discourse on statebuilding. The presented theoretical framework provides analytical cornerstones for a political settlement analysis such as formal and informal institutions, actors and ideas within different spheres (political, economic and cultural) and across different levels (domestic level: split into higher-(elite) and lower-level factions (non-elite) as well as international forces) (see figure 2.1).

The chapter moves on to outline the broader historical context of state formation in Sub-Saharan Africa which contextualized the political settlement approach by highlighting salient societal cleavages and recurring themes with regards to African state formation. These include the dichotomous dimensions urban/rural; old/young; traditional and modern elite as well as ethnicity and social class. In addition, the influence of global forces, both materially and ideologically are sketched out. These themes and societal fissures, combined with the broader analytical cornerstones mentioned above, are guiding the subsequent analysis of state (re-)formation in Ghana. The chapter concludes by outlining the thesis methodological approach. It reasons the choice to rely on Ghana's 2012 elections as a window to observe the country's current political settlement before outlining in more detail and critically reflecting on the applied methods used for data collection and interpretation.

III. GHANAIAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Wiase di adane dane[2]
Ghanaian proverb

Committed to a critical political economy approach which emphasizes the importance of historically grown structures and power relationships, this chapter traces the evolution of Ghana's post-independence settlement. To grasp the historical roots of societal and elite conflict in Ghana, the first section outlines key social dynamics under colonial rule. These have shaped Ghana's politicised societal cleaveages most of which continue to form the basis of political and social conflict until today. Based on these key prerequisites, the following part sketches out the evolving constellation of power in Ghana's immediate post-independent state and how these have been embedded and reflected in formal and informal institutions. It will be demonstrated how the overtaxation of rural productive entrepreneurs in favour of the urban factions' consumption, which characterised Ghana's post-independent settlement, had assumed by the end of the 1970s proportions eroding the country's economic base. In fact, it led to Ghana's fiscal and economic breakdown and resulted in the disintegration and collapse of the entire state system. In contrast, the last section of the chapter will illustrate that Ghana's more recent historical developments provide the building blocs for the currently dominant narrative of its image as "African success story". Ghana's remarkable macroeconomic recovery coupled with its (re-)democratization process including incumbent presidents abiding by term limits and two relatively peaceful turnovers of power through the ballot box, are not only exceptional in view of Ghana's history. These achievements make Ghana also stand out in regional comparision and suggest albeit rather simplistically that the country has arrived at a new place. Chapters 4 to 6 will critique and nuance this narrative.

3.1 Social dynamics and historical roots of elite conflict

To grasp the development of Ghana's post-independent settlement in a Gramscian sense, this section will outline the social dynamics within "Ghana"[3] under

[2] Meaning in English: No situation is permanent.
[3] To implify matters, the thesis refers to "Ghana" while covering the pre-independance period to capture al four territories which had been administered separately under British colonial rule and

colonial rule and sketch out the resulting historical roots of societal and elite conflict. It will illustrate the development of politisized societal cleaveages, namely (1) the nationalists against the British; (2) commoners against chiefs; (3) youth against age and (4) the manifestation of regio-ethnic identities, most of which continue to shape political and social conflict in Ghana until today.

3.1.1 Impact of colonialism

The territory of modern day Ghana has been home to well-developed precolonial political entities with diverse structures of social organization (Hutchful 2002: 103; Austin 1964: 2). In Akan society, for example, social differentiation was often based on descent, but differed from the type of social stratification created by feudalism and the industrial revolution that exists in some societies of the global North (Svanikier 2007: 118-19). Pre-colonial Akan society had a long tradition of powerful monarchs supported by extensive aristocracies. Moreover, gerontocratic principles were underpinning society and conditioning access to power so that generation differences were no small matter.

To accommodate the generational and royal/non-royal societal cleavage, the traditional Akan system integrated its "young men" into the political system through the asafo (traditional militia), the nkwakwaa (youth or commoners' assembly) and nkwakwaahene (chief of the commoners) (Hutchful 2002: 107). These institutions allowed commoners[4] some means of checks and balances on chiefly power (Rathbone 2000, Owusu 1986, Austin 1970), which they used to have a frequently rebellious impact on the polity (Hutchful 2002: 107).

The British did not attempt to abolish these earlier indigenous forms of state. Rather, the colonial state aimed at accommodating itself to traditional state structures and usurped their legitimacy for its own purposes (Hutchful 2002: 103). Outside the capital and major urban centres it mediated its relationship with its subjects through a system of indirect rule based on the legitimacy and physical presence of traditional elites (Hutchful 2002: 103; Rathbone 2000: 10). This co-opting of traditional rulers by the British undermined chieftancy (Rathbone 2000: 4); in fact it debased and politicized tradition.

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went on to form together the independent state of Ghana since 1957. The four areas included the Northern Territories, Togoland, Ashanti and the Gold Coast spanning the Southern coastal areas.

[4] The concept of "commoners" refers in the Ghanaian context to individuals who were not of aristocratic birth (Svanikier 2007: 124).

During colonialism “tradition” was far from being static, since the colonial state allowed for the manipulation of traditional norms which enabled chiefs to cement and augment their power (Hutchful 2002: 106; see Fordwor 2010: 5). The policies of indirect rule upset the delicate equilibrium of pre-colonial power relations (Fordwor 2010: 4; Hutchful 2002: 108). They had facilitated a considerable shift of power to the traditional elite and linage elders, so that the societal fissures along generational lines and the royal/non-royal divide deepened (Hutchful 2002: 107).

While under the traditional system of social differentiation commoners could not have hoped to achieve equal political and social elite status as royals (Svanikier 2007: 124), a new kind of status system emerged during the colonial period. Western-style education became decisive to social mobility (Foster 1965) which in turn had lasting ramifications for the configuration of political power in the independent state of Ghana (Svanikier 2007: 120).

Coastal merchant families came to form a highly educated minority and the nucelus of a professional elite. Some came from Fante aristocratic backgrounds or were the offsprings of European merchants and officials (Foster 1965: 68). On the ground of their educational backgrounds, this nascent modern elite believed that it was they who should swiftly be incooperated by the colonial state as its local agents. Hence they challenged the authority of the chiefs and their political role in the colonial state (Rathbone 2000: 21; Austin 1970: 9). By the end of the 19th century, the British preferences for working with traditional rulers had however bit by bit excluded the burgeoning modern coastal elite from such roles (Rathbone 2000: 21). Unsurprsingly the modern elite began to oppose colonialism and anyone they perceived to support it (see Apter 1970: 262-285). The colonial state had impacted not only on the position of power of traditional rulers, but also played a crucial role in the formation of a nascent modern elite, whose social and political mobility was – at least for some – limited through the existence of the same.

Even though it was not common practice at the time (Svanikier 2007: 121), some chiefs’ sons and lower ranking royal descendents did receive Western-style education to high levels. It was this group of Western educated royals from the next generation which eventually helped to form a coalition between the professional/modern and traditional elite. By the early 1950s these three societal groups

– traditional rulers, professional coastal elites and educated aristoracts – formed a political alliance which constituted the core of a nationalist conservative faction. Soon it was up against another societal group – educated and semi-educated commoners – which formed the heart of political elite disunity in independent Ghana (Svanikier 2007: 122; see Rathbone 2000: 50).

The colonial educational system also contributed to the rise of elementary school leavers and hence the growth of a faction of educated commoners, some of whom obtained education up to university level (Austin 1964: 17). With education and occupation emerging as new determinants of social status, educated and semi-educated commoners could for the first time aspire to elite status (Svanikier 2007: 124). The unprecedented extension of education to commoners especially at the basic level created social tensions between established elites and commoners, since the economy could not absorb the supply of school graduates. There was widespread unrest as some Asafo companies that were organised into youth organisations challenged corrupt practices of some traditional rulers whose powers were protected by the colonial authority (Svanikier 2007). Couped with an increasing urbanization these developments set the foundation to undermine colonial rule (Nugent 2012: 14) and paved the way for a fierce conflict amongst higher-level factions for control of the independent state.

3.1.2 Manifestation of societal factions

The experiences during the Second World War, in which thousands of “Ghanaian” soliders had fought under the command of British officers, had altered the perceptions of black-white relations in “Ghana” (Israel 1987). Coupled with an international shift against imperialism and the declaration of the Atlantic Charter proclaiming self-governance, these changed circumstances spurred in the late 1940s the nationalist movement pioneered and spearheaded by “Ghana’s” modern elite.

Besides the social divisions that had emerged through education, economic hardship triggered by general inflation and the swollen shoot disease, which had infected a quarter of cocoa trees, caused high levels of discontent in the Gold Coast after World War II. The colonial government’s policy of cutting out cocoa trees to control the disease stirred severe opposition from farmers and chiefs (Danquah 2003: 51). In addition, demonstrations of ex-service men who had returned and expected to be paid their end-of-service benefits for their time

in the British Army added further to unfolding social unrest. This situation augmented feelings of grievance against repressive colonial governance and fired the demand for self-rule (Fordwor 2010: 20-23).

While the colonial government faced severe post-war difficulties, "Ghana's" different elite factions managed for the first time to build a broad societal alliance against British rule. This was possible since the links between the traditional elite and the colonial government were slowly dissolving due to different vested economic interests (see Danquah 2003: 51).

In August 1947 the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was formed, as the first "nationwide" movement with the aim to see that

> **[…] the control of government should pass into the hands of the people and their chiefs in the shortest possible time (Austin 1964: 53).**

Amongst the movement's founding members were professional and business cadre like G.A. Grant, R.S. Blay, and E.O. Obetsebi-Lamptey as well as individuals from the upper class with close family ties to the traditional elite. Most prominent amongst this group was J.B. Danquah the younger half-brother of Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I, the Okyenhene (king) of the Akyem Abuakwa chiefdom in the Eastern Region of Ghana (Ghana Nation 2011). Danquah had acted as his brother's secretary before earning a PhD and a law degree in the UK and becoming a prominent lawyer (Svanikier 2007: 122). Others included William Ofori Atta, popularly called Paa Willie, who was a son of Nana Sir Ofori Atta I (Fordwor 2010: 23; Danquah 2003: 52) and Edward Akufo-Addo who was Nana Sir Ofori Atta I's son-in-law (Danquah 2003: 52). A few individuals with non-royal backgrounds like Ako Adjei were also founding members of the UGCC.

To enable the movement to take root apart from the southern coastal areas also in Ashanti and the Northern territories, the UGCC appointed Kwame Nkrumah as its General Secretary (Davidson 1973: 52). Nkrumah had studied together with Adjei in the United States and was, in contrast to most founding members of the UGCC and like Adjei, a younger educated commoner.

Due to Nkrumah's ability to make common cause with workers, farmers, market women, petty traders and underpreviledged, he was able to draw many more sections of the masses into the struggle for independence (Fordwor 2010: 19). While initially united in their common cause to achieve self-government, soon ideological differences between Nkrumah and the nationalist conservative faction became evident. Nkrumah was sympathizing with communist ideas which

the national conservative faction fiercely opposed. However, their views also differed with regards to which societal groups should form the party's support base. Nkrumah was striving for a broad movement of the masses, while the nationalist conservative faction believed that it was they who had the responsibility and the right to establish the guiding policies, and not the other way around (Fordwor 2010: 30). One could say that Danquah, consciously or unconsciously, aimed to stage a passive revolution to forge a new ruling coalition made up of the educated upper class and the chiefs, for the time when the hegemony of the colonial power would crumble. The nationalist conservative faction seemed to strive for directing this process themselves, rather than it being driven by the masses.

Soon these fundamental differences led to increased tensions between the nationalist conservative faction and Nkrumah, so that he eventually defected from the UGCC and established the Convention People's Party (CPP) under his leadership in June 1949 (Davidson 1973: 68).

Hence, the social dynamics under colonial rule led to a reconfiguration of "Ghana's" political elite and its split into two opposing factions: an "elitist", nationalist conservative faction with strong ties to traditional rulers, and by trend a younger counter-elite striving for a mass movement of the common people. Both factions were decisively modernist in outlook, but epitomizing two fundamentally different conceptions of modernization (Hutchful 2002: 106).

3.1.3 National power struggle and flaring up of regional-ethnic factions

By the early 1950s the fight against colonial rule was in many respects over (Rathbone 2000: 59). It had been replaced by a new main political conflict which centred on demands by newly educated commoners for political inclusion and their endeavours to seize power from the established elites (Svanikier 2007: 118). As the newspaper Daily Graphic proclaimed in a lead article in Feburary 1954:

> **Our problems are more of an internal nature rather than an external one (Rathbone 2000: 59).**

While the British initially only allowed incremental reforms leading to limited forms of self-government, the two elite factions attempted to mould the emerging post-colonial formal political institutions in their favour. The UGCC strove to curtail the influence of the youth in the political process by recommending to increase the voting age to 25 and suggesting that a person would only be qulified to vote if he or she owned property in the constituency (Fordwor 2010: 51).

The CPP strongly opposed the UGCC's advances which were in the end unsuccessful. With its attempt to belittle the influence of the youth, the UGCC alientated exactly the group which was going to represent a huge bulk of the voting population (Forwor 2010: 47). Since the CPP had consciously opted for and obtained the active support of the masses, and in particular the commoners who represented a significant large part of the population, the CPP won comfortably the elections in 1951.

As Leader of Government Business, Nkrumah gradually worked towards his envisaged constitutional changes which strengthened the influence of the masses and further reduced the formal powers of traditional elites (see Fordwor 2010: 62). As a result of these constitutional changes another general election was held in June 1954 (Frempong 2012: 34). Besides the CPP several parties had emerged to contest the elections. Most of them were regional in outlook and ethnic based (Frempong 2012: 34). These included amongst others the Muslim Association Party (MAP) and the Northern People's Party (NPP). The latter had been formed by several traditional rulers and modern political elites from the Northern Territories, todays Northern, Upper West and Upper East regions. Amongst its leaders were S.D. Dombo, chief of Duori in today's Upper West region, Yakubu Tali and J.A. Braimah (Frempong 2012: 34). Another regional-ethnic cleavage was underlined by the formation of the Togoland Congress Party (TCP) which advocated the unification of Eweland as an independent polity (Smock and Smock 1975: 69-70).[5] In contrast, the Anlo Youth Organisation (AYO) which contested the 1954 elections represented an Ewe-sub-group campaigning for the Ewe people under British rule to stay within Ghana after independence. Solely the Ghana Congress Party (GCP), which was formed in May 1952 in reaction to the devastating loss of the opposition parties in the 1951 elections, aimed for a wider coalition. It enclosed the UGCC, the National Democratic Party (NDP), defected former CPP members, and a few individuals such as K.A. Busia and M. Dowuona (Fordwor 2010: 60). Busia, the older brother of Nana Kusi Appea the Paramount Chief of Wenchi (Austin 1964: 181), became the Chairman and leader of the GCP. Yet, also the attempt of a broader nationalist conservative alliance lost the polls against Nkrumah's CPP.

[5] After the end of World War I, the former German colony of Togoland was divided into a British and French mandated area, which resulted in the partition of the Ewe people between the two differently administered areas.

The outcome of the polls reinforced the politicization of regional-ethnic factions. In September 1954 the National Liberation Movement (NLM) was formed under the leadership of Baffour Osei Akoto, senior linguist to the Asantehene, King of the Asante people (Fordwor 2010: 65), to voice and remedy the grievances of the Asante in relation to the central government. The movement clearly saw the emerging post-colonial formal institutions as disadvantagous for its people and its traditional elite in particular (Akoto 1992: 36-39). Therefore the NLM vehemently called for replacing the unitary system with a federal government (Parkinson 2007: 107). It was joined in its call for a considerable devolution of powers by the Northern People's Party (Fordwor 2010: 68). Moreover, the UN plebiscite held in British Togoland – today's Volta region – on a separate Ewe state in May 1956 emphasized the surge of politicized ethno-regional societal fissures. In light of these apparent regional-ethnic factions, the CPP strongly opposed the idea of a federal constitutional design for an independent Ghana. It feared it would query the unitary nature of the "nation" (Fordwor 2010: 67).

The British were reluctant to grant independence while in the midst of a constitutional controversy and attempted to mediate in the power struggle between the competing factions. Eventually London believed that only another election could establish the majority opinion on the constitutional matter (Fordwor 2010: 70). Contrary to the NLM's expectations, the CPP once again clearly won the polls and Ghana gained its independence on March, 6th in 1957 as the first sub-Saharan African state with Nkrumah becoming its first President (Fordwor 2010: 72). The consecutive election results showed how much the balance of power had shifted from the chiefs and the UGCC's intelligentsia to the youth and commoners represented by the CPP (Frempong 2012: 33). In fact, Owusu (2009: 29) points out that Nkrumah's greatest source of power was that he combined in himself leadership in all three dimensions of societal conflict in "Ghana" during the 1940s: (1) the nationalists against the British; (2) the people against the chiefs; and (3) youth against age.

3.2 Ghana's post-independent settlement

After having outlined the historical roots of societal and elite conflict in Ghana, the following section will sketch out the evolving constellation of power in Ghana's immediate post-independent state.

3.2.1 The origin of the "urbanized vampire state"[6]

After wresting power from the colonial rulers, the "progressive" CPP faction of newly educated commoners became Ghana's new ruling elite. It continued an open domestic power struggle with the nationalist conservative elite faction for control of the state. The evolving post-independence settlement was characterised by elite disunity, in particular in terms of persisting elite differences in ideological convictions for Ghana's political and economic trajectory. The following section outlines how the ideological convictions of the CPP faction have shaped Ghana's formal economic institutions and hence the evolving settlement. They established an institutionally entrechend constellation of power in which the urban areas benefitted to the detriment of the rural ones. The institutionalised over-taxation of rural productive entrepreneurs in favour of the urban masses' consumption soon undermined the economic base of the Ghanaian state and led to a deteriorating economic situation. Coupled with a systematic marginalistion of the traditional elite and exclusion of the modern nationalist conservative faction from the political sphere, these conditions set the scene for a violent alternation of the ruling elite.

Formation of Ghana's post-colonial formal institutions in the economic sphere

Ghana's formal economic institutions have been shaped significantly by the legacy of the colonial past and the hegemonic ideology at the time. Nkrumah, who had been attracted to socialist ideology, envisioned an outright attack on underdevelopment through accelerated industrialization as the basis for economic growth (see Killick 2010: 37-60). The structural transformation of the Ghanaian economy was to be achieved by a rapid expansion of state initiatives in production (Nkrumah 1963: 119), since capital accumulation amongst domestic capitalists did not match the resources needed for the intended social transformation (Opoku 2010: 18; Gyimah-Boadi 1989: 225).

Even though back then socialism was not a hegemonic ideology in the international sphere, mainstream development economics of the fifties was at many points highly congruent with Nkrumah's ideas (Killick 2010: 27; Herbst 1993: 20; Bates 1981: 97). As a result, statism, the view that the state has a

[6] See Frimpong-Ansah (1991) and the outline of the concept further below.

necessary and legitimate role in directing the economy, either directly through state-owned enterprises, or indirectly through economic planning (Looney 2001: 1475-1480), became the dominant development paradigm, both internationally as well as domestically.

Despite the agreement amongst development economists to attribute to the state a central role, there was much less agreement on whether the instrumentalities of the state should be largely indirect, by means such as tariff policy and the provision of tax incentives, or direct, through administrative controls and the establishment of state-owned industries (Killick 2010: 26). With the establishment of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), the British had however already laid the foundation for the post-colonial state's direct involvement in the cocoa industry (see Alence 2001: 397; Grossman-Greene and Bayer 2009: 5-7). The CMB operated as a monopsony. It had the monopoly on buying the entire cocoa production of farmers at a price set by itself, and resold the crop to licensed, mainly international firms for global trade.

Given the CPP's ideological conviction and the fact that cocoa had been the state's main source of revenue since the 1920s, it was natural for the CPP to maintain this institution to ensure the state's capacity to tax agricultural surplus, in particular cocoa, to finance government's development plans (Gyimah-Boadi 1989: 226). As Nii Moi Thompson put it:

> **[Back then, J.R.] the theory was that, in the early stages of development, when industries are low, you necessarily have to finance expansion of industry, or the non-agricultural sector, with the surplus from agriculture (Thompson in Agyeman-Duah et al. 2008: 56).**

At the beginning the CPP tried to revitalise the traditional small-scale based farming sector through the CMB's farmer assistance programme and measures of price stabilization. Over time these functions were de-emphasized and the CMB's ability to accumulate surplus for the state was greatly enhanced (Gyimah-Boadi 1989: 226). The CPP began to stress state-sponsored, large-scale mechanized agriculture (Gyimah-Boadi 1989: 224). State farms were established and the state's control over agricultural production and marketing was further expanded by the creation of more parastatals like the Agricultural Produce Marketing Board and the Timber Marketing Board (ibid.).

The increased control over the country's most crucial economic sector was also a means to secure the ruling forces' hegemony. State-controlled structures, especially with regards to the cocoa industry, allowed pre-empting of political

opposition from the rural areas in general, and the dominant cocoa growing Ashanti region, stronghold of the NLM opposition in particular (see Gyimah-Boadi 1989: 225; Bates 1981: 109-110). In fact, Nkrumah managed to ward off the NLM's threat to unseat the CPP by channelling vital loans and access to subsidized inputs through neopatrimonial networks like the CPP's farmers' wing UGFC. This practice had soon eroded Ashanti cocoa farmers' support for the NLM (Bates 1981: 110).

To fulfil its ambitious developmental promises, which were supposed to provide legitimacy for the regime (Nugent 2010: 49), the CPP had to shift resources from the productive – agricultural – sector. These were used to expand state services such as medical and educational facilities; the provision of infrastructure such as roads, railways and the construction of Tema harbour and the giant Akosombo Dam, which gave Ghana strategic control over its energy resources and formed part of the industrialisation plan (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 97). The big push in state-led development was however only partly financed by the produced agricultural surplus and taxation of cocoa. Nkrumah's large state investments and related high imports were also financed by foreign currency reserves (see table 3.2.1 column 8) left by the colonial regime[7] and regular large budget deficits (see table 3.2.1 column 6 and 7; Jonah 1989: 96; Esseks 1975: 38; Bates 1981: 101). Ghana's foreign currency reserves were soon depleted so that the CPP government resorted to domestic borrowing (see table 3.2.1 column 10) to fund its twin deficit, the negative balance of payments (see table 3.2.1 column 3 and 5) and increasing budget deficits (Esseks 1975: 38-39). Above all, the international price for cocoa was decreasing in the immediate independence period, so that Ghana's external terms of trade deteriorated and foreign currency became an even scarcer good (see figure 3.1 and table 3.2.2 column 3).

[7] According to Jonah (1989: 96) the county's foreign currency reserves dropped from £211,165,000 in 1955 to £182,622,000 in 1957 and to £150,280,000 in 1960.

Table 3.1 Indicators of Ghana's economic decline (I)

					Fiscal policy		External sector		Money & inflation	
(1) Year	(2) Population in million	(3) Exports fob in million Cedi	(4) Cocoa exports in million Cedi	(5) Imports cif in million Cedi	(6) Revenue current prices in million Cedi	(7) Expenditure current prices in millions Cedi	(8) Net reserves ratio to GDP	(9) Measure of over- or undervaluation base 1960 (%)	(10) Money supply change over previous year (%)	(11) Rate of inflation (%)
1955		191	131	176	128	141	35.3	4.0	8.5	0.5
1956		173	102	178	99	118	32.4	2.2	4.4	4.1
1957	6.2	183	102	193	120	114	25.9	1.7	-10.6	1.0
1958	6.4	209	125	169	133	151	25.4	0.2	-7.3	0.0
1959	6.6	226	138	226	140	174	23.7	0.0	13.6	2.9
1960	6.8	246	133	296	167	224	21.2	0.0	11.4	0.9
1961	6.9	244	139	326	144	207	12.2	-0.1	15.4	6.2
1962	6.9	240	134	270	157	253	12.9	4.1	13.3	5.9
1963	7.0	234	136	290	170	269	12.1	7.4	0.0	5.6
1964	7.4	247	136	283	254	365	5.5	22.1	41.2	15.8
1965	7.7	251	135	392	284	371	-0.5	45.4	0.0	22.7
1966	7.9	222	117	298	231	273	-1.8	60.3	4.2	14.8

Source: Frimpong-Ansah (1991: 160-169)

To gain more control over trade and the allocation of the state's scant foreign exchange resources, the CPP established an import licensing system – with tariffs, quotas, exchange control and import bans – as well as rigid foreign exchange policies (Esseks 1975: 38; Opoku 2010: 19). This rationing regime gave the government even more allocating power with regards to scarce and hence well sought after goods which strengthened informal institutions such as neopatrimonial networks (Opoku 2010: 19). Besides controlling the country's expenditure of its foreign currency, the government funded its budget deficits by interfering in the monetary policy of the Central Bank. This practice of domestic borrowing caused Ghana's money supply to grow and set in motion an inflationary spiral greatly compounded by the fact that too much money was chasing too few goods (see table 3.2.1 column 10 and 11; Sowa 1989: 124; Esseks 1975: 39). A deliberately kept fixed exchange rate, guaranteed an overvalued Cedi, which in turn upheld the price for Ghanaian cocoa on the world market artificially. The loss of competitiveness and burden of decreased world prices for cocoa, which had been entirely passed on to farmers, eroded farmers real income and caused them to reduce cocoa production and investment (see table 3.2.2 column 2 and 4; Opoku 2010: 19; Herbst 1993: 20; Esseks 1975: 42). The costs to the farmers resulting from the overvalued Cedi enabled the country however to continue purchasing artificially cheap imported goods such as food, clothes and consumer goods which benefited predominantly the urban population (Herbst 1993: 61).

Figure 3.1 Development of the international price for cocoa, 1960-1985



Source: World Bank Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities (2014)

Table 3.2 Indicators of Ghana's cocoa sector (I)

(1) Year	(2) Cocoa production in tons	(3) International price for cocoa (in $/kg, real 2010$)	(4) Real producer price (in 1972 NC)
1955			799
1956			733
1957			679
1958			598
1959			560
1960		3.076972	546
1961	415,200	2.452238	539
1962	428,100	2.303734	501
1963	427,800	2.830320	420
1964	580,500	2.555764	351
1965	415,800	1.828495	278
1966	381,100	2.498808	294

Source: (1) FAOSTAT (2015); (2) World Bank GEM Commodities (2014); (3) Stryker et al. (1990: 101)

To implement the state-led import substituting industrialization project and hence the highly protectionist trade policies, the CPP government expanded its parastatal institutions, whereby it further increased the state's involvement in the country's economic sphere. These institutions did not only enforce the new trade regime of import restrictions, they also provided employment for urban dwellers. In fact, the urban population soon benefited not only from the overvalued Cedi, but also from the government's padding of state-owned enterprises with as many surplus workers as possible; further job opportunities in a ballooning civil service; subsidies on fuel and the provision of government services not usually available to the rural population (Herbst 1993: 61; Opoku 2010: 18-19).

In short, Ghana's post-colonial formal economic institutions complemented by informal ones as concomitants of the rationing system (see Opoku 2010: 19), embodied an institutionalised urban bias to the detriment of rural factions in terms of the allocation of costs and benefits.

CPP assigns traditional elite its place in the emerging post-colonial political settlement

The political institutions were further moulded by the CPP in the post-colonial period. While Nkrumah had already begun to curb the power of chiefs through reforming local governance in the early 1950s, following independence the CPP

launched an attack on the remaining formal authority of the traditional elite (Ninsin 1989b: 167-68; Smock and Smock 1975: 229). The Local Government (Amendment) Act of 1959 removed all chiefs from local and municipal councils and through the Court Act of 1960 magistrates replaced chiefs and elders as Chairman of local courts. Both laws contributed to stiffening the political marginalization of chiefs. In addition, the Chiefs Recognition Amendment Act of 1959 confirmed government's authority to approve or withdraw recognition from chiefs. It even gave government the power to send chiefs into exile from their traditional states (Smock and Smock 1975: 229). Hence the law could easily be used as an instrument to rebuke chiefs in opposition to the regime and to reward supporters (ibid.).

Driven by the fact that some powerful chiefs were financially backing and forming part of the political opposition confronting the CPP, the government also aimed to undermine their independent economic base (Ninsin 1989b: 168). Between 1958 and 1962 a series of laws were enacted that gave the state power over communal and other lands; power to authorize the acquisition and use of such lands for either private or public purposes; and to control the collection and use of stool revenue. By the early 1960s the CPP had ensured an increased dependency of traditional authorities on, and their subordination to, the state (ibid.).

The economic marginalization of chiefs coincided with Nkrumah's advances to modernize the agricultural sector under the aegis of the state. However, there was not only the need to secure land, previously under the control of chiefs, for large state farms, but also for the emerging class of domestic entrepreneurs aligned with the CPP who needed land for a wide range of industrial and commercial purposes (Ninsin 1989b: 169). Those activities concentrated on the timber industry that had been dominated by foreigners, but also covered growing demands for urban lands for real estate development (Ninsin 1989b: 169-70). The passing of the Land Development Protection of Purchasers Act of 1962 (Act 2) the CPP ensured that the rights of the "new class" of urban landlords were protected (Ninsin 1989b: 170).

Fundamental change to strengthen the position of small scale farmers, who were largely depended on access to land and remained after all the country's main productive entrepreneurs, were not rigorously implemented. From the CPP's point of view dispossessing the traditional political elite enabled the party

to break their hegemony and move the regime a step further towards gaining leadership in the economic sphere as well as within the polity's cultural sphere.[8]

Increasing centralization of power – exclusion of opposition factions

To consolidate the CPP's hegemony in the political sphere, the regime passed a series of legislation depriving the already weak opposition forces of its remaining power and rights. Nkrumah regarded the ethnic based opposition parties not only as a threat to his own power, but also to the national unity of Ghana. Therefore the CPP government adopted the Avoidance of Discrimination Act which banned any

> **organisations […] engaging in tribal, regional, racial or religious propaganda to the detriment of any other community, or securing the election of persons on account of their tribal, regional, or religious affiliations (Government of Ghana 1957).**

Busia condemned the law in the parliamentary debate by stating

> **Our problem is one of nation-building, and you do not do it by repressive legislation, but leaving parties and policies to the choice of the people (Fordwor 2010: 80).**

The bill however did not crush the opposition; rather it led to its reorganization. The GCP, the NLM, NPP, TCP, MAP and AYO formed an alliance under the roof of the United Party (UP) with Busia as its leader (Fordwor 2010: 81). The bond of the new party with the traditional elite was expressed in its manifesto which proclaimed:

> **[…] to uphold and maintain the institution of chieftaincy and the rights of people to their lands; and to ensure that the chiefs play a democratic and effective part in the development of Ghana […] (Fordwor 2010: 83).**

The power struggle in Ghana's political sphere continued, and laws like the Emergency Powers Act formed the legal basis for the CPP regime to suppress, harass and persecute members of the opposition epitomizing the nationalist conservative faction (Fordwor 2010: 85-86). In 1958 Amponsah, the General Secretary of the UP, was detained based on (inconclusive) charges of plotting the assassination of Nkrumah. With the regime's firm grip on the mass media (see Fordwor 2010: 98-99), campaigns to intimidate and discredit members of the opposition were easily arranged (Fordwor 2010: 86). The persecution worsened to the extent that Busia fled into exile to the Netherlands in 1959. In his absence his seat in parliament was declared vacant and was filled following a questionable by-election with a CPP candidate (Fordwor 2010: 88).

With the UP's leader forced into exile and its General Secretary in prison, the opposition once again had to reorganise itself (ibid.). Simon D. Dombo, leader of

[8] For a detailed analysis of the CPP's commitment to eliminate chiefly power see Rathbone (2000).

the Northern People's Party and chief of Douri Na in the Upper Region (Daily Guide 2010), was elected as the UP's new leader, and Joe Appiah, a "young" Western educated Asante aristocrat became the UP's new General Secretary. While the UP continued to its best ability to counterbalance the CPP, Nkrumah moved towards further institutionalizing his position of power in the political sphere by transforming Ghana into a Republic. In April 1960 the CPP put to vote a new constitution which combined the positions of Head of State and Head of Government (Fordwor 2010: 90). Naturally the UP opposed the move and suggested adopting a system under which the position of Head of State would rotate amongst senior traditional chiefs of the various ethnic communities (ibid.).

With its mobilizing party auxiliaries, such as the Trades' Union Congress (TUC), United Ghana Farmers' Council (UGFC), Young Pioneers, and the National Council of Ghana Women (NCGW) (Smock and Smock 1975: 217-219; Tsikata 1989: 77-80), the CPP had established however a solid institutional network reaching in and impacting on Ghana's cultural sphere. This mobilization capacity assisted in ensuring Nkrumah's victory in the plebiscite and the presidential race against Danquah which was held alongside the referendum. The centralization of power and exclusion of the nationalist conservative faction from the political sphere reached its peak with the amendment of Ghana's constitution to become a one-party state. The outcome of the 1964 referendum confirmed the CPP as sole legal party with 99,9% "Yes" votes and no single "No" vote from the Ashanti region, the opposition's stronghold (Frempong 2012: 36). Afrifa reports on the referendum as follows:

> **[…] There was the incident of the fraudulent referendum in January 1964. I was horrified that in places like Kumasi the Convention People's Party received 100 per cent vote of confidence. I knew people who had voted "No". A cousin of mine, who was a Returning Officer in one of the constituencies, told me that before the election he was instructed by the Regional Commissioner that before the votes were counted all the "Nos" were to be either destroyed or transferred into the "Yes" ballot box. Irregularities and malpractices were rampant. There was the particular case of a man who voted eight times, he walked in, voted, came out, collected another paper, voted, and in fact spent the best part of the day just voting […] (Afrifa 1966: 94).**[9]

As a consequence of the constitutional changes, general elections were scheduled for an enlarged parliament of 198 members in June 1965. Since the CPP was the only legal party allowed to contest the elections, candidates were selected by the CPP's Central Committee. In fact, in the absence of any opponents, the CPP's "candidates" were in short declared as members of the National

[9] For a similar account see also Boahen (1997: 211).

Assembly (Fordwor 2010: 99). These institutional changes as well as a worsening economic situation eroded the CPP-faction's solid anchoring in Ghanaian society.

Consumer goods became scare by the mid-1960s and eventually products like milk, flour and fabrics began to disappear from the shops (Esseks 1975: 38). Municipals' water systems ran without purifying chemicals and hospitals lamented shortages of X-ray fluids and vaccines. Shortages of materials required for manufacturing and export industries were severe by 1964 and led retailers to hoard supplies until maximum profits were likely. By 1966 the economic developments had generated grievances amongst most groups of society, including cocoa farmers, private businessmen, urban workers whose real wages rapidly fell due to spiralling inflation and young people unable to find jobs in an environment of raising unemployment (Esseks 1975: 42). As a result the CPP regime ruled more through coercion than consent. Moreover, the opposition forces realized that their expectations of changing the ruling coalition through the electoral process no longer stood (Frempong 2012: 36).

With centralization of power adopting more and more personalized traits, also fissures within the CPP became apparent. Faced with deteriorating living conditions of the masses, Nkrumah opted to turn against long standing allies such as K.A. Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio and Ako Adjei (Fordwor 2010: 94) and labelled them as saboteurs and self-seekers setting himself aside from party members who were perceived to have used their positions in government to accumulate capital for private gains (Austin 1975: 4). Nkrumah opted to side with the young and radical left wing of the party emphasizing his commitment to promote the interests of the common people and even began to persecute his former CPP allies (see Fordwor 2010: 96). Soon an increasing amount of societal factions was bearing grievances against Nkrumah's regime. None of them had channels to alter it and its embodied mechanisms for the distribution of political power and goods.

Several assassination attempts on Nkrumah led him to impinge as well on the composition of the security forces (see First 1972: 195-201). For his own protection Nkrumah had established with Soviet help a Presidential Guard under his personal control which was much better resourced than the regular armed forces and police (Fordwor 2010: 104; Dowse 1975: 16; Afrifa 1966: 99). In addition, lack of proper equipment and training for soldiers sent off to war in the Congo and Rhodesia (see Afrifa 1966: 105), combined with interference

with promotions in the hierarchically structured armed forces and frequent removals and dismissals caused professional grievance and estranged the military from the regime (Kandeh 2004: 66).[10] As Afrifa (1966: 99) reports:

> **In August 1965 […] Major-General Otu, the then Chief of Defence Staff, and his deputy, Major-General Ankrah, were retired from active service. Ghanaians were informed that they had "retired", but most of us in the Army knew that they had been dismissed. I was only a junior officer and had no means at my disposal for finding from them the reason for their sudden "retirement". But this was not the way to treat Generals.**

Furthermore, he (1966: 42) states:

> **Our army was being run on family sentiments unbefitting any decent army. I felt that if this was the way our army was going to be run, then there was no future for the young officers who had decided to make it their career.**

A professional sense of danger which cut across lines of possible tribal differences led to severe grievances amongst the Ghanaian armed forces (Dowse 1975: 18). On the 24th of February 1966, they took over the government in cooperation with the national police – allegedly supported by the CIA (see Stockwell 1978: 201) – while Nkrumah was travelling to Hanoi. The "Operation Cold Chop" was said to aim at breaking the enforced monopoly of single party government and restore competitive politics to a disenfranchised electorate (Austin 1975: 5).

3.2.2 Altering constellations of power?

The alliance against Nkrumah's regime between the army, police and the nationalist conservative faction of Ghana's political elite facilitated an alternation in power between the two dominant competing civilian higher-level factions. Despite different key support bases in Ghanaian society and ideological convictions, the new civilian ruling coalition was not able to implement any structural change. While the actors in power had changed, the following section will illustrate that the constellation of power within the Ghanaian state did not alter after the military coup had ousted Nkrumah from power.

Facilitating shifts of power?

The coup which ousted Nkrumah from power brought a group of military and police leaders into key political positions of the state, which made non-civilians for the first time central figures amongst Ghana's political elite. The leadership

[10] For a discussion of the role of corporate grievances in both the 1966 and 1972 coups see Bennett (1973; 1975).

of the National Liberation Council (NLC)[11] was mainly Sandhurst-trained, Western oriented military and police officers who had distaste for Nkrumah and his socialist ideology (Chazan 1988: 101). They claimed to ensure a quick economic recovery, political revival and to return to the barracks soon (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 99). The NLC tried to dismantle the Nkrumahist state by pushing it back from the economic sphere. Hence it implemented an austerity programme combined with IMF-supported monetary reforms. These reform measure provided indeed some macroeconomic recovery (ibid; see table 3.2.3 and 3.2.4). However, rearranging the formal economic institutions, including closing uneconomic state projects and a general reduction in state expenditure, also led to resistance towards the NLC despite its initially broad support from society.

A series of severe strikes by mineworkers and railwaymen (Dowse 1975: 28) indicated the continued presence of the Nkrumahist state. At the same time restoring civil liberties slowly opened up the previously oppressed cultural sphere for debates, so that students and other critics of the government used the reopened space to express their dissatisfaction with the regime's pro-Western orientation and in particular its liberal economic policies. Many Ghanaians critiqued the privatisation of state-owned entreprises, since they either believed the state had received too little for its assets, and/or regarded the sales as a retreat from the pursuit of economic independence (Herbst 1993: 22).

With Nkrumah's ideology still very entrenched and present in the cultural sphere, the NLC faced severe resistance towards its liberal economic policies. The regime was simply not capable of displacing Nkrumah's ideology on how the state should participate in the economy with its own alternative vision. Moreover, ethnic undertones soon arose with ethnic leaders from the forest regions and the north claiming their political access was confined by the coastal tinting of the NLC (Chazan 1988: 102). An attempted counter coup in April 1967, in which Kotoka, leader of the coup that overthrew Nkrumah, was killed, was interpreted by some as an insurrection of Ashanti and Fanti against the Ga and Ewe dominated NLC (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 99; Chazan 1988: 101; Dowse 1975: 25-27).[12] Ethnic

[11] The leadership of the NLC was made up by General Joseph Ankrah (Ga), Inspector General of Police John Harlley (Ewe), Colonel E.K. Kotoka (Ewe), Commissioner of Police B.A. Yakubu (Northerner from Gushegu), Colonel A.K. Ocran (Fanti), Assistant Commissioner of Police J.E.O. Nunoo (Ga), Major A.A. Afrifa (Asante), and Deputy Commissioner of Police A.K. Deku (Ewe) (Smock and Smock 1975: 240).

[12] Ethnicity had not explicitly been referred to as a factor for the 1966 coup. Yet three key plotters were Ewes, a group which had not been represented in Nkrumah's cabinet since Gbedemah had

tensions increased within the NLC and the politicised ethnic-regional cleavage was distinct in the 1969 election results (see Brown 1982: 55-59).

Ahead of the polls the NLC initiated the process of crafting a new constitution. While most former CPP party leaders were excluded from the Constituent Assembly (Chazan 1988: 103; Dowse 1975: 24), Ghana's traditional rulers enjoyed renewed influence under the NLC and ensured that their interests were secured within the new emerging formal political institutions (Dowse 1975: 22). Since the new regime could not rely on forces which had supported Nkrumah, it forged an alliance with those least associated with the CPP regime. Ankrah, Head of the State under the NLC, declared:

> **We shall respect the institution of chieftaincy and recognise the role chiefs will play in the development of Ghana (Dowse 1975: 21).**

And Harlley, who had helped Ankrah to topple Nkrumah and was Inspector General of Police and member of the NLC, assured that he regarded:

> **[…] chieftaincy an essential element in Ghana's national life (ibid.).**

Both prominent groups opposing the CPP, the NLM and Northern People's Party, incorporated chiefly elements – for example Busia and Dombo (Dowse 1975: 21). Moreover, with chieftaincy still gaining widespread support in both urban and rural areas, the NLC might have been seeking to secure a degree of legitimacy it was otherwise lacking (ibid.).

The basis for the composition of Ghana's new ruling coalition was laid with the NLC passing Decree No. 345 which banned senior officials and prominent members of the CPP regime from holding any significant political positions within the Second Republic (Fordwor 2010: 116). In light of this decision as well as the NLC's incorporation of Busia, who after his return to Ghana in March 1966 ran a civic education campaign for the NLC government, many CPP members argued that the exclusion of the CPP ran counter to the democratic claims of the NLC. Critics reasoned that excluding the CPP, the only party which was able to pose a real challenge to Busia's newly formed Progress Party (PP), would give an unfair and clear advantage to the nationalist conservative faction (Fordwor 2010: 116).

The two leading political parties contesting the 1969 elections were the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), led by Gbedemah who previously had split from the CPP, and the Progress Party under the leadership of Busia, which was a re-

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been removed by Nkrumah in 1961 (Smock and Smock 1975: 240). The sidelined Ewe faction seemed to have forged successfully a temporary broader based ethnic alliance with the nationalist conservative forces amongst Ghana's security forces.

vised version of the UP (NLM and UGCC) (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 99; Chazan 1988: 103). Even though the PP overwhelmingly won the elections, securing 105 out of 140 seats, the polls revealed that neither of the two parties was nationally as broadly based within society as the CPP (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 100). While the NAL won no seats in the Akan regions, the PP did not manage to secure any seats in the Ewe areas, illustrating clearly an ethno-regional voting pattern (Frempong 2012: 36). The results mirrored the previously mentioned ethnic divisions within the NLC, in particular since Harlley and Deku, who were both leading the police forces (see footnote 9) preferred their fellow Ewe Gbedemah to win, while Afrifa, as NLC member and Asante/Akan, who had tried to disqualify Gbedemah from the 1969 election, supported the candidacy of Busia. Busia was in contrast a royal decendent of the house of Wenchi in Brong-Ahafo and hence also an Akan like Afrifa (Brown 1982: 57-59; Smock and Smock 1975: 240-242).

The previous alliance between the Akan and Ewe in the NLC was replaced by an Akan-Ewe rivalry, which was going to shape Ghana's electoral politics lastingly. In fact, since no Ewe had won a parliamentary seat on the ticket of the PP and since the 1969 constitution stipulated that ministers had to be chosen only from parliament, Busia's cabinet had no Ewe members (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 100; Oquaye 1980: 72). Nevertheless as promised in 1969 the NLC handed over power to Busia's civilian Asante-Brong ruling coalition.

Shifting resources to the rural areas

The development strategy of the PP government followed the one of the NLC: a policy of strengthening the private sector coupled with a renewed stress on agriculture and rural development (Chazan 1988: 105). The manifesto of the PP for the 1969 elections had claimed that the party was going to

> **redress the developmental imbalance between urban and the rural areas (Fordwor 2010: 124).**

Once in power the PP regime did improve the transport infrastructure by building feeder roads which improved the connection between rural areas and the urban centres. Besides it ameliorated water supplies, electricity and health services in rural communities where its power base lay (Fordwor 2010: 124; Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 100).

To achieve higher standards of living the PP formed the National Service Corp (NSC) whose aim was to increase the production of staple foods crops such as maize and cassava. It coordinated the rural labour force and was supposed to demonstrate that those who helped themselves would get further assistance from the government (Fordwor 2010: 124). Moreover, the PP increased the producer price of cocoa from 4 to 8 Cedi per load of 60lb (Fordwor 2010: 127) and established a Development Fund (Fordwor 2010: 124). This fund was provided with resources from taxing workers and civil servants, hence primarily the urban constituents. While workers had to pay a percentage of their wages towards the Development Fund, senior civil servants who were provided with official accommodation by the state were obliged by the government to pay 15% of their salary as rent (Fordwor 2010: 124; Packham 2001: 192).

Busia also paid attention to large-scale mechanized agriculture. Like the NLC, the PP government encouraged high ranking civil servants, members of the professional class, as well as foreigners to invest in agriculture (Gyimah-Boadi 1989: 229). The state provided considerable support for private large scale investments in the sector by subsidizing inputs such as fertiliser and improved seeds, and granting access to soft loans (Ninsin 1989b: 172). Hence, while the PP ruling coalition was on the one hand driven to protect stool lands and defended the interests of Ghana's traditional elite, it also ensured that its agricultural policy opened up profitable opportunities for members of its modern elite (ibid.). Chazan (1988: 105) states

> **The big patrons of the PP used the freedom they had within the democratic framework to appropriate public resources for private wealth.**

Entrenched legacies catchup on the PP

Despite the regime's liberal economic mindset, Busia shied away from selling off any more state-owned enterprises since it was aware of the resistance by the urban constituents towards the NLC's attempts at privatization. In fact, regarding the industrial sector the presence of the state continued and even expanded during the late 1960s. Between 1965 and 1969 four new state enterprises were created and Busia established the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, to coordinate their management (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 102). It seemed the concept of state ownership and state operational intervention in the business sector had become accepted in Ghana (ibid.).

The NLC's initial attempt to withdraw the state from the economic sphere was no longer rigorously followed by the PP. The urban pressure groups situated close to the centre of power imposed policy constraints on Busia. Faced with a situation in which the rural factions could not be relied upon to produce, in the foreseeable future, the kind of increased productivity upon which to build both economic and political security, the PP regime was sensitive to the demands of urban pressure groups. To ensure the new ruling coalition's security, the government needed to mobilize some kind of support from the urban factions (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 101).

To do so the PP regime reverted to a state led and rapid industrialization policy similar to the one adopted under Nkrumah. J.H. Mensah, who had already played a key role in drawing up Nkrumah's Seven Year Plan, held on, as Busia's Minister of Finance, to his strategy of enhancing growth by fiscal expansion (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 101 and 103-108; Herbst 1993: 22). For a short time it was possible to implement high spending policies, since the international price for cocoa had been exceptionally high (see figure 3.1 for the years 1966-69 and table 3.2.4 column 3). In the medium term however, fiscal expansion to support rapid industrial growth combined with a heavy debts burden from Nkrumah's era increased Ghana's public deficit.

Just within two years the PP government had accumulated the same amount of debts Nkrumah had compiled over nine years (Chazan 1988: 106). Paired with sharply dipping international prices for cocoa in 1969/70 (see figure 3.1 above and table 3.2.4 column 3), and increasing imports due to the government's liberalization of its import regime (see table 3.2.3 column 5), the Busia government had worked its way back to the structural twin deficit the state had faced before (see table 3.2.3 column 3, 5, 6 and 7; Chazan 1988: 105). With inflation soaring and food prices increasing, the real cocoa producer price fell from 1969 to 1971 (see table 3.2.4 column 4). Thus, the fiscal deficits and overvaluation of the Cedi entirely offset the government's incentive policies regarding productive entrepreneurs in the rural areas.

Facing increased fiscal constraints, the regime sought to bridge its perceived short-term balance of payments issue with a credit line from American banks. The request however was not granted, since the Americans did not want to undermine ongoing multilateral negotiations concerning Ghana's debts. The

negative response was probably equally caused by a seemingly general apprehension that Ghana was returning to economic policies similar to Nkrumah's (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 105). Busia also attempted to ensure bi-lateral financial support from Britain, West-Germany and France. It was hoped that the Western allies would value Ghana's democratization efforts and recognise the threat the fiscal situation posed to Ghana's political stability (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 106). The creditors however did not share the PP's view that the balance of payments problem was of short-term character. They refused any immediate foreign capital flow to Ghana which pushed the Busia government to implement corrective measures (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 107). On the 27th of December 1971 the regime devalued the Cedi by about 42 percent (ibid.).

The devaluation of Ghana's currency decreased the Cedi's purchasing power drastically, in particular with regards to imported goods. While the devaluation of Ghana's currency affected all groups within society, the urban constituents had already experienced a reduction of welfare due to the shift of resources in favour of the rural areas (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 100). Many of the privileged elements within society had been reluctant to accept the changes implemented by the regime such as the development levy and rent payments for official residences. In addition, members of the armed forces and the police became aggrieved when amenities and facilities they had previously enjoyed, such as free electricity, water and maintenance allowances for their cars, had been taken away or reduced. Moreover, the PP regime had decided to increase security forces' rent for accommodation, in some cases by as much as 100% (Fordwor 2010: 142). These changes put security forces in a worse position than under the regime of Nkrumah.

Table 3.3 Indicators of Ghana's economic decline (II)

					Fiscal policy		External sector		Money & inflation	
(1) Year	(2) Population in million	(3) Exports fob in million Cedi	(4) Cocoa exports in million Cedi	(5) Imports cif in million Cedi	(6) Revenue current prices in million Cedi	(7) Expenditure current prices in millions Cedi	(8) Net re-serves ratio to GDP	(9) Measure of over- or un-dervaluation base 1960 (%)	(10) Money supply change over previ-ous year (%)	(11) Rate of inflation (%)
1966	7.9	222	117	298	231	273	-1.8	60.3	4.2	14.8
1967	8.1	274	131	315	236	321	-3.5	19.8	-4.0	-9.7
1968	8.3	396	181	369	298	400	-2.6	4.8	8.3	10.7
1969	8.4	447	221	428	332	395	-5.2	6.7	11.5	6.5
1970	8.6	523	301	539	437	468	-1.1	2.5	6.9	3.0
1971	8.9	537	203	689	451	524	-0.4	6.9	3.2	8.8
1972	9.1	582	275	428	420	543	4.5	-17.6	43.8	10.8

Source: Frimpong-Ansah (1991: 160-169)

Table 3.4 Indicators of Ghana's cocoa sector (II)

(1) Year	(2) Cocoa production in tons	(3) International price for cocoa (in $/kg, real 2010$)	(4) Real producer price (in 1972 NC)
1966	381,100	2.498808	294
1967	423,500	2.862174	364
1968	327,000	3.479971	376
1969	414,300	4.113398	363
1970	406,000	2.907652	349
1971	470,000	2.203595	320
1972	415,700	2.418084	366

Source: (1) FAOSTAT (2015); (2) World Bank GEM Commodities (2014); (3) Stryker et al. (1990: 101)

In addition, ethnic resentments were further fulled by the plan of the mostly Asante-Brong regime to sack 568 individuals from the civil service, who were predominantly Ewe and Ga. When the Supreme Court ordered their reinstatement, Busia refused to comply with the ruling and hence violated the judiciary's independence (Fordwor 2010: 134-136). Widespread grievances against the PP regime were expressed by student protests, a rash of strikes and rural agitation. In response to the severe opposition, Busia disbanded the Trade Union Congress and threatened the leadership of the National Union of Ghanaian Students (Chazan 1988: 106). The increasing economic deterioration for core factions important for the security of the PP regime, led to their alienation from the government and eventually to the regime's decay. On the 13th of January 1972, shortly after the devaluation of the currency, Colonel Acheampong overthrew the PP government in another military coup (Fordwor 2010: 143).

Busia's regime had not succeed in the balancing act of strengthening the state's domestic productive entrepreneurs (Ghana's rural small scale cocoa farmers) and keeping the urban factions, representing a security challenge for any ruling coalition in Ghana, at bay. The PP's failure to curb the demands of the wider state, and the urban factions in particular, led to fiscal policy excess which coupled with the external shock of falling cocoa prices destabilized the vulnerable external sector. Paradoxically the attempt to keep urban factions content eventually undermined the economic base provided by the regime's rural constituency which was needed to guarantee the regime's political security.

3.3 Gramscian organic crisis and collapse of Ghana's post-independent settlement

The following section will outline how the overtaxation of Ghana's rural productive entrepreneurs in favour of the urban factions' consumption which characterised Ghana's post-independent settlement, had assumed proportions eroding the country's economic base. In fact, it led to its fiscal and economic breakdown and resulted in the disintegration and collapse of the entire state system.

3.3.1 Reinforcing old institutions and their inherent distribution of benefits?

The new military coup in 1972 marked not only the point when the military had clearly become a mechanism for altering ruling coalitions; but it also represented the arrival of the military as one of the permanent contenders for political power in Ghana (Austin 1975: 5). While the first coup which ousted Nkrumah from power could claim to have broken an enforced monopoly of a single party regime to reinstall competitive politics, Busia's administration ruled under a constitution which foresaw elections in 1973/4 (ibid.; Chazan 1988: 107). In 1966 senior security forces intervened with the intent of passing power to the alternative civilian faction which had previously been excluded from the political sphere. For the upper middle ranks of the officer corps who had toppled Busia there was no perceptible civilian alternative to the dismissed nationalist conservative ruling coalition. Acheampong, who was mocked by established elite groups for not being a university graduate or even attending one of the more academic secondary schools (Svanikier 2007: 130), installed himself and the military in power with no limit to their rule (Austin 1975: 5). Thereby he established the military as a new dominant faction amongst Ghana's political and economic elite adding to Ghana's high rotation amongst ruling elites.

A key reason for the coup had been the military's and civil servants' reduced real income (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 108). Naturally Acheampong opposed the devaluation of the Cedi and the implied redistribution of resources to the rural factions implemented by the PP. The first policy decisions of the new National Redemption Council (NRC), were to rectify the PP's policies by restoring allowances and benefits to civil servants and to revalue – at least partially – the Cedi (ibid.). Thus Acheampong was setting about re-establishing institutions for the benefit of societal factions close to the nucleus of the state. Besides the military and the bureaucracy, the NRC included traditional rulers in its ruling

coalition aiming to depoliticize public life (Chazan 1988: 107; see also Oquaye 1980: 204). The PP's leaders and over 1300 ex-politicians, who the NRC blamed for the country's economic ills, were arrested and detained to underline the regime's intention of establishing an apolitical technocratic/ administrative regime (Stryker et al. 1990: 59). The NRC tried to suppress ethnic divisiveness, which had come to the forefront again under Busia, by promoting regional balance and creating the most ethnically balanced cabinet since independence (ibid.). The new leadership also denounced the PP for permitting international actors' excessive influence on Ghana's economic policies and proclaimed a return to statism. The new regime tried to distinguish itself clearly from the previous government in ideological terms, but also differed with regard to its prime support base within society.

In light of Ghana's history, the open return to socialist-style economic policy might lead some to expect a rapid deterioration of the economy. However, the economy prospered between 1972-74 (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 108), since the NRC had entered a pact with Ghana's Central Bank. This pact stated that the Bank was going to manage the country's external sector and ensure that no unbearable balance of trade deficits would occur (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 109). A restrictive trade regime was re-established, similar to the one under Nkrumah, which gave the NRC a firmer grip on the outflow of foreign currency. Much more decisive was the NRC's unilateral repudiation of Ghana's international debts. This step enabled the regime to disentangle itself from the burdensome commitment of repaying large amounts of foreign currency to creditors and created some financial scope (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 108). The refusal to repay Ghana's debts, which became popularly known as "Yentua" policy – we shall not pay – formed part of the NRC's overall call for self-reliance (Oquaye 1980: 13). It stood in harsh contrast to Busia's "Kafo didi" – the debtor must eat – policy (see Busia 1971: 218) which was strongly condemned by his critics as too pro-West and servile towards the creditor nations (Amamoo 2007: 155). It was evident that the NRC's step to refuse any further repayment of its international debts ruled out any large inflow of foreign capital in terms of concessional and long-term bilateral loans needed for fostering industrialization in the years to come. Future economic growth was therefore only feasible through the agricultural sector (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 109).

These circumstances led to the pragmatic policy of aiming for self-sufficiency in agriculture and actively promoting the food sector. With “Operation Feed Yourself” (OFY) the NRC intended to usher in an agricultural revolution (Oquaye 1980: 12). It aimed to meet a steadily increasing demand for food staples driven by a growing population (see table 3.2.1; 3.2.2 and 3.3.1 each column 2) with local production (import substitution), rather than food imports further depleting Ghana’s foreign currency reserves (Konings 1984: 96). To push for a green revolution, the share for agriculture in the budget rose between 1972-78 about 62.5% (Ninsin 1989b: 173) and Ghana’s main development banks were instructed to increase their lending to the agricultural sector (ibid.). Agricultural production rose and due to extremely favourable world market prices during the first half of the 1970s (see figure 3.1) the economy prospered under the first three years of NRC rule. The pact between the NRC and the Central Bank represented de facto a self-imposed austerity programme which ran counter to Acheampong’s initial promise to his urban support base (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 109). Government expenditures and imports as ratio of GDP decreased between 1972-74, and trade surpluses were registered which allowed Ghana’s foreign currency reserves to rise again (see table 3.3.1 columns 3, 5 and 8; Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 108). The recovering agricultural production and the regime’s financial support showed that investment in land yielded massive profit.

Members of the ruling coalition took advantage of the opportunities opening up and acquired, with state support, large amounts of arable land (Lefore 2012). The rice production in the Northern Savannah zone is one example of how businessmen, politicians, serving and retired bureaucrats, top military and police personnel transformed themselves into capitalist rice farmers (Ninsin 1989b: 172-177). Oquaye (1980: 187) notes:

> **Nearly every Commissioner formed a company and became a full-time business-tycoon, a part-time Commissioner and for his hobby, an Army officer.**

The rush for farm lands also involved foreign private capital, so that agricultural production was soon penetrated by multinational investments (Ninsin 1989b: 174).

The enormous flow of capital into the agricultural sector increased the demand for land and intensified competition over it (Lefore 2012). Large scale agricultural projects like the Twifo (Hemang) Oil Palm Project in the Central region; the Benso Oil Palm Project in the Western region; and the Cocoa Marketing

Board Coffee Plantations in the Ashanti region all represent examples of interventions which crowded out small scale farmers by depriving them of land (Ninsin 1989b: 174). In fact, an old colonial law, which vested all communal land of the North in the state, had enabled the ruling elite to easily appropriate Northern land for private commercial interests (Ninsin 1989b: 175). Like previous ruling elites, memebers of the NRC used their access to the state for larger capital accumulation. With military men's increased role in the country's economic sphere as well as their occupation of key positions in public corporations and government ministries (Chazan 1988: 107), they had established themselves not only as political but also as new members of Ghana's economic elite.

Large cocoa exports combined with high international prices for cocoa boosted government revenue in 1974/75 (see table 3.3.1 column 6). This allowed the NRC to expand state expenditure (see table 3.3.1 column 7), in particular large wage increases to public sector employees (Stryker et al. 1990: 62). The regime had resumed negotiations with its creditors and tried to reschedule Ghana's external debts hoping opportunities of external capital inflows would reopen. In light of rising revenue and a more relaxed international environment, the NRC did not deem necessary to further subdue the demands of the wider state. However, the regime's enlarged spending structure was not sustainable in the second half of the 1970s when international prices for cocoa crashed (see figure 3.1 above). In 1975 the gap between government expenditure and revenue began to significantly widen again (see table 9.2.2 columns 6 and 7). Moreover, the pact between the regime and Ghana's Central Bank withered when its Governor, J.H. Frimpong-Ansah, retired in 1973 and was replaced by Amon Nikoi under whom a more accommodating relationship evolved between the Bank and the NRC (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 110). By the mid-1970s the Central Bank was financing again government's increased budget deficits by increasing money supply (see table 3.3.1 column 10; Woods 2004: 234-235). As a result, inflation augmented quickly (see table 3.3.1 column 11), and a continued overvaluation of the Cedi in combination with rapidly deteriorating international cocoa prices at the end of the 1970s eventually led to the disintegration of the NRC's hegemony.

Table 3.5 Indicators of Ghana's economic decline (III)

					Fiscal policy		External sector		Money & inflation	
(1) Year	(2) Population in million	(3) Exports fob in million Cedi	(4) Cocoa exports in million Cedi	(5) Imports cif in million Cedi	(6) Revenue current prices in million Cedi	(7) Expenditure current prices in millions Cedi	(8) Net reserves ratio to GDP	(9) Measure of over- or un-dervaluation base 1960 (%)	(10) Money supply change over previ-ous year (%)	(11) Rate of inflation (%)
1971	8.9	537	203	689	451	524	-0.4	6.9	3.2	8.8
1972	9.1	582	275	428	420	543	4.5	-17.6	43.8	10.8
1973	9.4	751	397	600	382	549	6.1	-9.0	28.3	17.1
1974	9.6	868	466	1054	584	754	0.0	-5.8	18.6	18.8
1975	9.9	1023	556	974	810	1146	2.4	6.4	44.3	29.8
1976	10.3	1025	516	1047	870	1484	0.3	58.2	41.6	55.4
1977	10.4	1171	680	1289	1171	2137	0.0	177.3	67.1	116.5
1978	10.8	1754	988	2033	1393	3165	0.1	220.4	72.8	73.1
1979	11.1	3259	1846	2792	2600	4296	1.2	133.5	13.3	54.5
1980	11.5	3521	2564	3835	2951	4668	0.5	201.7	30.1	50.2
1981	11.9	3454	1118	3866	3279	7719	-0.3	563.6	54.5	116.5

Source: Frimpong-Ansah (1991: 160-169)

Table 3.6 Indicators of Ghana's cocoa sector (III)

(1) Year	(2) Cocoa production in tons	(3) International price for cocoa (in $/kg, real 2010$)	(4) Real producer price (in 1972 NC)
1971	470,000	2.203595	320
1972	415,700	2.418084	366
1973	343,000	3.661782	374
1974	385,100	4.147190	354
1975	397,300	2.980658	333
1976	326,700	4.834464	263
1977	277,400	8.285695	220
1978	268,200	6.402001	252
1979	280,800	5.552967	237
1980	277,200	3.991594	147
1981	246,500	3.184666	211

Source: (1) FAOSTAT (2015); (2) World Bank GEM Commodities (2014); (3) Stryker et al. (1990: 101)

3.3.2 The maximized "urban vampire state"

As the balance of payments situation worsened, the NRC attempted to structure the import bill away from consumer goods and towards industrial raw materials and producers' equipment (Stryker et al. 1990: 63). However, restriction on imports caused shortages of a variety of goods including food stuffs like rice and maize. Surges in food prices were the consequence, since shortages were only partly dampened by shifts in production towards these importables. This situation further fuelled inflation and undermined increases in wages, producer prices, and other incentives. Soon formal institutions of market allocation were replaced by an informal allocation system which became known as "Kalabule" (Oquaye 1980: 17). The NRC issued import licences to family members, friends and a few selected regime supporters. With import restrictions in place only these individuals were able to import goods. Thus a privileged few with access to patronage networks had control over the distribution of scarce goods which they resold to "middle retailers" at highly increased prices to make big and quick money. "Middle Kalabule traders" again resold those goods at inflated prices to make money just like the small market women who vended the goods to the public (see table 3.3.3 to get an impression on levels of price increase).

Some commodities disappeared completely from the market or were only sold informally in secret. In addition, market women and other retailers engaged in hoarding to pass goods on when prices, and hence profits, could be maximized. According to Oquaye (1980: 21):

> **Kalabule sellers made the buyer feel that the latter was lucky to get anything to buy at all and at whatever price.**

By the mid-1970s a system of profiteering, corruption, and favouritism had been superimposed on all formal economic institutions, and in 1978 Ghana was, after Argentina, the country with the highest inflation in the world (Oquaye 1980: 27).

Table 3.7 Market prices in Ghana for commodities in 1972-78

Commodity	Price in Cedi		Price increase in %
	1972	1978	
1 tin of milk	0.17	3.00	1664.71
1 packet of cube sugar	2.00	20.00	900.00
1 lux soap	0.70	5.00	614.21
1 tinned tomatoes	0.65	6.00	823.08
1 loaf of bread	0.40	5.00	1150.00
1 large margarine	0.80	15.00	1775.00
1 bottle of large bear	0.55	8.00	1354.55
1 bottle of Coca Cola	0.20	1.50	650.00

Source: Oquaye 1980: 21 and 25

Rampant price increases and overvaluation of the Cedi made selling goods rather than producing them much more lucrative, so that investments in manufacturing and production were neglected. The privileged few who became rich through state patronage and the economic anarchy at the time did not reinvest their profits in production, but spent it on importing luxurious goods (Oquaye 1980: 16). Through channelling state patronage primarily to senior military officers, Acheampong successfully co-opted those who could pose an immediate threat to his reign. By the mid-1970s he did not shy away from using national resources to buy his (regime's) security (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 111).

The ordinary citizens who had to bear the costs of the regime's economic mismanagement developed different coping mechanisms. Plenty of citizens resorted to "beat-the-system" strategies (Pellow and Chazan 1986: 168). Cocoa farmers disengaged from the state by circumventing the Cocoa Marketing Board and smuggled their harvest to neighbouring Ivory Coast and Togo where they received higher prices for their production. While farmers could expect about 80 Cedi per load in Ghana, on the black market they received between 120-140 Cedi per load (Oquaye 1980: 50). Bulíř (1998: 23) and Stryker et al.

(1990: 267) estimate that about 40-60.000 tons of Ghanaian cocoa were sold per year through Abidjan during the late 1970s.

While rural citizens could engage in subsistence farming to feed themselves, urban factions, in particular those with fixed incomes and mainly depended on purchasing food, were most affected by the drastic price increases (Azarya and Chazan 1987: 117). While it was harder for the urban factions to immediately extricate themselves from the state, plenty of the professions including doctors, engineers, architects, surveyors, accountants and teachers withdrew by emigration (see Anarfi et al. 2003: 31; Gravil 1985: 528; Azarya and Chazan 1987: 118). But also unskilled and semiskilled labour disengaged from the Ghanaian state by emigrating in masses to, amongst others, Nigeria (ibid.). Those of the urban factions who could not or did not want to leave, soon engaged in revolts and strikes, challenging further the crumbling hegemony of the ruling military (see Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 111; Oquaye 1980: 56-66).

3.3.3 Attempts at realigning the ruling coalition

With the deterioration of the economic situation Acheampong's initial ruling coalition of the military, the bureaucracy and traditional rulers crumbled (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 110). Since soldiers occupied all key public positions, including boards of state financial institutions and the Central Bank, their standing was damaged and they were regarded as responsible for the economic misery. Aware of the fact that his regime's hegemony was challenged, Acheampong opted for a strategy Gramsci refers to as transformism. In 1975 he chose to reorganize the structure of his government, rather than reassessing policy (Chazan 1988: 107). Hence, Acheampong reformed his coalition by replacing the NRC with the Supreme Military Council (SMC) which was entirely made up of service commanders (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 110). This step amplified the beneficiaries of state patronage and largesse amongst those who could pose an immediate threat to Acheampong's rule. As a result, the regime became even more exclusive which removed it further from the ordinary citizens and resentment formed also among the lower ranks of the military.

The increased side-lining of civilian factions coupled with the economic crisis led to a cycle of ever-widening dissent and protest. Urban elites, predominantly professionals, organized in the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPB), spearheaded the protest and were joined by students, traders,

bureaucrats and chiefs (Chazan 1988: 108). Other movements which called for a return to civilian and constitutional government included the Front for the Prevention of Dictatorship (FPD) and the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ). The leadership of the PMFJ included many Progress Party stalwarts like William Ofori-Atta (son of Ofori Atta I, King of Akyem Abudkwa, and founder of the UGCC), Jones Ofori-Atta (son of Ofori Atta I, King of Akyem Abudkwa and Deputy Minister of Finance under Busia), A.K. Deku (NLC member/Ewe), Adu Boahen (who ran as the presidential candidate for the nationalist conservative faction in the early 1990s) and Nana Akufo-Addo (grandson of son of Ofori Atta I, King of Akyem Abudkwa, son of Edward Akufo-Addo), who acted as the movement's General Secretary and continues to play a decisive role in politics until today as the leader of the current main opposition party NPP (Fordwor 2010: 149; Oquaye 1980: 89). To safeguard his and the military's continued role in the political sphere, Acheampong intended to reform his coalition once again by establishing "Union Government" (Unigov).

Unigov was to be based on representation of all major groups in society including the military (Chazan 1988: 109). The plans evoked an even wider wave of protest and culminated in a countrywide strike in July 1977 demanding Acheampong's removal. Instead of bowing entirely to the pressure from below, the regime responded with a two-year schedule for a return to civilian rule. The first phase envisaged a plebiscite on Unigov which was held in March 1978. While opposition forces against Unigov coalesced around PMFJ and FPD which were predominantely based in Kumasi (Ashant region), the new realigned regime sponsored the pro-Unigov Ghana Peace and Solidarity Council (GPSC) which was led by some ex-CPP stalwarts (Chazan 1988: 109). This situation caused old competing political factions to resurge during the referendum.[13]

The campaign was intense and heavily distorted. The SMC sold food stuff at controlled prices to selected individuals who then resold the goods to government bodies at higher prices. The profit, on which no tax was paid, was funnelled to promote the campaign for Unigov (Oquaye 1980: 23). At the same time the campaign efforts of the opposition forces were suppressed and its members harassed. In the end only 42.48% of the registered voters participated

[13] Since membership in factions remained fluid, the divisions were not as clear-cut as the dichotomous categories suggest. For exmaple K.A. Gbedemah, former minister of finance under Nkrumah, was a member of the PMFJ just like Lt.-General Afrifa who had supported Busia's PP (Oquaye 1980: 89).

in the poll, indicating that most Ghanaians preferred to stand aside (Chazan 1988: 109). While the official results declared Unigov had won the plebiscite, events around the management of the polls resulted in wide-spread rumours that the SMC had in fact lost the referendum. Ahead of the poll the government had demanded from Justice Abban, acting Electoral Commissioner at the time, that the regime could chose its own returning officers. Abban refused not only to comply with this demand, but also with the regime's instruction to count votes at regional centres using soldiers and policemen, rather than at the constituency level as the electoral law foresaw (Oquaye 1980: 97-105). A temporary disappearance of Abban while counting was ongoing, his dismissal and replacement coupled with a ban of the Electoral Commission, PMFJ and FPD caused people to believe that the regime had failed to pressurise Abban to alter the results and had actually lost the referendum (Asamoah 2014: 243-44). In July 1978 the crisis exploded into a coup in which Acheampong was replaced by Lt.-General F.W. Akuffo, Acheampong's Chief of Defence Staff who became Head of State of SMC II.[14] In brief, the NRC/SMC I regime under Acheampong had enlarged the state, appeased the urban factions, and was thrown out by them when no further benefits could be extracted from the shattered productive sectors (Frimpong-Ansah 1991: 111).

3.3.4 Collapse of Ghana's post-independence settlement

Within the next three years after Akuffo had seized power, Ghana not only experienced a further deterioration of its fiscal and economic situation (see table 3.3.1 above from 1978), but also underwent increased political instability. Just between 1979-81 Ghanaians experienced four different governments. On June 4th, 1979 the SMC II regime was replaced by another military coup, this time from below, which temporarily established junior officers in power (Kandeh 2004: 65-96; Hutchful 1998: 211-256).[15] They formed the Armed Forces Revo-

[14] The SMC II was made up of the following members: General Akuffo as Head of State; Major-General Osei Boateng (Boarder Guards Commander); Major-General Odartey Wellington (Army Commander); Lieutnant-General Joshua Hamidu (CDS); Rear Admiral Joy Amedume (Navy Commander); Air Vice Marshal Yaw Boakye (Air Force Commander) and B.S.Y. Kwakye (IGP) (Asamoah 2014: 244).

[15] The AFRC which governed the country from June 1979 was originally composed as follows: Flight-Lieutnant J.J. Rawlings (Chairman); Captain Boakye-Gyan (Official Spokesman); Major Mensah-Poku; Major Mensah-Gbedemah; Lt.-Commander Apaloo; Warrant Officer Class II Obeng; Private Owusu Adu; Corporal Owusu Boateng; Staff Sergeant Alex Adjei; Leading Aircraftman Gatsiko; Lance-Corporal Peter Tasiri; Lance-Corporal Ansah-Atiemo; Lance-Corporal Sarkodee-Addo; Corporal Sheikh Tetteh (Oquaye 1980: 135).

lutionary Council (AFRC) under the Chairmanship of Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, who would go on to play a recurrent and decisive role in Ghanaian politics throughout the following decades. The AFRC could not accept that the SMC II had envisaged to go back to barracks without steps having been taken to punish those who had tarnished the image of the Armed Forces. In the view of the junior officers this situation posed a threat to the existence of the Armed Forces (Oquaye 1980: 138).

As a result, the AFRC dealt ruthlessly with Ghana's previous military rulers. Acheampong, Akuffo, Afrifa and other notable NLC and SMC leaders were executed by firing squad (Oquaye 1980: 138-139). More were sentenced to death, life imprisonment or were jailed for several years (Oquaye 1980: 144-146). The junior officers were determined to overhaul the existing power structure in the political sphere, but also intended to stop black marketeering, hoarding and corrupt practices (Chazan 1988: 110-111). There were investigations, property confiscations and tax collection exercises. Those found guilty were fined, flogged or jailed. When exhortations failed, the AFRC regime even razed Makola Market Number 1, one of Accra's main trading centres (Chazan 1988: 111) so that their interlude brought unprecedented levels of violence to ordinary citizens. The AFRC's coup however only interrupted and did not stop the SMC II's plan to return to civilian rule. Elections were scheduled for June 1979 and for the first time in Ghanaian history a National Consultative Assembly comprising members from both dominant competing political factions was formed to discuss the way forward (Oquaye 1980: 170). Soon political parties re-emerged: The People's National Party (PNP) was formed by Imoru Egala who helped his nephew Hilla Limann from Sisalla – based in today's Upper West region – to the post as the PNP's presidential candidate. Meanwhile the Progress Party representing the nationalist conservative faction split in two different parties: The Popular Front Party (PFP) represented the Asante faction under the leadership of Victor Owusu, and the United National Convention (UNC) led by William Ofori-Atta, who, as son of Ofori Atta I, King of Akyem Abuakwa, bundled the coastal forces of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition around the Akyem faction. The Action Congress Party (ACP) became known as "The Farmers' Party" whereas the Social Democratic Front (SDF) represented the faction of labour coalescing around the Trade Union Congress (Oquaye 1980: 164-170).

Limann won the 1979 general elections and became Ghana's first northern president. His cabinet resembled that of Busia with regards to its "class" composition and ethnic bias. This time the bias was however in favour of the Ga and Northern factions (Chazan 1988: 113). While the PNP had advocated for reforms, old patterns continued. The government carried on with its overspending (it had tripled the minimum wage) and as a result inflation soared in the early 1980s (see table 3.3.1 column 11). Acute food shortages persisted and cocoa production reached its lowest level since independence at precisely the time when the international price for cocoa dropped into a trough (see table 3.3.2 column 2 and figure 3.1 above). With economic and ethnic discontent rising, the Limann government was clamping down on the cultural sphere: demonstrations were supressed and the press was censored.

During the days of increasing economic suffering, nostalgia spread in Ghana's cultural sphere about the era of Nkrumah and its achievements. Urban labour unrest reached unprecedented levels (Nugent 1995: 31) and radical ideas gradually took hold amongst the student body particularly at the University of Ghana at Legon (Nugent 1995: 32). The students had already been politicized and could claim some political credit for the demise of the NRC regime. Besides, the mutiny of June 4 in 1979 had spurred the proliferation of various political associations and heightened political awareness – also in socio-economic terms – amongst certain urban factions (Yeebo 1985: 64). Two groups became of vital importance: the New Democratic Movement (NDM) and the June 4 Movement (JFM) (Nugent 1995: 33). The NDM was formed at Legon and consisted of academics and students like Yao Graham, Fui Tsikata[16] and Kwesi Botchwey, who later became Ghana's Minister of Finance in the crucial time period between 1982 to 1995 (The Insight 2002). The JFM on the other hand was named after the mutiny and derived its discipleship initially only from students. Soon however the JFM strove to mobilise beyond the student body and it pledged to maintain the impetus of AFRC reform. (Baynham 1985: 637). For this purpose it quietly began to build a constituency for revolutionary change (Nugent 1995: 33). Many JFM members were young Northerners including for example Zaya Yeebo, Napoleon Abdulai and Chris Atim in leading positions.

[16] He is the older brother of Tsatsu Tsikata who was the lead counsil for the NDC in the election petition 2012/13 (see chapter four) and served as Chief Executive of the Ghana Petroleum Commpany between 1988-2000.

Their nostalgia about Nkrumah's era and support for the JFM was not surprising since they believed that it was Nkrumah's socialist educational policies which had allowed them to reach university in the first place (ibid.). Early in 1980 the JFM invited Rawlings and Captain Kojo Tsikata, Rawlings cousin, to join its steering committee. Rawlings became Chairman, Kojo Tsikata a member of the Central Committee and Chris Atim took on the role of General Secretary (Hansen 1987: 186). Both sides benefited from this arrangement: while the JFM gained greater political credibility, Kojo Tsikata and Rawlings had won useful allies for their resistance to being neutralized by the Limann regime (Nugent 1995: 33).[17] In fact, the continuous harassment and attempts to tarnish Rawlings' image by the PNP increased his popularity amongst lower-level factions (Owusu 1996: 311). Due to their localised support bases and the fact that political activities were mainly limited to a few urban areas in Accra, the impact of the JFM and NDM on public opinion in Ghana's cultural sphere at the time should not be overestimated. Nevertheless the proliferation of these neo-Marxist organizations is significant, since they are evidence of the alienation of Ghana's more youthful intellectuals (Nugent 1995: 34).

However, not only the younger generation developed distrust towards the established higher-level factions. Owusu (1996: 319) describes this general alienation of higher- and lower-level factions by referring to one of his interviewees:

> **This septuagenarian farmer, with no political party affiliation, frank in the manner of senior citizens, angrily described the PNP administration […] as totally inept (wambeye hwee) and corrupt (ewifo). He obviously had no sympathy for the "Old Guard".**

Thus, the distrust towards ruling civilian and military higher-level factions, was rather a phenomena spanning wider sections of society and casting doubt – at least amongst some – on all forms of accumulation (Nugent 1995: 28-29). As a result, rural citizens retreated into a cynical view of the political process and large parts of urbanites took refuge in joining the charismatic churches that started proliferating from the late 1970s (Nugent 1995: 31; Asamoah-Gyadu 2003: 433). Repeated ethnic clashes in the Bimbilla district led to Ghana's worst violent ethnic conflict since independence and were a further indication of Ghana's political crisis during the early 1980s (Hansen 1987: 171).

[17] See Baynham (1985: 633-42) for more details on how the Limann regime tried to subordinate the remaining AFRC and armed forces to its control.

In the context of a worsening economic crisis and a general alienation between established civilian and military higher-level factions on the one side and ordinary lower-level ones on the other, Rawlings appeared for the second time on Ghana's national political scene and toppled Limann in another military coup on 31 December 1981. Rawlings promised to alienated and politizised lower-level factions nothing less than a revolution aimed at transforming the social and economic order of the country (Rawlings 1982: 1).

By the beginning of the 1980s Ghana's post-independence political settlement had collapsed and the entire state system was disintegrating. The dynamics of the "urban vampire state" – taxing productive rural entrepreneurs in favour of urban factions' consumption – had assumed proportions which eroded the country's economic base and led to the fiscal and economic breakdown of the post-independence settlement (see table 3.2.1; 3.2.3 and 3.3.1 each column 6). While Nkrumah had fostered the Akan conception of the state as active promoter of collective benefits (Nugent 1995: 23-25; Owusu 1970: 15), Ghana's "productive social contract" between higher and lower-level factions (Nugent 2010: 57), was, due to its neopatrimonial crisis, no longer intact by the early 1980s. Ruling higher-level factions eventually could no longer sustain production in the agricultural sector which implied the loss of the material base to provide minimum material needs for lower-level factions. This situation resulted in an enourmous "shredding process" (Callaghy 1994: 144) and dual crisis of legitimacy of civilian and military authority (Hutchful 1997b: 560) challenging their hegemonic position. What made the situation in the early 1980s so politically explosive however was a growing public perception that ruling higher-level factions were in fact profiting from the crisis at the expense of the ordinary lower-level factions (Nugent 1995: 27).

None of the post-Nkrumah civilian or military ruling coalitions had managed to change the institutionally entrenched power constellations whose distribution of resources and benefits often ran counter to the interests of consecutive ruling coalitions' support bases. Rural factions tended to be diffused, unorganized and therefore could not be relied upon to build regimes' political survival. In contrast, urban factions physically close to the nucleus of the state were able to mobilize and hence threaten regimes' security which favoured short-term horizons amongst ruling coalitions (see Killick 2010: 278).

3.4 Shifting power to the people?

The previous section illustrated the organic crisis and eventual collapse of Ghana's post-independence settlement. In contrast, the following part addresses the PNDC's initial aim and attempts of transforming Ghana's social and economic order.

When Rawlings had seized power, he stressed that he did not intend just to change the "palace guard" (Hansen 1987: 172). Rather he aspired to replace Ghana's "sham democracy" with a political system "giving power to the people":

> **Fellow citizens of Ghana, as you would have noticed we are not playing the National Anthem. In other words this is not a coup. I ask for nothing less than a revolution. Something that would transform the social and economic order of this country […] (Rawlings 1982: 1). The military action […] was not […] another opportunity for some soldiers and their allies in trade and the bureaucracy to come to power for their own ends. It is rather to create by this action an opening for real democracy. Government of the people, by the people, and for the people (Rawlings 1982: 4). […] Ghanaians are determined to make democracy really work for the ordinary man not just for small groups of people to exploit them and ride over their misery (Rawlings 1982: 12).**

The supporters of the revolution – including lower ranks of the military, urban workers, radical intellectuals, university students and individuals disenchanted with the political establishment – were unified in their critique of the workings of the Ghanaian state and its institutionally entrenched power dynamics. This diverse societal coalition was also reflected in the composition of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which took on the role of government after the coup. With four military and three civilian members making up the immediate post-coup PNDC leadership, it was obvious that the military was expected to play an integral part in the envisioned revolutionary process (Nugent 1995: 42). In contrast to the AFRC (section 3.3.4) the composition of the military members of the PNDC sought to embrace various levels of the military hierarchy (Nugent 1995: 43). Sgt Akata-Pore represented the lower ranks while Warrant Officer Joseph Adjei-Boadi was an exponent of the junior – middle ranking – officers. The appointment of Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah was expected to ensure the support of senior officers (Hansen 1987: 176-77). The civilian members were supposed to secure the support of critical, yet primarily ideologically left-leaning urban factions. Chris Atim, General Secretary of the JFM, was meant to appease the youth and student movement, whereas Amartey Kwei, a popular militant labour leader, was appointed to guarantee the support of the urban workers. Reverend Kwabena Vincent Damuah, a Catholic priest with rad-

ical sympathies, was most likely chosen to appeal to the large Christian sections of society (Nugent 1995: 43; Hansen 1987: 177).

Besides the PNDC members' close relationships with each other (Hansen 1987: 173) and their organizational links to societal factions building the regime's support base, ethnic origin was another important factor for the composition of the new leadership (Nugent 1995: 43; Hansen 1987: 172-73). While Nugent (ibid.) speaks of a deliberate effort to achieve a rough ethnic balance in the new leadership,[18] Hansen (1987: 172-73), a PNDC member between 1982-83, argues that the very visible positions of many Northerners in the PNDC, in particular the presence of Atim and Akata-Pore, did have a mitigating effect on Northern factions in the Armed Forces and society in general. It diffused the tendency to interpret the overthrow of Limann's regime – which had been perceived as being dominated by Northerners – in ethnic terms (Hansen 1987: 173).

Initially the PNDC lived up to its claim to incorporate a wider political spectrum of Ghanaian society. It included four members of the defunct political parties as members of its Committee of Secretaries, which took on the role as cabinet and was led by PNDC member Paul Victor Obeng (Asamoah 2014: 297; Oquaye 2004: 135). The four members included Obed Asamoah[19] (UNC/APP) who took on the role as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu[20] (UNC/APP) who joined as Secretary of Transport and Communications, K.B. Asante[21] (SDF/APP) who became Secretary of Trade and John Agyekum Kufuor[22] (PFP/APP) who joined as Secretary of Local Government and later went on to become Ghana's President between 2001-2009 (Asamoah 2014: 296). The appointments caused an immediate and vehement storm of protest by the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS). The students argued that PNP ministers (Nkrumahist tradition) had been replaced by APP men (Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition) running counter to the revolution's aim of structural change (Asamoah 2014: 296). Rawlings, who believed that a broad-based government was needed

[18] The composition of the initial PNDC members was as follows: Rawlings is an Ewe (on his mother's side, his father was Scottish); Nunoo-Mensah was a Fanti, Adjei-Boadi was an Ashanti; Akata-Pore was a Frafra from the Upper Region (Nugent 1995: 43).
[19] Obed Asamoah served as Foreign Minister and Attorney General under Rawlings between 1981-1997.
[20] Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu is the husband of Betty Mould-Iddrisu, former Attorney-General under the NDC, who became discredited for her role in the Woyome scandal (see chapter five).
[21] K.B. Asante had already severed as Secretary to Nkrumah.
[22] Kufuor had already served as Deputy Foreign Minister in Busia's government and became the protégé of the back then Foreign Minister Victor Owusu.

for stability and the success of the revolution (Asamoah 2014: 297), convinced critics to permit the politicians to prove their political worthiness (Nugent 1995: 44). Apart from Kufuor, who left the PNDC regime at the end of 1982, these politicians were able to establish themselves successfully within the regime throughout the years to come (ibid.). The incorporation of a wider political spectrum amongst the PNDC's higher-level factions resulted however in an ideologically highly diverse body. As a result, the Committee of Secretaries often became the scene of intense ideological elite struggle (Hansen 1987: 177-78). In fact, the competing ideological convictions amongst the ruling higher-level factions were soon to manifest themselves in increased open power struggles.

While populist forces within the PNDC claimed to strive for a revolution from below (Hansen 1987: 175), this societal coalition of middle to lower ranking factions within the military and selected civilian, predominantly urban higher-level factions, acted rather on behalf of the people. Aiming to shift power to the common citizens, the PNDC established so called Defence Committees.[23] These new political institutions were envisaged to serve as basic units of the new state structure (Oquaye 2004: 143; Hansen 1987: 178; Yeebo 1985: 66). They were set up in formal work-places such as textile companies, mining firms and even military barracks as well as in neighbourhood areas to foster common citizens' participation in the decision making process (Oquaye 2004: 143). Defence Committees also had the mission to expose and deal with corruption; exercise price control checks and to terminate smuggling (Agyeman-Duah 1987: 619; Yeebo 1985: 68). Initally the JFM helped to recruit individuals with the right political credentials to fill leadership positions at various levels of the new political institutions (Ninsin 1996: 27).

Even though Defence Committees were intended for ordinary Ghanaians, not all societal factions shared the same feelings about the "organs of people's power". Parts of them were deliberately excluded from membership (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 330). In fact, the institutions openly side-lined so called "bastions of the old order" including in particular businessmen, members of management, professionals, the so called petty bourgeoisie and traditional leaders (Oquaye 2004: 151; Owusu 1996: 309; Agyeman-Duah 1987: 619). From the revolutionaries' point of view they represented part of the problem and could therefore not

[23] These included the National Defence Committee (NDC), Workers Defence Committees (WDCs) and People's Defence Committees (PDCs).

be part of the solution (Oquaye 2004: 151). Naturally members of excluded factions were highly suspicious of institutions deliberately omitting societal factions from participation while claiming to promote the interests of all (Oquaye 2004: 151; Owusu 1996: 309). As a result, a dichotomization of Ghana's society into "friends and enemies of the revolution" occurred (Oquaye 2004: 152). While some factions felt empowered by the new institutions, others perceived unfolding acts by Defence Committees like beatings, fines and detentions of innocent citizens, including elders as excessive behaviour (Oquaye 2004: 153; Owusu 1996: 308; Agyeman-Duah 1987: 620).[24] Indeed an evolving estrangement of some previously supportive forces of the coup is illustrated by the septuagenarian farmer already quoted above who condemned:

> **the senseless harassment and beating of decent men and women by youths and soldiers, who seemed to have lost all respect for their elders (Owusu 1996: 320).**

Since the PNDC aimed at shifting power to the common citizens, one needs to address the response of rural citizens who represented in the 1980s about 70% of Ghana's population (World Bank 2015). In contrast to the urban factions, their reaction to the coup was "slow, suspicious and generally cynical" (Yeebo 1985: 69; Hansen 1987: 176; Nugent 1995: 72). The predominantly urban radical intellectuals had assumed a natural bond between urban workers and farmers based on "common class interests". Retrospectively however radical intellectuals acknowledged that class lines – conceptualised based on socio-economic developments in Western societies – had not been very sharp in Ghana's rural communities (Hansen 1987: 180). Rather, the rural constituency, as Ghana's main place of economic production, was characterized by more complex realities (Nugent 1995: 73). Chiefs, commercial farmers and landlords, who formed part of the rural higher-level factions, had been framed as enemies of the revolution. Their rural capitalist interests and the fact that they were delibearately excluded from the new institutions made them opponents of the new structures. The hostile attitude of influential chiefs towards the revolutionary processes rubbed off on agricultural labourers (Yeebo 1985: 69-70). Moreover, the PNDC imposed controls on the sale and price of food to appease the urban

[24] In particular Ghanaian academics linked to the excluded factions of these days – like Agyeman-Duah, Oquaye and Owusu – highlight the beatings, fines and detentions of innocent citizens, including elders, under the P/WDCs. The antagonism of the time is also reflected in the authors generally negative, almost condescending portrayal of P/WDC members who they describe as "school drop-outs", "common criminals" or "misfits" (Owusu 1996: 320).

factions who represented the PNDC's initial support base and whose income had shrunk significantly under high inflation (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 330-33; Agyeman-Duah 1987: 623; Yeebo 1985: 69-70). Yet, the regime's arbirtrary sale of farm produce which was the rural populace's main source of income (Agyeman-Duah 1987: 623) alienated rural lower-level factions. Another factor which made rural factions keep their distance from the regime during its early days was the harassment against their "middle-class" sons and daughters often living in urban centres (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 330). These crucial family linkages that existed and continue to exist between the urban and rural areas added to rural factions' aversion towards the revolution. The radicals' assumption that smuggling was a big men's occupation also clashed with rural realities of the time (Nugent 1995: 73). For many rural citizens had resorted to these informal means to cope with the crisis. Thus the revolution spoke less directly to the concerns of the rural population. Nervertheless this did not mean that Defence Committees were not been formed. While it was in fact commonly the chiefs who inaugurated the first Defence Committees, this compliance should not be misunderstood as an endorsement of the revolution (Nugent 1995: 72). Rather, traditional rulers tried to avoid possible accusations of obstructionism. Despite this anticipatory obedience, Atim and other progressive forces within the PNDC accused traditional authorities of attempting to hijack the organs of people's power (Yeebo 1985: 67-69). While they eyed chiefs suspiciousy as part of the old order, in contrast to Ghana's modern political higher-level factions, the chiefs' authority was not in crisis or affected directly by the decay of the Ghanaian state. For traditional leaders had not been perceived to have shared in the prerogatives of the post-colonial state (ibid.). Hence, one could interpret the formation of Defence Committees by chiefs rather as an expression of continued adaptability of dominant forces in the rural areas to frequently changing circumstances enacted by the urban centre. Overall in the early 1980s the revolution had failed to forge a coalition between the politicized urban factions and rural masses:

> **[…] none of the policy outcomes at this time reflected the interests of the rural population. There was no attempt to mobilise them. […] Here the young militants […] set course which counted the most numerous class out of the political process. The peasants became onlookers as the political process unfolded (Hansen 1987: 191-92).**

As a result the new political institutions echoed diverse reactions. By favouring some and excluding others, Defence Committees created once more space for

rotations of actors, yet they failed to structurally shift power to the majority of lower-level factions. Instead the numerously dominant rural factions seemed not quite sure yet what to make out of the new structures and in this context they tended to be absorbed in one way or another into the existing diverse local realities.

While some societal factions were deliberately banned from the new political institutions at lower-levels, a few members of the established political elite had joined the PNDC leadership. This apparent discrepancy was an expression and source of the soon manifest tensions and power struggles amongst the PNDC higher-level factions (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 331). Early on tensions had arisen between those who had seized power from the PNP over Ghana's political trjectory (see Nugent 1995: 49; Yeebo 1985: 67-68) and economic policy (Hansen 1987: 192). At the beginning the PNDC was simply undertaking short-term initiatives to stabilize the economy which resembled the measures of the AFRC period (see Hansen 1991: 102; Asamoah 2014: 342). In addition to these ad-hoc measures, which were sold by Rawlings as being largely in congruence with the ideological stance of the radical left, a National Economic Review Committee (NERC), prepared from the early days of the regime a larger economic reform programme (Nugent 1995: 90; Yeebo 1991: 114). The NERC had been quietly convened by Rawlings, Kojo Tsikata – Rawlings closest advisor (Yeebo 1991: 144) – and a few others since its members comprised for example Joe Abbey and Kwame Peprah[25] (Yeebo 1991: 114) who were perceived by the radical left as right-wing economists, bureaucrats and technocrats. The NERC's stance was that substantial external financial assistance was needed for any economic recovery (Hansen 1987: 192). Therefore it had been in touch with the IMF as early as of March 1982 (Hansen 1987: 197). The IMF in turn had insisted on considerable policy reforms including devaluating the Cedi (Nugent 1995: 91) and on containing the radical elements within government and other institutions (Yeboo 1991: 119).

At a meeting in April 1982 the radical left confronted Rawlings to confirm or deny rumours of a planned devaluation of the currency which they regarded as inconsistent with the objectives of the revolution (Yeebo 1991: 115). Rawlings admitted that the NERC had been considering devaluation, but asserted he had advised against it (ibid.). The controversy over the general direction of the eco-

[25] After serving as Minister of Mines and Eenergy under Rawlings between 1993-95, Kwame Peprah took over from Kwesi Botchwey as Minister of Finance between 1995-2001.

nomic policy was however much more than a narrow debate over devaluation. Rather, it reflected a conflict over accepting a different paradigm of development in which foreign capital did or did not play a crucial role. Initially none of the higher-level faction was strong enough to impose its position (Hansen 1987: 192). Rather the two opposing factions had arrived at a situation where neither the progressive nor regressive ones could triumph. In the wake of this stalemate Rawlings could be seen as intervening third force – a situation Gramsci refers to as Caesarism (chapter two) – trying to mediate between the two competing higher-level factions.

While mid-1982 suspicions about secret talks with the IMF were rising amongst the left, the abduction and killing of three High Court judges and a retired army officer aroused massive outcry and disgust from Ghanaian society and the national conservative faction in particular. The question of who was behind the killings ignited the dissolution of the PNDC's coalition of higher-level factions. Conservative forces within the PNDC leadership believed individuals of the radical left had committed the crime (Nugent 1995: 88), whereas the radical left was convinced that they were being framed with the aim of weakening their position.[26] Eventually members from the conservative faction within the PNDC were replaced by members of the radical left (Hansen 1991: 112). Overall the events had caused an atmosphere of increased mutual suspicion amongst the PNDC's remaining higher-level factions (Nugent 1995: 90). In this climate the struggle over the direction of economic policy intensified.

Kwesi Botchwey, the Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, had been secretly sent off to Washington to finalize an agreement with the IMF and World Bank by early August 1982 (Yeebo 1991: 116). Yet, radical left-wing forces within the PNDC including JFM and NDM members did not regard liberalization and an adjustment of exchange rates and prices as the solution to economic recovery. Rather they aimed for an economy free of dependence on imperialism to uphold a genuine revolution. Therefore they demanded the government not to turn to the IMF for help (Nugent 1995: 92). Instead they recommended moving closer to friendly socialist countries (ibid.) and emphasised autonomous and self-reliant development based on domestic mass mobilization (Hansen 1987: 198).

[26] Even though it might never be fully known who were the murderers, in August Kwei resigned from the PNDC and confessed to having been involved in the killings for which he was executed (Herbst 1993: 32).

Within this power struggle Botchwey and Rawlings drew on divide and rule tactis to play off the old rivals NDM and JFM which led to an increased isolation of the JMF/United Front (UF)[27] (Nugent 1995: 92; Yeebo 1991: 126). The radical left-wing faction around Atim (JFM/UP) felt betrayed and openly attacked the IMF and Botchwey's "devaluation pact" to mobilise mass resistance amongst the lower-level factions. This confrontation coupled with perceived security challenges forming from within the military and exile groups in neighbouring countries (Yeebo 1991: 127), made Rawlings and Kojo Tsikata very much aware of the UF, and the JFM in particular, as a competing power bloc challenging more and more their own ruling positions.

By October 1982 the dispute over Ghana's economic trajectory was giving way to a violent power struggle amongst the political elite for pre-eminance. Atim and Sgt Akata-Pore had formed a coalition of frustrated UF/JFM members and ranks within the military. They attempted a coup against Rawlings lead by Akata-Pore and loyal predominanlty Northern soliders with support from Defence Committees in Accra. Since their plan had leaked, troops loyal to Rawlings, who were predominantly Ewe, however prevented the takeover (Nugent 1995: 94; Hansen 1987: 198). Yet the rift within the PNDC and in particular Rawlings' faction; the UF/JFM and Northern ranks within the military was now public. The subsequent withdrawal of Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah and Kufuor from the PNDC, who both represented the nationalist conservative faction (Yeboo 1991: 162), further underlined the fragility of the PNDC's ruling coalition. Another unsuccessful coup was attempted on November 23rd in 1982 led by Northern junior officers who opposed the revolution (Nugent 1995: 95). Rawlings and Kojo Tsikata had a reasonable suspicion of a link between the two coups based on a nested purpose-oriented alliance between Akata-Pore (a Frafra from the Upper region) and Nunoo-Mensah (a Fanti) who had claimed his group had American backing (Nugent 1995: 95; Yeebo 1991: 162-64).[28] Rawlings used the incident to supress the power block of the radical left (Hansen 1987: 198). He arrested Akata-Pore and soldiers closely associated to him and caused Atim and other members of the radical left, and the UF/JFM in particular who had not been arrested or detained, to flee the country (Hansen 1987: 198). By the end of 1982 only Rawlings and

[27] The United Front had been created mid-1982 by a merger of the JFM and the People's Revolutionary League of Ghana (PRLG).
[28] For more details see Nugent (1995: 95).

Adjei-Boadi were left of the initial PNDC members. All others had been dismissed or resigned because they either felt the revolutionary process had been betrayed (Atim, Akata-Pore, Kwei) or that things had gone too far (Damuah and Nunoo-Mensah) (Nugent 1995: 96). The open power struggle amongst the higher-level factions was not over at this point, nor had an ideological consensus on Ghana's political and economic trajectory been achieved. The exit of the radical left-wing faction did however create space for pragmatic leftist forces like Rawlings and Botchwey (NDM) to solidify their own position in power willing to straddle diverse political constituencies within the domestic as well as international sphere (Nugent 1995: 124). Thereby the political conditions had been established to launch an Economic Recovery Programme based on an understanding with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs).

3.5 Towards a reconstitution of the Ghanaian state?

After having outlined the PNDC's initial aim and attempts at transforming Ghana's social and economic order, the last part of this chapter will highlight the elements of Ghana's more recent history which provide the building blocs for the currently dominant narrative of Ghana's image as "African success story".

3.5.1 Reform of economic institutions

By April 1983 the PNDC had agreed with the IMF, World Bank and various Western multilateral and bilateral agencies on a comprehensive programme of economic recovery and structural adjustment (ERP/SAP). The reform programmes reflected the new international hegemonic paradigm of state withdrawal from the economic sphere as prescribed by the ideology of supply-side economics (Gyimah-Boadi 1997: 313). The measures included:

- Liberalizing the exchange rate by moving from a fixed exchange rate regime to a more flexible one achieved through open and disguised devaluation of the Cedi;
- Removal of price controls and withdrawal of government subsidies as well as introduction of fees with respect to social services such as health, education, water, electricity etc.;
- Wage restraint and job retrenchments in the civil service;
- Market retreat by the state through privatization of state-owned enterprises and parastatals;
- Control of inflation by restraining expansive monetary policy;

- Rehabilitation of production for the export sector, hence a focus on agriculture and in particular cocoa, timber and mining along with the economic infrastructure of harbours, railways, roads etc.;
- Liberalization of imports and exports; and
- Establishing liberal investment and trading codes to attract foreign investments (Gyimah-Boadi 1997: 309).

The implementation of the ERP/SAP with its austerity programme and underlying ideology ran counter to the interests of the PNDC's initial primarily urban support base. Urban citizens who were the main buyers of imported consumer goods were hit hardest by the devaluation of the Cedi and its accompanying loss of purchasing power (see Bawumia 1995). The group of urban wage earners suffered tremendously under the wage restraints, labour retrenchments and the introduction of fees for social services such as health, education, water and electricity which were first and foremost available to urban dwellers (Hutchful 2002a: 168; Gyimah-Boadi 1997: 316; Herbst 1993: 45 and 61-65). For radical students and the left intelligentsia the material deprivation was aggravated by the PNDC's perceived retreat from the revolutionary path (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 332).

The alienation of the regime's key constituencies manifested itself in widespread protest and anti-IMF riots by students and other politizised urban lower-level factions (Herbst 1993: 45; Yeebo 1991: 189). Another attempted coup on June 19 launched by rebels, who infiltrated Ghana from Togo, also proved that the physical struggle over power at the centre amongst the higher-level factions was not yet over. The reaction of some lower-level factions that greeted the attempted coup with a strong suspicion that the ARPB (right-wing forces) and NUGS (left-wing forces) had both received prior warnings of the overthrow, showed quite plainly the dangers posed by a broad societal anti-PNDC coalition. These developments strengthened existing intentions within the PNDC to approach the economic reform process with utmost caution (ibid.).

Following the implementation of the ERP/SAP Ghana experienced however a remarkable macroeconomic recovery (Fosu and Aryetee 2013: 51; Hutchful 2002: 57-66; Gyimah-Boadi 1995: 310-11; Jeffries 1992: 207).[29] The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) indicated positive growth rates for the first time in

[29] This assessment is based on a "before versus after" analysis of Ghana's economic perormance. For an evaluation of the ERP/SAP's macroeconomic impact based on " plan versus actual outcome" see Aryeetey and Harrigan (2000: 17-18).

many years from 1984 onwards (see figure 3.5.1). Cocoa, gold and timber production rose so that Ghana's export earnings increased despite significantly fallen prices for most of its export commodities (see figure 3.5.2 and table 3.5.1 for the example of cocoa; Gymah-Boadi 1995: 310). As a result, the balance of payments recovered (in terms of margins between exports and imports) and government's deficit could be drastically reduced (in terms of margins between revenue and expenditure) (see table 3.5.1; 3.5.2 and 3.5.3). In addition, the inflation rate decreased and the previous decline in real wages had been reversed by 1986 (see table 3.5.1 and 3.5.4) (Fosu and Aryetee 2013: 59).

Figure 3.2 Ghana's GDP growth (annual %), 1960-2015



Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) (2013)

Figure 3.3 Ghana's cocoa production, 1981-2013



Source: FAOSTAT (2015); World Bank GEM Commodities (2014)

Table 3.8 Indicators of Ghana's macroeconomic recovery

Year	Exports in million Cedi	Cocoa exports in milion Cedi	Imports in million Cedi	International reserves in million USD	Rate of inflation (%)
1981	0.3	0.1	0.3	158.2	116.5
1982	0.2	0.1	0.2	153.7	22.3
1983	1.0	0.6	1.1	158.9	122.9
1984	1.9	1.3	2.2	316.7	39.7
1985	3.3	1.8	4.7	487.2	10.3
1986	7.8	4.2	9.3	525.1	24.6
1987	14.3	8.0	17.5	209.1	39.8
1988	20.6	9.4	18.6	231.5	31.4
1989	27.5	11.2	34.7	357.5	25.2
1990	---	12.1	---	230.5	37.3
1991	46.0	12.7	38.8	563.6	18.0
1992	54.7	11.8	95.1	333.1	10.1
1993	63.2	16.2	243.9	422.9	25.0
1994	135.9	26.6	202.9	597.9	24.9
1995	207.0	45.7	228.9	711.8	59.5
1996	273.3	79.1	345.2	842.6	46.6
1997	335.3	82.6	476.9	550.8	27.9
1998	415.1	143.7	593.2	390.6	14.6
1999	529.3	142.2	934.7	467.2	12.4
2000	732.2	217.0	1617.1	244.8	25.2

Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) (2013); IMF IFS Nov. (2016)

Table 3.9 Ghana's internal balance, 1981-1989

Year	Total revenue in million Cedi (excluding grants)	Total expenditure in million Cedi
1981	3,234	7,719
1982	4,804	9,530
1983	10,185	14,755
1984	21,728	26,694
1985	38,691	45,763
1986	69,758	70,660
1987	105,009	102,135
1988	142,238	143,897
1989	193,170	196,466

Source: IMF Government Finance Statictis (GFS) historical (2006)

Table 3.10 Ghana's internal balance, 1990-2010

Year	Total revenue in million Cedi (current and excluding grants)	Total expenditure in million Cedi (current)
1990	122.5	127.1
1991	145.3	186.1
1992	181.1	233.2
1993	229.6	299.2
1994	258.1	338.1
1995	382.4	503.3
1996	533.7	757.8
1997	679.9	897.4
1998	1038.2	1312.3
1999	1518.5	1668.4
2000	1896.7	1790.3
2001	2015.1	2560.1
2002	2618.1	3228.0
2003	3299.2	4468.5
2004	4183.8	4904.3
2005	5513.0	6974.3
2006	6861.5	8228.0
2007	8039.3	9387.4
2008	9966.7	10642.0
2009	11658.8	12477.0
2010	13564.2	14563.0

Source: World Bank African Development Indicators (2013)

Table 3.11 Nominal and Real Average Monthly Earnings per Employee (in Cedis)

Year	Nominal earnings	Real earnings
1960	33.00	5.538
1965	38.97	3.828
1970	54.99	4.035
1975	102.69	3.473
1980	460.22	1.147
1985	3633.00	0.996
1986	7433.00	1.636
1987	10524.00	1.657
1988	13805.00	1.655
1989	24257.00	2.321
1990	30056.00	2.096
1991	35212.00	2.080

Source: Fosu and Aryetee (2013: 59)

Alongside the remarkable macroeconomic recovery, Ghana's economic and social infrastructure improved visibly (Gyimah-Boadi 1995: 311). The cash (in)flow from the ERP had been used by the regime to expand access to infrastructures across the country. The railway – in particular the western line – and deep water ports of Tema and Takoradi were rehabilitated (ibid.). Moreover a substantial investment was made in the construction and improvement of roads. With poor roads having been a source of grievances and symbol of developmental divide for some time, in particular in the Northern parts of the country, the political impact of the substantial makeover of Ghana's road infrastructure should not be underestimated (Langer 2010: 182). In the course of the ERP/SAP the PNDC had also managed to extend the national electricity grid. While in 1988 only 15 percent of the population had access to electricity, the PNDC had connected vast amounts of rural areas, particularly in the northern parts, to the electricity grid (see Briggs 2013: 71-4; Gyimah-Boadi 1995: 311). It had furthermore promised that all district capitals would receive electricity by 1992 (Langer 2010: 182-83; Nugent 1995: 206). These policies had brought the PNDC clearly in touch with the aspirations of the rural areas.

Even amongst the urban dwellers who had suffered severely from the implementation of the ERP/SAP, the PNDC regime received some support. Many believed that they would have been much worse off without the ERP. The improving macroeconomic situation (Jeffries 1992: 216) and the fight against corruption had revived national pride and provided a cause for optimism about the future (Modern Ghana 2015). By the end of the 1980s there was a notable in-

crease in the supply and distribution of consumer goods and services (Gyimah-Boadi 1995: 311). A vast majority of PNDC's policies were seen to focus on collective goods which credited the regime with probity and social improvements like a reduction in crime and re-installing public order earned the PNDC also credit amongst urban citizens (Jeffries 1992: 217). The PNDC had cultivated also support among the ranks of nascent business men/women, for whom the ERP meant new opportunities to achieve personal prosperity (Nugent 1995: 203). For the PNDC had not only rehabilitated the sociability of wealth through economic liberalization, but had also created new chances of accumulation (Nugent 1995: 204). According to Nugent (ibid.) by the early 1990s it was possible to distinguish

> **a stratum of individuals whose wealth had been acquired over a matter of years rather than decades.**

These *nouveau riches* entrepreneurs felt more comfortable with the PNDC in power, since established wealth tended to be oriented towards the old political forces (Nugent 1995: 204; chapter five).

Until today Ghana has sustained positive GDP growth rates of on average above 5% (table 3.5.1). Despite fluctuating international prices, also its cocoa production has continuously increased just like the country's export earnings (figure 3.5.2 and table 3.5.5). Nevertheless economic data also indicates sustained trade and budget deficits (table 3.5.6; see also chapter six). However, the inflation rate has steadily decreased and remains, compared to the 1970s, moderate. Overall, Ghana seems to have continued the positive trends of macroeconomic recovery.

Table 3.12 Ghana's current macroeconomic performance

Year	Exports in million Cedi (current)	Imports in million Cedi (current)	Intern. reserves in million USD	Rate of inflation (%)
2001	1,722.1	2,467.5	310.6	32.9
2002	2,082.3	2,681.2	553.1	14.8
2003	2,691.2	3,745.1	1,367.4	26.7
2004	3,140.0	4,822.6	1,641.9	12.6
2005	3,545.1	6,003.1	1,767.0	15.1
2006	4,712.3	7,618.6	2,105.1	10.9
2007	5,678.6	9,453.8	1,999.6	10.7
2008	7,553.5	13,424.9	1,785.0	16.5
2009	10,720.1	15,481.8	3,401.7	19.3
2010	13,538.8	18,982.0	4,778.4	10.7
2011	22,529.2	30,312.7	5,498.5	8.7
2012			5,382.6	9.2
2013			5,264.4	11.6

Source: IMF IFS (2013); IMF IFS Nov. (2016)

Table 3.13 Ghana's trade and budget deficit, 2004-2015

Year	Budget deficit in percent of GDP	Trade deficit in percent of GDP
2004	-0.4	
2005	-2.7	
2006	-4.2	-6.5
2007	-8.1	-14.6
2008	-24.2	-10.8
2009	-9.5	-4.0
2010	-7.5	-8.2
2011	-5.0	-11.6
2012	-11.8	-12.1
2013	-9.5	-12.3
2014	-10.4	-9.5
2015	-6.7	-7.5

Source: Trading Economics (2015a and b)

3.5.2 Reform of political institutions

Following the economic reforms which paved the way to Ghana's remarkable macroeconomic recovery, the PNDC regime embarked on reforming once again the country's political institutions. Increasing domestic demands for a return to democratic civilian rule in the late 1980s led the PNDC regime to rejuventate the idea of

local government. The plan grew to establish 110 district assemblies as new local government bodies (Owusu 1996: 37) and between December 1988 till Feburary 1989 the PNDC held non-partisan local government elections. Some regarded the polls as a practical demonstration of the regime's commitment to place "power in the hands of the people" and give ordinary citizens the opportunity for genuine participation in the governance process (Ayee 1990: 169). In fact, the local government reforms and polls generated much enthusiasm in the countryside (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 338) which was also reflected in the relatively high voter turnout in the rural areas (Herbst 1993: 90). Overall the district elections provided the PNDC as military regime some legitimacy. Moreover, they placed Ghana amongst the first African states to decentralise so that Ghana after its economic reforms once more became portrayed as a potential role model for Africa also with regards to reforming political institutions (Crawford 2009: 58).

This image was reinforced by Ghana's return to competitive politics and process of (re-)democratization throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The outcome of the 1988/89 polls had reassured the PNDC leadership that it had nothing to fear from multi-party elections. In addition, by the early 1990s the international setting had changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall. This set the scene for IFIs and Western donors to tie continued financial support not only to economic reforms, but also to political liberalisation. Hence, after the endorsement of a new constitution in April 1992, the PNDC entered a transformation process in which it contested the 1992 general elections as the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Its main adversary was the National Patriotic Party (NPP) which bundled the nationalist conservative factions coalescing around the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition. Rawlings won the presidential race on behalf of the NDC against Adu Boahen, the NPP's presidential candidate. While international observer groups had endorsed the 1992 election results, opposition forces denounced electoral fraud and malpractices leading to their boycott of the subsequent parliamentary elections.

In contrast, to the transitional polls, contesting parties accepted the declared results in 1996. Rawlings was reeleted as president of Ghana's Fourth Republic and the defeted presidential candidates of the NPP, John A. Kufuor, and the People's National Convention (PNC), Edward N. Mahama, attended the inaugural ceremony. In comparative perspective, remarkable developments un-

folded in Ghana in 2000. Unlike many other African leaders, Rawlings abided by the two-term limit set in the constitution, so that John Atta Mills contested the presidential elections on the ticket of the NDC. He lost to Kufuor (NPP) as the main opposition's candidate. As a result, in 2000 the NDC became the first party in Ghana to lose power through the ballot box (Frempong 2012: 95). Moreover, the NDC's defeat made Ghana – as often before – the pioneer in Sub-Saharan Africa to have a smooth civilian-to-civilian transfer of government (Fosu & Aryeetey 2013 : 74).

In 2004 the NPP reasserted itself in power with Kufuor as Head of State. Like Rawlings, Kufuor did not attempt to run for a third term in the subsequent presidential race. Instead Nana Akufo-Addo contested the election as NPP candidate against John Atta Mills. Mills won in 2008 on behalf of the NDC so that Ghana experienced yet another change of government decided through the ballot box. Compared to Ghana's immediate post-independence history, the overall political situation has drastically changed: Since 1992 Ghana has held six consecutive elections, so that the country's Head of States no longer seize power through military coups, but through the ballot box. In addition, despite the fact that Ghana's recent presidential elections have been very close-run, all elections have been largely peaceful and considered mostly "free and fair". These achievements are complemented by an open political space and vibrant media scene. This outcome of the political and economic reform process make Ghana also stand out in regional comparision and suggest that the country could be considered a political success story.

Addressing the people of Ghana in 1998 Bill Clinton stated as first US President to visit Ghana:

> **Today, Ghana again lights the way for Africa. Democracy is spreading. Business is growing. Trade and investment are rising. […] The world admires your success. The United States admires your success. We see it taking root throughout the new Africa. And we stand ready to support it. […]**

Seung Hong Choi, former World Bank's representative in Ghana commented on Ghana's (apparent) transformation process:

> **Up until 1983 Ghana was really a hopeless place – everybody, both Ghanaians and donors were abandoning the place. […] If it can happen in Ghana, it can happen in any African country (Brooke 1989).**

And even US President Barack Obama praised Ghana as success story during a bilateral meeting with President Mills in the Oval Office in March 2012:

> **[…] there's sometimes a tendency to focus on the challenges that exist in Africa […]. But I think it's important for us to also focus on the good news that's coming out of Africa, and I think Ghana continues to be a good-news story. […] Ghana has proven, I think, to be a model for Africa in terms of its democratic practices. And I very much appreciate the efforts that President Mills has taken not only to ensure fair and free elections, but also to […] make sure that government is working for the people of Ghana and not just for the few. So we're very appreciative of those efforts. In addition, Ghana has become a wonderful success story economically on the continent. In part because of the initiatives of President Mills, you've seen high growth rates over the last several years. […] So that's a good-news story (The Whitehouse 2012).**

3.6 Chapter summary

Guided by the theoretical framework developed in chapter two which focuses on structures (institutions), ideology and actors within different spheres at various levels, chapter three has sketched out the evolvement of Ghana's post-independence settlement, its collapse and re-constitution. The chapter started by highlighting the origins of Ghana's historically grown politicized societal cleavages which are crucial to understand political and social conflict in Ghana, and hence its political settlement. Through its form of rule and introduction of Western-style education, the colonial state has played its role in creating politicized societal cleavages. They include the fissures of (1) the nationalists against the British; (2) commoners against chiefs; (3) youth against age and (4) the manifestation of regio-ethnic identities. The social dynamics under colonial rule led to a reconfiguration of "Ghana's" political elite and broadly its split into two opposing factions: a nationalist conservative faction with strong ties to traditional rulers, and by trend a younger counter-elite striving for a mass movement of the common people. Both factions were decisively modernist in outlook, but were epitomizing two fundamentally different conceptions of modernization. The demands of newly educated commoners for political inclusion and their largely successful attempts to wrest power from more established elites characterized Ghana's post-independence settlement (Svanikier 2007: 118). Due to the leading role of the state in the economy, Ghana's post-independence settlement was characterized by an entanglement of the political and economic sphere causing capital accumulation to occur mainly through access to the state. This structure led to fierce elite competition over the state and shaped its neopatrimonial character. The elites' competition was reinforced by the highly fragmented nature of Ghanaian society along ethnic lines as one dominant politicized societal fissure, and was amplified by a lack of

elite consensus with regards to ideological and thus institutional set up – in particular for Ghana's economic sphere – fuelled by systemic rivalry at the international level. A high rotation of fiercely competing civilian ruling coalitions was the consequence. Those temporarily in power tended to marginalize members of the previous ruling coalition from the political sphere and hence neopatrimonial networks. However, since Ghanaian society is highly fragmented along ethnicity as one of its key politicized societal fissues and to ensure regime security, Ghanaian elites needed to continuously forge cross-ethnic alliances to form new ruling coalitions. Despite competing ruling coalitions' ideological differences and varying supported bases in society, no ruling coalition managed to implement structural change. Or put differently, neither civilian nor military ruling coalitions till the early 1980s managed to alter the historically grown and deeply entrenched power constellations in Ghana institutionally embodied by an over-taxation of the productive entrepreneurs in the rural areas in favour of the state's urban masses' consumption. Hence, while ruling elites fluctuated rather frequently, the power constellation embedded in the structures were characterized by continuity. In the long run Ghana's post-independence institutionalized "urban vampire state" eroded the country's economic base, massively strengthened informal institutions and eventually led to its fiscal and economic breakdown. The accompanying crisis of hegemony of Ghana's ruling elites, including both competing civilian factions as well as the older generation of military authority, represented a crisis of the entire state system and caused the collapse of Ghana's post-independence settlement.

In contrast, the last section of the chapter highlighted Ghana's more recent historical developments which provide the building blocks for the currently dominant narrative of its image as "African success story". Ghana's remarkable macroeconomic recovery coupled with its (re-)democratization process including incumbent presidents abiding by term limits and two relatively peaceful turnovers of power through the ballot box, are indeed exceptional achievements. They make Ghana stand out in regional comparison and suggest that the country has arrived at a profoundly different place. Whether the notion of an "African success story" is well-founded and Ghana has arrived at a new and stronger political settlement will form the discussion in chapter four to six.

IV. GHANA'S 2012 PRESIDENTIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Elections form part of the body politics of this country. The body politics of this country never goes away. We are perpetually living under the banner of politics
A15, interviewed 16/11/2012

Ghana's drastic image change, from a failed and collapsed state in the late 1970s to a polity that has been hailed internationally as a beacon of democracy and stability in West Africa since the 1990s, suggests a significant change has taken place in the country. This thesis aims to contribute to the statebuilding debate by evaluating the social change that has occurred in Ghana. In order to address the main research question of the thesis, namely whether the Ghanaian state has undergone any fundamental structural change as the image of an "African success story" suggests, the following two chapters are devoted to a critical analysis of Ghana's current political settlement and the workings of the Ghanaian state as it stands today. To empirically ground the analysis and outline Ghana's current political settlement presented in chapter five, this chapter focuses on Ghana's 2012 elections as a lens to observe the country's current power constellation.

Why do elections matter in the context of analysing Ghana's current political settlement? Since the liberal paradigm became hegemonic in the international sphere in the early 1990s, elections turned into the only internationally recognized means for deciding the struggle (conflict) over state power. In OECD states holding state power equates to being able to decide how to redistribute society's welfare, for example through policies of taxation. In large parts of the Global South, however, control of the state is vital for the allocation of welfare or rather resources in the first place. Therefore, in most states of the Global South – including Ghana – there is an imperative to win elections; election times represent distinct periods of societal power struggles. During this deviant time, politicized societal cleavages are brought out and informal institutions and their handling manifest themselves more clearly. Zooming in on Ghanaian electoral politics and addressing key issues and the events which occurred during the 2012 electoral cycle – spanning the pre-election, election, and post-election periods – therefore illustrates the workings of the Ghanaian state. Moreover, analysis of the election reveals the significant actors in Ghana's political, economic and cultural sphere. Moreover, the election results divulge the crucial structural underpinnings charac-

terizing Ghanaian society today. At the same time, elections generally present an opportunity for change – at least a change of actors and therefore of who may get a "slice of the national cake" (Lamptey and Salihu 2012: 185) – so that stakes tend to be high. Relying on Ghana's 2012 general elections as a lens to observe Ghana's current political settlement therefore represents a practical starting point to gain insight into the current workings of the Ghanaian state and vital societal power dynamics. This scrutiny and the subsequently presented narrative, are based on fieldwork conducted in Ghana in 2011 as well as during Ghana's 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections.

4.1 Pre-election period

Ghana's 2012 pre-election period was characterized by subtle attempts by key stakeholders to deliberately impact the outcome of the polls by moulding Ghana's formal institutions. This was attempted by modifying the legal framework regulating the upcoming elections. Endeavours initiated and pushed by the main opposition party aimed to curb the malpractice that had previously occurred on election day and to downsize the advantage of incumbency for the ruling party. In contrast, measures taken by the incumbent party attempted to tip the electoral framework in its favour to counterbalance the advance of opposition forces. Equally important to understanding the power dynamics and workings of the current Ghanaian state and society, are the existing informal institutions. These were crystallized during the pre-election period, in particular in the realm of voter mobilization.

4.1.1 The process towards a new voter register

Shortly after the wafer-thin victory of John Atta Mills for the NDC in the presidential run-off of 2008,[30] opposition parties, in particular the NPP led by Nana Akufo-Addo, once more demanded electoral reforms. Ahead of the 2008 polls the quality of the voter register had already been questioned (CODEO 2012c: 7). Afari-Gyan, Chairman of the Electoral Commission (EC), stated himself that:

> **If our population is indeed twenty-two million, then perhaps thirteen million people on our register would be statistically unacceptable by world standards. If that is the case, then it may mean that there is something wrong with our register (Otchere-Darko 2013).**

[30] For Ghana's 2008 election results see annex table 9.4.1

The voter register used for the polls in 2008 was known to be bloated with minors, foreigners, ghost voters, deceased citizens, and double or multiple registrations. Back then Afari-Gyan remarked:

> **[…] at the end of the day, the register is as good as the stakeholders are prepared to accept. If they think there is nothing wrong with the register that is fine. […] they bussed the people, they sent the children, they invited the foreigners to come and participate in this. If they think that is ok… What else could we use? We have to use a register. That is the register that we will use (Yeboah 2008).**

As a result, opposition parties identified the voter registration process and be flawed electoral register (Carter Center 2009: 2 & 24; CODEO 2009: 14; EU-EOM 2009: 15) as key issues to be targeted with their aspired reform for 2012.

In the emerging post-2008 election debate, the Danquah Institute (DI), as an NPP think-tank, advocated electronic voting early on (e-voting) for Ghana's 2012 elections (Otchere-Darko 2009). This call for e-voting spanned the demand for biometric voter registration (BVR); biometric voter verification (BVV) on the election day; and both electronic means of casting a vote and of counting them. In the preceding debates, the EC was quick to acknowledge the need for an enhanced voter register. Afari-Gyan hinted as a guest of Kwadwo Oppong-Nkrumah's Super Morning Show on Joy FM in March 2009, that a completely new voter registration exercise would be undertaken to derive a new electoral roll for the 2012 general election (Yeboah 2008). Thus, the EC accommodated the push for electoral reform which had been reinforced by a call by the Chief Observer of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EOM), Nickolay Mladenov. He had prompted the EC to tackle the issue of the voter register shortly after the 2008 election (Ghana News Agency 2009c).

As keynote speaker at the 5th "Kronti ne Akwamu Lecture",[31] held by Ghana's Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), Afari-Gyan stated:

> **The Commission is considering biometric registration of voters, but as for biometric voting, I don't think the country is ready for it. If we do, I believe some people will start asking whether the Castle[32] has not programmed the machines with some figures to their advantage (The Statesman 2009).**

After endorsing the idea of BVR in order to provide a clean(er) electoral roll for 2012, the EC engaged political parties in a series of post-election self-assessment consultative fora (Ameyibor 2013). By bringing key stakeholders of future elections together, the EC aimed at ensuring the integrity of future gen-

[31] The english meaning of this phrase is: "Democracy and Governance Lecture".
[32] "Castle" refers to the seat of Ghana's government.

eral elections so that their results would be acceptable to all participating parties (A34 interviewed 14/12/2012; A35 interviewed 14/12/2012; A38 interviewed 18/12/2012; D3 interviewed 23/10/2012). As an outcome of an Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) meeting in May 2009, Ghana's main political parties agreed to mandate the EC to compile a new voter list based on BVR (Ghana News Agency 2009a). The communiqué of the meeting captured this lowest common denominator and in the subsequent months the different positions of the stakeholders became apparent.

The NPP was trying to push e-voting further up on the agenda of electoral reform. To gather support for their stance, the DI, headed by Gabby Asare Otchere-Darko,[33] organized a few national conferences exploring the viability of e-voting (DI 2010). Participants of these conferences included all actors whose understanding and support was vital for a potential shift of Ghana's electoral system towards e-voting (DI 2009: 3). When lobbying for e-voting, the NPP clearly envisaged the changes to be in place for the 2012 elections. They suggested combining the needed exercise of biometric data collection for the new electoral register with the, back then, already ongoing biometric registration project for the new national ID (Ghana) cards (A38 interviewed 18/12/2012; Danquah Institute 2010: 2).

The EC however strongly rejected the idea of e-voting. Its Chairman stated:

> **Until we make the people comfortable with the use of the computer, we cannot go e-voting (Mac-Jordan 2010).**

The EC's rejectionist stance might also have resulted from a realistic assessment of its own workload capacity. Within the given timeframe, introducing e-voting on top of the District Assembly elections scheduled for the end of December 2010, and a possible national referendum on constitutional review which was to be held, the task of compiling a new biometric voter register for 2012 and the likely redemarcation of constituency boundaries as an outcome of the national census of 2010, might have been too ambitious. Afari-Gyan however, stood by the plan to compile the new biometric voter register for 2012.

In contrast to the EC, the NDC was in general not averse to the introduction of e-voting. Yet, unlike the NPP, the NDC opposed the introduction of e-voting for the 2012 elections. Haruna Iddrisu, Minister of Communications, said:

[33] Otchere-Darko is a nephew of Nana Akufo-Addo and managing editor of the NPP-linked newspaper "The Statesman" (The Herald 2014; Arthur 2013).

> **[The] Government is ready to ensure that e-voting becomes a reality in 2016 (Ghana News Agency 2009b).**

Despite the NDC's generally proclaimed support for electoral reform (The Voting News 2011a), some voices queried its commitment to compile and use the new electoral register for the 2012 polls. For 18 months ahead of the polls, the NDC government had not released the necessary funds to the EC to conduct the biometric registration exercise (The Statesman 2011).

In spite of these differences and after troublesome District Assembly elections in December 2010, the EC invited vendors at the beginning of 2011 to bid for the contract for the procurement of a BVR system (Daily Graphic 2011). In October 2011, the EC announced that GenKey, a Dutch company, had been awarded the contract for the procurement. By limiting the call for tenders to a BVR system, it became apparent that electronic voting and electronic counting for 2012 was off the table. The NPP realized that their maximum demand was not going to be met. They therefore lowered their demands and soon began to lobby for at least complementing the biometric voter list with BVV on the election day (CitiFM 2011a). In return, the NDC insisted on sticking to the agreed minimal consensus reached in 2009 and vehemently dismissed the introduction of biometric voter verification for 2012. Likewise, the EC stressed that biometric verification was not a priority on its agenda (Myjoyonline 2011a).

Over the next few months, more and more actors joined the debate on BVV. The Catholic Bishops' Conference declared its support for BVV in its communiqué of 2011 which was heavily rebuked by the NDC (Ghana Business News 2011; CitiFM 2011b). Various individuals from the opposition forces entered the passionate debate in favour of BVV and advocacy groups close to the NPP, such as the Centre for Freedom and Accuracy, and the DI, supported the main opposition party in its demands (Amponsah 2011). In mid-November 2011, the EC gave in and budgeted for BVV. At the same time the EC stressed that an implementation of BVV for the 2012 polls was only possible if the government released the extra funds that were needed (Mahama 2011). According to The Statesman, a newspaper close to the NPP, the debate finally tipped in favour of BVV when Ghana's development partners declared it as a necessary step towards free and fair elections. The paper quoted a senior source at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) with the following words:

> **The countries responsible for our multi-donor budget support have made it clear to us that they want free and fair elections and see biometric verification as a necessary step towards that end (The Voting News 2011b).**

At the end of November 2011, the NDC eventually gave in and agreed that voters should be biometrically verified before casting their votes in the 2012 elections (The Voting News 2011b). As a result, the EC conducted the BVR exercise between March and May 2012. NPP and NDC party agents followed the registration process closely and filed most of the challenges regarding questionable applications. These challenges were often made on the grounds of age, residency, and nationality (CODEO 2012c: 5). CODEO, the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers, monitored the main registration period and noted that particularly in rural and smaller urban communities the identity of registrants was in some centres not checked and eligibility criteria were not strictly adhered to (CODEO 2012c: 4). This observation goes hand-in-hand with comments by several Ghanaians (A3 interviewed 14/11/2011; A26 02/12/2012; A29 interviewed 04/12/2012; B4 communications 11/2012; B5 communications 11/2012) who pointed out that:

> **Barely anybody would deny an underage mother to register, especially in the Northern parts of the country. After all she is a mom and hence has reached adulthood which people believe entitles her to vote (A16 interviewed 19/12/2012).**

The coexistence of formal (de jure) and informal (de facto) institutions and their contradiction is a reoccurring common phenomenon as will be illustrated throughout this work. During the registration exercise low incidences of violence took place. According to CODEO (2012c: 5-6):

> **[They] manifested in violent attacks, assaults, intimidation and harassment of EC officials with respect to attempts at registering ineligible voters, marauding thugs on unregistered motorbikes, and property destruction, including that of registration kits. Physical abuse, confrontations and restraint of those suspected to be ineligible were typical responses to instances of EC and party officials challenging eligibility.**

Incidences occurred, amongst others, in the West Mamprusi and Asunafo South Districts, Tafo-Pankrono, Tain and Odododiodio constituencies (see CODEO 2012c: 6). Troubling in this context is that the Ashanti region, known as a stronghold of the NPP, topped the list of registration centres marred by violence during the BVR exercise (AllAfrica 2012). Despite these incidences and the fact that the EC had recorded between12,000 and 15,000 multiple registrations at the end of the BVR exercise (Ghana News Agency 2012a), the registration process was still broadly assessed as satisfactory. According to CODEO (2012c: 8):

> **[…] the biometric voter register may not be a perfect document, its quality is substantial and therefore an improvement that would contribute to credible and peaceful 2012 elections.**

In the end the EC had registered about fourteen million Ghanaians as voters for the 2012 elections. Subsequent to the BVR exercise and before the polls, Afari-Gyan presented evidence to the political parties and the public at large that significant numbers of minors had been detected in the newly compiled biometric register (see figure 4.1). He suggested that the vast amount of underage registrations – the estimated figure was 20,000 (see Commonwealth Observer Group 2012: 16) – suggested that some of their registrations had been organized (Ghana News Agency 2012c). Since the Constitutional Instrument (CI) 72, which regulates the registration of voters in Ghana, does not provide the EC with the power to expunge names from the certified register, Afari-Gyan appealed to parents of registered minors to discourage them from voting.

Figure 4.1 Minors registered in Ghana's 2012 voter list

Source: Mac-Jordan 2012

In fact, several civil society organizations (CSO) joined the exhortation made by the EC's and the National Commission for Civic Education's by campaigning against underage voting with radio messages like the following:

> **This is a warning from the Editors' Forum of Ghana. You may have registered as a voter, but if your age is below 18 years do not vote because underage voting is illegal and you can be arrested and prosecuted. Parents please stop your children from voting if they are below 18. Any person under 18 years who votes may be arrested and prosecuted (D16 observation 12/2012).**

Only a court order would have allowed for the removal of names from the register which would have required proof, such as birth certificates, for each registered minor. With the elections only a few weeks away, juridical resolution of the issue was not feasible. Interestingly, despite the fact that the issue of registered minors caused an uproar ahead of the polls, the issue seemed to fade after the EC's Chairman had caught out and pointed fingers at the political parties.

4.1.2 Creating new constituencies during the year of the polls – gerrymandering?

While the opposition forces had pushed for electoral reform to curb previously occurring malpractices and to downsize the advantage of incumbency, the NDC, for their part, attempted to tip the electoral framework in its favour so as to counterbalance the advantage it lost due to reform concessions. Parallel to the debate on BVR, BVV, and registered minors, another issue which shaped Ghana's electoral framework was passionately debated: the delimitation of constituencies. Due to the results of the population census conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) in 2010, the government announced in October 2011 its plan to create new districts. Officially these were to ensure adequate public services to all Ghanaian citizens. A Legislative Instrument (LI) was passed by parliament to establish 46 new second level administrative units.

The creation of the new districts only several months ahead of the elections had a direct impact on the EC's preparations. Since some of the newly created districts were not covered by any of the existing constituencies, the EC saw itself forced to adjust the electoral boundaries and intended to create 45 new constituencies. The NPP as opposition party vehemently decried the creation of new districts and in particular its timing. Former President John Agyekum Kufuor (NPP) cautioned against the creation of new constituencies:

> **There is nothing in the constitution that enjoins the EC to create new constituencies just because the Ministry of Local Government has decided to create new districts. There is nothing like that. I don't think the Commission is bound by law to do that. It may make for trouble (The Statesman 2012).**

The NPP was quick in accusing the EC to make common cause with the NDC government and claimed gerrymandering behind the pending delimitation process. Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, the National Chairman of the NPP, expressed the NPP's concerns as follows:

> **We are worried […] about a number of developments […] the EC must be seen to be above suspicion. Even in sports, it is when the people doubt the neutrality of the referee that mayhem erupts. The EC is allowing doubt about its neutrality to seep into the nation. The 45 constituencies that the Commission is determined to create do not yet exist. Why then are the Electoral Commission's officers illegally conducting primaries for the NDC in the as yet non-existent constituencies? Why are they seeking to give unfair advantage to the NDC at the expense of the law abiding parties (Obetsebi-Lamptey 2012)?**

To prevent the creation of new constituencies, NPP associates filed several law suits at the country's Supreme Court (Ghana News Agency 2012b). Eventually, the petitions for injunctions against CI 78, the Constitutional Instrument establishing the new constituencies, failed and CI 78 passed parliament and established 45 new constituencies about ten weeks prior to Election Day.

One might wonder how the NDC benefitted from increasing the number of constituencies in the presidential election, since the number of voters decisive for the outcome remains the same. In recent years, however, the parliamentary and presidential elections have been neck-and-neck races where no political party can be assured of a "one touch" victory – meaning winning the presidential elections in the first round with the required 50%+1 vote. Several Ghanaians explained that the results of the parliamentary elections have an impact on voters' choice for the presidential run-off (A7 interviewed 21/11/2011; A11 interviewed 30/11/2011; A16 interviewed 19/11/2012; A27 interviewed 02/12/2012). They argued that whoever wins the majority in parliament will also win the presidency in Ghana. Therefore, so their argument goes, political parties have an interest in winning as many constituencies as possible (ibid.). Moreover, creating new constituencies increases the number of jobs distributed amongst the political elite. More individuals are able to run for office which is a sought after job. As Owusu (2009: 41) states:

> **Government jobs are good, lucrative, and secure jobs, with the higher levels conferring power and influence as well as status and prestige.**

Taking a closer look at the delimitation process suggests that the NDC government indeed tried to use the creation of new districts to tip the electoral framework slightly to its favour. The new districts had not strictly been established in areas most affected by population growth (see table 4.1 and figure 4.3). Roughly speaking the government did two things: First, it split existing districts

into two, which were congruent with constituencies. The case of Bia, a district in the Western Region illustrates this first scenario (see figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Issue of delimitation in Ghana 2012



Source: Based on map from peacefmonline (2012)

By splitting an existing district, one of the new districts was going to lack an MP. Due to the way that the Ghanaian state works, the EC saw itself forced to create new constituencies in areas where the government had split previous congruent districts and constituencies. Afari-Gyan had publicly wondered:

> **What will be the loot of the new district assemblies if elections are not held in the 45 new constituencies this December? Will they be doing business without MPs (Papran 2012)?**

In the second scenario the government was faced with districts which already had several constituencies. Therefore, the government could create a new district without the need for the EC to create a new constituency: One example which fits this scenario is the former district of Bulisa in the Upper East (see figure 4.2). Bulisa as a district was made up of two constituencies, Bulisa North and South. The government formed two districts out of one without the creation of new constituencies. Even though no new constituencies were created in this scenario, it was still a strategy by the NDC to mobilize support from voters (see section 4.1.3). Table 4.1 indicates that the course of action taken by the government indirectly pushed the EC to create a substantial number of new constituencies in NDC strongholds such as the Volta, Northern, and Upper West regions as well as in the selected swing regions of Western and Brong-Ahafo.

Table 4.1 Establishment of new districts & constituencies per region[34]

Region	New District New Constituency (NDC initiated)	New District Old Constituency (upgrade)	Old District New Constituency (EC initiated)
Western	3	2	1
Central	1	2	3
Greater Accra	1	5	6
Volta	4	3	0
Eastern	1	4	4
Ashanti	2	1	6
Brong-Ahafo	3	2	2
Northern	3	3	2
Upper East	0	4	2
Upper West	1	1	0
SUM	**19**	**27**	**26**

Source: Based on election results 2008 (FES 2010); election results 2012 (EC of Ghana 2012); new districts & nominated DCE's (Ghanadistricts.com 2012)

Regions characterized by high population growth and large population size, like Greater Accra and the Ashanti region – the stronghold of the NPP – had been strikingly neglected in the government's exercise (see figure 4.4 and table 4.1). Out of the top 5 regions mostly affected by population growth according to the 2010 population census (see figure 4.3) the government strove to create new constituencies first and foremost in its own strongholds.[35]

Figure 4.3 Annual average intercensal population growth rate in Ghana according to region (2000/2010)



Source: GSS (2012: 2)

[34] For a list of new districts and constituencies see annex figure 9.2.2.
[35] While the Upper East region as an NDC stronghold was not awarded any new constituencies, the region benefited from the creation of several new districts (see middle column in table 4.1).

Figure 4.4 Ranking of Ghana's regions according to population size (2000/2010)



Source: GSS (2012: 1-2)

A clear majority of new constituencies whose creation had been initiated by the NDC government, were won by the NDC in the 2012 presidential and parliamentary race (thirteen and twelve out of nineteen) (see table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Winners of 2012 elections in new districts & constituencies

	New District New Constituency (NDC initiated)		New District Old constituency (upgrade)			Old District New Constituency (EC initiated)	
Results 2012 Presidential	**NDC**	**NPP**	**NDC**		**NPP**	**NDC**	**NPP**
	13	6	23		4	9	17
Results 2012 Parliamentary	**NDC**	**NPP**	**NDC**	**PNC**	**NPP**	**NDC**	**NPP**
	14	5	23	1	3	9	17

Source: Table 4.1 and 2012 election results published by EC of Ghana (2012).

By creating new constituencies mainly in its own strongholds, the NDC government attempted to impact power relations between Ghana's regions in favour of the NDC (see table 4.3). To counterbalance the ruling party's advance, the EC established 26 new constituencies on its own initiative (see scenario three illustrated in figure 4.2). The EC targeted primarily Central and Greater Accra as regions with high population growth (see figure 4.3), but also the Ashanti and Eastern regions as strongholds of the NPP (see table 4.1 column three). The EC's Chairman noted:

> **In Volta Region, four new districts have been created, so automatically, the constituencies in the region move from 22 to 26. […] If Volta Region is being given additional constituencies, the Commission therefore should compensate all the other regions in the country (Daily Guide 2012a).**

Table 4.3 Regional share in constituencies (population size/seats in parliament)

Region	Share in 2008	NDC vision of share for 2012	Share in 2012
Greater Accra	11.7	11.2	12.4
Central	8.3	8.0	8.4
Northern	11.3	11.6	11.3
Ashanti	17.0	16.5	17.1
Volta	9.6	10.4	9.5
Brong-Ahafo	10.4	10.8	10.5
Eastern	12.2	11.6	12.0
Western	9.6	10.0	9.5
Upper West	4.3	4.4	4.0
Upper East	5.7	5.2	5.5

Source: Election results 2008 (FES 2010); table 4.1 and election results 2012 (EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 4.3 above shows that the 26 new constituencies initiated by the EC indeed re-established to a large extent the old constellation of power between Ghana's regions. The region of Greater Accra, as a highly populous region that was mostly affected by population growth, relatively improved its share of constituencies compared to 2008. Again, the results of the 2012 elections support this narrative since most of the constituencies added by the EC were won by the NPP (see table 4.2 column three). The Centre for African Democratic Affairs (CADA) based in Accra commented on the issue of creating new districts and the delimitation process this entailed as follows:

> **If these districts are split, they cannot meet the minimum population threshold for qualification as a district. The fact that there are some existing districts with lower populations does not justify a repetition of previous wrongs. The announcement of the creation of new districts has led to many agitations as many people want their communities to either be upgraded to the status of districts or their towns are made capital towns of the new districts. Such exercises must be done with transparency and integrity. There is a perception that the exercise was selective to satisfy a parochial political interest. Perception is as important as reality.**
>
> **The idea behind the population threshold is that with a minimum population […] there will be a sizeable number of people in the economically active group who could […] pay basic rate to generate the initial capital to fund projects. […] Because some districts have lower populations, they cannot generate enough revenue so such districts always wait for the release of District Assembly Common Fund before projects are started. This defeats the decentralization policy.**

> **[...] If the rush to create new districts without recourse to the existing laws was meant to force the EC to cede constituencies to such areas it will not wash […] If the Commission accepts to cede constituencies to the new districts that do not adhere to the existing legal provisions, it will amount to gerrymandering and therefore unconstitutional and undemocratic. (Center for African Democratic Affairs (CADA) 2012).**

The NPP loudly cried out foul over the government's plan to create new constituencies. A similar situation had arisen ahead of the 2004 polls when the NPP was in power. At the time the number of constituencies was increased by the EC on the basis on the 2000 population census. Having lost power in 2000 and ahead of the first post-alteration election in 2004, the NDC had claimed a ploy by the EC to assist the NPP to win several seats through the re-demarcation exercise (Frempong 2012: 104). Since the NDC had realized that it could not prevent the creation of new constituencies, it strove instead to ensure the new constituencies could only be used in 2008. Eventually, the Supreme Court vindicated the EC's intent to establish and apply the new constituencies for the 2004 polls (ibid.). In 2012, this move by the NDC might have reminded the NPP of its own tactics ahead of the 2004 elections.

Having focused on Ghana's formal electoral institutions and outlined how political elites endeavoured to shift the power relations embedded in them, the following section will shed some light on the workings of the current Ghanaian state during election times. It will address in particular the matter of informal institutions in the context of Ghanaian electoral politics.

4.1.3 The realm of voter mobilization

Adjusting Ghana's formal institutions through the establishment of new districts was used by the NDC government to ensure the support of voters in these upgraded areas. Citizens highly welcomed the new districts since they provided direct access to state resources for the communities (A40 interviewed 20/12/2012; A41 interviewed throughout summer 2013; B5 communications 2012; B17 communications 2013). Inhabitants and chiefs in the Ekumfi (Central region) and Pusiga regions (Upper East region) exuberantly celebrated the inauguration of their new districts (Paintsil and Essakyire 2012; Ghana News Agency 2012d). Naba Ibrahim Ayumah Aguri, Chief of Pusiga, remarked in his speech during the festivities:

We the chiefs and the good people of the newly created District wish to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to His Excellency President Mills and the NDC for giving us a district (Ghana News Agency 2012d).

In Ghana each district is assigned a share of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) which has its source in a guaranteed share of not less than five percent of the country's tax revenue (see Art. 252 (1) of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana & The District Assemblies Common Fund Act 1993 (Act 455)). The DACF is distributed among all the District Assemblies on the basis of a formula approved by Parliament (see Art. 252 (2) of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana & The District Assemblies Common Fund Act 1993 Section 1 (4)). Currently, the administrator of the DACF submits a proposal to parliament on how to weight different criteria (see annex figure 9.2.1) determining the allocation of the DACF to each district. Since the administrator of the DACF is a member of the ruling party, the majority in parliament has always waved the proposed formula through (Banful 2007: 8). However, the promised allocations to districts and the actual disbursements of funds tend to differ (Banful 2007:1-2).

In his study of the DACF, Banful (2008) finds that there is a persistent election cycle in the magnitude of annual disbursements and in the proportion of allocation that is actually disbursed. In an election year, the disbursement is 25% higher than in other years. He also finds that resource allocation is greater in government supporting districts that are at risk of switching their allegiances to another political party (Banful 2007: 2). Banful's findings, combined with the fact that each district is allocated a certain base amount of the DACF, speaks for the narrative that the new districts had been created to channel funds to particular areas as a way of mobilizing voters support for the NDC. Moreover, areas which are upgraded to constituencies have access to the "MPs' Constituency Common Fund" (Ahwoi 2010: 179). Before the annually agreed formula for the DACF is applied, an amount of 10% previously called "Contingency Fund" and nowadays known as "Reserve Fund" is taken from the total DACF allocation (Banful 2007: 7). A proportion of this reserve fund is distributed evenly between all MPs and forms the "MPs' Common Fund". These resources are supposed to be used for development projects in the constituencies. Besides access to the DACF and a portion of the "MPs' Common Fund"', a district entails government jobs such as the post of District Chief Executive (DCE), Presiding Member of the Assembly and Assembly Members.

Again these jobs come with certain assets such as emoluments, the right for the DCE to live in a state-funded bungalow and goods such as cars, motorbikes, and computers (A40 interviewed 20/12/2012; A41 interviewed throughout summer 2013; B5 communications 2012; B17 communications 2013). The establishment of districts and constituencies has been used in Ghana as an instrument to (re)distribute resources amongst the electorate. With an overwhelming majority of 23 out of the 27 upgraded new district areas having voted in the 2012 elections for the NDC (see table 4.2 column two), this part of the government's mobilization strategy has paid off for the NDC.

Issue of monetization of politics

Several weeks before the polls, the government distributed around 100,000 free laptops to students, secondary, and tertiary educational institutions (B4 communications 11/2012; B7 communications 12/2012; Anane 2012). According to the government the distribution was part of its Better Ghana ICT project. The timing for the giveaway campaign as well as a lack of transparency regarding the selection of beneficiaries suggests that the measure was another component of the NDC's mobilization strategy (A30 interviewed 04/12/2012). The NPP harshly critiqued the distribution campaigns, and pro-opposition media pointed out that the lists indicating the selected beneficiaries contained hundreds of ghost names and several educational institutions which did not exist. On certain university campuses the scheme was referred to as "one laptop per NDC supporter" (A27 interviewed 02/12/2012; A30 interviewed 04/12/2012; Radio XYZ 2012). Papers close to the NPP also claimed that university students across the country had been rewarded with cars (see Quartey 2012) given out by the groups "Movement For Mahama" and "Youth For Mahama" in exchange for their lobbying for NDC support (A27 interviewed 02/12/2012; Ghanaian Observer 2012). With the youth constituting a large proportion of eligible voters, successfully mobilizing students is vital for Ghana's political parties.

In addition to the direct distribution of larger goods – such as laptops and cars – and widely scattered smaller give-aways such as t-shirts, shoes, flags, caps, neck scarves, and stickers all in party colours, the dispersion of cash is relied upon in Ghanaian electoral politics as a way of mobilizing voters support:

> **It is common, it is very common to give money to make people vote for you. Some are… how should I put it… some are not educated, so you can use money to convince them. I have somebody who brought me matchboxes. They gave him a matchbox. They saw him and they gave him a matchbox like this and when he opened it, it was 50 Ghana. They have money sitting governments. They make sure they will use wise the money. They are using money from the state for it and everybody knows. It's normal that's politics. […] Most MP's do it (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012).**

Another means of vying for voters' support is to live up to the electorates' expectations of public goods such as education, transportation infrastructure, and health facilities (see also Harding 2015):

> **She brought a clinic; she bought ambulances for more clinics. She brought another school. She was doing a lot, but the constituency was big. They just divided it. The NDC people will know she is doing well, but then it's politics. NDC some of them believe she has done some for them so they will vote her and vote for their presidential candidate. That's how some people see it […]. Now it's different. For the presidential everybody will vote how they believe. But for parliamentary they see what work has been done. The district directors, the DCEs they have been being doing roads, but once you are an MP people expect you to be doing roads, to bring hospitals and schools. When you don't do these things for them they will vote against you […]. That's why the political campaign is about what they have done and not about what must be done (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012, cp. also 2012 campaign flyer below).**

Figure 4.5 Campaign flyer of NDC candidate for Krowor constituency in Greater Accra



A crucial pillar for voter mobilization in Ghana is the distribution or redistribution of goods and resources amongst the electorate during pre-election times. A study conducted in the constituency of Ablekuma Central revealed that the electorate assessed politicians based on how they met the daily needs of the people (Lamptey and Salihu (2012:190). This included for example paying school fees and giving generous funeral donations. Yet, voters also viewed their political interest in broader communal terms of religion, ethnicity, and tradition. As Ninsin (Ninsin in Lamptey and Salihu (2012: 190)) puts it:

> **[The] Ghanaian electorate does not vote as sovereign individuals, aiming to implement certain democratic ideals or rights, but as members of the community aspiring to improve their own material conditions.**

The "political currency" used during campaigns therefore depends on the nature of the addressee(s) and their political sophistication (ibid.). While some goods and resources are channelled through networks based on ethnicity, others are distributed by some degree of "community-oriented developmental patrimonialism".[36] Incumbent political elites resort to the provision of public goods – such as schools, roads, and health infrastructure – in particular in ethnically fragmented local communities, so as to benefit the maximum number of potential voters and ensure their electoral support (see also chapter five).

The practice of (re)distributing goods and resources amongst the electorate raises the matter of monetization of electoral politics. Without access to a significant amount of financial resources or a senior financial mentor it is impossible to successfully run for a seat in parliament. In particular younger politicians repeatedly denounced the monetization of Ghanaian politics as an impediment to running for office (A17 interviewed 11/2012; A 15 interviewed 16/11/2012; B3 communication 19/11/2012; D18 observation 11/2012). As Owusu (2009: 39) puts it:

> **[…] only a person of some means or considerable wealth can aspire to or hold office either because of the expenses necessary to compete, run for office or maintain it.**

[36] The concept of "developmental (neo)patrimonialism" has been developed by Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011) and challenges the assumption that (neo)patrimonialism hinders economic development. Based on case studies from Rwanda and Ethiopia, the authors illustrate that some states have harnessed neopatrimonialism for developmental ends. These states have ensured that disbursed rents based on access to the state are used for productive investments that expand society's income in the long term (Kelsall 2011). The concept of "community-oriented developmental patrimonialism" builds on this idea. Yet, it claims that in ethnically fragmented communities, politicians resort to providing public goods to maximize patronage benefits and voters' support for their own ends.

Party financing

Closely linked to the issue of voter mobilization and monetization of politics is campaign and party financing. So far there is no limit on campaign spending in Ghana which has been critiqued by some Ghanaians and actors of the international community (A 31 interviewed 11/12/2012; A 32 interviewed 12/12/2012; A33 interviewed 12/12/2012; B3 communication 19/11/2012). Even though reliable figures on actual spending are not publicly available due to poor implementation of political party laws (see Ashiagbor 2005: 7), anecdotal evidence suggests that campaign spending has substantially increased over the years; some even say it has become excessive (ibid.; A 31 interviewed 11/12/2012; A33 interviewed 12/12/2012; B3 communication 19/11/2012; B3 communication 19/11/2012; Asare 2013).[37]

A large sum is spent on printing billboards, posters, the production of campaign songs, and campaign paraphernalia. However, a significant portion of the spending is also said to be used for buying votes, bribing election officials or financing hooliganism (A14 interviewed 08/11/2012; Asare 2013). Some people refer to the election year as "cocoa season" (B4 communications 11/2012; B5 communications 11/2012; B7 communications 11/2012), meaning that it is the time of harvest characterized by rent payments of candidates who want to be (re-)elected. Normally parliamentary candidates are expected to cover most of their expenses from their own pocket (Nugent 2001: 408). Only sometimes do the headquarters grant additional support (B1 communication 23/11/2011), since presidential candidates take precedence accessing scarce resources to fund their campaigns. A successful MP candidate explained:

> **Elections are not for the poor. It is an extremely expensive enterprise – very very expensive (Nugent 2001: 408).**

Besides the personal and family wealth of candidates, direct or indirect financial contributions are vital for party campaigns. These comprise membership dues, donations by founders of political parties, party members and sympathisers, local businesses, foreigners but also sources from kickbacks, state subventions and returns on business investments, which often results in the use and

[37] Asare (2013) claims that NDC and NPP each spent over £31,498,745 during the 2012 elections.

abuse of state resources (Saffu 2003: 22; Boafo-Arthur 1998: 82).[38] In general party financing is a major problem for all political parties, except the one that is in power (ibid.). Despite the fact that Ghanaian law prohibits foreign contributions (see 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana Art. 55 (15) and Art. 23 & 24 of Political Parties Act 2000, Act 574), the NDC and the NPP are both said to have benefitted from foreign financing during the 2012 election cycle. Ahead of the polls the NDC was accused of receiving indirect financial support from China Huawei Technologies (see Africa Confidential 2012b). The Chinese company allegedly sponsored campaign materials for the NDC. The claim was put forward by the Alliance for Accountable Governance (AFAG), a pro-NPP governance monitoring agency based in Accra. The AFAG based its allegations on the fact that the company had been awarded the contract for building Ghana's national e-governance infrastructure – said to be worth approximately USD 127.5 million – and was given a USD 43 million tax exception by parliament. Both the contract and the tax exception for Huawei were opposed by the minority in parliament (Africa Confidential 2012b). Likewise, the NPP was rumoured to receive cash and vehicles from the Ouattara regime in neighbouring Ivory Coast in support of its 2012 campaign. The allegations spread after the publication of an article in "The True Statesman" (2012), a newspaper close to the NDC. While both parties were quick to deny the accusations against them, both factions are known to have benefited from donations from national, foreign, and multinational companies. South Africa's telecommunications company MTN for example is said to be close to the NDC, while Britain's Vodafone, which secured a remarkably cheap license from Kufuor's government (Africa Confidential 2012d), is regarded as close to the NPP (Africa Confidential 2012b). Campaign donations are also said to be flowing in from foreign sources such as from political and business elites in neighbouring countries (International IDEA 2012: 24; Quartey 2011: 139; Gyimah-Boadi in Ayee et al. 2007: 8). Africa Confidential (2012d) reports:

[38] According to Ninsin (2006: 17) the income structure of one of the major political parties consists of: 45% donations; 35% contribution by MPs; 15% party membership dues, and 5% of other sources.

> **Companies such as United Bank for Africa and Zenith Bank have made political friends in Accra as have telecommunications companies such as Glo, owned by Michael Adenuga, a close business associate of ex-President Ibrahim Babangida [of Nigeria]. Adenuga moved to Ghana in 2007 with encouragement from the Kufuor government. Then Nuhu Ribadu, Chairman of Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, was pursuing Adenuga as part of a wider investigation. For several months, Ribadu froze Adenuga's assets in Nigeria; Adenuga is now close to the NPP and financed sporting events, such as football's Cup of Nations in January 2008. Nigeria's Rivers State Governor, Rotimi Amaechi, has strong business ties in Ghana and is said to support the NDC. The former Chief Executive of the United Bank for Africa, Tony Elumelu, is said to be a close ally of the NPP's Kufuor. Bola Ahmed Tinubu, former Lagos State Governor, is close enough to President John Mahama to have invited him as guest of honour to his star-studded 60th birthday party in Lagos in April.**

It seems that Africa's political elite form transnational supportive alliances (see also Africa Confidential 2011b) which, based to hearsay, provide mutual financial support during the election season (Saffu 2003: 24; Africa Confidential 1999).

Another important foreign source for generating an income for political parties are donations from citizens living abroad. Both of Ghana's main parties have established branches overseas with the ones in the UK and US being the most significant (see Boafo-Arthur 1998: 83). In their disclosure of funds, Ghanaian political parties in fact list "citizens living abroad" as a separate category (Saffu 2003: 24). During the 1996 elections, the NPP's presidential candidate allegedly received USD100,000 from the NPP's US branch (ibid.). Hence pre-election campaign trips by presidential candidates are not limited to Ghanaian soil, but also span trips abroad to mobilise financial support. As Akufo-Addo explained during his stay in Hamburg in 2011:

> **Some people criticise this decision, arguing that the campaign is restricted to the geographical territory called Ghana. I disagree. I still disagree. I consider their contribution to the development of Ghana as equally important. The taxes that they pay at the ports when they ship things home form a big part of government revenue (Myjoyonline 2011b).**

The diaspora is not only a valuable source of party financing but with its annual remittances of about USD2.0 billion, also represents a crucial source of foreign currency for Ghana's Central Bank and vital pillar in the economy (see Ghana Business News 2016).

Traditional rulers, the media, and polarization of ethnicity

Access to financial resources is key in the context of voter mobilization in Ghana. Yet, access to voters is just as important (see Nugent 2001: 407). In this way, traditional rulers as well as the media play an important role. Political parties and candidates reach voters by spreading their campaign messages through bill

boards installed in public places, TV spots, and newspaper ads. Most important are radio programmes, the dominant media outlet in Ghana, and campaign rallies which allow for direct contact with the electorate (A18 interviewed 23/11/2012; D14 observation 04/12/2012; D15 observation 05/12/2015).

Since the gradual reopening of Ghana's cultural sphere to private media in the early 1990s, FM stations have sprouted up all over the country (A18 interviewed 23/11/2012; A22 interviewed 27/11/2012). Today there are about 300 radio stations broadcasting in English and/or local languages. Several are owned by politicians or individuals close to one of the main parties. Radio Gold for example is said to be 50% owned by the 31st December Women's Movement, suggesting a link to former First Lady Nana Rawlings (Doste 2012), while Oman FM is owned by Kennedy Agyempong, a sitting MP for the NPP in Assin North (A19 interviewed 23/11/2012). During the election period FM stations are frequently used as "parties' mouth pieces" shaping the campaign discourse (ibid.; Danson and Edu-Afful 2012: 122-23).

Rallies are a highlight of the electoral season within communities and seem to be the most vital way of mobilizing voters. In this context traditional rulers play a vital role since custom requires political campaigners to pay courtesy calls to chiefs before being allowed access to the land and the communities (observation fieldwork 11/2012 and 12/2012). While it appears that MPs are complying with customs and paying their respect to traditional leaders, a survey amongst MPS carried out by Gyampo (2008: 20) clearly shows that half of the respondents also made courtesy calls to win chiefs over to their side and to solicit more votes (Gyampo 2008: 22). The influence of the chief permeates the fabric of social life in Ghana's rural communities so much (Gyampo 2008: 12) that traditional leaders, despite the little formal powers that they have, remain extremely influential in the cultural sphere (Ansah-Koi 1998: 152).

Even though Ghana's constitution bans chiefs from active party politics, Gyampo (2008), Jonah (2003), and Ansah-Koi (1998) demonstrate vividly that some have been dragged into politics by politicians who seek the mandate of the people. Chiefs can be seen at party rallies, adorned in party paraphernalia and sometimes declaring support for the candidates (Gyampo 2008: 10). According to Gyampo (2008: 20), chiefs in Ghana's Fourth Republic attempted, in mostly subtle ways, to influence outcomes of elections at the national and local

levels. Some exert their influence by persuading or coercing rival candidates to stand down. This is what Jonah (2003: 218) calls “Patronage by Restriction of Competitors” (PRC). Moreover, traditional rulers are said to hold secret meetings, make partisan commitments, and offer various opinions of a partisan nature (Gyampo 2008: 22) aiming to mobilize support for their preferred candidate. Jonah (2003) terms this “Patronage by Mobilization of the Electorate” (PME) Gyampo (2008: 18-19) reports:

> **Prior to the 2000 General Elections, an interview with some residents of La, a suburb of Accra […] revealed that the Chief convened a meeting of all the seven clan heads in La and called on them to support an aspiring member of parliament (MP). […] In the case of the La Chief, he was very popular among his sub-chiefs and subjects and so his preferred candidate won the elections.**

Interesting in this context is also Ansah-Koi’s (1998: 152) remark who confirms this narrative but adds that:

> **The impression should not be left that queenmothers are not involved in the entire drama.**

In the prelude to the 1996 elections, the NDC worked hard to organize queenmothers to mobilize, in particular, the support of female voters (ibid.).

In a country where origins are everything (Nugent 2001: 416) and people continue to look up to their traditional rulers for leadership (Gyampo 2008: 12) ethnicity plays a key role in voter mobilization. Political parties take this into consideration when selecting their candidates:

> **After splitting the old constituency, two of the new ones are safe for the NPP and one is 50/50. There are more Ga and Hausa. They like NDC. And the NDC people have also used the strategy to bring a candidate that is a Ga. So now its 50/50 and that man is a popular man. When it was the old whole constituency they had small votes then (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012).**

Moreover, party representatives play the ethnic card in terms of political rhetoric to assure voters’ support. During the 2012 pre-election period much attention was paid by Ghanaian society to the issue of politicization of ethnicity. Already in February 2011, Akufo-Addo addressed his party executives in Korfuridua using the phrasing “Owo bia eye owo” – meaning “all-die-be-die” – to get his audience into the mood for the upcoming elections. His speech had been recorded and soon audio sequences were spreading around the media. With Ghana having a longstanding tradition within its political culture of frowning on ethnic appeals (Jockers/Kohnert/Nugent 2009: 2) the “all-die-be-die” statement of the NPP’s flag bearer was largely critiqued for inciting other ethnic groups, and Akufo-Addo was accused of undermining national unity and cohesion (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012:

111). Naturally, the most vocal critique came from the NDC, but numerous civil society groups joined the outrage and harshly condemned the statement as hate speech. Ghanaians seemed however to be split on the issue. While hard core NPP supporters tried to downplay the statement as a common Ghanaian saying, NDC stalwarts claimed the NPP was "beating tribal war drums". They stressed that the explosive comment was a warmongering call to party sympathizers and individuals with a particular ethnic background to adopt violence in the upcoming elections (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 111). Johnson Asiedu Nketiah (2011), the NDC Secretary-General quoted Akufo-Addo in a press conference as follows:

> **We Akans are not the cowards we are perceived to be by the other tribes. […] The little violence that we displayed in Attiwa is just the tip of the iceberg of what the NPP would do in 2012. […] 2012 is going to be a do and die affair after all: All-die-be-die!**

A party supporter toned down his flagbearer's statement:

> **Nana said all-die-be-die and it grows a whole lot. He told his supporters they have to die for the party. It is time for the party supporters to go out and die for the party, to do something for the party to come to power. He didn't say violence talks. When it came out it was politics time. He was trying to say we have to fight together, he was not talking to the nation, he was talking to his party supporters that this is the time that you will die for the party; you have to go around campaigning for the party convincing people to come to NPP you understand.**
>
> **He was using the word die for his supporters. You understand the word die? It was not to kill somebody. But when it was election time people used that to say he will bring violence, but its not true (A 13, interviewed 07/11/2012).**

The debate about the "all-die-be-die" statement is indicative of the fact that mobilizing along regional-ethnic lines is still very common in Ghana and pursued by political parties across the board (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 98; Ninsin 2006: 9). At a rally in Walewale, the hometown of Mahamudu Bawumia, the running mate of Akufo-Addo, Mahama stated in 2012:

> **I am a Northerner looking for President. My younger brother, Bawumia is a Northerner looking for Vice-President. There is a world of difference between being President and being Vice-President (The Chronicle 2012).**

In addition to ethnic appeals, other forms of hate speech such as derogatory language have been used to gain political capital over opponents and to mobilize support (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 109). Sitting NPP-MP for Assin North, Kennedy Agyapong, has developed a reputation for provoking his political opponents and using hate speech on air. Ahead of the 2012 polls for example, Agyapong warned the NDC that:

> **If we don't have peaceful elections in this country and Koku Anyidoho [Deputy Secretary General of the NDC] thinks he can use the military, the macho men to intimidate and rig elections, Ghana would not be like Kenya, Ghana would be like Rwanda. When you look at Nana Addo's age and this guy [Koku Anyidoho], Nana Addo can be this boy's father, but because of cheap politics, we do in this country, he gets up and starts insulting this man [Nana Addo] with no just reason. We want peace, nobody wants to fight in this country… but an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth… this time we would not sit down for NDC to intimidate anybody, if they hit one we would hit three (Daily Guide 2011).**

During the pre-election period verbal duels between opposing candidates and party representatives are very common and quarrels are played out particularly during radio programmes (A20 interviewed 27/11/2012; A21 interviewed 27/11/2012). One can even say the FM stations are providing a platform for it (D8 observation 16/11/2012; D9 observation 27/11/2012). The heated political discourse is further fuelled by so-called "serial callers" who receive money or phone credit in return for calling in on radio shows on behalf of their parties (Danso and Edu-Affu 2012: 117). It is not only party foot soldiers who are involved in this venture. Parties seem to have made certain members in charge of spreading provoking comments, and mobilizing voter support along ethnic lines. In this way, leading party members and presidential candidates do not have to be associated directly with this "dirty business". These members often expect rewards for their "services to the party" such as appointment to government institutions or ministerial posts, once the party has gained power (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 116). As an NDC regional youth organiser put it:

> **When high-ranking members in the NPP use derogatory remarks against their opponents, their supporters are very happy; the same applies to us (NDC) – when we insult, you would have people calling to congratulate you, and some might even ask you to pass by their shop, home or office for monetary rewards (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 117; B17 conversation in 2013 and 2014).**

As the outcry about the "all-die-be-die" statement has shown, the practice of politicization of ethnicity and inciting language co-exists with a strong repulsion and repudiation of hate speech and ethnic appeals. Ahead of the 2012 polls, numerous peace campaigns were run by social groups strongly condemning hate speech and electoral violence (A3 interviewed 14/11/2011; A6 interviewed 18/11/2011; A15 interviewed 16/11/2012; A 23 interviewed 28/11/2012). Slogans like the following were spread all over Accra before, during, and after the election:

- **Say no to tribal politics; Say no to politics of insults and violence; Say yes to unity and peace; Say yes to Ghana (Youth Action for Progress).**
- **When violence erupts; all are affected and there's no escape (Ark Foundation).**
- **Promote Peace; Stop Hate Speeches**

In addition smaller and larger events were organized in abundance. Events such as peace concerts that particularly targeted youth and campaigns such as "Peace Everybody's Business" by Ghana Peace Campaign, a "1 Million People March for Peace", were organised in Accra involving leading politicians such as Vice President Paa Kwesi Amissah-Arthur (NDC), Jake Obestebi-Lamptey, Chairman of the NPP and Mayor of Accra Alfred Okoe Vanderpuije (NDC) (A15 interviewed 16/11/2012). While some members of the political elite engaged in hate speech, political party leadership participated in and endorsed the peace events organized by various societal groups countering the increasingly heated pre-election political discourse.

The death of the sitting president Mills at the end of July 2012 and the passing away of Aliu Mahama, NPP Vice-president under Kufuor, close to the polls in mid-November, interrupted the swelling intense political discourse. The tragic incidents called for a period of national mourning. Since funerals represent important social events in Ghana celebrating the life of the departed, campaigning was suspended by all parties for a few days allowing for a degree of cooling down.

As the election day approached, peace messages grew. Otumfuo Osei Tutu, the Asantehene, Ghana's most influential traditional leader, together with the National Peace Council and the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) invited presidential candidates and leading stakeholders to Kumasi to sign for the first time a declaration taking a stand against electoral violence, impunity, and injustice (A40 interviewed 20/12/2012; see Kumasi Declaration 2012). The event with speeches by Rawlings, Kufuor, and several presidential candidates was widely covered by the media. In addition to these big events, peace songs like "Yɛn ara asase ni"[39], Ghana's unofficial national anthem, combined with countless peace appeals dominated the immediate pre-election discourse. Radio presenter Cecil Nii Obodai-Wentum called upon Ghanaians on the morning of Election Day:

[39] Meaning in english: "This land is our own".

> **[…] Ghanaians will decide today whether to retain the NDC or bring in a new president. We should also be mindful of the fact that the international community is paying close attention to the outcome of today's polls. We should go to the polls once again to test our democratic strength and […] should have at the back of our minds that Ghana is the only country we have. If we destroy this beautiful fabric of unity, we are doomed forever. We all heard our president yesterday appealing for calm and cool heads. What else can we ask for again but the supremacy of peace and stability? My brothers, my sisters we cannot make any meaningful impact in the political environment filled with violence, acrimony, confusion and turmoil. My brothers and sisters our future as a nation lies in our ability to sustain and keeping the peace of our democratic process. Our strength as a people lies in our ability to protect, to sustain and to improve our political institutions, economic institutions in some way. […] Finally we should remember our image as a country lies in our ability to showcase and sustain our hard won reputation and enviable democracy by going to the polls as one people (D16 observation 07/12/2012).**

Radio stations were continuously broadcasting peace messages from eminent Ghanaians such as Reverent Emmanuel Asante, Chairman of the National Peace Council who stated:

> **[…] try to see whether we would like to retain or whether we would like to bring in a new government. This is what democracy is all about. It is not a matter of war. Politics is not a matter of doing and dying as some people want to give us that impression. […] All of us will not agree on one thing, but the fact that we have political disagreement does not mean that we should engage in political violence. We should learn to live and let others also live. My dear fellow Ghanaians be mindful of your language. […]We do not want to see those things we currently see on our television where there is violence and people are carrying mattresses and other things not knowing where to go. Ghana is our only country. Ghana is the only country that we have. We do not want to become refugees in countries in people's language we cannot even speak. We love mother Ghana. So let us conduct our politics in a civil way. Let political civility prevail. At the end of the day when all of us have been able to select by majority vote the person we would want to rule, we will rejoice and give praise and thanks to the almighty God who has enabled us to go that far. Please let peace prevail! And I speak to you as the Chairman of the National Peace Council […] Let peace prevail in Ghana! (D16 observation 07/12/2012).**

According to some citizens, Ghana's political discourse has been increasingly marked by verbal abuse and hate speech during the pre-election period (A14 interviewed 08/11/2012). This potentially sets the scene for isolated incidences of electoral violence, which have been a recurring feature of all Ghanaian elections since 1992, to become endemic (Danso and Edu-Afful 2012: 98-99). This could pose a threat to national stability, in particular in a context where electoral stakes have been raised since Ghana entered the "club of oil producing countries" at the end of 2010 (A14 interviewed 08/11/2012).[40]

[40] For an introduction to Ghana's politics of patronage and its evolving oil industry see Boynton (2013).

> **There is more hate speech in 2012 than in 2008. But civil society has pointed to it more. Civil society has progressively developed more capacity. They are more finger pointing and speaking up more but it doesn't necessarily erase it or make it lesser. Civil society has come around to say these are the problems watch it, but the problems still exist. [...] This year the tensions have been quite new (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**

The perceived need for such a vast amount of peace campaigning could reflect a lingering and potentially growing fear of violence and uncertainty linked to elections in Ghana (CW-EOM 2012: 33). It is rather difficult to evaluate whether this indignation is entirely home-grown or to what extent the substantive financial support from donors has driven the peace campaigns. There is probably some truth in both. Certainly the peace campaigns in 2012 created an atmosphere in which the use of hate speech and politicization of ethnicity, at least by leading political figures, became socially unacceptable. From a political campaign perspective, Akufo-Addo committed an immense PR mistake with his "all-die-be-die" statement.

> **It all depends on the time you talk, the moment you have been talking. Agyempong knows the NPP is too soft. He was telling them they need to be hard and fight. The timing wasn't right, it was this election time whenever you use such words, it will come out and it will be wrong. Its politics and the politicians are all friends and they know what they are doing. In Ghana politics you have friends, an NDC friend while in the NPP. After the elections they will all be friends, but now they are not friends (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012).**

Akufo-Addo's statement was gratefully taken up and exploited by the NDC who used the mistake to reinforce the image of the NPP as an "Akan party" and tried to brand Akufo-Addo as an "arrogant and aggressive" man. One can imagine how in a heated political sphere the phrase could easily be taken literally by some NPP stalwarts. This dispute combined with reports about secret training camps of about thirty combatants in the Volta region, among them Ghanaians and other African nationals, and the media reporting on an influx of small arms and weapons, certainly caused unease among some voters ahead of the polls (A14 interviewed 08/11/2012; A31 interviewed 11/12/2012). Again, this apprehension during election time and lingering fear of eruptions of pockets of election-related violence, existed parallel to an overall generally peaceful interconnected life between ethnic groups in Ghana.[41]

[41] Ghana has experienced significant regional ethnic conflicts in the Northern parts of the country (see chapter five).

4.2 Voting day

The following section will narrate some of the main incidences that occurred during the two days of voting in Ghana's 2012 elections. These events illustrate first and foremost that there is an imperative for the two big parties and individual candidates to win the polls.

Hiccups during voting day

On December 7th 2012, Ghana's first day of voting, several polling stations throughout the country had to cope with the late arrival of election materials and EC officials. At a polling station in the constituency of Ayawaso Central in Greater Accra, the voter register was missing and therefore the start of the voting procedure was substantially delayed. Queuing voters questioned whether the missing voter register was indeed accidental as claimed by EC officials or whether it was an act intended to delay the election process (D17 observation 07/12/2012). Rumours were spreading that the person responsible for the missing voter register was from the NDC and was intended to delay the voting in an area where the NPP was rather strong (B12 communication 07/12/2012).

Of interest were the ways in which the different stakeholders interacted to resolve the issue. Polling agents had informed EC representatives who were dealing with logistical challenges and complaints. At the same time a journalist from the Daily Graphic passed on the information to his editor claiming that his boss would ring up EC officials to increase the pressure (D17 observation 07/12/2012). The presiding member of the local assembly quickly appeared on the scene to assist in getting the voter register delivered to the polling station. He called EC officials numerous times and even offered to pick up the register from wherever it was, to deliver it to the polling station quicker (B12 communications 07/12/2012). Accordingly, plenty of informal mechanisms were put in place to deal with the situation. In the meantime, a team of mobile security forces made up of military and policemen checked several times that the situation remained calm (D17 observation 07/12/2012). Also Henry Quartey, the NPP candidate running for the parliamentary seat in the constituency came with his group of "macho men" to personally assess the situation (D17 observation 07/12/2012). Eventually the register was delivered by the EC around 10.15am and welcomed with great cheer from patient voters. Voting started after a three-and-a-half-hour delay at 10.30am. In a similar way to the incident described above, logistical challenges have oc-

curred at various places across the country. The fact that many Ghanaians suspected, or even expected, intended interferences, speaks for itself.

Throughout the election day several polling stations faced more serious challenges, in particular the breakdown of verification machines (African Elections Project 2012). Technical defects due to the humid climate and sometimes inadequate handling of the machines, which had been used for the first time, were frequently identified as reasons for the breakdown (B12 communication 07/12/2012; D17 observation 07/12/2012). With no spare verification devices and the previously resolved rule “No Verification, No Voting”, the EC decided to run a second day of voting at affected polling stations (B12 communication 07/12/2012; D17 observation 07/12/2012). Initially the decision caused some confusion, with doubtful voters who had been told at their respective polling station to return the next day to cast their votes, called local radio stations to verify the information. A radio host who could not confirm that voting had been postponed till the next day advised voters to remain at or return to their polling stations. He urged them not to be deceived out of their vote:

> **Voter: Hello, good morning! I am Laura […] we have been here since 5.30 and I have a shop and as I am talking to you now I have closed the shop, [I] wanted to come and vote and go early. I have a kid at home, I have left the baby at home. And as I am talking to you now I am not so sure, cos we have not seen anybody, we are just queuing under the sun. We don’t know when we are voting and I heard that we are voting tomorrow, cos some of us…**
>
> **Radio: No, no, no, no, no! Don’t let anybody deceive you that you are you are gonna vote tomorrow!**
>
> **Voter: We were told we will be given numbers […] we didn’t get the numbers […] this is going to create confusion.**
>
> **Radio: I understand! What I suggest is you remain calm and then you stay there. It is unfortunate that you’ve left your baby at home and your shop. But you exercise that patience ok!?**
>
> **Voter: Ok, ok.**
>
> **Radio: Don’t let anybody deceive you that you are coming back tomorrow to vote. The exercise will end at 5pm today (D16 observation 07/12/2012).**

This incident demonstrates the underlying scepticism and mistrust Ghanaians have during election time. Furthermore, it illustrates the informal mechanisms citizens rely on to deal with challenges, in this case how to verify information. In the end, the news about the second day of voting trickled through and voting continued in some 431 polling stations on the following day (D17 observation 08/12/2012).

Issue of electoral violence

During the two days of voting Ghana also experienced sporadic incidences of so-called first-order electoral malpractices.[42] A group of strong men, for example, stormed the collation centre of the Ablekuma North constituency in Greater Accra and set the ballot papers ablaze during the tabulation process (Joy Online 2012). The parliamentary candidates from the two leading parties accused each other of being behind the attack. Collation and declaration of the results continued at the police station based on the secured cast ballots. The perpetrators were arrested and supposed to face trial.

So far only sporadic incidences of electoral violence have been common during the elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic. However, by now certain areas have become known as so-called "hot spots" where electoral violence is said to be likely to occur. Interviewees have mentioned such areas as Ashaiman, areas around Tema, Nima, Odododiodio (all Greater Accra), Bawku (Upper East) and Peki (Volta) as being "hot spots" (A13, A14, A31, A34, A35, A40). There seems to be a tendency for areas such as the Northern, Ashanti, and Greater Accra regions to have the highest incidences of election-related violence (Lamptey and Salihu 2012: 194). In this context the youth - individuals falling within the 15 to 35 age bracket - play a significant role (Abdallah and Osei-Afful 2012: 307), as they are hired to engage in illegal activities to ensure "their" candidate will win:

> **The youth is used for the violence. You know right now the youth don't work. So once somebody gives them money, take this and do this they will go. In this area if you give a boy money, take this, do this, they will go. There is no work. But if you are working you wouldn't because how much would that person give you? So they are using the youth that has no work. So if you want to use those boys you will get. […] I don't know for now if it is an MP, but even if it is some MP, you would not see his or her face. They take it through somebody so it will be difficult to get to know their IDs. Unless the person that the MP sends, he or she sees. They catch the person and tell this is the MP. But before you have taken big money and I swear whenever they catch him they will say it's not me. You don't know the person who is catching, he did it himself. […] They catch them who did it. But other time they go. It favours the party in power. So if NDC now sends people to go and military they catch them, definitely they will go out again cos it's them that sends them (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012).**

Another interviewee shared the view that predominately socially deprived members of the youth are used by politicians to ensure electoral victory:

[42] For a definition of first- and second-order electoral malpractices, see Norris (2012: 155).

> **In Bawku we had about 50 young people who have been directly involved in the things from both sides. And these people are against what is happening. They don't like it. It disrupts their future. When you speak to them they are not able to go to school (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012). In our upbringing as a people we are supposed to respect the elderly. We are brought up in a way that it is difficult to say no to the elderly. Through political motivation politicians play on the poverty in the area to give money to people, they tie them with money and some of these kids are 11 or 12 years old, some are even younger. They get involved in these things. They are the ones who burn the houses (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**

Even though the perpetrators are occasionally caught by security forces, as in the case of the Ablekuma North constituency, most election-related violence still seems to go hand-in-hand with a culture of impunity:

> **Even the law cannot take its course cos they always fly under the banner of the political parties. So depending on which political party is in power and I go and do something on behalf of that political party who comes for me. The police have no authority. And if it is the biggest opposition and you arrest their person they also come out in their numbers and storm the police station. There are some instances where jails have been broken and people taken out of jails. So everybody lives under a certain banner. The banner of the government in power or the one of the opposition. These people are like untouchables. The police cannot arrest them because it is not in the interest of the police to arrest them. In Tamale […] he has over 500 boys under his watch that he can command at a snap of a finger ready to move (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**[43]

Even though instances of first order electoral malpractices were not widespread, it remains worrying that sporadic instances of election-related violence still regularly occur.

Overall however, the security forces were in control of the situation. Each polling station was supposed to be staffed by a police officer or personnel of another security agency. In addition, armed roaming patrol teams made up of policemen and soldiers were responsible for an assigned area covering several polling stations (B15 communication 08/12/2012; D17 observation 07/12/2012). Slight tension arose at another polling station in Ayawaso Central due to discontent over the handling of access to the premises of the polling station. As soon as the roaming patrol team and in particular soldiers were in sight, people stopped quarrelling and promptly followed orders given by the military (D17 observation 07/12/2012). Several voters remarked that no Ghanaian would want to mess with military personnel (B12 communication 07/12/2012). This under-

[43] Ghana's youth is a relevant actor in electoral politics as they make up a significant part of the electorate. Moreover, as party foot soldiers the youth plays a decisive role in mobilizing grassroots support (see Abdallah and Osei-Afful 2012).

lines the continuous respect bordering almost on fear Ghanaians have of their security forces and in particular the military (A13 interviewed 07/11/2012).

Vote count and tabulation process

At the observed polling stations, the vote count and tabulation process was transparent and not questioned by stakeholders. A brief disquiet erupted at a polling station in Ayawaso Central when a police officer chased an individual who was said to have attempted to steal one of the ballot boxes (D17 observation 07/12/2012). In the end no ballot box was stolen and the accused person was chased off the premises.

Counting aloud each single vote per candidate continued as normal with polling station staff, media representatives, party and international observers present. At the observed polling stations the result protocols, the so-called “pink sheets”, were signed by relevant stakeholders. Afterwards the presiding officer brought the election material to the constituency’s collation centre at the Kotobabi District Office and Police Station. Media representatives followed the election material to ensure it was brought straight to the collation centre where throughout the night more and more results from the polling stations were checked and collated (D17 observation 07/12/12 & 8/12/2012).

Second day of voting

On the second day of voting most Ghanaians were focusing on the results trickling in from the various constituency levels and witnessed the NDC gain ground in the 2012 presidential race. In light of these developments a number of instances raised tensions slightly. Despite the fact that results from the NDC strongholds in the three northern regions were still outstanding on the second day of voting, Kwadjo Owusu Afriyie, the NPP General Secretary, held a press conference in the afternoon of the 8th of December in which he declared Akufo-Addo the winner (D17 observation 08/12/2012; The Informer 2013). Afriyie even urged NPP supporters to attend church in white, the colour of victory, on the following Sunday to celebrate the NPP’s triumph. The declaration of the NPP’s win was promptly condemned by Reverend Emmanuel Asante, Chairman of the National Peace Council, who stressed that the announcement was illegal and an affront to the peace and stability of the nation. Asante stressed that the EC was the only constitutionally mandated body to declare the winner of the elec-

tions and strongly criticised the NPP for its attempt to usurp the EC's authority (D17 observation 08/12/2012; Ghana News Agency 2012e).

Another instance attracted public attention on the second day of voting, when a number of NPP supporters intended to raid Superlock Technologies Limited (STL), an Israeli company which had been contracted by the EC to compile the biometric register and to provide IT services during the elections. NPP supporters had heard that STL received electoral results from regional EC offices without the knowledge of NPP leaders. Thus, an allegation was quickly spreading that STL was involved in manipulating the results favouring the NDC before passing them on to the EC's national headquarters in Accra[44] (D17 observation 08/12/2012). Yet, security personnel soon brought the situation under control. Both incidences point to the lingering mistrust, expectations of cheating, and heated atmosphere closer to the declaration of results.

Declaration of results

The official announcement of the election results came with some delay on Sunday evening, since the NPP had urged the EC to desist from declaring a winner (D17 observation 09/12/2012). Obetsebi-Lamptey argued that the NPP had detected a number of anomalies in some of the results announced at constituency level. He claimed that there were significant disparities in the number of ballots cast for the presidential and parliamentary elections. As examples he cited the Yendi constituency in the Northern region and Korle Klottey in Greater Accra. The official validly cast votes for the parliamentary election in Korle Klottey were 74,407 votes compared to 74,422 for the presidential race. For the Yendi constituency the EC had declared the figures of cast votes as follows: 49,113 for the parliamentary and 48,741 for the presidential election. In addition, the NPP alleged that there had been substantial differences in figures declared by media houses and those announced at collation centres such as Ledzokuku in Greater Accra. Obetsebi-Lamptey therefore announced that his party would not accept the results until these issues had been addressed. A meeting was held with representatives of the NPP, the NDC, the EC and the National Peace Council as an attempt to pour oil on the troubled waters (Mod-

[44] Owing to a lack of evidence the NPP had to drop claims against the STL in 2012. A report published by Ghana UNDP however challenges STL's role in allowing multiple registrations to occur in 2012 and raises the issue of the company's responsibility for a bloated register (Daily Guide 2015).

ern Ghana 2012). Eventually, and despite resistance from the NPP, Afari-Gyan held sway and declared the NDC candidate, John Dramani Mahama, the winner of the 2012 presidential election.[45]

4.3 Post-election period

Just like events and incidences during election days, the 2012 post-election period illustrates the importance of winning elections for political elites in Ghana. It also demonstrates how the NPP walked the tightrope between claiming electoral fraud and simultaneously choosing a path deliberately conforming to international standards to challenge the declared result. By contesting the validity the 2012 presidential election results in court, the NPP not only emphasized its commitment to international norms and nurtured Ghana's image as an African role model, but also opted for the court room as one of its members' prominent professional strengths.

A balancing act: Claiming electoral fraud via a process of legal remedies that deliberately conform with international standards

The NDC embraced the declared outcome of the elections with joy. According to the official results Mahama had polled 5,474,761 votes while 5,247,898 ballots had been cast for Akufo-Addo. Even though these results left a margin of only 226,863 votes, the difference between Mahama and Akufo-Addo was much larger than the slim majority of 40,586 votes Mills had secured for the NDC in 2008. As was common practice since 1992, the NDC as winner of the presidential race had also secured the majority in parliament with 148 seats compared to 123 seats for the NPP. While NDC supporters were celebrating their party's victory, NPP supporters joined and reinforced their party leader's claim of electoral fraud (B8 communications 12/2012; B13 communication 09/12/2012; B16 communication 11/12/2012). Despite the assessment of the elections as free and credible by domestic, regional, and international observer groups,[46] protests began to form quickly on the streets of Accra and Kumasi. Soon sheets were spreading around Accra trying to capture in figures where and how the NPP had allegedly been robbed of its victory (B8 communications

[45] Interestingly, before Afari-Gyan had officially announced the 2012 election results to the press, the results had been published on the EC's facebook page (D13 observation 08/12/2012).
[46] These included CODEO, ECOWAS, the Commonwealth Observer Group, an EU Observer team, and the mission of the African Union.

12/2012; B16 communication 11/12/2012). Eventually, NPP leaders decided to deflate the daily protests of their supporters by announcing their intention to take the remonstration into the court room (see Petitioners/NPP 2012).

In accordance with the country's regulation, the NPP – represented by its presidential candidate, his running mate, and the party's Chairman – filed a petition at the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the election of Mahama as president. In court the NPP was pitted against the NDC and the EC as respondents, represented by Mahama and Afari-Gyan respectively (see Petitioners/NPP 2012). The petition was based on six irregularities, violations, and malpractices which the NPP claimed had occurred during the two days of voting. These included:

(1) over-voting;
(2) voting without prior biometric verification;
(3) unsigned pink sheets (declaration forms of results at polling station level);
(4) duplicate serial numbers on pink sheets;
(5) duplicate polling station codes on different pink sheets; and
(6) voting at unknown polling stations (Petitioners/NPP 2012; 2013).

In the public realm the NPP alleged the NDC and the EC had rigged the elections via these statutory violations. Yet, in the witness box Bawumia did not impute any conspiracy by the NDC or the EC to fix the vote. Rather, the NPP aimed to demonstrate that tens of thousands of electoral malpractices had been committed (Africa Confidential 2013b) revoking the election's legitimacy. The petitioners demanded that the Supreme Court annul 4,670,504 votes stemming from 11,916 polling stations which the NPP claimed to be affected by malpractices (see Petitioners/NPP 2013).[47] The annulment of the votes would have reversed the results of the presidential race. Mahama, who gained 50,7% of the valid vote cast, would have dropped to 39.1% whereas, Akufo-Addo who had secured 47.7 % of votes, would have increased to 59.7% – implying a "one touch" victory for the NPP (Petitioners/NPP 2013). The Supreme Court, with its nine-member panel,[48] had to decide whether there had been violations and malpractice in the way the polls were conducted and if these had affected the results.

[47] This number refers to the 2nd amended petition pursuant to court order dated 7th of February 2013.
[48] The panel was made up of Justice William Atuguba as presiding judge, Justice Julius Ansah, Justice Sophia Adinyira, Justice Rose Owusu, Justice Jones Dotse, Justice Annin Yeboah, Justice P. Baffoe-Bonnie, Justice N.S. Gbadegbe and Justice Vida Akoto-Bamfo (see SCRG 2013).

After six months of hearings the judges unanimously dismissed three of the NPP's six allegations; namely "unknown polling stations, duplicate polling station codes, and duplicate serial numbers of pink sheets" (see SCRG 2013). The respondents' side countered the accusations of ghost polling stations by arguing that Akufo-Addo himself had signed documents assigning NPP polling agents to the supposedly unknown polling stations (Modern Ghana 2013). The fact that several pink sheets with the same polling station codes indicating different results existed, was explained by Afari-Gyan pointing out that some polling stations had been used for early voting on December the 5th (see also D13 observation 09/12/2012). Therefore, several pink sheets for the same polling station with different results were in existence (Ghana Web 2013a; Ghana Web 2013b). Furthermore, he argued that the serial numbers of the pink sheets had "absolutely no relevance to the compilation and declaration of results*"* and that they would not represent the unique security numbers of the polling stations. Afari-Gyan stressed that pink sheets would be distributed randomly to polling stations and that the EC would not rely on the embossed serial numbers of the pink sheets when tabulating results (Ghana Web 2013b; Ghana Broadcasting Cooperation 2013a). Rather, all polling stations were identified "by their unique code and by their names*"*.

The Supreme Court was split on the three most serious claims – "over-voting", "voting without prior biometric verification", and "unsigned pink sheets". While mooting the claim of over-voting, it became apparent that petitioners and respondents differed in their view of what over-voting entailed. The respondents limited their definition of over-voting to a situation in which the number of votes cast exceeds the number of registered voters. In contrast, the petitioners defined over-voting to include cases where the number of ballot papers counted in the box exceeds the number of individuals verified to vote (SCRG 2013: 530). The court was indeed presented with pink sheets documenting cases of over-voting in which the sum of rejected ballots and valid votes cast was higher than the amount of verified voters. However, Bawumia, as a witness for the petitioners, had to concede that several of the pink sheets submitted by the NPP to underpin its claim of over-voting, did not contain over-voting as defined by the petitioners at a second look. Furthermore, numerous other pink sheets presented by the petitioners were said to contain clerical errors. Sometimes this was a re-

sult of carbonation so that, for example, the figure seventy-one was misinterpreted as twenty-one (Ghana Web 2013d; 2013e).

In the context of over-voting it is worth mentioning the discussion of the total number of voters registered in the 2012 elections. The EC had initially indicated a provisional number of 13,917,366 registered voters. After adding Ghanaians working abroad, the EC provided a "raw figure" of 14,158,890, indicating an increase of 241,524 registrations. During the declaration of the results, Afari-Gyan had quoted 14,158,890 as the total number of registered voters. On the same day however, the excel sheet titled "registered voters per constituency document" on the EC's website listed the total number of registered voters as 14,031,793 (D17 observation 09/12/2012). The petitioners filed a motion demanding the EC provide a detailed list of added voters who were working abroad. When prompted by the Supreme Court, the EC was only able to provide further information on 2,883 of the added voters, falling short by a rather large figure of 238,641. The NPP felt reinforced regarding its claim that the number of registered voters had "mysteriously metamorphosed".[49] In court Afari-Gyan conceded that the figure stated in the declaration of results had been incorrect (see Respondent/EC 2013). He emphasized that this slip had no effect on the total votes cast (10,995,262) which formed the basis of the declaration of results. The mistake affected solely the percentage of the voter turnout raising the national figure from 79.43% to 80.15% (SCRG 2013: 118). Overall the petitioners' claim of a bloated register did not create a massive stir and the majority of the judges took the view that the petitioners had failed to raise any concerns about the voter list before the election day (see SCRG 2013: 133).

The court was split on the issue of whether voting without prior verification had affected the election results. Ahead of the polls Afari-Gyan had announced that for those polling stations where the number of votes cast exceeded the number of persons verified by even one vote the results would be cancelled (Ghana Web 2013d). According to Judge Baffoe-Bonnie, the NPP had filed quite a number of pink sheets proving voting without prior biometric voter verification. Sometimes the sheets even indicated that every person who voted at a particular polling station had cast their vote without verification. Hence, in his judgement he found that the

[49] In fact the EC had corrected the figure on its website to 14,031,793 registers voters a few days after its declaration of the results so that the published figures again matched (D17 observation 12/2012).

EC did not tender the biometric verification devices as evidence, even though the respondents had claimed that the machines had still stored the relevant data (Ghana Web 2013d). As a result, Judge Baffoe-Bonnie was one out of the four judges who upheld the petitioners' claim based on voting without verification.[50]

Opinions also differed regarding the question of whether missing signatures on pink sheets represented significant electoral malpractice. The NPP argued that the lack of signatures indicated that presiding officers had vehemently disagreed with the conduct of polling under their supervision. They claimed that the omission represented a statutory violation of Ghana's electoral laws and argued respective pink sheets were therefore invalid. The respondents countered the argument by pointing out that the signatures of the EC representatives may have been missing on several pink sheets, yet accredited NPP party agents had signed the disputed documents (Ghana Business News 2013). A tussle followed in which NPP supporters claimed their polling agents had been coerced into signing the pink sheets. Moreover, allegations were made that the EC returning officer at Savelugu in the Northern Region invited presiding officers to retrospectively validate some unsigned pink sheets (Joy Online 2013). In response, the NDC accused the NPP of being behind the unfolding pink sheet scandal. A five to four majority interpreted the missing signatures as mainly administrative lapses (see SCRG 2013), so that on August 29th, 2013, the Supreme Court eventually dismissed the NPP's petition and validated Mahama as the legitimately elected president (Graphic Online 2013).

In brief, Ghana's post-election period was characterized by the NPP's claim of electoral fraud and in particular its election petition. The court case revealed various electoral malpractices during the election days (see SCRG 2013). These might have been accidental or intended. In either case the court has ruled that the malpractices did not have a significant impact on the results of the 2012 presidential election. The exposed malpractices, suggestions for electoral reform by the judges and a call by Kofi Annan (Africa Confidential 2013b) to tackle the raised complaints, will certainly pave the way for a continued strive to further improve Ghana's

[50] He suggested cancelling the results of affected polling stations and rerunning the elections at those stations (see SCRG 2013). In the course of the hearing it became evident that the results of seven polling stations had been annulled on voting day due to a lack of verification. Afari-Gyan stated that he had only been aware of the cancellation of votes in the Berekum East constituency. According to his statement in court, he found out about the other annulments when they were cited in the petition (Ghana Link News 2013).

electoral framework.[51] By challenging the election results in court, the NPP tried to withdraw internal legitimacy from the 2012 elections. However, the party also attempted to erode the external legitimacy in the post-election period. Otchere-Darko lobbied relevant international organizations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Carter Center (CC) on behalf of the NPP to try to convince them of the seriousness of the electoral malpractices that occurred in 2012 (Africa Confidential 2013d).[52] Even though the NPP did not succeed in eroding the election's internal or external legitimacy, the party could vaunt itself for taking the path of legal remedy to address its grievances. The petition, which after a few months had been strongly critiqued by many Ghanaians as a money-wasting endeavour (B17 communications 07/2013), allowed the NPP and its presidential candidate to save face in front of its/his supporters. In addition, Akufo-Addo gained cross-party acclaim for promptly accepting the verdict even though he disliked and disagreed with the court's decision (Africa Confidential 2013b).

4.4 What do the 2012 elections reveal about the structural underpinnings in Ghana?

After having zoomed in on Ghana's 2012 electoral politics and addressed the key issues and events which occurred during the electoral cyle, the last section of this empirical chapter analyses what the polls reveal about the structural underpinnings in Ghana.

4.4.1 Pattern of regional-ethnic bloc voting

One of the recurring themes during the election was ethnicity. One interviewee stated:

> **In this country no matter what everybody says here is this tribal hegemony and that's what is at play (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**

While it is difficult to make a definite call on which factors determine Ghanaians' choice of how to vote, Lamptey and Salihu (2012: 192) state:

> **At least in popular perception ethnicity matters more than any other socio-economic perception.**

[51] The implementation of the Representation of People's Amendment Act (ROPAA) passed by parliament in 2006 which gives Ghanaians living abroad the right to vote might be another issue for future electoral reform (see Graphic Online 2014).

[52] This advance was reinforced by Ghanaians demonstrating in front of the White House in Washington DC – in its front line was the NPP National Youth Organiser for the United States (Kyei 2013).

This perception was reinforced by the 2012 election results. The data shows that ethnic or at least regional bloc voting as a characteristic of Ghana's Fourth Republic, reflecting ethnicity as one of the key politicized societal cleavages. While the Ashanti region voted in the presidential race with an overwhelming majority for the NPP candidate, the Volta, Northern, Upper East, and Upper West regions voted as clearly for the NDC (see table 5).

Table 4.4 Regional distribution of valid votes per party in Ghana's 2012 presidential election

Region	NPP	NDC
Western	468,517	482,193
Central	429,135	492,374
Greater Accra	1,009,787	1,125,751
Volta	111,149	734,641
Eastern	641,074	485,187
Ashanti	1,531,152	612,616
Brong-Ahafo	469,909	511,244
Northern	383,263	570,602
Upper East	120,814	274,019
Upper West	83,098	186,134
TOTAL	**5,247,898**	**5,474,761**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012a)

In fact, since 1992 neither of these regions has voted against "their" party in a presidential race (see also Fridy 2007).[53] Further statements from interviewees confirm the impression given by the results:

> **The people from the Volta regions say he speaks my language he is great but we need to get to the point that the people will say he speaks my language great but what will he do for us. We need to get to the point where the people in the Ashanti region will say he is our brother but what's he gonna do for us. We need to start asking critical questions of politicians. Then we can start identifying philosophies and then also we need to start electing our district officers. If the mayor of Accra was held accountable to the people of Accra, he would be out. Somebody would kick him out. And we will give them five years so that they go beyond the normal four-year electoral process then they will start thinking and say look you know what I need to start thinking of the people of Accra first. As it is now all DCEs are appointed by government. And that's why the politicians take the people for granted. Because he knows that going into elections NDC thinks Volta is mine, NPP thinks Ashanti is mine so whether good or not I have my constituency I have my base (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**

While the Ashanti region, home to the Akan people, is known as an NPP stronghold, the Volta region, predominantly settled by the Ewe people, is said to be the

[53] The results of parliamentary elections display similar voting patterns. The only exception has been the parliamentary election of 1992 which was boycotted by the NPP.

“World Bank” of the NDC (B8 communications 12/2012; B13 communications 08/12/2012). Since both big parties can rely on groups of core voters made up of “their” respective ethnic group, they tend to successfully mobilize along these two competing regional-ethnic lines. The Eastern region, which also voted clearly for the NPP, is also perceived as an NPP-Akan stronghold. However, this has not always been the case. In 1992 and 1996, a comfortable majority of the Eastern region’s citizens voted for Rawlings (NDC). Only since the elections in 2000 has the Eastern region continuously voted with an overall majority for the NPP.

The academic literature tends to treat the Akan people as a homogeneous ethnic group. This creates a deceptive picture since the Akan are divided into different sub-groups. In political terms there is an important rift between the Akyem and the Asante people which also features in NPP intra-party politics (see chapter five). It is important to bear in mind that not all Akan people necessarily vote for the NPP. Even if that were the case, number-wise the NPP would not have enough Akan voters to automatically emerge as the winner during the elections. The same holds true for the NDC. Thus, both parties hark back to a significant amount of regional-ethnic-based core voters; however, demographically, these groups are not large enough to guarantee electoral victory. Therefore, both parties have to compete for and mobilise “floating voters” to ensure their support. These “floating voters” mainly reside in the so-called “swing regions” which are Brong-Ahafo, Central, Greater Accra, and Western (B8 communications 12/2012; B10 communications 4 & 5/12/2012; B13 communications 08/12/2012). Ensuring the support of “floating voters” in “swing regions” is decisive for winning elections. The 2012 results show that the four swing regions have been contested much more closely than any of the regions known as party strongholds (see table 5). The NDC primarily won the elections in 2012, since it managed to convince the majority of voters in the Greater Accra, Central, Western, and Brong-Ahafo regions to vote NDC.

4.4.2 Rural-urban dynamics reflected in Ghana’s electoral framework

Comparing the population share of Ghana’s regions in relation to their representation in parliament discloses another societal fissure (see table 4.6). The figures in table 4.6 indicate that rural areas tend to be slightly overrepresented in Ghana’s parliament. In contrast, the table illustrates that the more populous regions, Greater Accra and Ashanti, are underrepresented in Ghana’s legislature compared to their population size.

Table 4.5 Share of regions' population representation in parliament

Region	Share of pop. based on 2010 census	Number of const. per region 2012	Share of repres. in parliament	Over- & under- repres. of regions
Western	9.6	26	9.5	+/- 0
Central	8.9	23	8.4	Slightly -
Greater Accra	16.3	34	12.4	-
Volta	8.6	26	9.5	+
Eastern	10.7	33	12.0	+
Ashanti	19.4	47	17.1	-
Brong-A.	9.4	29	10.5	+
Northern	10.1	31	11.3	+
Upper East	4.2	15	5.5	+
Upper West	2.8	11	4.0	+
TOTAL	**100.0**	**275**	**100.0**	**Slight rural bias**

Source: Based on data obtained from the EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a) & GSS 2012

This is an interesting constellation as currently slightly more Ghanaians live in urban localities than rural ones (see GGS 2012: 92). A look at the five smallest and largest constituencies by registered voters hints at a similar pattern: rural areas tend to score well in Ghana's institutional set up (see table 10 and 11). Among the five smallest constituencies, four are located in predominantly rural areas, whereas of the five largest ones, most are located in urban and populous Greater Accra.

Figure 4.6 Ghana's population by type of locality (urban and rural) according to region



Source: GSS (2012: 4)

Table 4.6 Five smallest constituencies in Ghana by registered voters

Constituency	Region	Registered Voters
Sekyere Afram Plains	Ashanti	12,193
Salanga North	Northern	13,354
Banda	Brong Ahafo	13,575
Builsa South	Upper East	16,945
Saffiama/Bussie/Issa	Upper West	17,317

Source: EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a)

Table 4.7 Five largest constituencies in Ghana by registered voters

Constituency	Region	Registered Voters
Ledzokuku	Greater Accra	127,742
Ketu South	Volta	127,576
Dome/Kwabenya	Greater Accra	126,925
Ashaiman	Greater Accra	126,246
Ablekuma Central	Greater Accra	122,862

Source: EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a)

Prominent exceptions amongst the smallest constituencies are Sekyere Afram Plains in the Ashanti region and Ketu South in the Volta region, which one would expect to be much smaller. Both constituencies are special cases. Sekyere Afram Plains is one of those constituencies which seem to have been created deliberately ahead of the 2012 elections to secure another constituency for the NDC in the Ashanti region (see EC Ghana 2012 for election results).The large size of the Ketu South constituency in the Volta region appears at first glance to contradict the pattern of larger constituencies in urban areas and smaller constituencies in rural regions. Yet, the high amount of registered voters in the Ketu South constituency raises doubts in relation to its population size. According to the 2010 census (GSS 2012: 92), the Ketu South district, which overlaps with the Ketu South constituency, had 160,756 inhabitants. Roughly projecting the district's population in 2012 based on GSS' own population prediction for 2012 (see GSS 2015), gives an estimated population figure of 168,368. According to the Population & Housing Census, 56.2% of Ketu South's population were age 18+ in 2010. Since the composition of Ketu South's population can be assumed to remain rather constant with regard to its age structure, 127,546 registered voters translates to 75.8% of the population being registered. Interestingly, the number of total registered voters for South Ketu differs for the parliamentary race, which the EC

had indicated was 126,659. Even if one takes this figure as a baseline, over two thirds of the population (75.2%) were registered in South Ketu. The constituency's size by registered voters seems therefore questionable. The fact that the constituency boarders on Togo (see figure 6) may also suggest that Togolese Ewe may inflate the register. After all, the national border is, like in many African contexts, rather porous. Accordingly, Ketu South and the Sekyere Afram Plains do not alter the pattern of a slight bias in Ghana's electoral framework in favour of rural areas at the expense of urban ones.

Figure 4.7 Geographic position of Ketu South constituency



Source: Self-compiled based on map from peacefmonline (2012a)

The issue of significant discrepancies in the size of constituencies has also been picked up by the Commonwealth Observer Group, who noted that equal suffrage is not a given in Ghana:

> **It is noted that despite the requirement for constituencies to be as equal as possible there are in fact quite wide variances in size. Based on figures released for the 2012 elections, while the average number of registered voters per constituency across the country is some 50.000, the smallest constituency has just 12,082 while the largest has 126.659. Equal suffrage is therefore not adequately provided for (CW-EOM 2012: 15).**

Since MP's are expected by their constituents to engage in the provision of development projects (B1 communication 23/11/2012), differences in size of con-

stituency matters; these differences translate directly into different shares in resources allocated from the centre (see section 4.1.3). In relative terms, smaller constituencies tend to receive more resources per citizen. One could justify this constellation of power as a bias in favour of rural areas to the detriment of the populous urban ones, since rural areas continue to be marginalized in socio-economic terms.

4.4.3 Strategies of "vote massaging"?

Attempts by the elites to mould Ghana's electoral framework, as well as their determined strategies of voter mobilization and the contestation of the declared results, all substantiate the fact that there is a pressing imperative for the political elite to win elections. The following section concludes this chapter by discussing the alleged strategies through which irregularities and malpractices occurred.

Issue of skirt and blouse voting and high amount of invalid votes

An issue which gained significant attention from Ghanaian analysts after the elections was the matter of "skirt and blouse voting". Twenty-six constituencies, which is equivalent to about 9.5%, voted for a presidential candidate from one party and a parliamentary candidate from another. Since the number of "skirt and blouse constituencies" had increased, some commentators argued that this has become a new trend revoking or at least weakening the historical trend of regional-ethnic bloc voting. Speaking of a revision of the trend of regional-ethnic voting would however give the matter to much weight. The affected constituencies have been scattered all around the country so that each region has at least one "skirt and blouse constituency". Several of the split results occurred due to the fact that independent candidates, who had lost the primaries, had won the parliamentary race. Moreover, plenty of "skirt and blouse constituencies" have been rather tight races. It could therefore theoretically also be a case of "vote massaging" at polling stations, rather than conscious decisions for two different candidates/parties by the electorate.

Another significant issue was the large number of invalid votes. According to the EC's final results 251,729 votes were rejected during the presidential race. This is equivalent to 2.24% of the entire votes cast. In contrast, only 178,243 votes were declared invalid during the parliamentary elections. Several Ghanaians claimed

that rejecting votes at polling stations had been used by party supporters as a strategy to minimise the votes for their opponents in the past, particularly in party strongholds (B8 communications 12/2012; B 16 communication 11/12/2012). One of the interviewees explained:

> **The Volta region is their stronghold. You see NDC people like twenty and NPP like five. Last time they didn't even allow some to vote. They will know this one is NPP and they won't allow you to vote. So when you are NPP and you are in the Volta region you have to keep quiet, you should not even have to talk. That's what they believe in. They believe that place is all NDC. But it's not. So more police there. First the police people they are also NDC, but it will not show up. But when NDC people are disciplining NPP people they will keep quiet. […] They want to reduce NPP votes.**

Given the very tight races between parliamentary and presidential candidates, this strategy seems plausible. With only a 226,863 vote difference between the NDC and the NPP in the 2012 presidential election, 251,729 rejected votes represents a significant amount. Taking a closer look at those constituencies which are strikingly over the national percentage of 2.24% of invalid votes,[54] it is clear that the vast majority of these constituencies (89%) were won by one of the two big parties with a rather large winning margin. In fact, most had been won by a double or triple margin.[55] The fact that almost half of these constituencies have been affected by the pre-election delimitation reform processes attracts attention. One might wonder whether there may be some truth to the claims by some Ghanaians that high numbers of invalid votes may have resulted from declaring votes for the opponent invalid in areas where one party tends to dominate. The figures presented here do not speak unambiguously for that narrative. Most of those constituencies with rather high percentages of invalid votes are based in the Northern, Upper East, and Upper Western regions. Ghanaians have pointed out that a lack of voter education in these – to a certain extent still marginalized – regions could explain the higher percentages of invalid votes. In absolute numbers the sparsely populated regions of Upper East and Upper West are also at the bottom of the invalid vote ranking. One exception to this is the Northern region which actually leads the ranking in absolute numbers of invalid votes for the 2012 presidential election (see table 6).

[54] "Strikingly" is here defined as double the national percentage, or ≥4.48%, leaving 37 constituencies to examine further.
[55] Compare annex table 9.4.3.

Table 4.8 Ranking of regions according to absolute numbers of invalid votes in the 2012 presidential election

Region	Invalid votes	% of Invalid votes	Total of cast votes	Valid votes
Northern	34,978	3.45	1,014,956	979,978
Ashanti	29,373	1.34	2,190,293	2,160,920
Brong-Ahafo	27,571	2.7	1,020,470	992,899
Western	27,515	2.51	1,097,274	1,069,759
Central	26,360	2.71	971,046	944,686
Eastern	25,673	2.2	1,164,376	1,138,703
Volta	24,121	2.73	883,739	859,618
Greater Accra	22,390	1.03	2,174,645	2,152,255
Upper East	19,611	4.54	432,048	412,437
Upper West	14,128	4.74	298,135	284,007
TOTAL	**251,720**	**2.24**	**11,246,982**	**10,995,262**

Source: Based on EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a)

The figures on rejected votes, including their historical development,[56] do not unequivocally tell a narrative of vote massaging in party strongholds. Unfortunately, data broken down to the level of polling stations that would possibly allow further investigations, is not available since Ghana's EC so far only publishes election results per constituency. The fact that the level of invalid ballots was already much lower, especially in regions considered as strongholds; this combined with the fact that the amount of invalid votes tends to have been increasing since 2000, means this is an issue to keep under review.

Voter turnout

Another alleged strategy for influencing electoral results is adding votes in party strongholds to the election results (B8 communications 12/2012; B 16 communication 11/12/2012).

> **They are using every… I mean in the Volta region you see small town, but number of voters coming out of that place is plenty. That's why they brought this biometric. […] I think this time they will bring some police from here to there and from there to here, so that there will be peace (A13, interviewed 07/11/2011).**

The logic behind this approach can be summarized as maximizing votes for your own candidate while minimising those of the opponent. This tactic suggests that voter turnout should be higher in party strongholds. Looking at the figures of voter turnout throughout Ghana's Fourth Republic, one can see that rates indeed tend to be higher in party strongholds (see table 7 and 8). Where-

[56] See annex table 9.4.4.

as the Ashanti region has always been among the top three regions in terms of voter participation since 1992, the Volta, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, and Eastern regions took turns joining the top three regions in terms of voter turnout. The figures hint at the fact that adding votes to the election results in party strongholds has indeed been used as a strategy to enhance the chance of electoral victory.

Table 4.9 Regional voter turnouts in Ghanaian presidential elections, 1992-2000

Region	1992	1996	2000	2000 run-off
Western	47.8	74.5	58.8	55.2
Central	47.7	79.1	63.9	58.4
Greater Accra	46.0	78.4	59.5	57.4
Volta	62.4	81.8	60.3	68.9
Eastern	51.0	81.1	63.9	60.9
Ashanti	53.1	79.8	65.1	65.4
Brong-Ahafo	46.0	71.8	58.4	57.1
Northern	50.7	74.8	64.2	59.6
Upper East	51.5	79.8	60.3	57.8
Upper West	51.0	75.8	59.9	57.4
National Total	**53.8**	**76.1**	**61.7**	**60.4**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a); African Elections Database (2012) & FES 2010

Table 4.10 Regional voter turnouts in Ghanaian presidential elections, 2004-2012

Region	2004	2008	2008 run-off	2012
Western	83.6	67.3	66.5	76.5
Central	84.4	69.1	70.0	78.3
Greater Accra	84.4	67.1	70.0	77.1
Volta	87.6	67.1	73.1	75.7
Eastern	82.3	67.4	72.2	80.7
Ashanti	88.7	73.6	83.8	84.9
Brong-Ahafo	83.0	68.5	68.8	81.1
Northern	88.0	74.9	75.3	79.5
Upper East	81.6	70.7	70.3	75.7
Upper West	81.2	68.9	67.2	80.8
National Total	**85.1**	**69.5**	**72.9**	**79.4**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012; 2012a); African Elections Database (2012) & FES 2010

Registered voters by region

Despite the EC's continuous efforts to compile a clean(er) voter list, people have raised concerns that the register continues to be bloated (see issue of registered minors and registered Ghanaians living abroad). Again this is supposedly caused by over registration in party strongholds. Since there is no reliable data available at the constituency level with which to investigate this issue further, no well-founded comment can be made. However, interesting in this regard is the fact that at least at the national level the figure of 14,031,793 registered voters does not seem completely unrealistic in light of other data provided by official Ghanaian statistics. According to the GSS' (2015) own population projection for 2012 the country's population was 25,824,920. With 55.3% of Ghana's population being 18yrs+ in 2010, a figure of 54.33% of registered voters seems at least consistent with Ghana's otherwise officially published data.

4.5 Chapter summary

The outline of developments and events throughout Ghana's 2012 election cycle has clearly shown that there is a strong imperative for the political elite to win elections. This has been illustrated by the elite's continuous power struggle over the alteration of the electoral framework (see the introduction of BVR/BVV and the creation of new constituencies); the issue of sporadic electoral violence; and the NPP's move to challenge the election results in the Supreme Court. Moreover, Ghana's 2012 electoral politics, in particular the conduct of voter mobilization, has shown that the workings of the Ghanaian state continue to be characterized by the prevalence of patronage politics. Referring to election times as "cocoa season" and describing it as harvest time for rent payments from politicians who want to be (re)elected, captures this. In Ghana, voters judge their political elite by their ability to allocate and redistribute goods and resources to their respective communities. Furthermore, the analysis presented in this chapter has identified a variety of significant groups of actors within society that shaped Ghana's 2012 electoral politics. They include the modern political elite, traditional rulers, security forces, the youth, CSOs such as think tanks, religious groups, the media, international influences embodied by the donor community, transnational alliances amongst the African elites, as well as the Ghanaian diaspora. Furthermore, the persisting practise of voter mobilization

along regional-ethnic lines and the 2012 election results have exposed two politicized societal cleavages: First, a regional-ethnic fissure which is paralleled to some extent by religion, with a Christian South and Muslim North. The religious fissure is however not as politicized as ethnicity. Second, the data disclosed a rural-urban fault line. Lastly, the analysis identified a simmering fissure between the elderly and the youth which continues to shape Ghanaian society. Based on this empirical foundation the following chapter will engage in outlining in more detail the present configuration of power relations between identified prominent social factions. The presentation of Ghana's current political settlement in chapter five will explain how the constellation of power relations between different actors at different levels within different spheres characterises the Ghanaian state and its workings.

V. GHANA'S CURRENT POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF ITS 2012 ELECTION

Based on the analysis of Ghana's 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections, chapter five sketches the constellation of power between contesting social groups in Ghanaian society and how these relations of power are embedded in formal and informal institutions. To do so, the politicized societal cleavages that were identified in chapter four – namely (1) a regional-ethnic, (2) a rural-urban, and to some lesser extent (3) a fissure between the elderly and the youth – will be taken into account. In line with the analytical framework developed in chapter two and applied to the scrutiny of Ghana's post-independence settlement, this chapter will focus on the setup and interplay of structures, actors, and ideas in the political, economic, and cultural sphere amongst Ghana's higher and lower-level factions. The overall constellation of power will explain why the current Ghanaian state is working in the way that was illustrated by Ghana's electoral politics in the previous chapter.

5.1 Higher-level factions

The first section of this chapter analyses the constellation of power between Ghana's elite. It will demonstrate that Ghana's political elite, just like its society, is highly fragmented along regional-ethnic lines. This structure results in a constant need to forge societal alliances taking Ghana's main politicized societal fissures into consideration. The section then moves on to interlink Ghana's political elite with its important economic actors. Their relationship will be explained by analysing Ghana's economic structure and in particular the role of the state within the country's economic sphere. Identifying important sectors and actors within Ghana's economic sphere also provides one of the links to Ghana's lower-level factions, whose position and role within the current Ghanaian settlement will be scrutinized in the second part of this chapter.

5.1.1 Political sphere

Ghana's higher-level factions are mainly made up by the country's modern political elite, the economic elite, traditional rulers, and high-ranking members of the security forces. In this mix of actors, the political elite is essential (at all times rather than during election times only). Since the return to multi-party democra-

cy, Ghana's political elite falls broadly into two dominant blocs: on the one side the National Democratic Congress (NDC), representing the Nkrumah tradition, and on the other the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which has its roots in the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition. Both parties have to cope with waves of inter-elite factionalism.

> **Within the political parties, there are power blocs. Within one political party, there are its own power dynamics. So whatever maligning will take place will take place (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**

This factionalism manifests itself in internal power struggles where alliances are regularly reformed, and constellations of power tend to shift, in particular during preparations for upcoming elections. Ghana's underlying politicized societal fissures, including regional origin (North/South), ethnic affiliation, religious denomination (Christian/Muslim), and to some degree age, play a crucial role in taring internal power struggles.[57]

NDC's factionalism and intra-party power constellations

After the death of Ghana's President John Atta Mills six months before the 2012 elections, John Dramani Mahama took over the leadership of the NDC. Mahama, a Christian from Bole in the Northern Region, had served as Vice-President in the Mills government. By stepping up directly to the post of Head of State, he has been regarded by some in the NDC as accidental President (Africa Confidential 2013c: 3). Under Mills' leadership, three different factions had already become visible within the party. One camp is said to have been a broadly Akan-Fanti-Nzema clique whose primary loyalty lies with Ato Ahwoi who serves as Chairman of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) (ibid.). Its regional alliance covers first and foremost the Western region, where Ghana's new offshore oil fields are located on the coast, but also spans parts of the Central region (see figure 5.1). Ato Ahwoi served as Secretary for Fuel and Power under Rawlings' PNDC government from 1987-1993. His brother Kamena Ahwoi worked as Minister for Local Government and Rural Development in the first NDC government and continued his political career in various ministerial posts during Rawlings' second democratic turn (see Princeton University 2009). Currently, another Ahwoi brother, Kwesi Ahwoi, who served in the Mills government as Minister for

[57] While gender currently does not represent a major politicized cleavage within Ghanaian society, it is taken into consideration when forging ruling alliances and deciding on the composition of the national government (national portfolios, regional ministers etc.). This seems to mirror mainly international donors' concerns.

Food and Agriculture, is Minister of Interior in Mahama's cabinet (Africa Confidential 2013c: 3). Kwesi Ahwoi was kept as a member of Mahama's government despite the fact that he lost a party parliamentary primary to Queenstar Maame Pokuah Sawyerr, who is now Deputy Minister of the mainly Fanti-speaking Central region (ibid.). The promotion of Emmanuel Armah Kofi Buah to full Minister of Energy and Petroleum in January 2013 was a strong signal that the Ahwoi family still has financial and political clout (ibid.). In fact, Buah's appointment seems to be the result of successful lobbying by a group of chiefs from the oil-producing Western Region (Gadugah 2013), who demanded that the President appoint a Minister of Energy from their region. According to them, they could:

> **only trust a son of the Western Region to manage the oil resources to benefit the indigenes (ibid.).**

The group put forward the former Deputy Energy Minister Buah for the post (ibid.). There has been speculation that the Ahwoi family might have encouraged the chiefs to lobby for Buah (B17, Bradford, December 2013). At the same time Buah, who is Nzema, is said to have steadily built up a power base in the Western Region, close to the main offshore oil and gas fields (Africa Confidential 2013c: 3-4).

When Mahama became President in July 2012, he replaced the late Mills who himself was a Fanti. In taking office, Mahama sidelined the Fanti faction within the NDC – who reside mainly in Ghana's South-Western coastal region – because he brought in more people from his team. Some voices critiqued that Mahama's in-group consisted largely of individuals from the three northern regions (Mensema 2013; Africa Confidential 2013c: 4). Indeed, more than half of the President's appointees, amongst them senior advisors, ministers of state, and appointees to Presidential priority projects, originate from the Northern parts of the country. Moreover, more than one-quarter of the Deputy Ministers and nine out the 25 ministers in Mahama's cabinet stem from the Northern regions (see figure 9.2.3). Some Ghanaians have eyed criticised the increased influence of their Northern fellow countrymen in the political sphere. Notice was taken in particular of the policy fields in which members of Mahama's camp have been perceived to be placed. The prime policy fields are said to be the energy and petroleum portfolio and the security forces.[58] Hanna Serwaa Tetteh who served as Minister of Trade and Industry under Mills is also considered to

[58] For a detailed list of Northerners' positions in Mahama's government see annex table 9.5.1.

be a Presidential ally of Mahama (Africa Confidential 2013c: 4). She now runs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration.

A third group still influential in the NDC remains loyal to ex-President Jerry John Rawlings. The leverage of this group weakened under Mills' leadership. More recently, however, voices from the Akan side have claimed that Rawlings' clique has regained sway under Mahama's wing, in particular within the area of security (Amankwah 2013). The circle is said to comprise Mark Owen Woyongo, former Regional Minister in Upper East, who Mahama picked to lead the Ministry of Defence. Enoch Teye Mensah who started his long term political career under the PNDC regime has been designated by Mahama to coordinate the implementation of Presidential priority projects. Mensah was Chief Executive of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly under the PNDC regime and served as Minister in several NDC led governments in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Also, Shirley Ayittey, current Minister of Heath in Mahama's administration, is thought to belong to the Rawlings camp. Ayittey had been put on trial by the NPP government together with Rawlings' Minister of Finance, Mr Kwame Peprah, and the former First Lady, Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings. The three were accused of having caused massive financial loss to the Ghanaian state. As former Managing Director of Caridem Development Company Limited, Ayittey had been involved in the process of acquisition of the government GIHOC Cannery through a divestiture process, because Caridem Limited had bought the cannery. At that time Caridem was owned by the 31st December Women's Movement (DWM) which had been founded and run by Mrs Rawlings (Daily Graphic 2007). Paul Victor Obeng, who passed away in May 2014, served as a senior Presidential advisor and belonged to Mahama's inner circle. As a long-time political companion and former chief of staff for ex-President Rawlings, he was also seen as belonging to Rawlings' clique within the NDC (see figure 5.1).

To summarize the NDC's internal power constellation, there are three main sub-factions within the party today: (1) a group loyal to ex-President Rawlings who are not predominantly Ewe but still have a strong support base in the Volta region and hence amongst the Ewe people in Ghanaian society; (2) Mahama's clique which originates predominately from the Northern parts of the country and is comprised of both Christian and Muslim factions; and (3) an Akan-Fanti-Nzema faction loyal to the Ahwoi brothers whose home is the Southern coastal

region of Ghana and who are gaining importance due to the region's offshore oil production (see figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Areas of influence of NDC's factions



Source: Based on map of Ghana's Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2012)

Realignment of power constellations and forming intra-party cohesion

Alliances are formed and reformed regularly within the dominant blocs of Ghana's political elite. After the death of Atta Mills, the Ahwoi brothers are said to have favoured an internal election process within the NDC to determine who would replace Mills as the NDC's front-runner for the 2012 Presidential race (B17, Bradford March 2014), rather than the Vice-President automatically getting the Presidential candidate ticket. Rumours spread that the Ahwoi clique intended to nominate one of them and that they had considered Haruna Iddrisu as a potential running mate. Iddrisu, a young and ambitious politician from Tamale in the Northern region, has been the President of the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) and national youth organizer of the NDC. He has been the MP for the Tamale South constituency since 2004 and joined the Mills administration as Minister of Communication. With his Northern roots and strong connections to the Youth (issue of voter mobilization – see section 4.1.3), Iddrisu, who is said to have Pres-

idential ambitions (Addo-Tetteh 2012; Mubarak 2009) would, in fact, be — a reasonable running mate.

Mahama intended to promote Iddrisu from his former post as Minister of Communications to Minister of the Energy Portfolio. However, Iddrisu did not get appointed to this post. In fact, with the nomination of Inusah Fuseini, the MP for Tamale Central, as Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, the NDC Youth in Tamale became worried that their patron Iddrisu would not join Mahama's administration. In protest the Tamale-based group "NDC Youth Network for Peace" tore down and burnt billboards displaying pictures of Mahama and Fuseini (Joy News 2013). Eventually, after the 2012 elections, Iddrisu was assigned the portfolio of Minster of Trade and Industry in Mahama's administration. Rumour has it, however, that the substantial delay in Iddrisu's nomination to Mahama's government had been linked to his considerations of forming a collation with the Ahwoi camp. One might wonder if Iddrisu had been used as a pawn the Ahwoi block since the energy portfolio which Mahama initially intended to assign to Iddrisu is now under the control of Buah from the Western region, the home of the Ahwoi brothers.

Power dynamics amongst Ghana's higher-level factions are always prone to shifting. As one interviewee put it:

> **We never say it is one year after the election and therefore this is a rest period. There is nothing like that in Ghana. It's constantly political. Because in between elections we have the district level elections which have also been politicized. So the flavour of politics immediately goes into that one. And then there will be appointments, and there will be dismissals. So the process of dismissals spans a new wave of discussion on the political front. And then there will be politicians who die, and they will have to be replaced in parliament, so there are by-elections. So in Ghana, there is no dry season in politics. There is no let off in Ghanaian politics. It's a perpetual playground down from day one to the next elections (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**

To remain in control of the intra-party power constellation, Ghanaian Presidents and their inner circle rely on the strategy of frequent reshuffling of individuals. It is seen as "exercising authority over the government" (Ghana Herald 2012); or rather having control over the amount of time individuals have access to state resources. The reshuffling process can, therefore, be used either as a means to cut off the access of individuals and their support bases to state resources or equally, as a way of granting it to them. The strategy has become so common that lower- and higher-level factions expect reshuffles to occur regularly. In response to persistent rumours of an impending reshuffle being circulated on so-

cial media at the beginning of 2014, Mahama's administration released a statement denying that the President intended to reshuffle his ministers in the near future(Radio XYZ 2014).

Electoral waves of intra-party factionalism

In Ghana, the repositioning of intra-party factions tends to occur in electoral cycles. Regarding the NDC this process was illustrated in March 2014 when Kwabena Adjei was challenged in his position as NDC Chairman. A group called "Friends of Dan Abodakpi" (FDA) had been calling for a new party Chairman to "ensure total victory in the 2016 elections" (Mordy 2014). The FDA promoted the Dan Abodakpi, Ghana's High Commissioner to Malaysia, as the candidate. Abodakpi, who, like the current Chairman Adjei, stems from the Volta region, was Minister of Trade and Industry in Rawlings' second government (Abodakpi 2013). Under Kufuor's regime, Abodakpi served a ten-year jail term for having caused financial loss to the Ghanaian state (Dogbevi 2008). With the NDC regaining political power, he was amongst those pardoned by President Kufuor and Abodakpi re-joined the political scene as MP for the Keta constituency in the Volta region. His candidacy as the NDC's new Chairman is said to be backed by "powerful Fanti-Dzelukope confederacies" (Abodakpi 2013).[59, 60]

Another candidate for the post of NDC Chairman is Kofi Portuphy, National Coordinator of the National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO) (ibid.). Portuphy is popular amongst the NDC grassroots and enjoys substantial support from the party's middle ranks (ibid.). His origin from Ada in Greater Accra could, however, play to his disadvantage since the Chairmanship position has been reserved since the party's inception for Voltarians. There are voices within the party that the NDC should choose its Head based on competence rather than sectarian considerations (ibid.).[61] While Voltarians seem united in refusing their support for Adjei's third term, younger members from the South, in particular, query whether Abodakpi has the necessary energy and dynamism to lead the party. Doubts about Abodakpi as Chairman have been raised, in particular since younger candidates

[59] Dzelukope is a town located near Keta in the Volta Region.
[60] The Ewe represented a unique source of loyalty and viable source of support for Rawlings' PNDC regime (Amamoo 2007: 233; Oquaye 2004: 141; Hansen 1987: 173). Critics referred to the influence of the Ewe in the political leadership as "Dzelukope Mafia", referring to the hometown of Rawlings' and the Tsikatas' mother and several other strongmen of the PNDC (Oquaye 2004: 121).
[61] One could interpret this call as a move towards meritocracy. Yet, it seems more likely to be an attempt to challenge and shift the institutionalized power relations within the NDC.

such as Paul Afoko and Stephen Ntim have indicated their interest in replacing Jake Obetsebi Lamptey as Chairman of the NPP. Some NDC members doubt that Abodakpi can match the personalities of their biggest political arch-rival (ibid.). Hence, the internal power constellation of the other dominant political faction is also taken into account during intra-party power quarrels.

At the beginning of a new electoral cycle, sub-factions begin jockeying for influential positions to satisfy the interests of their group. In Ghana, this usually finds its climax about half a year ahead of the parties' national congress. Eventually, ad-hoc coalitions are formed and nurtured into a power bloc, which is constellated around particular individuals (see Bob-Milliar 2012). A phase of maintaining the cohesion of the arranged power bloc then follows.

NPP's factionalism and intra-party power constellations

The NPP is regarded and has continuously been portrayed by its main opponent as, as a predominantly Akan and elitist party. As highlighted before, the Akan are not a homogenous ethnic group. Rather, they are divided into several different ethnic sub-groups. They include amongst others the Asante, Akuapem, Akyem, Agona, Kwahu, Wassa, Fanti, Anyin, Baoulé, Chakosi, Sefwi, Nzema, Ahanta, and Jwira-Pepesa (TheGHNetwork 2013). In political terms, there is an important rift between the Akyem – who reside mainly in the Eastern region of Ghana – and the Asante people –predominantly based in the Ashanti region (see figure 5.2). This cleavage shapes NPP's internal politics.

The Akyem are rooted in the Danquah tradition, whereas the Asante see their alliances with Busia. Just like within the NDC, factionalism within the NPP fluctuates between cooperative and competitive phases. In contrast to the rather intense competitive period ahead of the 2008 election, the NPP's internal fissure between the Danquah and Busia factions tended to blur in preparation for the 2012 polls. They created a semblance of cooperative factionalism since Nana Akufo-Addo had consolidated his position of power within the party (Africa Confidential 2011a; Africa Confidential 2010). Cooperative factionalism within the NPP can be interpreted as an unspoken elite consensus amongst the two main sub-factions. After Kufuor, an Asante had been President between 2001 and2009, the Akyem faction led by Akufo-Addo successfully claimed its turn to grasp power on behalf of the party. Akufo-Addo's undisputed leadership position within the NPP in 2012 was underlined by the fact that seven out of ten par-

ty executive positions went to supporters of the Akufo-Addo camp at the NPP's congress in February 2010 (Africa Confidential 2010). Six months later, Akufo-Addo, with 78.89% of the NPP's "Special National Delegates Election" votes, was unambiguously endorsed as Presidential candidate for 2012. Alan Kwadwo Kyerematen, Kufuor's political protégé and hence representative of the Asante sub-faction, came in second with 19.91%. The other three contesting candidates, Isaac Osei, Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng and John Kwame Kudua, shared the remaining 1.2% of the votes (Ghana News Agency 2011c). According to a Ghanaian, Kyerematen primarily contested the NPP's internal election in 2010 "because he needs to be in the queue" (B17, Bradford, March 2014). While the selection process of the NPP's 2012 Presidential candidate was characterized as rather cooperative, the party's 2008 Presidential primaries had, in contrast, been much more fiercely contested.

Ahead of the 2008 polls – a highly competitive phase amongst NPP's internal factions

The rivalry between the Asante and Akyem factions became evident in 2007 (Bob-Milliar 2012: 598). Back then, the Busia faction surrounding outgoing President Kufuor favoured their young fellow Asante protégé[62] Kyerematen as new leader of the party (Africa Confidential 2007a; Kennedy 2009: 15-19). Kyerematen's main opponent in the competition for the 2008 NPP Presidential candidacy was Nana Akufo-Addo, who was representing the Akyem faction. According to Bob-Milliar (2012: 582), the Akufo-Addo faction had reproached President Kufuor for attempting to" disrupt the leadership queue and hold on to power" within the party structures. NPP establishment figures also disliked Kyerematen as a he was a "newcomer who had failed to find a parliamentary constituency in the 2004 elections" (Africa Confidential 2007). Nevertheless, in 2007 the Kyerematen**/**Akufo-Addo rivalry dominated the NPP primaries for the position as front runner (Bob-Milliar 2012: 581). Already ahead of the congress critical voices had been raised about the free-spending campaign-style of the aspirants. In fact, Kyerematen became in this context popularly known as "Alan Cash" fitting his campaign slogan "jobs for the people, cash for the people" (Africa Confidential 2008; Ghana News Agency 2008). The lavish campaign practices have even led some to describe the NPP hierarchy as a "monetocracy" (Africa Confidential

[62] Kyerematen is son of a Fante mother and an Asante father (Africa Confidential 2005).

2007a). In particular younger – and probably less wealthy – aspirants, such as Yaw Osafo-Maafo and Kwabena Adjei Agyepong, critiqued the process of choosing delegates for the party's congress, who then elect the party's new leader. Each constituency could elect, select, or recommend six of their ten delegates to congress. This system, so the critique went, was prone to manipulation by both influential party members and local chief executives (ibid.). With 60% of delegates not chosen until a fortnight before the congress, aspirants, with the help of their supporters, have been handing out inducements to as many party members as possible (ibid.) so as to mobilize support. During the actual voting day for the primary, accusations of vote-buying had been put forward at the forecourt of the Great Hall at the University of Ghana in Legon (Daily Guide 2007). One narrative of the events is that when it became apparent that Kyerematen was presumably going to tie with Akufo-Addo, Lord Commey, back then the National Organiser, who was perceived to be a member of the Akufo-Addo faction, claimed that the voting process had been infringed (Bob-Milliar 2012: 582). Lord Commey alleged that some of the men close to Kyerematen, amongst them Paul Akofo, an ally of President Kufuor, had been distributing dollar bills to delegates to swing votes in favour of Kyerematen (ibid.; Daily Guide 2007). This development nearly wrecked the congress. The atmosphere was said to be so charged that some delegates accused the National Chairman, Peter Mac-Manu, of having lost control of the event (Daily Guide 2007). Delegates had been disgruntled about the fact that the party neglected the promise to allow all ten regions to cast their ballots at the same time. Mac-Manu had to consult intensively with aspirants to bring the situation back under control (ibid.). In the end, nobody was convicted of the allegations put forward. The rather small size of the Electoral College of about 2300 delegates, however, lets the accusations appear plausible (Bob-Milliar 2012: 582), particularly in light of the aforementioned issue of the monetarization of Ghanaian politics (see section 4.1.3). The claims become even more convincing given the NPP's subsequent internal reforms which were put into practice for the first time in preparation for the 2012 elections. The NPP had substantially increased the number of delegates from 2,300 to 113,000. Moreover, the number of contenders for the post of Presidential candidate was limited to five (Statesman 2009; Bob-Milliar 2012: 583).[63]

[63] In 2007 the NPP was faced with 18 aspirants for the post as Presidential candidate. These includ-

The Akufo-Addo faction was in favour of expanding the Electoral College and argued that it would "transfer ownership of the leadership to the grassroots of the party" (Asare 2009).

In contrast, the faction around Kufuor and Kyerematen intended to maintain the status quo (The Chronicle 2009; Bob-Milliar 2012: 583). The different positions of the two factions have been interpreted in the following way. While the Danquah faction around Akufo-Addo was not able to match the Busia faction in terms of resources, they supported measures to curb the influence of money in internal party competition. The well-resourced Busia faction, on the other hand, could "buy" support of 2,300 delegates more effectively than it would with an expanded Electoral College of over 100,000 voters. For this reason, the Busia faction was perceived to be against an enlargement (Bob-Milliar 2012: 583). Ultimately, the proposed internal reforms were implemented for the NPP's primaries in 2010. Despite the agitation about vote buying during the 2007 primaries, Akufo-Addo won and became the party's flag bearer for the 2008 presidential race. Back then Akufo-Addo had secured 47.97% of the votes in the first round and was about two points short of an outright win (Ghana News Agency 2008; Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar 2010: 65). According to the NPP's Constitution (NPP 2009: 57-58) a run-off between Akufo-Addo and Kyerematen, who had come second with 32.30% of the votes, should have taken place (Ghana News Agency 2008). However, the runner-up conceded defeat, and Akufo-Addo was declared the NPP's presidential candidate for 2008.

Challenges to rebuild party cohesion after intense phase of competitive factionalism

Ahead of the 2008 elections, the NPP did not manage a quick transition from the highly competitive phase between its two prominent factions to a more cooperative one. Akufo-Addo's faction went on the campaign trail without the active involvement of President Kufuor. In addition, members of the Busia faction had been assigned less eminent positions in the running of the NPP's 2008 presidential campaign (Bob-Milliar 2012). The fierce competition between the two camps had penetrated down to the grassroots level, with MP aspirants taking either the Danquah or the Busia faction side. Party cohesion seemed at a low when

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ed eight ministers of Kufuor's government – amongst them Akufo-Addo, Addo-Kufuor (President Kufuor's brother), Alan Kyerematen and Aliu Mahama, the sitting Vice-President (Frempong 2012: 120).

Kyerematen submitted his letter of resignation from the NPP only several months ahead of the polls (Africa Confidential 2008). As the reason for his resignation, Kyerematen cited the ongoing harassment of his supporters since he lost the primaries (Daily Guide 2008). Two weeks after his unexpected resignation, Kyerematen was convinced by Kufuor to revoke his decision and re-join the party in the interest of unity (Africa Confidential 2008b).

Compared with 2007, the battle between the two factions had considerably calmed down ahead of the preparation for the 2012 election. This situation was reflected by Akufo-Addo's clear win in the primaries with almost 80%. Even though the regional-(sub)ethnic fissures within the NPP continue to exist, the stronger position of Akufo-Addo within the party led the NPP to appear more unified ahead of the 2012 polls. Moreover, the NPP's experience of how apparent internal rifts can damage the party's electoral prospects made them realise that ahead of elections the party needed to shift more quickly from the competitive to the cooperative phase.

Further internal fissures within the NPP

Besides the underlying regional-ethnic fissure and in contrast to the NDC, within the NPP there is also a rift between the "heirs of natural rulers versus plutocrats and self-made middling class professionals" (Bob-Milliar 2012: 578; Kennedy 2014).

So far the "heirs of natural rulers" seem to retain the upper hand. Whereas Adu Boahen, the NPP's presidential candidate in 1992 was an Asante commoner perceived to be close to the Danquah tradition (Bob-Milliar 2012: 579); Kufuor, Kyerematen, and Akufo-Addo share a privileged, royal background. Kufuor is an Asante aristocrat with "deep historical and personal ties to the Golden Stool" (see Agyeman-Duah 2004: 7-16; Bob-Milliar 2012: 579).

Kufuor's father was the head of the Oyoko clan to which Asante's royalty traces back its roots (Agyeman-Duah 2004: 7); and his sister was married to Prempreh II, King of Asante between 1933-1970 (Knierzinger 2011: 42). Additionally, Kyerematen has royal roots, being the paternal great-grandson of Asantehene Kofi Kakari (McCaskie 2009: 459). Akufo-Addo's mother, Adeline Yeboakua Akufo-Addo, was the daughter of Ofori-Atta I, the Okyenhene and King of Akyem. In addition, Akufo-Addo's father, Edward Akufo-Addo, was a founding member of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and belonged to the "Big Six", who were detained by colonial authorities in 1948. Edward Akufo-Addo

served as Chief Justice and titular President of Ghana's Second Republic under Prime Minister Busia. Joseph Kwame Kyeretwie Boakye Danquah, also a member of Ghana's "Big Six" and one of Ghana's most influential post-colonial politicians, was Nana Akufo-Addo's great-uncle; and William Ofori-Atta,[64] popularly known as "Paa Willie", was his maternal uncle (The Mirror 2008). These family ties demonstrate the deep historical, political legacy characterizing the leadership of the NPP and how closely interwoven it is with the traditional elite. In contrast to the NPP, the NDC is not characterized by such close and persistent family ties between Ghana's modern political and traditional elite, which also nurtures the NPP's image as an elitist party. Another non-dominant fissure in the NPP – linked to the one just mentioned – is represented by those who are sceptical of the NPP's predisposition to gerontocracy (Bob-Milliar 2012: 579). The party advocates for younger leaders to modernise the NPP (Africa Confidential 2010a).

New electoral wave of internal realignment

Following the 2012 elections and in preparation for the next electoral cycle, the NPP held its National Delegates' Congress in Tamale in April 2014 to elect its new national executive officers who would steer the party for the next four years. The fact that ten out of eleven national executives have not retained their position indicates that realignments of power constellations are already taking place in preparation for the next electoral cycle. The NPP's former National Chairman Jake Obetsebi Lamptey, a Ga from the Greater Accra region, lost his post to Paul Afoko, an influential NPP financier and descendant from the royal family of the Bulsa people in the Upper East Region (Adam 2014; Afoko 2014). While Lamptey was perceived as an ally of the Akufo-Addo/Akyem camp, Afoko is known to be close to former President Kufuor and the Asante faction within the NPP. Since Akufo-Addo declared his intention to contest the flag-bearer slot again, more voices have been demanding that the position of party Chairman not be filled with an Akan (PeaceFMonline 2014). The election of Afoko as new party Chairman could, therefore, be seen as a strategic move by NPP members to position the party as a widely appealing power bloc within Ghanaian society based on the

[64] William Ofori-Atta was the son of Nana Sir Ofori-Atta Okyenhene, King of the Akyem between 1912-1943, and leader of the United National Convention (UNC).

assumption that Akufo-Addo, as Akan/Akyem, is likely to run again as the NPP's presidential candidate in 2016.

Further realignments took place in the NPP's national executive team in preparation for 2016. Freddie Blay, whose origins lay in the Western region, has replaced Fred Oware, a banker, and entrepreneur from the Central region, as First National Vice-Chairperson (Adam 2014). Blay, who used to be a member of the CPP, one of the smaller political parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic, had been supported by the NPP for several years in the sense that the party did not nominate its own parliamentary candidate for Ellembele constituency. Blay represented Ellembele in parliament from 1996 till Buah, Minister of Energy and Petroleum under Mahama, replaced him as MP in 2008 (Statesman 2011). The co-operation between the NPP and Blay was further expressed by the fact that the NPP nominated Blay for the position of Deputy Speaker of Parliament between 2005 and 2008 (ibid.). Eventually, in 2011, the NPP entirely co-opted Blay when he left the CPP. Besides hailing from the Western region, which due to its energy sources is growing in political significance, Blay is the majority shareholder of Western Publications Limited, home of Ghana's second largest newspapers the Daily Guide (Ikando 2014).[65]

Sammy Crabbe, former regional Chairman of the NPP in Greater Accra, has been elected as Second National Vice-Chairperson and replaced Sheik T.B. Damba who enjoys widespread support from the Northern parts of the country. Crabbe is a businessman who helped to set up the ACS/BPS, an American off-shore data-entry and transmitting business operating in Ghana's free zone area, which at one time became the biggest private company in Ghana. Moreover, Crabbe holds shares in Ghana International Airlines Limited and is the founder of Omanye Money, a global mobile money platform based in the UK (Saji 2013). Frederick Antoh became Third National Vice-Chairperson, the NPP's Ashanti Regional Chairman who replaced Sophia Horner-Sam, a representative of the Western region (Adam 2014). Another change with less impact on the regional balance of the new NPP alliance is seen by the fact that Kwabena Agyei Agyapong from Kumasi, known to be close to the Akyem faction, is becoming General Secretary, replacing Kwadwo Owusu Afriyie (Sir John), who also hails from the Ashanti region.

[65] Gina Blay, wife of Freddie Blay, is CEO of the Daily Guide.

Figure 5.2 Areas of influence of NPP's factions



Source: Based on map of Ghana's Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2012)

To summarize, like any society Ghana is characterized by underlying politicized social fissures which constitute the basis for the formation of societal ruling alliances. In Ghana's political sphere, two dominant factions tend to form along ethnic lines: Broadly speaking the NPP is seen to represent the Akan, with a strong support base in the Eastern and Ashanti regions, while the NDC is regarded as representing the Ewe people who predominantly reside in the Volta region. However, neither of the two factions has a group of loyal supporters large enough to guarantee accession to power through the ballot box. In addition, as a matter of course, Ghanaian society is not neatly split into Akan and Ewe but is much more diverse. To gain political power both dominant factions need to forge a societal alliance large enough to win elections. Higher-level factions compete for support from lower-level factions and must create a societal alliance cutting across politicized societal cleavages. Smaller groups, in particular members from the Northern parts, are included or temporally co-opted into a faction's power bloc. Besides regional and ethnic diversity, other prominent fissures such as religion are vital for the composition of a power bloc to mobilize and maximize electoral support. The forging of a societal alliance – as Gramsci calls it – turns into a negotiation process which is constantly in flux so that realignments and slight

shifts in power between sub-factions are very common. Since Ghana's ethno-demographic composition turns elections into neck-and-neck races between the two dominant factions (see section 4.3), smaller groups can play a decisive role in forming winning alliances.

Smaller political groupings amongst Ghana's higher-level factions

Besides the two dominant factions, Ghana's political sphere is characterized by a few smaller political groups fluctuating in size and societal influence. As mentioned in chapter four, the most significant ones in 2012 were the Convention People's Party (CPP), Progressive People's Party (PPP), People's National Convention (PNC), and the National Democratic Party (NDP). While the CPP and PNC have their historical roots in parties formed before Ghana's Fourth Republic, the PPP and NPC are relatively young political groups which emerged by splitting away from the established ones.

Today's CPP has its origins in the political party founded by Kwame Nkrumah in 1949. Through a referendum in 1964, Ghana's first President transformed the CPP into the only legal party. With 99,91% in favour of the proposed amendments, the referendum was said to be clearly rigged (African Elections Database 2012; Anthony 1969: 337). After being overthrown in a coup by the National Liberation Council (NLC) in 1966, the CPP was banned. It reformed again in 1996 and has since gained a few parliamentary seats. For the 2012 elections Samia Yaaba Nkrumah, daughter of Nkrumah, was leading the party as its Chairman and Abu Sakara Foster was the CPP's Presidential candidate. Even though the CPP managed under Nkrumah to have a wide, cross-ethnic appeal, in 2012 the party seemed to have its main power base in Jomoro, in the South-Western part of Ghana and home to the Nzema people. With Sakara as Gonja from the Northern region as presidential candidate, the CPP aimed to forge a larger societal alliance.

Paa Kwesi Nduom, born in Elmina, Central region of Ghana, owns the Coconut Groves Hotel chain, Gold Coast Security, and First National Savings and Loans (International Institute of Sustainable Development 2015; Nduom 2014; GN Investments 2011). He ran as the CPP's presidential candidate in 2008. However, due to disunity, he formed the PPP by splitting away from the CPP ahead of the 2012 elections. Nduom, who had lost influence in the CPP primaries in 2011 to newer candidates such as Samia Nkrumah, ran as presidential candi-

date for the PPP in 2012. Probably due to the young age of the party and assumed limited societal impact by relying mainly on a power base in the Central region, the PPP did not receive the same recognition ahead of the 2012 polls as the other smaller, yet established political parties. While the CPP and PNC were both represented by their presidential candidates in Ghana's Presidential Debates in 2012, the PPP was left out (D21 observation 10/2012 and 11/2012).

The PNC has its historical roots in the People's National Party (PNP). Hilla Limann, who had won the presidential elections for the PNP in 1979, became the only President of Ghana's Third Republic and Ghana's first Northern (Christian) President. Limann had been sponsored by his uncle Alhaji Imoru Egala since Egala himself had been banned from public office by the Military Supreme Council (El Alawa 2015; Osei 2012: 109). Having served as Minister of Foreign Affairs under Nkrumah, Egala had close ties to the CPP and its former elite. His PNP was regarded as having absorbed a significant number of former CPP loyalists which caused some Ghanaians to label the CPP as the ancestor of the PNP (ibid.; Danquah Institute n.d.: 7). These ties caused the interim military regime to debar Egala from regaining a prominent role in Ghana's Third Republic. As the example of Egala shows, former political elites have been rather successful in maintaining their political influence, at least indirectly. Following Rawlings second coup in 1981 which topped the PNP government, the party was banned. In 1992 Limann revived the PNP tradition by forming the PNC for which he ran again as presidential candidate (Frempong 2012: 47). He was succeeded by Edward Mahama (Frempong 2012: 70) who contested the presidential race for the PNC in the subsequent years until Hassan Ayariga took over as the flag bearer in 2012 (D21 observation 10/2012 and 11/2012). The PNC is still regarded as a party following the Nkrumahist political movement. Most importantly its support has been and still is rooted first and foremost in the Northern regions of Ghana, in particular around Tamale.

Like the PPP, the NDP was formed by breaking away from another established party. Former first lady, Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings, founded the NDP in October 2012 in response to a clash of the pro-Rawlings faction and anti-Rawlings bloc within the NDC over her presidential ambitions (D21 observation 10/2012 and 11/2012). While the faction "Friends of Nana Konadu Agyemang Rawlings" (FONKAR) lobbied for the former First Lady's endorse-

ment as the NDC's presidential candidate for 2012, the group "Get Atta Mills Endorsed" (GAME) supported Mills rerunning as the party's flag bearer (Bob-Milliar 2012: 575). At the beginning of July 2011, Mills had been, with 2,771 to 90 votes, overwhelmingly elected as flag bearer by the delegates at the NDC's congress in Sunyani (Ghana News Agency 2011b). Faced with dissonance and the weakened position of the pro-Rawlings faction within the NDC under Mills, Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings founded her own party and attempted to run as Ghana's first-ever female presidential candidate for the NDP in 2012.[66] However, the EC rejected her candidacy on the grounds of the NDP's failure to comply with the administrative rules and regulations for the nomination process (D21 observation 10/2012).

Role of smaller political groupings and their relationship to dominant parties

Despite a rather limited influence on Ghanaian society as a whole, the CPP and PNC have a role to play in Ghana's Fourth Republic. With presidential elections being a tight decision, smaller parties can easily end up as "kingmaker" (Frempong 2012: 96). In 2000 for example, the presidential race ended in a run-off between Kufuor and Atta Mills. The NPP had won the second round for which the support of the CPP and the PNC had been crucial. In return for assisting the NPP to gain political power, members of both smaller parties had been awarded political posts. The CPP's 2000 presidential candidate George Hagan was appointed as Chairman of the National Commission on Culture. Defeated CPP parliamentary candidate Paa Kwesi Nduom was made Minister of Economic Planning, and the defeated CPP incumbent for Evalue Gwira constituency, Kojo Armah, was made DCE of the Nzema East District (Frempong 2012: 96/fn. 63). The PNC was also paid tribute by appointing Mallam Issah as Youth and Sports Minister and its Sisasla MP, Moses Dani Baah, became Deputy Minister of Health (ibid.). Furthermore, Charles Wereko-Brobbey, the UGM's presidential candidate, became head of the Volta River Authority (VRA). Three independent MPs – Rashid Bawa who had won the Akan constituency, Boniface Saddique MP for Salaga constituency and Joseph Akudibillah elected MP for Garu-Tempane – all became Deputy Ministers (ibid.). Hence the NPP had successful-

[66] The Ghana Freedom Party (GFP) nominated Akua Donkor as their Presidential candidate in 2012. Her candidacy had been rejected by the EC (D21 observation 10/2012 and 11/2012).

ly co-opted these individuals, and with them the social factions they were representing, into their societal alliance.

While some politicians let themselves be absorbed into one of the dominant blocs, others are described as "stomach politicians" (B17, Bradford May 2014).

> **Where there is bread that's where they will go (ibid.).**

The PNC, for example, seems to swing its support between the two dominant parties. In 2000 it assisted the NPP to gain power, whereas the two PNC MPs who were elected in 2012 voted with the NDC's governing majority (Africa Confidential 2013c: 4). As much as the dominant factions are aware of the necessity to include or co-opt smaller factions into their alliance, smaller factions are conscious of their importance to the NDC and NPP. Mahama Ayariga, the younger brother of Hassan Ayariga, the PNC's 2012 presidential candidate, hails from Bawku in the Upper East. While Mahama Ayariga's brother and father have been active members of the PNC, Mahama Ayariga is a member of the NDC. He has served as presidential spokesperson under Mills as well as Deputy Trade Minister and Deputy Minister for Education (Okoampa-Ahoofe 2014; Citifmonline 2011c). After the 2012 elections, he was appointed as Minister of Information and Media Relations to Mahama's cabinet (Ghana Web 2013f). Some families within Ghana's higher-level factions seem to maximize their chances by joining opposing political camps strategically:

> **In this NDC government right now, we have one MP that's brother was ex-NPP's Financial Minister, Osafo-Mafoo. He is having a brother in NDC who is a Minister you understand. So once some things come out, and some things are going in, it will work (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012).**

Political networks in Ghana are historically grown, tight, and intertwined. They are also in constant flux since the two dominant parties are permanently trying to broaden their support base to maximize their chances of electoral victory. To ensure electoral support attempts to split existing camps are common practice. Selecting presidential running mates is vital in this context. While Mahama as a Christian Northerner was striving to ensure as many Northern votes as possible for the NDC, the NPP attempted to win votes with Mahamudu Bawumia, a Northern Muslim, as the running mate of Akufo-Addo in 2008 and 2012. While Bawumia's family has its political roots in the UP/NPP, Bawumia's wife, Samira, is the daughter of Alhaji Ahmed Ramadan, the National Chairman of the PNC (Africa Confidential 2008a). Both dominant parties are constantly aiming at winning over smaller societal factions into their power bloc. If that is not possible,

they will try to split them and at least appeal to some of the members of these smaller groupings. Throughout the process of constant realignment of coalitions, all forged alliances are vulnerable to being weakened by factions breaking away and possibly joining, or at least indirectly strengthening the opponent.

Further important players amongst Ghana's higher-level factions in the political sphere

Among Ghana's elite, the modern political elite is currently the most dominant. However, traditional authorities and security forces had supremacy in previous settlements. Their remaining role and influence will be addressed in the subsequent sections.

The role of traditional rulers in Ghana's current political sphere

Besides the modern political elite, the top level of Ghana's primarily hierarchical traditional authorities[67] forms part of Ghana's higher-level factions (see Knierzinger 2011: 42).[68] Despite the fact that chiefs have lost all formal governmental, judicial, and land-revenue management roles (Crook 2005: 2), which they used to hold in pre-colonial and to some extent throughout colonial times, traditional leaders have managed to hold their ground as influential actors in Ghana's political sphere (see Boafo-Arthur 2006: 152; Crook 2005: 2; Mahama 2009: 8). Some authors ascribe the continued influence that the chiefs have to the resilience of chieftaincy as an institution (see Boafo-Arthur 2006: 145; Pinkney 1972: 96). In some people's view, (see Sennah n.d.: 1; Knierzinger 2011: 33) this has led to a parallel mode of governance to modern institutions. Rather than treating the continued existence and influence of traditional authorities as a parallel system of governance (discourse on hybridity), this thesis interprets it as a crucial and integral part of Ghana's political settlement, characterizing the form and hence the workings of the current Ghanaian state.

Ghana's modern political elite has attempted several times to establish local institutions to penetrate society to the grassroots level. Nkrumah established Town and Village Development Committees (T/VDCs), and Rawlings set up

[67] The term "traditional authority" comprises chiefs, queenmothers and other recognised structures within the traditional governance structure (see Mahama 2009: 8).

[68] Traditional institutions vary enormously across the different cultures and localities in Ghana. While broadly speaking hierarchical chieftaincy is dominant in the Southern and Northern parts of Ghana, there are significant "cultural minorities" in Trans-Volta-Togoland for whom these structures are not traditional (Crook 2005: 2). Due to a limited scope, this section will focus on the dominant patterns in Ghanaian society.

People's Defence Committees (PDCs). However, a relevant system of local government that reliably connects all local spaces throughout the country with the central administration does not exist in Ghana (see Harris 2013: 172; Quarcoopome 2006: 405). This infrastructural trait of the Ghanaian state combined with the continued and unmatched authority of the traditional elites in Ghanaian society assigns chiefs a distinct role. Royals, who exist even in the smallest and most remote villages (Knierzinger 2011: 16), have managed to hold their ground in a space where the modern state and its elites have not succeeded in completely replacing previous power structures.[69] According to Gyapong (2006: 189), in the rural areas, in particular, the only authority visible in communities is the chief and his *Akyeame*, elders, queen mothers and "stool fathers". This situation could explain to a degree why chiefs continue to have a large influence over people, particularly those living in rural areas (Boafo-Arthur 2006: 164; Valsecchi 2007: 5). Sennah (n.d.: 9) further claims that:

> **In many regions and districts in Ghana today, some paramount chiefs command more respect than Regional Ministers and District Chief Executives; and in the same breath, some chiefs have greater capability for social mobilization than many political appointees.**

The continued presence of traditional authorities at all levels, but particularly at the grassroots level, combined with their continued and unparalleled powerful position in Ghana's cultural sphere (power through authority), provides chiefs with significant capabilities for social mobilization. This position turns them into a link between the central government administration and the citizens, acting as channels of communication and disseminating government policy and decisions (Mahama 2009: 13). This role of political intermediary between the urban and the rural makes chiefs important stakeholders in Ghana's political sphere.

In Ghana's current political system of highly competitive party politics, being capable of social mobilization is invaluable. Even though Ghana's Constitution bans chiefs from actively engaging in partisan politics (article 276 of the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution), modern political elites use the institution of chieftaincy to mobilize support during election time (see chapter four). In particular, individuals aspiring to the position of MP or presidential candidate seek the support of prominent chiefs to enhance their chance of electoral victory (Sennah n.d: 9). George Hagan, presidential candidate for the CPP in 2000, summarized this phenomenon as follows:

[69] For an analysis of the roots of resilience of chieftaincy in Africa see Logan (2013).

> **You cannot win an election in Ghana if the chiefs do not support you because while you are asleep, they are with the people. A chief said to me you cannot win; you have no money to give to the chiefs. If you have money, I can go from village to village in my domain and tell people to vote. At times the voting is done even in the chief's palace. And people go to the chief's house to greet him in the morning and ask him how they should vote. He would not open up his mouth; he would give them a sign. […] So let's be realistic: The theory is that they should not participate, and that is the idea (Knierzinger 2011: 35).**

Even during non-election times, traditional authorities are highly visible in Ghanaian life (Valsecchi 2007: 4). Numerous public events in rural and urban areas take place in settings of chiefly pageantry where political figures from all different levels interact with traditional authorities (observation fieldwork 2011 and 2012). During these occasions chiefs frequently voice developmental requests to politicians on behalf of their communities (ibid.). Chiefs are therefore said to be and are portrayed as, "agents of development" (D2 observation 17/10/2012; Mahama 2009: 12). They took on this role mainly due to their marginalized position in formal politics since the 1950s by the, back then, new/modern, predominantly urban-based political elite. In Ghana's current political settlement chiefs are expected to mobilize resources from external agencies and urban residents; hence, transferring resources from the urban metropolis to the economically marginalized rural communities (Tonah 2012: 5).[70] Since 1992, their role as an agent of local development has been more and more taken over by the District Chief Executive (DCE), the Assemblymen, and Committee members who control the resources of the various districts. This overlap of roles between modern local political elites and traditional authorities often leads to tension and conflict (see Ayesu 2006: 500; Gyapong 2006: 187). To some degree, it is the expression of the continuing power struggle between these competing forces.[71]

Relationship of chiefly with modern political elites

Traditional authorities and formal politics are interwoven to a considerable extent through personal union and kinship (Knierzinger 2011: 33; see also Dziyenu 2011). Even though chiefs are banned from party politics and cannot

[70] The state's scarce allocation of resources to the local level, has led to the establishment of development chiefs, the so called "nkosohene" (Brefo 2014). These positions are primarily awarded to individuals who are perceived of being capable to mobilize external funds for communities' development. It has become a trend to enstool even white chiefs: Bob Geldof for example is the nkosohene of Ajumako-Bisease in central Ghana (ibid.) (see also Stänner 2014; WDR 2014).

[71] Traditional authorities have been striving for more effective participation in the control over resources at the local level (Valsecchi 2007: 9; Crook 2005: 3). In course of Ghana's constitutional review process, initiated by Mill's in 2010, voices have been raised to lift the ban for chiefs to engage in party politics (D2 17/10/2012).

become MPs, they are allowed to be appointed to public offices and serve in public institutions that are formally non-partisan (Valsecchi 2007: 4). Valsecchi (ibid.) cites as a prominent example the Omanhene of New Juaben of the Eastern region, who served as Statistician of the State under Rawlings for two terms during Ghana's Fourth Republic. The number of chiefs occupying positions of responsibility and power in government and public administration is extremely high (ibid.). At the same time, chiefly positions and titles are actively sought by Ghana's modern political elite since they provide a notable path to social recognition and political influence (see Tonah 2012: 5).

As much as Ghana's traditional authorities are linked to its modern political elite, the pro-chief position of the NPP, which it inherited from the UGCC, continues to be highly visible. As already mentioned, the NPP's leadership can be genealogically linked to the two mightiest chiefs in Ghana. CPP factions within post-independence Ghana, on the other hand, have mainly worked towards marginalizing and curbing the power of traditional rulers in the political sphere. Hostility towards the power of chiefs or at least scepticism towards traditional rulers continues mainly amongst more radical CPP political traditions (Crook 2005: 3). The relationship of both dominant political parties with the traditional elite is today overall characterized by its mutually interwoven nature.

Ghana's Constitution recognizes and guarantees the institution of chieftaincy. As much as it bars traditional authorities from party politics, article 270 guards chieftaincy against intrusion by the state, at least in theory. In practice, the interlocking between traditional and modern elites has not only led national parties to seek electoral advantages by engaging with local factions but competing traditional sub-factions also seek support from national level patrons (Crook 2005: 3). This constellation has politicized and occasionally intensified chieftaincy disputes, especially regarding the issue of succession.

The most significant case represents the Dagbon Skin (throne) dispute. The succession to the Yendi throne was vested in the descendants of two royal families, the Abudu and Andani (Tonah 2012: 6; Crook 2005: 3). The Ya Na (King) of Dagbon used to be chosen "by a system of alternating succession between the two families" (ibid.).

The neglect of this principle caused massive dissatisfaction amongst the Andani clan who felt robbed of the high office (Tonah 2012: 7). The two disputing

sub-factions aligned themselves with the two largest political parties. While the Abudus became associated with the anti-CPP faction, today represented by the NPP; the Andani family has aligned itself with CPP factions which are nowadays mainly represented by the NDC (see ibid; Crook 2005: 3). Since the PNDC regime refused to entertain the Abudu claims to power in the early 1980s, the Andani remained enstooled, and most constituencies in Dagbon supported Rawlings's NDC in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections. However, when the NPP came to power in 2000, the power constellation shifted slightly between the two disputing clans (see Tonah 2012: 8; Crook 2005: 3). The NPP appointed leading members and supporters of the Abudus to key ministerial and governmental positions, probably to reward the sub-faction for its electoral support which contributed to further stiffening the fissures in Dagbon. The posts occupied by pro-Abudus included amongst others the Minister of the Interior, the Head of National Security, the Northern Regional Minister, and the Yendi DCE.

Tensions between the Abudus and supporters of the enstooled Ya Na Andani II grew steadily following the changeover of power at the national level in 2001 (see Tonah 2012: 8). In March 2002, an attack on an emissary of Ya Na Andani II by a group of Abudu youth sparked three days of fighting which resulted in the death of the Dagbon King Andani II and over 30 of his supporters (ibid.). The failure of national security agencies to intervene in the violent clashes caused Andanis to believe that the NPP government, with Abudus occupying key security posts, was somehow complicit in the murders (Tonah 2012: 11; Crook 2005: 3). Due to public pressure, the Minister of the Interior, the National Security Adviser, and the Northern Regional Minister resigned (see Tonah 2012: 9). Following the Yendi massacre, the NDC strove to benefit from the inability of the NPP to resolve the matter. Media close to the NDC ensured that the issue stayed on the agenda (Tonah 2012: 11). In fact, the party used the murder of Ya Na Andani II as a major campaign issue in the 2004 and 2008 elections. In its 2008 election manifesto, the NDC pledged to

> **[…] set up a new and truly non-partisan and independent Presidential Commission to re-open investigations into the murder of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II and his elders in March 2002 (Tonah 2012: 12).**

Political parties continued with their attempts to exploit the factionalism in Dagbon to their electoral advantage. This dispute remains unresolved today, and there were subtle worries about the conflict flaring up during the 2012 campaign. Maha-

ma however, made clear during his campaign in 2012 that he was not siding with any of the disputing parties:

> **I say categorically that Dagbon is one. I do not know Andani Dagbon or Abudu Dagbon. All Dagombas are one. […] I belong to no side (Sannie 2012).**

In brief, Ghana's traditional rulers continue to be crucial actors in national and local power struggles (see section 5.1.1). Those whose social positions are legitimized by tradition attempt to establish or widen their access to the state, while modern political elites try to utilize what is perceived as traditional legitimacy and authority for their ends (Sennah n.d.: 12). The inter-linkages and overlaps between Ghana's modern political elite and traditional authorities form new alliances between these two groups of actors (Knierzinger 2011: 33) and shape Ghana's current political settlement (see Dziyenu 2011).

Security forces

Regarding Ghana's history, security forces and in particular the military cannot be ignored as influential actors in the political sphere (see chapter three). Since 31 December 1981 Ghana has not experienced a successful military coup.[72] This situation has allowed for the longest period of uninterrupted civilian rule since independence. Ghana's experiences in civil-military relations suggest that civilian rule cannot just be equated with civilian control over the military (Hutchful 1997b: 559).[73] Sustained civilian governance allows us to reasonably assume that security forces have been subordinated again under civilian rule (see Handley and Mills 2001: 29; Hutchful 1997a: 266-68). According to Hutchful (1997a: 273-77), there is an acceptance within the military hierarchy of the principle of civil supremacy. In fact, he claims that a consensus has emerged among both military Commanders and elected Government to have a common interest in stabilizing their authority (Hutchful 1997a: 274). While there seems to be no doubt about civilian supremacy over the security forces, it has been critically noted that it continues to rest predominantly with the executive (Aning and Lartey 2009:13 Agyeman-Duah 2002: 20; Handley and Mills 2001: 29). Democratic control or independent parliamentary oversight over the security forces remains rather weak (see Aning and Lartey 2009: 13). Agyeman-Duah (2002: 30) speaks of a general

[72] During the early years of the PNDC regime the country faced however numerous coups attempts (see chapter six) and there have been claims of a coup attempt in 2004 (see NDC 2004).
[73] As a result of weak monitoring capability, even under civilian rule the military has enjoyed considerable autonomy (Hutchful 1997b: 559).

de-militarization of governance and regards the fact that soldiers no longer participate in political events as a sign of Ghana's military's depoliticization and professionalization. The role taken on by security forces during the days of the 2012 elections gave the impression of a "republican military" (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 28). Ghanaians occasionally have broached the issue of politicization of security forces by ruling factions related to the issue of electoral violence as highlighted in chapter four. How far dynamics of regional-ethnic factionalism within and between the different security forces[74] feeds into this perception cannot be assessed within the scope of this thesis. Overall it can be concluded that Ghana's modern civilian political elite has reclaimed supremacy over its military counterparts. With politicians continuing to regard the military as a (potential) "enemy from within" some suspicion between political and security elites seems to remain (Aning and Lartey 2009: 14 and 29).

5.1.2 Economic sphere

After outlining the relationship and constellation of power between the major groups constituting Ghana's elite in the political sphere, the following part focuses on significant actors within the economic sphere. The section will illustrate that the Ghanaian state, and hence the modern political elite, continue to play a prominent role in Ghana's economy. As a result of this constellation, capital accumulation tends to occur still, primarily through direct or indirect access to the state. Engaging with Ghana's economic sphere lays the foundation for understanding the workings of the current Ghanaian state since it will not only complete the picture on the constellation amongst Ghana's higher-level factions but also provide first points of reference how the elite is interlinked to the lower-level factions.

Structure of Ghana's economy

To start the endeavour of sketching the constellation of power in Ghana incorporating the economic sphere, the structure of Ghana's economy will be analysed first. The following section will highlight the Ghanaian state's continued prominent role within the economic sphere.

[74] These include Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), comprised of the army, navy and air force; Ghana Police Service (GPS); Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS); Bureau for National Investigation (BNI) Military Intelligence and the Research Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prison Service (see Aning and Lartey 2009: 3-4)

Agriculture

Agriculture dominated the economy in terms of GDP contribution and employment in Ghana's immediate post-independence settlement. Exports were typically primary agricultural or mining products, whereas most non-agricultural consumer goods needed to be imported. Recently, the service sector started to dominate the economy regarding its contribution to GDP. Agriculture continues to be a vital sector, still contributing more than one-third of Ghana's GDP (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 4). Besides most Ghanaians still tend to work in the agricultural, forestry and fishing sectors (see GSS 2012: 75; Kolavalli et al. 2012: 14).

The agricultural sector is dominated by crop production, and even though the sector is transforming through diversification into non-traditional products, cocoa beans produced mainly in the rural areas of the southern regions remain the most important export crop (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 5). In fact, cocoa continues to be one of the country's main foreign currency earners. During the past decade, Ghana's agricultural sector has grown about 5% per year (ibid.). Most of this growth, however, has not been achieved by a general increase in productivity but has rather been driven by an augmented production of cocoa beans achieved primarily through expanding the amount of cultivated land (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 6). This expansion was achieved through the implementation of market reforms which passed on an increased share of the world market prices of cocoa to farmers, in tandem with an accompanying increase in world prices for cocoa (ibid.).

The sector's inability to significantly increase productivity caused Ghana to become a net agricultural importer of primary foods and agro-processing products (excluding cocoa) (ibid.). Agricultural commodities which traditionally have been produced in Ghana are not able to compete with imported goods. Hence, almost one-third of foreign exchange earned by cocoa exports is used to pay for imported foods and other agricultural products. The increasing demand for meat, rice, and processed food, which, according to Kolavalli et al. (ibid.), is a result of growing urbanization and an emergent middling class, is increasingly met by imports. It is crucial to note that Ghana's agricultural production is carried out predominantly on smallholder farms (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 7). As one of the interviewees put it:

We don't even have plantations to farm cocoa. We grow cocoa on subsistence basis (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).

This situation is linked to Ghana's land tenure system. It vests the rights of land ownership in the hands of traditional authorities so that different customary laws apply to specific localities (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 7). This situation is said to hamper the ability of investors to acquire large tracts of land and hence large scale commercial agriculture (ibid.). As a result, small-scale rural cocoa farmers continue to form the backbone of Ghana's domestic productive entrepreneurs. Since these actors tend to be scattered in the rural areas, mobilization amongst cocoa farmers remains limited, just like their ability to accumulate capital on a larger scale.

So far the Ghanaian state and Ghana's modern political elite continue to exercise control over Ghana's cocoa export including the distribution of its earnings through the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD). COCOBOD is the central government agency responsible for the development of the cocoa sector and is set up as an (export) monopsony. Besides fixing the buying price for cocoa in Ghana, COCOBOD manages almost all aspects of the internal cocoa marketing process and maintains a monopoly on the export of Ghanaian cocoa. While the internal marketing of cocoa has been liberalized through the establishment of Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs), it needs to be pointed out that the Ghanaian government issues these licenses and has, therefore, significant allocation power within the sector. Commissioned LBCs who bought their cocoa from cocoa farmers sell their cocoa to domestic industries for local processing or – and that is the most substantial part of the crop – to COCOBOD as Ghana's legally established single buyer of Ghanaian cocoa beans for export. As a major purchaser of cocoa beans and Ghana's only exporter, COCOBOD has substantial control over the domestic cocoa market; assigning the Ghanaian state a crucial role within the agricultural sector.

Industry

The share of Ghana's industrial sector regarding GDP contribution has remained relatively constant since independence with about 25%. One key subsector in Ghana's industry is mining, dominated by gold-mining. Besides the export of cocoa and since 2010 oil, gold is one of Ghana's main foreign-currency earners. In addition to paying a significant share of Ghana's import bill, mineral royalties, income tax from those working within the sector and corporate tax contribute considerably to government's revenue. Another important branch in Ghana's extractive industries is the emerging oil sector (see Kastning 2011: 7). In July 2007, Tullow Oil and Kosmos Energy discovered oil in commercial quantities in offshore fields on the coast of Ghana's Western region. Oil production started in 2010 and has since then added to government revenues, even though much less than expected (Looney 2014). With several government parastatals – like the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), which has a monopoly on the importation of crude oil, and the Tema Oil Refinery – the state is the sole wholesale supplier of petrol products to oil marketing companies in Ghana (see Whitfield 2011: 23).

Most countries which have achieved rapid economic growth did so because of an expansion of industrial activities, especially in the manufacturing sector (see Kolavalli et al. 2012: 7). Even though Ghana rose up to a lower-middle income status at the end of 2010, manufacturing was not the driver of Ghana's growth since 1992. Despite a few policy initiatives aimed at developing this subsector, manufacturing remains small regarding contribution to GDP. Existing firms are mainly involved with agriculture-related activities, including food and wood processing as well as textiles (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 9).

The largest subsector in Ghana's industrial sector is construction which is in general non-traded and has much weaker links to the rest of the economy than manufacturing. Since the construction sector has been significantly driven by infrastructure developments which are commissioned by the state, strong dependencies exist between this sub-sector and the state (see section 5.1.3). As a result, the Ghanaian state also occupies a decisive role within the industrial sector of the economy.

Services

Since the early 2000s, the service sector has replaced agriculture as the most important one and makes up almost 50% of the Ghana's GDP (see annex figure 9.2.6). In that regard, there has been a modest structural shift. Ghana's service sector is dominated by public services and domestic-oriented private services, meaning these services are mainly consumed domestically (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 11). Only a small proportion of the service sector is export related – earns foreign currency – such as luxury hotels and restaurants providing services to foreigners. Government services, such as administration, health, education and housing, have for many decades accounted for the service sector's GDP growth (Kolavalli et al. 2012: 12). Although the state has withdrawn significantly from direct involvement in house production and financing, as well as the communications sector, as part of liberalization measures (see ibid.), the state still carries significant weight in Ghana's service sector based on the significance of public services.

Regarding employment, the service sector, and more precisely the subsector of wholesale and retail, provides, after agriculture, most jobs (see GSS 2012: 75). Typical jobs in the service sector include amongst others market seller (numerous Ghanaian market women), petty trader, street vendor, tro tro and taxi driver, individuals working in chop bars or barber shops. Many of these jobs are, just like in the agricultural sector, in private informal settings. Most formal employment is provided by the state:

> **The proportion of the population working for wages in the private sector remains small; the government is still the largest employer of wage labour (Owusu 2009: 22).**

According to Sandefur (2010: 20), the growth of micro-enterprises in the service and manufacturing sector has accounted for most of the gross and net job creation between 1987–2003 (Sandefur 2010: 20). Similar to Ghana's cocoa farmers in the agricultural sector, these micro-enterprises tend not to grow into medium or large-scale companies over time (ibid.). This characteristic illustrates once again that capital accumulation amongst Ghana's private entrepreneurs remains limited. Sandefur (2010: 20) notes that

> **[…] in Ghana […] small enterprises die early and small. Conversely, big firms don't represent successful micro-entrepreneurs that have risen through the ranks of smaller firms. Rather, big firms are born big.**

In brief, even though the service sector has replaced agriculture in terms of GDP contribution, the agricultural sector remains, with the production of Ghana's third largest export product cocoa, and because it is still the country's prime

labour sector, crucial. Small-scale cocoa farmers continue to be Ghana's central domestic productive entrepreneurs. Capital accumulation amongst them remains limited. The country's extractive industries related to gold and oil are, together with cocoa exports, Ghana's largest foreign-currency earners and vital for paying Ghana's growing import bill. With the state leading the service sector; its role in the cocoa and oil market and being a significant customer of the construction sector, the Ghanaian state continues to carry heavy weight in the economic sphere; or as Owusu (2009: 41) puts it:

> **The state is […] deeply involved directly or indirectly in most economic activities, often controlling the commanding heights of the economy.**

5.1.3 Relationship between political and economic sphere: Ghana's political economy

Compared to Ghana's immediate post-independence settlement, efforts have been undertaken by both dominant political parties to shift the state's role in the economic sphere to the benefit of the private sector (see Tangri 1992: 97). During its early years, the attitude of Rawlings' regime has been rather antagonistic or even hostile towards domestic capitalists (see chapter six). However, the fact that the international community – and in particular IMF and World Bank – provided vital "policy rents" (see Hutchful 2002a: 165) financing Rawlings' ruling coalition and the Ghanaian state, set in motion the implementation of liberal economic reforms. The resulting divestiture of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly in the mining (gold) industry, reduced the role of the state in economic production and trading activities. In fact, the share of the private sector in GDP exceeded that of the public one by 1991 (Tangri 1992: 97). However, the structural outline of Ghana's economy has shown that the state remains highly influential the economic sphere.[75]

While Ghana's divestiture programme has been praised by the international community for rolling back the state and strengthening the private sector; in practice, the reforms have not led to a fundamental structural shift. For the NDC used the programme as a major avenue to create an independent economic base for itself. It sold SOEs to chosen regime members, their relatives or PNDC supporters (Opoku 2010: 152-153; Hutchful 2002a: 223). B.A. Mensah claimed in an interview with Opoku (2010: 147):

[75] The establishment of the state-owned GNPC which is running the emerging oil industry has re-strengthened the state's role in the economic sphere.

The P/NDC decimated the fledgling private sector out of jealousy and greed only to replace it a decade later with a political party-based private sector composed of those who had organised the coup.

In this context, the Ahwoi brothers, who form one of the poles of power within the NDC today, have been referred to as an example illustrating this process (Whitfield 2011: 24). Before entering politics, the Ahwoi brothers were all civil servants with no business background (Opoku 2010: 147). In the course of the privatization of Ghana's internal cocoa marketing business, their company Cashpro was amongst one of the six firms initially granted a license to buy cocoa beans (Whitfield 2011: 24; Opoku 2010: 148). While Cashpro as Licensed Buying Agent (LBA) had to sell the cocoa to state-owned COCOBOD, Cashpro and other LBAs received concessionary loans with moderate interests from COCOBOD for their operations (Opoku 2010: 148). Several reports speculated that Cashpro, which was (despite other publicly announced plans) the only company contracted to undertake a cocoa output plan in 2000, operated as an arm of the NDC's rural political machine, just like the Cocoa Purchasing Company did under Nkrumah (Oelbaum 2002: 303). According to Africa Confidential (2004; 2002), Cashpro was a major financier of the NDC party and owed in the early 2000s millions of dollars in unpaid loan advances (see also Whitfield 2011: 25). Based on their access to state resources, the Ahwoi brothers managed to expand their business, so that it spans today also a waste disposal firm maintained by a lucrative contract with Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA); a hotel in the Central region and a haulage company called Comstrans. According to Opoku (2010: 147), the Ahwoi brothers furthermore own large parts of land with which they plan to enter Ghana's real estate market.

Further examples illustrating that the privatization of SOEs served as a path for political elites to enter or anchor themselves amongst the country's economic elite are the following: Nana Rawlings bought several SOEs through Caridem Corporation which is a subsidiary organization of the 31st December Women's Movement (DWM). The former First Lady is said to be the owner of for example GIHOC Cannery, GNTC Bakeries, GIHOC Brick and Tile, GNTC Supermarket and the former State Transport Corporation (Opoku 2010: 148). The family of Peter Peperah, ex-Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, bought Mim Timbers through the divestiture process – afterward renamed Scanstyle, a timber and wood processing company (Opoku 2010: 153). And Kojo Tsikata, Rawlings' for-

mer national security chief, became the owner of Gold Coast Motors and holds assets of GIHOC, an Accra-based distilleries company (ibid.). While Ghanaians close to the P/NDC bought the bulk of divested SOEs – 169 of 212 (~79%) – these were mainly small-scale companies whose value accounted for about 10% of the total value of sales (Appiah-Kubi 2001: 222). Hence divestiture in Ghana did benefit above all foreign capital (Opoku 2010: 152).

Despite some withdrawal of the state from the economic sphere through privatization, Ghana's political and economic spheres continue to overlap strongly. On the one hand, this is the case because of the state's prominent role within all economic sectors as outlined above. This structure leads to the fact that the state remains the crucial source for capital accumulation and allocation of resources. Therefore, as Owusu (2009: 13) states:

> **The extractive view of politics [….] remains a dominant feature of our [Ghanaian, JR] political culture.**

It goes in hand with a widespread perception in Ghana that

> **politics is all about making money (CDD-Ghana 2005: 25; see as well Ashiagbor 2005: 3).**

An interviewee summarized the issue as follows:

> **In 2008 the shape of this economy was much smaller than we have now, in terms of the opportunities there is oil now. Whoever controls that oil sits on big money. Foreign direct investment is increasing. No doubt in 2013 housing is gonna become a major issue. There is the opportunity to build more housing. Education is gonna become a major issue. So we can see the country sits on the cut of an expansion, so who controls that expansion. So everybody wants this. They want it not because I just wanna be President. They want it because they see what the opportunities are and they would like to ride those opportunities (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**

In fact, the interlocutor conceptualized the consequence of the structural constellation between Ghana's political and economic sphere as "merchant politics":

> **In Ghana today there is something what we like to call merchant politics. Invest your time, a little bit of money, and then you get a good position. If you are able to break the odds and come to power… If you help the party to come to power by being aggressive, by being the guy who will die for the party you get a position. You become a deputy minister; they put you on a board somewhere. That's how you make some money, you solidify yourself, and then you become an MP. So that's the merchant, you think like a commercial businessman. You invest time and energy, you go out and take the risk, and when the party comes to power it rewards you, and when it rewards you, you have the opportunity to do this. […] Young people have seen it is quite profitable, it is a merchant industry. There are enough positions to sort out everybody, and the winner takes all. […] There are people who came straight from school and went into positions without having had any experience in managing people. Ghana runs an executive presidency and that executive presidency rewards the system of patronage.**

> **So we have what in Ghana we call the Oboro, the big man, and then he is the patron, and he rewards everybody. Now, the fundamental flaw with this system is that it is occasioned by the constitution and the constitution at the time was tailor fitted for President Rawlings. So they gave him overriding powers. He could say anything.**
>
> **If he sneezed, Ghana could go to war. After eight years they realized ok […] I am sure President Kufuor came and realized woowww how brilliant this constitution, I mean not as abrasive or empowering, but I would certainly like to live in this constitution. So then President Atta Mills comes and says you know this is beautiful but can we make a few changes to the constitution. So he set up a constitution restructuring review committee, and they brought recommendations. Unfortunately, nothing has been changed; nobody has touched them. It's not always when you as the President want something the party would agree with you cos of positions (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**

The continuing strongly pronounced interwovenness between Ghana's political and economic sphere is based on the fact that key domestic entrepreneurs are largely intertwined with the modern political elite. Their relationship was firmly characterized by interdependency. Private business tends to be politicized and patronage-orientated (Booth et al. 2005: 5). This means the existing private sector is quite dependent on the state (Whitfield 2011: 13) since the state is the primary source of giving away large contracts for example for construction companies (building infrastructures such as roads, schools, clinics or housing, etc.) but also printing jobs, or IT infrastructure. To acquire these contracts enabling larger capital accumulation, access to the state or close ties to the ruling elite is key.

This interlinkage was illustrated in 2012 by the Woyome scandal. Alfred Woyome, a known NDC financier, and businessman, claimed to have had a contract with the Ghanaian state to rehabilitate football stadia before Ghana hosted the Africa Cup of Nations in 2008 (Africa Confidential 2012c). In 2009, Woyome managed to convince the (new) NDC government that his contract had been illegally canceled by the Kufuor administration. Therefore, Woyome sought financial compensation through the judiciary which granted and paid him rather quickly a sum of 58 million Cedis (approx. US$34,5 million) as judgment debt (Africa Confidential 2012a).With the 2012 elections approaching, critical voices questioned why the NDC government had paid, apparently quite willingly, such a large sum out of state finances. Soon rumours resonated that several NDC members were deeply entangled in the affair of their party's financier. In particular former Attorney-General, Betty Mould Iddrisu soiled her reputation in the course of the

scandal.[76] At the beginning of 2015, Woyome was discharged by a court ruling. It remains to point out that the NPP also is said to have benefited financially from Woyome's largesse (Africa Confidential 2012c). Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that Kobla Mensah Woyome, brother of Alfred Woyome, has received support from his sibling to win the parliamentary seat for the NDC in South Tungu in the Volta region in 2008 and to recapture it in 2012 (see Radio XYZ 2013).

The politicization of private business is a key challenge (Booth et al. 2005: 5-6). Some Ghanaian businesses have become associated with either the NDC or the NPP (Booth et al. 2005: 6). According to Opoku (2010: 108-120; 147) the following Ghanaian entrepreneurs were/are known to be aligned with the NPP: Akenten Appiah-Menkah**,** former owner of Apino soap (Opoku 2010: 118-119); Kwame Donkoh Fordwor, owner of KAS Products Ltd., a quarry company and a mining interest (Opoku 2010: 114); Benjamin Amponsah Mensah (former) owner of International Tobacco Ghana Ltd. (Opoku 2010: 97 and 109); Justice Atta Addision owner of Multi-Wall Paper Sacks (MWPS) and Takoradi Beach Hotel as well as shareholder of the cement manufacturer GHACEM (Opoku 2010: 115; see as well Takoradi Beach Hotel 2001); Kwadwo Gyamfi, owner of a pharmaceutical company; and S.C. Appenteng former owner of Vacuum Salt Products Ltd. (Opoku 2010: 113-114). Notably, besides NPP party elders, current leading NPP party members are well-established entrepreneurs as well. To name a few: the NPP's Second National Vice-Chairperson, Sammy Crabbe, is, for example, the founder of Omanye Money and shareholder of Ghana International Airlines Ltd. (Saji 2013). Also, high-ranking chiefs like the Asantehene and Okyenhene form part of the Ghanaian business elite. They dispose of substantial capital and investment potential (Crook 2005: 5).

Similarly the NDC has aligned entrepreneurs such as the already mentioned Ahwoi brothers (Cashpro), Nana Rawlings (Caridem Cooperation) (now NDP), Peter Peperah (Mim Timbers/Scanstyle) and Alfred Woyome, owner of Anator Holdings Company Ltd., parent company of Stewise Anator Company Ltd. and Anator Construction Company Ltd. (Anator Holding 2011). Moreover, Edward Annan who owns EA Group Ltd; Masai Developers Ltd. and Masai Computer Services Ltd. (MCS); Kate Quartey-Papafio, owner of Reroy Cables Limited and Tony Oteng-Gyasi, owner of Sub-Saharan Cable and Conductor Ltd. (TCCL),

[76] Betty Mould Iddrisu is the wife of Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu, who served as Secretary of Transport and Communications in the PNDC regime (see chapter six).

can be regarded as entrepreneurs close to the NDC (see Annan 2015). While Annan was awarded procurement contracts that ensured him a near-monopoly on the supply of IT equipment to state institutions and a contract to rehabilitate Ghana's main harbour at Tema (Opoku 2010: 157); both electrical cable manufacturing companies were amongst the three firms who were awarded contracts totalling GHC 80 million by the Ministry of Energy in 2011 to improve local participation in the energy sector (Agyemang 2011). In addition, Quartey-Papafio has been appointed as board member of Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund (GIIF) by Mahama in 2011 (Boadu 2015), and Oteng-Gyasi served as board chairman of Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) under Mahama till 2014 (The Al-Hajj 2013).

The politicization of private business and the blurred distinction between politicians and entrepreneurs seems further fed by the numerous family ties running across Ghana's political and economic sphere. Often the spouse, father/mother, uncle/aunt, brother/sister or cousin is involved in politics whereas the son/daughter, spouse, niece/nephew, cousin or brother/sister takes care of the family business. For example, David Lamptey, former MP for the NDC in Korle Klottey in Greater Accra, founded together with his wife Gifty Lamptey Sidalco Ghana Ltd, a fertilizer company (Sidalco 2015), which has become one of West Africa's largest fertilizer distributors used in particular in Ghana's cocoa sector.[77] Adwoa Safo, NPP-MP for Dome-Kwabenya constituency in Greater Accra is the daughter of Ghanaian entrepreneur Apostle Kwadwo Safo, owner of Great Kosa Company Ltd (Kantanka 2015; NPP 2015). The Kosa group has several sub-divisions, including firms in the transport, construction and quarry sector and is said to be registered with Ghana's Ministry of Roads and Transport as well as the Ministry of Housing and Water Resources. The NPP primaries for the Dome-Kwabenya constituency in 2011 were also contested by Isaac Amofo, former NPP constituency organizer, and Mike Oquaye Jnr., who was sponsored by his father Mike Oquaye – former NPP-MP for the Dome-Kwabenya constituency (Ghana News Agency 2011d). According to news reports, Amofo claimed to have been disqualified from the 2011 NPP primaries for the Dome-Kwabenya parliamentary seat, because – contrary to the other two

[77] David Lamptey has also been CEO of Radio XYZ (Ghana News Agency 2013). After his death in 2012, Gifty Lamptey, his wife, inherited the family business and is now the CEO of Sidalco (Goodman AMC 2015).

contestants – his "father is not a big man or a party financier". Reports quoted Amofo after his first defeat – he also lost the 2015 NPP primaries against sitting MP Safo (Adom online 2015) – stating that:

> **I was asked by some of the members of the committee how I will finance my campaign and what my father brings on board (StarrFMonline 2015).**

When in power, each party favours its entrepreneurial allies and discriminates against those of its opponents (Booth et al. 2005: 6). Hence the patterns of government-business relations remain patronage-oriented (ibid.) and play a decisive role regarding the issues of monetization of Ghanaian politics and party financing (see chapter four). Whitfield (2011: 13) refers to this as primitive capital accumulation and points out that most of this money is not channeled into productive activities. This might be the case, since quick returns from investments, or rather untied assets, are needed given a four-year electoral cycle. Interesting is, in any case, that many of Ghana's larger companies tend to exist in economic sectors which can benefit from state contracts such as transport and logistics, construction and quarry, real estates, finance services, media houses, printing and infrastructure (in the broadest sense roads, cables, IT, etc.). Only a few prominent Ghanaian companies seem to exist in sectors which hardly rely on the state or links to SOE for access to inputs or contracts.[78] Ghana's merchant politics was furthermore described by an interviewee as follows:

> **Even if you are not given a dire work appointment behind the scenes, you will be given contracts, constructing six housing blocks and you might not even be a constructor. So then you go and look for a constructor and give the person the contract and say, you know what, do this contract for me, I pay you this, or they give you supplies. We would need to change that system […], but we are not gonna do that. We would need to run for President. But here is the case Ghana is an evolving democracy, our democratic process is 20 years old, so we are looking at the opportunity of five elections, five. The first two only a few people understood it; the second two really opened our eyes, so we are evolving (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**

This entanglement of the private and public sector and its actors within both spheres continues until the lower-levels. Smaller local business men and women donate money to individuals running as MPs or DCEs. These businesses contribute money to individual campaigns, to be later rewarded with contracts for their companies or to enter business activities (B14 communication 05/12/2012; B17 communication 2013).

[78] One of the few exceptions is Darko Farms, a poultry farm, owned by Kwabena Darko, who contested the presidency in 1992 for the National Independence Party (NIP) (Opoku 2010: 116).

> **Let people decide who rules them on the local level. We have had situations where the two major political parties… when the NPP was in opposition, they were going to elect DCEs. But that's where they make all the money; they want loyalist people who will be loyal to them and not to the people. NDC also said in opposition we are going to elect DCEs. […] The parliament is not really structured to throw spikes in the wheel of the executive. We have a very very strong executive presidency with much powers. That's why the DCEs will never be voted. Because the President needs money, you know. Much contracts are from the districts. The President needs people loyal to him (A15, interviewed 16/11/2012).**

As much as certain branches of Ghana's private sector depend on the state, the modern political elite and political parties depend on contributions from party supporters and businesses to run their increasingly expensive election campaigns (see chapter four; Asare 2013).[79] Governments' increased spending in the run-up to elections continues to characterize election times in Ghana (Booth et al. 2005: 5). They are illustrated by electoral cycles of increased budget deficits (see chapter six) contributing to augment public debt. Since the Ghanaian law does not provide for direct public funding (see Nam-Katoti et al. 2011; Ayee et al. 2007: 7),[80] Ghana has a long tradition of private financing of political parties (International IDEA 2012: 11). Donations, kickbacks (toll-gating) on government contracts (10% commission levied on the value of awarded governments contracts) and funneling state resources through front organizations and voluntary groups affiliated with the ruling party in order to receive state subventions for allegedly doing useful and necessary community or welfare work, have been repeatedly identified as prime sources of political financing (see International IDEA 2012: 10; Ayee et al. 2007: 4). In connection with the 2012 electoral cycle, Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development (GYEEDA) and the Judgement Debt Commission were associated with the latter method of party financing (fieldwork observation 2012). A brief survey by the Ghanaian think tank Center for Democratic Development (CDD) (2005: 7) captures the interdependency of Ghana's political and economic elite rather well: When asked for the reasons why they donated to political parties, respondents cited as first motive gaining personal favours (54%), as second kickbacks (31%) and third attaining political appointments (17%).

[79] During the 1992 elections neither foreigners nor private firms were allowed to contribute to party financing (Jeffries and Thomas 1993: 338). In response to both domestic and external pressures these restrictions were later revised (Opoku 2010: 110-111). Today corporate funding of political parties is permitted, if the company is registered in Ghana and ownership rests at least with 75% by Ghanaians (2000 Political Parties Act 23 (2)).

[80] The state provides indirect funding by granting free airtime in the state-owned media and the EC provides vehicles for campaign purposes (International IDEA 2012: 11).

To sum up, Ghana's modern political elite dominates the political sphere and tends to forge societal alliances around two main blocs: the NDC and NPP. As much as the modern political elite depends on the country's business elite for funding highly competitive head-to-head elections, much of Ghana's business sector depends on the state for business and hence capital accumulation. Despite successful efforts curbing the state's role in the economy, in particular in the mining (gold) sector, the Ghanaian state continues to be an important actor in the economic sphere.

Since the modern political and economic elite are largely intertwined, Ghana's political and economic spheres continue to overlap, and their relationship is characterized by interdependency. By now both dominant parties dispose over solid financial bases backed by aligned domestic capitalists. A vigorous and independent non-partisan middle class is lacking. This is probably the case since the political elite will not have any interest in a more state-independent private sector. For it could dismantle the current symbiosis and create a new, possibly unpredictable centre of power, altering the current constellation of power to the disadvantage of the political elite.

Ghana has few large-scale productive entrepreneurs. The recovering growth during the last two decades has come mainly from a multiplication of the number of small enterprises rather than from the upgrading of enterprises from small to medium to large (Booth et al. 2005: 4). Most essential for financing the current settlement including increasing imports are growing revenues from national resources such as cocoa, gold, and oil as well as foreign direct investments in the extractive industries. Revenues from the extractive economic sectors have grown since international prices developed favourably for Ghana and the production of these goods could be expanded. So the increase has not been achieved through improved productivity. In addition to these favourable conditions, Ghana's ranking as a low, middle-income country since 2010 gives the state easier access to loans on the international financial markets, since Ghana's creditworthiness has improved. Besides, the donor's need for an African success story seems to keep foreign aid continuously flowing.

5.2 Lower-level factions

After the outline of Ghana's higher-level factions in the political and economic sphere and their structural constellation with each other, the second part of this chapter focuses on the lower-level factions. It will analyse how Ghana's higher-level factions are linked to the lower-level ones through their role in the economic and cultural sphere. The cultural sphere is conceptualized – based on Gramsci – as a non-state sphere providing space for formal and informal collective action by which ideological hegemony is created within society. The cultural sphere captures the realm in which various societal groups voice and shape public opinion forming society's dominant discourse. By also representing the space for political mobilization and competing ideas and norms in general, the cultural sphere is in itself inherently political. It is distinct from the political sphere which has been conceptualized in this thesis first and foremost by state institutions.[81]

5.2.1 Economic sphere

Amongst Ghana's lower-level factions, farmers, and in particular the Southern-based cocoa farmers, as primary productive entrepreneurs represent an important pillar for financing Ghana's current political settlement. With cocoa exports being a significant foreign currency earner, the farmers continue to contribute significantly to paying the increasing import bill. Growing urbanization as well as a growing middling class – which can afford to consume beyond the bare necessities, yet does not necessarily build up domestic savings enabling more investments in the domestic private sector – have led to an increasing demand for goods, including food products, which are met by imports (see Kolavalli et al. 2012: 6). Besides funding the augmented consumption of primarily urban areas, Ghana's agricultural sector and hence the rural areas are still the dominant sector with regards to employment. In Brong-Ahafo, the Volta as well as the three Northern regions, more than half of the labour force works in agriculture (see GSS 2012: 75). Also in the Western (47%), Central (42%), Eastern (45%) and Ashanti regions (30%), the sector carries significant weight concerning employment (ibid.). To maintain electoral support from these areas and to safeguard this

[81] See as well Whitfield's (2002) distinction between civil society as process in contrast to civil society as idea.

financing mechanism of the current settlement, higher-level factions need to ensure the profitability of the agricultural sector and cocoa production in particular.

Chiefs, family heads or – in the Northern regions – tindaana continue to control and manage land, if not legally then in practice (Crook 2005: 2). With Ghana's main economic productions – cocoa farming, mining, and oil extraction – being highly dependent and linked to land as a production factor, traditional rulers continue to carry weight in the economic sphere. While the scattered small-scale farmers are vital for financing the settlement, they are not leading Ghana's economic sphere. As outlined above a symbiosis of modern political and economic elites is taking on this leadership role. Due to the current constellation in Ghana's cultural sphere, however, Ghana's cocoa farmers, and hence rural areas, have gained relative strength compared to previous times.

5.2.2. Cultural sphere

For a complete picture of Ghana's current constellation of powers, the cultural sphere is crucial besides the political and economic one. Following Gramsci, it represents the space for competing and conflicting ideas and norms which are upheld, proposed and pushed for by various organized societal groups and represents the source of legitimation of state power. Within its realm, different organized actors strive to impact on public opinion which is about organizing consent and hegemony within society (see chapter two; also Whitfield 2002: 51). Previous Ghanaian regimes have either monopolized the mobilization of societal groups leading to stifling the cultural sphere by the state's firm control over it (Nkrumah) or pursued selective corporatist modes of politics (Acheampong) causing the exclusion of particular forces from political participation (see chapter three). In contrast, Ghana's current settlement is characterized by a re-opened cultural sphere providing room for the formation of mobilized societal groups, articulation of diverse public opinion and competition of ideas and social forces.

During Ghana's 2012 electoral cycle the media, think tanks, churches, traditional leaders, CSOs including the Trade Union Congress (TUC), Ghana Bar Association (GBA), Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT), diverse student associations, women's and youth groups as well as local and international NGOs were influential in terms of impacting on public opinion and

mobilizing for political support.[82] The following sections will sketch the role of a few selected groups of actors before moving on to abstracting (1) the relationship of Ghana's lower-level factions to its higher ones and (2) the power dynamics between Ghana's lower-level factions.

Media

Ghana's current media scene is very vibrant and provides citizens with information and diverse opinion through newspapers, TV stations and hundreds of FM stations broadcasting in English and local languages. FM stations represent the most widely used form of media, reaching most citizens in urban and rural areas (Bowen 2010: 40). Therefore, radio stations are essential for official mass communication and shaping public discourse. Talk shows like "Alhaji and Alhaji" (Radio Gold), "Current Affairs" (Joy FM), "Good Morning" (Oman FM) enable political discussions and participation of citizens through phone-ins (Nwokeafor et al. 2013: 208). Politicians and other opinion leaders are invited to the shows to discuss current topics whereby the guests tend to side with one of the dominant parties (see chapter four). Often these debates occur in a highly emotionally charged atmosphere characterized by the use of inflammatory language, occasionally even leading to physical assaults between arguing guests (see chapter four; also Nwokeafor et al. 2013: 208). Moreover, regular television programmes like "Agenda" (TV3), "Good Morning Ghana" (Metro TV) and the "Breakfast Show" (GTV) enable discussions on various political topics providing the means for political parties to communicate their stances to the voters.

Similar to the overlap of Ghana's modern political and economic elite, there also exists an entanglement with the media. Numerous politicians own FM stations and publishing houses. As mentioned before Freddie Blay (NPP) owns Western Publication Ltd. which publishes, amongst others, the Daily Guide. Kennedy Agyepong, sitting NPP MP for Assin Central, is main shareholder of Kencity Media, home of radio stations Oman and Ash FM as well as of the TV broadcaster Net2. The Statesman, one of Ghana's oldest newspapers, used to be owned by Akufo-Addo who is said to have sold it after the 2008 elections to his cousin Ken Offori-Atta and Keli Gadzepko (Daily Democrat 2009). Kwesi Twum is the founder and CEO of Ghana's most significant private media con-

[82] This has been illustrated for example by the issue of introducing BVV and society's response to ethnic voter mobilizing (see chapter four).

sortium, Multimedia Group Limited which hosts the radio stations Joy FM, Asempa, Adom, Hitz, Nhyira, and Luv as well as MultiTV. Pro-NDC media claim the company with its affiliated media outlets is close to the Akyem faction of the NPP (see Mensah 2013).

Also, the NDC disposes of its loyal media. The Palaver, Daily Democrat, Enquirer, and Lens are just a few papers regarded as pro-NDC. Word has it that the well-known Accra-based FM station Radio Gold is partly owned by the 31st December Women's Movement and hence indirectly controlled by Nana Rawlings (Dotse 2012). Moreover, ahead of the 2012 elections one of Ghana's most important TV stations, TV3 Network Ltd., was said to have been sold to high-ranking NDC members (see Statesman 2011). While the Statesman (2011) claimed Kofi Totobi Kwakye, a leading member of the NDC, was instrumental in the reacquisition of TV3 Limited, others suspect the Ahwoi brothers as owners of Media General Ghana Ltd. The fact that Stella Ageypong (Wilson), CEO of Kencity Media and wife of Ken Ageypong, decried illegal jamming and interferences of broadcasts of Net2 TV, Oman and Ash FM during the electioneering period (Daily Guide 2012b), indicates as well that Ghana's political elite regard the media as an important means for shaping national discourse and mobilizing for electoral support.

Think tanks

Besides media outlets, think tanks like IEA, CDD, IDEG and IMANI have become prominent actors throughout Ghana's Fourth Republic influencing and facilitating public debate. Ahead of the 2012 elections IEA organized Ghana's First Presidential as well as Vice Presidential Debates Series in cooperation with Ghanaian media and funded by STAR-Ghana. The events intended to foster policy dialogue which was accomplished with limitations. The chosen format of a rather exclusive event, gave the impression policy debate was mainly initiated amongst the elite, but not amidst the common citizens.

Ghanaian think tanks are also involved in policy formulation or at least providing input for it (Cudjoe 2015). IEA and IDEG are highly active in organizing events facilitating dialogue between the different, often competing stakeholders. These include, for example, the discussion of electoral reforms, post-election reviews and peace programmes such as the signing of the Kumasi Declaration (see chapter four) (Ghana News Agency 2014). Some think tanks take on the

role of “non-partisan watchdogs”. During the 2012 electoral cycle, CDD continued its efforts to forge an inclusive and broad coalition amongst citizens observing the elections as part of Ghana’s largest domestic alliances of election observers CODEO. It recruited observers from a broad range of organized social groups.[83] Like many Ghanaian CSOs, think tanks tend to depend financially however on foreign funding. Most receive funds from the international donor community and rely on good connections of their founding members to policymakers, business leaders and international financial institutions for resource mobilization to support their activities (see IEA 2014).

Traditional leaders

Ghana’s traditional rulers play a vital part in the realm of voter mobilization during election times (see chapter four and five). Due to their ubiquity and a general hierarchical structure, they need to be mentioned as well in the outline of Ghana’s influential lower-level factions. Moreover, their role in voter mobilization rests on their social authority, or what Crook (2005: 2) calls “cultural leadership” assigning them a significant place in Ghana’s cultural sphere. While the presence of their cultural leadership is beyond dispute, it is hard to determine its basis or roots. Orvis (2001: 25) argues that African cultural spheres are characterized by the predominant norm of community or reciprocal obligation. It manifests itself in a persistently contested sense of mutual obligation under which members of the elite are expected to use and share their success to improve the community as a whole (ibid.). Following Nugent (2010: 57-63), this can be conceptualized as Ghana’s “productive social contract” between higher and lower-level factions which is built around state-led economic development and the promise of improved education, health, and infrastructure. One interlocutor stated:

> **When you work in the public sector, society expects so much from you (B17 personal communications 07/2015).**

Orvis’ reasoning resonates in Chabal’s (2009: 43) critique of liberal thinking which considers individuals as the sole building blocks of societies. Traditional rulers embody and represent a crucial pillar of the sense of community in Ghana. At the grassroots level, they unite an individual’s place of origin and identity together to the notion of community. While individuals’ identity is shaped by

[83] For a list of participating groups see annex figure 9.2.4.

multifaceted relations, the place of origin remains the primary marker of community and hence identity.

The prominent role of traditional rulers at the local level who are by trend elderly is further enhanced by the fact that there exists the predominant norm of age determining one's social position. Old age goes in hand with an individual's higher place in the social hierarchy and strengthens an individual's social authority. Based on the prevalence of these two predominant norms, traditional rulers continue to enjoy popular legitimacy (Logan 2013: 357 and 365) solidifying their influential role within Ghana's cultural sphere.

Organized faith-based organizations

Another group of actors highly visible during Ghana's 2012 electoral cycle were organized faith groups. They impacted on the national discourse in particular before and after the polls. In 2011 the Catholic Bishop's Conference supported the opposition's call for introducing BVV in their conference's communique (see chapter four). Since pro-BVV voices gained more weight and eventually dominated the cultural sphere backed by international donors, the NDC government gave in, and BVV became an integral part of the electoral reform agenda for 2012. In the immediate pre- and post-election time religious leaders furthermore made ostentatious use of their social influence to appease rising tensions (see chapter four). Their cultural leadership is also reflected by their significant representation on Ghana's National Peace Council. Out of twelve seats, five are filled by various religious leaders with Emmanuel Asante, Bishop of Ghana's Methodist Church, being its Chairman. With their physical presence and the fact that faith-based groups play a significant role in the life of most Ghanaian citizens in urban and rural areas, organized religious groups, Christian as well as Muslim, have the capacity to reach huge parts of the population. Their prominent role within Ghana's cultural sphere can also be traced back to numerous and strong church-state partnerships in education. While this endows faith-based organizations with a significant capacity to mobilize, in 2012 religious leaders used their social influence first and foremost in a conciliatory rather than openly partisan way. Religious affiliation to some extent cuts across ethnic boundaries in Ghana, even though this might be limited to a predominantly Christian South and Muslim North.

Other CSOs and international influence

In 2012 Ghana's cultural sphere had also been characterized by numerous advocacy and organized professional collective actors. Many CSOs in Ghana receive substantial amounts of their funding – in particular for election-related projects – from external actors. STAR-Ghana, for example, is a multi-donor pooled funding mechanism supported by DFID, DANIDA, EU and USAID aiming at strengthening Ghanaian civil society. The organization provided substantial support for diverse election-related projects in 2012 organized and implemented amongst others by Blogging Ghana; IDEG; IEA; Legal Resource Centre (LRC); National Catholic Secretariat for Ghana Catholic Bishop's Conference; the ARK Foundation; West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP); Media Foundation for West Africa; Christian Council of Ghana and Ghana's Independent Broadcasters Association (GIBA).[84] It is hard to assess whether the vast number of peace campaigns, concerts and projects was mainly driven by a Ghanaian felt need for them or possibly represented an adaptive response of CSOs to access available resources from abroad. Either way, external actors indirectly shaped the national discourse by providing funds for local actors and occasionally contributing to the discourse directly through statements for example on BVV or poster campaigns (see chapter four).

Other notable CSOs were organized groups coalescing around professions such as teachers, lawyers, or students. Equally important were women and, in particular, youth groups of parties. These (professional) horizontal-interest-groups formed in Ghana during the colonial period and are said to be more frequent and powerful than in most other African countries (Booth et al. 2005: 3). However, their power lies predominantly within their mobilizing capacity cutting across ethnic identities in mostly urban settings (see Orvis 2001: 23 for organized CSOs having few roots in rural areas). This capacity makes them attractive and significant components of a system for dispensing state patronage in exchange for political loyalty (ibid.). Moreover, horizontal-interest-groups complement the repertoire for political mobilization with recourse to traditional leaders and ethnic identities. Most of these horizontal-interest-groups represent professions closely linked to the public sector and hence the state (teachers, nurses, doctors, midwives, students). While members of these organized groups might share similar socio-

[84] For an overview of funded projects see annex figure 9.2.5.

economic positions within society adding to a growing middling class, these groups do not occupy the same functional role as the middle class in industrialized societies. Industrialization created a politicized societal fault line between capital and labour in Northern societies. Due to different historical experiences class differences are however much less deep and sharp in Ghana. While membership in horizontal-interest-groups adds another dimension to Ghanaian's identity, with only a minority of urbanites sharing affiliations to professional associations, class is not (yet) a salient societal cleavage in Ghana.

Two main points characterize the relationship of Ghana's lower-level factions to the elite. Regarding financing, Ghana's current political settlement the country's small-scale cocoa farmers, and hence rural areas, are of vital importance. The revenue from cocoa exports generates substantial foreign currency and thereby contributes significantly to paying the increasing import bill driven mainly by growing urban consumption. As a consequence, to maintain electoral support from these areas and to safeguard this financing mechanism, the profitability of the agricultural sector and cocoa production, in particular, needs to be ensured by higher-level factions. This setup, in combination with the constellation of forces in Ghana's cultural sphere, gives significant weight to the rural areas.

Today Ghana's cultural sphere is shaped by an elite consensus on building and promoting Ghana as "liberal state". The liberalization of Ghana's polity in the 1990s has (re)opened and provided room for an expansion of the cultural sphere. The return to multi-party democracy, in combination with Ghana's given ethno-demographic composition and predominant norm of reciprocal obligation, has created a highly competitive system for Ghana's higher-level factions. It forces political elites to vie for voters along horizontal, though also mainly vertical identity lines by dispensing patronage in exchange for political support. As a result, Ghana's current political settlement is characterized by competitive electoral clientelism. This situation, in turn, enables lower-level factions – at least once in a while – to put pressure on higher-level ones to deliver with regards to articulated demands. During the 2012 election cycle a Ghanaian newspaper reported:

> **[…] [NDC MP] Lamptey was handling a road project at Haatso to appease taxi drivers who had threatened to vote against the NDC if the Haasto-Ecomog road was not fixed (Ghana Nation 2012).**

Orvis (2001: 27) regards reciprocal obligation as a mechanism – however imperfect – of both political participation and accountability for lower-level factions.

A Ghanaian interlocutor acknowledged the lower-level factions' position about Ghana's elite as follows:

> **People want to blame the politicians, but it is us the people who are milking the system (B17 personal communications 07/2015)**

Due to the fact that Ghanaian society is highly fragmented along its dominant societal fissures, patronage is not only disbursed through networks along ethnic lines to ensure electoral support. To maximise patronage effects and hence support from citizens in ethnically fragmented communities, Ghana's political elite also resorts to a sort of "community-oriented developmental patrimonialism". The provision of public goods such as infrastructure, education and health care, etc. is used by the political elite to achieve this aim. The benefits from the provision of these goods cut across ethnic lines and thereby benefit the maximum number of potential voters (see chapter four). Besides the example of the Haatso road project above, an interviewee captured this as follows:

> **He supported the NDC since Jerry's time, but I have managed to convince him since the last two years, and now he is no longer an NDC organizer. He saw he was not getting anything from the NDC. He was just wasting his time, clapping, singing and paying for them, and he didn't get anything, you understand. When somebody is bringing free education that means he also benefits if the party doesn't give him money, his children will benefit (A13, interviewed 07/11/2012).**

Overall Ghana's higher-level factions depend on political support from the lower-level ones. The highly fragmented nature of Ghanaian society along with its central politicized social fault line ethnicity forces the elite into competition for lower-level support. This situation strengthens the position of ordinary citizens. While urban areas have at their disposal a higher mobilizing capacity enabling them putting pressure on the elite, Ghana's rural population is not only key for electoral victory regarding numbers, but is also of vital economic importance for the financing and hence the maintenance of the current settlement.

5.3 Chapter summary

Ghana's current political settlement as outlined in detail above represents a snapshot of the power relations in the country in 2012. The modern political elite dominates the political sphere and tends to forge societal alliances around two main blocs: the NDC and NPP. Regional-ethnic lines constitute, as dominant politicized societal fissure, the primary basis for the formation of societal alliances. Due to its ethno-demographic composition, Ghana's society is highly fragmented along ethnic lines. This situation turns elections into neck-and-neck races which

pushes higher-level factions to compete for support amongst lower-level ones. In contrast to Ghana's post-independent settlement (see chapter three) lower-level factions are therefore relatively strong in Ghana's current settlement. This is reflected in Ghana's electoral competitive clientelism which ensures some degree of community-oriented developmental patrimonialism (see chapter four).

Despite successful efforts curbing the state's role in the economy, in particular in the mining sector, the Ghanaian state continues to be a major actor in the economic sphere. Regarding capital accumulation, the state and therefore access to the state remains crucial, just like throughout Ghana's post-independence settlement (see chapter three). This is mirrored in the Ghanaian perception that politics is "a money-making exercise" (CDD-Ghana 2005: 9). Ghana's modern political elite is largely intertwined with the economic elite leading to a strong interdependency between the political and economic spheres. By now, both dominant factions rest on solid financial bases backed by aligned domestic capitalists. A strong and independent non-partisan middle class is therefore lacking. Ghana's economic sphere is furthermore characterized by a few large-scale productive entrepreneurs. The country's major productive entrepreneurs are predominantly Southern based rural small-scale cocoa farmers amongst whom more substantial capital accumulation is limited.

Growing revenues from cocoa exports (produced by small-scale farmers), national resources such as gold and oil, remittances as well as the inflow of foreign capital are decisive for financing the current settlement. This includes the augmented bill of imports driven by increased urban consumption. Revenues from the extractive economic sectors rose over the last couple of years since international prices developed favourably for Ghana and the production of these goods could be expanded. Thus, Ghana's economic growth is not based on improved productivity. Besides, Ghana's ranking as a low middle-income country since 2010 gives the state easier access to loans on the international financial markets since Ghana's creditworthiness has improved and the donor community's eagerness for an African success story ensures the continued inflow of foreign aid (see chapter six).

The fact that access to the Ghanaian state is crucial for capital accumulation combined with (1) a high degree of fragmentation along Ghana's dominant politicized societal fissure and (2) the liberal paradigm being hegemonic in

Ghana's cultural sphere, together set the basis for Ghana's competitive electoral clientelistic politics. With four-year electoral cycles, the delivery of quickly visible benefits to a large section of the population is key to ensuring political support. Long term investments, such as the acquisition of technologies whose benefits could only be recouped after decades and tie up capital, are within the framework of competitive electoral clientelism not in the interest of Ghana's political elite. However, these investments would be necessary to push Ghana's economic transformation. In brief, Ghana's current configuration of power is characterized by competitive electoral clientelistic politics, relatively easy financing of the settlement and small scale domestic independent, productive entrepreneurs (see Whitfield 2011).

Reflections on continuity and change in Ghana

Continuities in Ghana's polity are salient. The most important one being that the state remains neopatrimonial in character and therefore has not yet undergone a substantial transformation as the positive image of Ghana might suggest. The workings of the Ghanaian state today are very reminiscent of the workings of Ghana's post-colonial state. Some Ghanaians go as far as to claim

> **everything is still pretty much the same (e.g. A14, interviewed 08/11/2012; A34, interviewed 14/12/2012).**

However, it would be misleading to assert nothing has changed at all in Ghanaian society. The thesis argues that while there has not (yet) been a fundamental change *of* the Ghanaian state, incremental structural change has occurred *within* it. The work at hand claims that the constellation of power within Ghana has changed in three different ways. First, the relationship amongst Ghana's higher-level factions has changed in the sense that civilian forces have reclaimed supremacy over its military counterpart in Ghana's political sphere and that the current settlement re-includes formerly excluded social factions. Moreover, higher-level factions have expanded in the sense that more individuals have become members of the political and economic elite (horizontal and vertical expansion of Ghana's higher-level factions). In contrast to the post-independence settlement, an elite consensus has emerged on the ideology determining the character of the economic (see Vehnämäki 2000) and political system of Ghana which has led to a redefinition of the relationship between the state and the economy (see Owusu 2009: 40). The state is still regarded as a major actor in

delivering public goods, but Ghana's modern political elite has realized and agrees on the fact that guaranteeing basic macroeconomic stability is essential for sustaining Ghana's current settlement, but more importantly for securing its survival. As Tony Oteng-Gyasi puts it:

> **As a nation, […] we have reached the stage where we have realized that government's role at the very minimum should be to keep a stable macroeconomic environment to allow actors to operate within it (Agyeman-Duah et al. 2008: 248).**

Second, the liberalization of Ghana's polity has re-established the link between its higher and lower-level factions. It has removed the state's control over the cultural sphere providing space for articulation and later participation of previously excluded social factions. The opening of space combined with the return to multi-party democracy has forced higher-level factions to ground their support base amongst various lower-level factions. This has relatively strengthened lower-level factions in their relationship with higher-level ones.

Third, compared to the post-colonial settlement (see chapter three), the relationship amongst lower-level factions has changed in the sense that rural areas have gained relative strength compared to urban ones. Ghana has managed to build a new settlement – or as Gramsci might say historical bloc – sustained by institutions in which numbers translate into political power. The urban population, previously posing a threat to the political leadership due to their physical proximity and easy mobilization, no longer dominates Ghana's political system. The insight of Ghana's elite that the small scale cocoa farmers constitute a crucial pillar for financing the settlement has given rural areas weight in economic and political terms. Moreover and closely linked to the strengthening of Ghana's rural constituencies, is the fact that Ghana's new political settlement is currently economically viable again – at least with the growth rates Ghana has been enjoying in recent years. How far this is likely to be sustainable, in light of growing public debts resulting from competitive electoral clientelism, is an entirely different question.

Having sketched out three broad trends of changes within the Ghanaian state – (1) change in the constellation between higher-level factions, (2) between higher-level factions and lower-level factions and (3) amongst lower-level factions –, the next chapter will outline the complex and very difficult process by which Ghana has arrived at its new configuration of internal power relations and hence managed to implement incremental structural change.

VI. PROCESS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA – ARRIVING AT A NEW CONFIGURATION OF INTERNAL RELATIONS OF POWER

If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change
Oelbaum, Populist Reform Coalitions in
Sub-Saharan Africa: Ghana's Triple Alliance

The previous chapters have outlined Ghana's current political settlement and demonstrated on the basis of Ghana's 2012 electoral politics that the Ghanaian state remains neopatrimonial in character. Therefore, the workings of the Ghanaian state today are very reminiscent of the workings of Ghana's post-independent state under various civilian and military regimes. Despite Ghana's drastic image change, and praise by the international community as "African success story", there has not (yet) been a transformation *of* Ghana's polity. This thesis argues however that Ghanaian society has arrived at a new configuration of internal relations of power, since continuous incremental structural change has occurred *within* the Ghanaian state over the last few decades. Chapter six will outline *how* the constellation of power within Ghana has changed (1) between Ghana's lower-level factions; (2) between the lower-level factions and the higher-level ones; and (3) how the relationship amongst higher-level factions has been altered.

6.1 Adjusting economic institutions – revolution from above

The implementation of neo-liberal economic reforms from 1983 onwards induced a structural shift of Ghana's institutionally entrenched constellation of power, in particular amongst its lower-level factions. This process that had significant implications for the current settlement, which was seen in the 2012 electoins. The SAP with its focus on production and hence bias in favour of Ghana's rural areas lead to a material deprivation of the PNDC's initial primarily urban support base (Hutchful 2002a: 168; Gyimah-Boadi 1997: 316; Bawumia 1995; Herbst 1993: 45 & 61-65). Moreover, the reforms of the PNDC were perceived by radical students and the left intelligentsia as ideological betrayal and alienated further key constituencies of the regime (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 332).

The following section outlines how the PNDC has managed to reconfigure the country's economic institutions from above with their inherent distribution of benefits running counter to the interests of the regime's key support base. This achievement is all the more astonishing as politizised urban factions had con-

stantly posed severe threats to regimes' survival in the past when attempting to alter the relations of power of the "urbanized vampire state" (Frimpong-Ansah 1991) epitomising an overtaxation of the rural areas to finance urban factions' consumption. By presenting a nuanced analysis of beneficiaries and cost bearers of Ghana's adjusted economic institutions, the subsequent section addresses how the regime succeeded in maintaining the reformed economic institutions and hence the incremental structural shift in power relations between urban and rural factions. The section will conclude by highlighting how the redistributive effects of reformed economic institutions demanded the PNDC to realign its ruling coalition and to reanchor itself amongst the lower-level factions. For it had to re-build a new ruling coalition amongst higher and lower-level factions which was to be in sync with the new distributional effects of the country's formal institutions to form a more stable historic bloc.

6.1.1 Circumstances & applied strategies for altering Ghana's economic institutions

In contrast to the Busia regime, the PNDC took gradual steps to accustom the main cost bearers of the economic reforms to the envisioned changes. In late 1982 the government took the first steps to prepare the way for its devaluation plans by raising the price of imported food so that it was equal to the price of locally produced foodstuffs (Herbst 1993: 43). Furthermore, the regime eventually managed to transform the still existing diversity amongst its higher-level factions from a source of tension and conflict to one of strength (Hutchful 2002a: 179). The fact that Rawlings and Botchwey had belonged to the left-wing faction within the PNDC enabled them to engage in a delicate balancing act mediating between external donors and a sceptical domestic general public.

IFIs were demanding a fundamental change of the country's economic institutions. Likewise Rawlings and Botchwey had been calling for a transformation, so that they were rhetorically not only in line with the IFIs, but could also maintain an outward appearance of revolutionary continuity at home (Nugent 1995: 124-42). As Nugent (1995: 134) puts it:

> **[…] Botchwey had attempted to demonstrate that the ERP was actually revolutionary in spirit, on the grounds that it was designed to squeeze the life out of the speculators.**

By introducing a surcharge and bonus system, which is synonymous with establishing multiple exchange rates, the regime was not only able to reward earners

and penalize users of foreign currency, but could also sell the changes more easily politically at home. For the IMF and World Bank had opposed as a matter of principle such a system, which in turn enabled the PNDC to claim it had neither just simply surrendered to a dictat from the IFIs nor adopted devaluation (Nugent 1995: 112; Herbst 1993: 44).

Another important factor was that Ghana had faced multiple blows in 1983 and that the PNDC regime was able to use the resulting exacerbated conditions to slow down the pace of reforms envisaged by IFIs (Nugent 1995: 112). A severe drought had further decreased local food production in 1983 and a very harsh accompanying harmattan as well as bush fires destroyed much of the acreage under income-earning crops like cocoa (Brydon 1985: 570). As if that were not enough, by mid-January 1983 the Nigerian government, aiming for re-election in an unfavourable economic climate, introduced an expulsion decree forcing between 900,000 and 1,200,000 Ghanaians to return home, who had taken advantage of the freedom of movement under the aegis of ECOWAS to seek work in Nigeria escaping the crisis in Ghana (Brydon 1985: 568-75). As a result, Ghana experienced a population increase equal to about 10% at a time of acute economic crisis and food shortages. While in 1982 the general public response to any 'Western' assistance would have been met with fierce opposition, in 1983 the country could neither feed its increased population by itself nor afford the required imports to cover the shortfalls (Nugent 1995: 112-16).

In this context, the PNDC regime managed to ask for international assistance emphasizing in negotiations with external donors that the crisis was not home-made and declared to its domestic audience that the national emergency required a unique response including assistance from outside (Nugent 1995: 113). A relief operation was set in motion which spread the relief to the wider community rather than channelling it to returnees only (Brydon 1985: 575). By reverting to People's Shops for relief distribution, which had been created as revolutionary institutions, the PNDC regime found another way to further uphold an appearance of continuity at home (Nugent 1995: 115). Some might have even regarded this as the regime defying the demand of IFIs to curtail the powers and activities of the people's institution (Hutchful 2002a: 172; Yeebo 1991: 188).

Even though food aid was distributed to rural and urban communities, much of it was despatched to rural areas to encourage returnees to head back to their

home/birthplace (Nugent 1995: 114). The regime possibly tried to avoid congregation in overcrowded urban areas in an already tense time regarding the socio-economic and security situation. In exchange for food relief, returnees to rural areas were encouraged to engage in farming projects which helped in cocoa planting regions to replant farms affected by the bush fires (ibid.). At the same time this strategy preserved at least temporarily the appearance of a continuing commitment to mass mobilization by the regime, appeasing the radical left-wing forces.

While the additional blows clearly exacerbated the socio-economic situation of Ghanaians at the time, the situation also enabled the PNDC to create more manoeuvring space at home and abroad. Domestically the regime used rhetoric skilfully in a situation of extreme scarcity to shift the emphasis away from ownership to production which brought it in line with the demands of the IFIs. As Rawlings said in August 1983:

> **[…] production and efficiency must be our watchwords. Populist nonsense must give way to popular sense. Many of us have spent too much time worrying about who owns what, but there can be no ownership without production first (Rawlings 1983: 32).**

Fortunate timing led the PNDC to tie up the agreement with the IMF to present the deal as a natural extension of the relief measures. As a result Botchwey was able to pitch it as a self-developed programme solely endorsed by the IMF (Nugent 1995: 113).

6.1.2 Distributive effects of adjusted economic institutions – a more nuanced picture

The circumstances of the adaptation of the deal with the IMF illustrate how the PNDC initially managed to adopt the reform programme leading to drastic changes of Ghana's economic institutions and their redistributive effects. However, they do not provide answers to the question of how the regime managed to maintain reformed economic institutions in the long-term given their bias towards politisized urban factions that had posed severe security threats to any previous regime striving for such structural change in the past. To shed some light on this issue, it is necessary to draw a more nuanced picture with regards to the cost bearers and beneficiaries of the redistributive effects stemming from the economic reform process and their respective responses towards the reform implications.

Impact and reaction by urban labour

Initially the urban constituents against whom the economic reforms ostensibly discriminated mobilised and staged mass protests against the reforms (Herbst 1993: 65; Yeebo 1991: 189). Moreover, the regime was also confronted with more physical resistance through further attempted coups in June and October 1983. In this context the question arises why these historically strong constituencies this time did not succeed in resisting the reforms in the long-term, or as Herbst (1993: 65) puts it, what explains their political acquiescence?

Multiple rifts within the urban constituency form part of an explanation (Hutchful 2002a: 170). An internal power struggle between the leadership of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), (Hutchful 2002a: 171) and newly strengthened younger forces from below weakened the main voice of urban labour forces (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson 1993: 201). This confrontation mirrored predominantly the societal conflict between old forces linked to previous regimes and new forces represented by P/WDCs. While subaltern forces eventually had swept away the former TUC leadership, their own influence was being curbed by the PNDC regime when it became evident that the attempted October coup had involved militants of the Accra-Tema WDCs and other elements of the NDC. In response to this threat and in line with its previously demonstrated skills of adjusting to changed circumstance, the PNDC leadership unveiled at the end of 1984 that P/WDCs were no longer to play their initially envisaged role as building blocs of Ghana's new political order (Nugent 1995: 139). The NDC was officially dissolved and P/WDCs were transformed into Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) (Hutchful 2002a: 172; Nugent 1995: 139). This ended their independent and central role as mobilizing political institutions and they were subjected directly under the PNDC which moulded them into the political wing of the regime (Hutchful 2002a: 172; Nugent 1995: 139; Ninsin 1989: 35).

With the destruction of the Defence Committees, the TUC regained its role as pre-eminent organization of the labour forces, but was significantly weakened. Even though the TUC further engaged in opposing the reforms – and eventually the PNDC regime – the organization neither had the capacity to intervene meaningfully in the highly centralized policy process of the PNDC, nor the analytical or organizational ability to present an economic alternative to the proposed reforms (Hutchful 2002a: 172; Herbst 1993: 68). Another reason for

the failure of this anti-reform faction to repel the changes in the economic institutions lay in the fact that the PNDC regime resorted to strong arm tactics such as repression and intimidation. When the TUC e.g. tried to repel the Cocoa Board's retrenchments, the PNDC reacted by encircling the TUC's headquarters with armoured vehicles (Herbst 1993: 69).

The PNDC's strategy of divide and conquer seemed however most important to contain urban labour discontent (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson 1993: 202; Herbst 1993: 69). For one central role of the rebranded CDRs was to stiffen resistance against the reform programme from labour factions and to prevent the formation of a united labour front against the regime (Hutchful 2002a: 172; Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson 1993: 203). According to Ninsin (1989: 35):

> **It was widely reported with satisfaction how CDR executive members in various establishments had held rallies to counter such moves [strikes] by the leadership of the TUC.**

It was also rather difficult for the TUC to forge an overarching coalition amongst its members, since the ERP with its emphasis on reinvigorating production had a differentiated impact on unionized sectors of the economy (Nugent 1995: 185). This eroded the solidarity of members on the overall issue of adjustment (Hutchful 2002a: 174; Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson 1993: 203) and posed a significant challenge for mobilizing against reform measures.

While the Timber and Wood-workers' Union (TWU), the Railway Workers Union (RWU), the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) and the Mineworkers Union were benefitting from the ERP with its focus on production for export and rehabilitation of the infrastructure and transport system (see Vehnämäki 2000), the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICWU) as well as the Agricultural Workers Union (AWU) were massively impacted by the retrenchments in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (ibid.). The AWU for instance lost a significant part of its members by the dismissal of 50,000 workers from the Cocoa Marketing Board alone (Hutchful 2002: 174). Splitting urban workers into those relevant to the country's trade and hence export earnings, and those irrelevant to it, weakened the thus far strong anti-reform labour faction. As a result, when the TUC called for action in July 1987 the Railway and Harbour Workers Union condemned the step and proclaimed its support for the ERP/SAP (Hutchful 2002: 174; Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson 1993: 204).

The split amongst labour became visible once more when the TUC invoked its members to boycott the District Assembly elections. GPRTU not only dismissed the call, but even supported the regime by providing GPRTU vehicles to convey voters to and from polling stations (ibid.). Some of the unions became therefore informally known as PNDC unions which has been affirmed by a PNDC Secretary telling Hutchful (2002: 174): “We have our own unions”. The partial and skilful integration of labour forces into the regime’s new evolving societal coalition might have been the most crucial factor for the urban faction’s ineffectiveness to oppose the ERP long-term.

Impact on and reaction by beneficiaries of adjustments

The section above demonstrated that some urban labour (sub)factions actually belonged to the group of beneficiaries of the adjustment process. As a matter of course they were not the only ones. Two other vital groups were perceived to benefit from the redistribution of benefits induced by the reforms: the business sector and cocoa farmers in the rural areas (Callaghy 1990: 266; Bawumia 1995).

The ERP programme was designed to promote the interests of the private sector (Hutchful 2002a: 176). In return for the implementation of these redistributive measures, one would assume these societal faction’s political support for the regime. However, once again the realities were more complex. While the business community in general welcomed the reforms, they continued to feel politically marginalized (Hutchful 2002a: 177). Even though the PNDC was technically introducing pro-business policies, rhetorically and in terms of political actions, the regime remained rather adversarial towards domestic entrepreneurs. For they were perceived by the PNDC as part of the old higher-level factions and continued to be harassed by the regime through investigation, business closure, detentions and confiscations (ibid.; Opoku 2010: 89-99; Tangri 1999: 84).

Amongst those affected were, for instance, K. Safo-Adu, owner of Industrials Chemicals Limited (ICL) a Ghanaian pharmaceutical company; A. Appiah-Menkah, founder and owner of Apino Oil Palm Plantation and Ashanti Oil Mills (Apino soap); Major K. Asante, founder of Kastena Air Processing; S.C. Appenteng, known as Ghana’s salt king and owner of Vacuum Salt Products Ltd as well as B.A. Mensah, founder of International Tobacco Ghana Limited (ITG) (Opoku 2010: 90-91). Many of these business men had held indeed high ranking positions within previous regimes. Appiah-Menkah had been Deputy Minis-

ter of Trade and Industry under Busia from 1969 to 1972. Safo-Adu had also served in the PP government as Minister of Agriculture and on the Council of State in Ghana's Third Republic. In addition, Asante had held the position of commissioner (minister) in the Acheampong regime. Asante and Safo-Adu had both set up their companies with loans from the World Bank paid through the National Investment Bank (NIB) (ibid.).

While this does not constitute any justification for their harassment by the PNDC, it illustrates the amalgamation of Ghana's political and economic higher-level factions and how domestic capital accumulation can be ignited through access to the Ghanaian state. It also reveals why domestic entrepreneurs were primarily regarded as political opponents by the PNDC (Opoku 2010: 90). In this politicized context the lack of consultation of the private sector by the PNDC's economic policy makers (Hutchful 2002a: 177; Herbst 1993: 55), is the result of the continued political marginalization of the old higher-level factions – or at least parts of it – by the PNDC regime. A report of the World Bank (1990: 54) stated that:

> **Until recently the private sector has complained about the lack of communication with the senior decision-makers of the Government.**

Furthermore, Tangri (1992: 102) states:

> **In all the years of economic reform since 1983, the private sector has not felt adequately consulted. Only occasional discussions have taken place between spokesmen of the business community and the key public officials concerned with fiscal and monetary policies […]. Indeed, institutional mechanisms for promoting communication between the various sectors of the economy have either been largely absent or remained moribund.**

The political marginalization, but even more so the experience of harassment and a persisting fear that this would reoccur, shaped for a long time the collective memory of affected higher-level factions (Opoku 2010: 90). In light of the political antagonism between the PNDC regime and the domestic business community at the time (Opoku 2010: 99), it is hardly surprising that the PNDC's pro-business policy did not manifest into widespread political support from this societal faction.

However two additional factors are vital for and complement a comprehensive understanding of a lack of support from domestic entrepreneurs for the PNDC's economic reforms. First, similar to the urban faction, sections of the private sector were affected differently by the reforms. While commercial, often transnational, interests benefitted especially from the export oriented ERP, domestic manufacturers and industrialists were much more ambivalent in their position towards the reforms (Hutchful 2002a: 179). Second, and much more

important, the regime tended to depend more on foreign loans and investment rather than on the prosperity of domestic entrepreneurs (ibid.). The perception amongst domestic business owners that in particular expatriate businesses benefited from the reforms added to their (political) marginalization. As Tangri (1992: 102) summarises in his survey of Ghanaian enterprises:

> **The regime was not perceived as sufficiently supportive of the economic interests of domestic capital, let alone abiding those hurt by the operational consequences of the ERP policy reforms. Indeed, it was viewed as destroying Ghanaian capital by not assisting local concerns to stand up to the rigours of international competition.**

While it was part of the liberalization process demanded by IFIs that the PNDC would *not* protect domestic businesses, there was indeed little overt encouragement of domestic enterprise to engage in areas where it seemed obvious, for instance in the divestiture of state companies. In fact, business representatives were initially not even represented on the Divestiture Implementation Committee (Hutchful 2002a: 178; Tangri 1991: 534). Hence the perceived (political) marginalization is comprehensible, even more so in light of who benefitted primarily from state divestitures (see chapter five). Overall the support from domestic entrepreneurs for the PNDC regime and its 'pro-private sector' reforms remained therefore limited.

To address Ghana's current account imbalance the ERP concentrated on reinvigorating production for export (Vehnämäki 2000). A central pillar of the reforms since 1983 was therefore the promotion of agriculture (Herbst 1993: 81). In the first few years most attention was given to the rehabilitation of the cocoa sector (Hutchful 2002a: 67), entailing a relative neglect of food crops (Herbst 1993: 81). Rawlings proclaimed that the reform of the economic institutions would imply a significant redistribution of resources:

> **Cocoa and forest products make up about 75 percent of all our export receipts and yet the benefits you get from the system [are] small in comparison with what you put in. It is with your agricultural products that we buy the cars, lorries, petrol, kerosene, matches, soap, sugar, etc. and yet how many of you have access to these things? We intend to reverse this trend and bring back the wealth of the country to where it belongs, in the rural areas (Herbst 1993: 83).**

The adjustment of Ghana's economic institutions redistributed indeed much greater resources to rural and cocoa farming areas in particular (Bawumia 1995; Herbst 1993: 86). The first policy reform to affect cocoa farmers was the change of the Cedi's exchange rate, which had the immediate effect of increasing the Cedi price of cocoa (Hutchful 2002a: 68; Herbst 1993: 81). Just between 1984

and 1988 nominal prices of cocoa increased fivefold raising also the real producer price (Herbst 1993: 81). To improve incentives for production further, cocoa farmers began to receive higher shares in the export price of cocoa (table 6.1) which de facto meant a reduced taxation of cocoa and hence the rural areas.

Table 6.9 Share of Producer Price in the Export Price of Cocoa, 1993/94 – 1998/99

Crop Year	Producers price per ton in Cedis	F.O.B. Value of exports per ton in Cedis	Percentage of price received by Farmers (%)
1993/94	308,000	1,012,327	30.42
1994/95	700,000	1,675,277	41.78
1995/96	840,000	2,157,051	38.94
1996/97	1,200,000	2,792,730	42.97
1997/98	1,800,000	3,795,913	47.42
1998/99	2,250,000	3,878,206	58.0

Source: Hutchful (2002a: 68)

This eventually led to an increase in production – rather than productivity – and was also supported by PNDC's initial policies of increasing the supply of insecticide and spare parts for spraying machines, providing improved high-yielding seedlings etc. (Fosu 1993: 50-58). As a result, Ghana's cocoa production did rehabilitate. While it bottomed out at 166,700 tonnes in 1984, in the early 1990s the production of cocoa had almost doubled to approximately 300,000 tonnes (figure 6.1).

Figure 6.3 Production of cocoa in Ghana, 1980-1990



Source: FAOSTAT (2015)

Since it takes about seven years for cocoa trees to yield a crop, some of the initial recovery of cocoa production was probably achieved by redirecting previously smuggled cocoa back into Ghana's official export marketing chains. This was mainly achieved through the incentives for producers provided by the ad-

justed fiscal and monetary policies. In light of the prolonged slide of world market prices for cocoa from the mid-1980s – average price for one metric tonne of cocoa in 1985 stood at £2,113 compared to £684 in 1992 (Hutchful 2002a: 69) – there is however no doubt that Ghana's production of cocoa recovered in response to the PNDC's neo-liberal economic policies (table 7.2).

Figure 6.4 Production of cocoa in Ghana, 1961-2014



Source: FAOSTAT (2015)

With Ghana's rural areas being the country's prime hubs of production for export, the ERP/SAP was positively biased towards the rural parts of the country (Bawumia 1995; Herbst 1993: 83). Yet, despite the fact that they belonged to the main beneficiaries of the reforms, the PNDC's policies did not – once again – automatically translate into political support from this societal faction. There are two main reasons for this. First the cocoa-producing regions in Ghana's middle forest belt tend to be dominated by Ashanti, who are regarded as the stronghold of the old forces coalescing around the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition. Hence there exists a politicized ethnic overlay (Herbst 1993: 86). Leading political figures of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition, who most likely had an impact with their views and rhetoric on Ashanti cocoa farmers, tended to strongly dislike the PNDC regime which they perceived – the lastest since the northern radical faction had been dislocated from the PNDC's ruling coalition – as being Ewe-dominated (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 141). Adu Boahen, who emerged in the early 1990s as a leading figure of this political tradition stated:

> **Is it not strange and rather unfortunate that the Head of State, the Head of National Security, the Head of the Police Service, the Head of the Army, the acting Governor of the Bank of Ghana and the Head of the National Investment Bank, and I am sure there are others – all happen to belong to a single ethnic group or at least a single region of the country? […] Whether Rawlings is aware of this or not, this situation is giving the unfortunate impression that the country is being dominated and ruled by that single ethnic group, and this impression is causing […] anger and irritation (Boahen 1989: 53).**

He was born in the Eastern Region and had his ancestoral roots in Juaben/Ashanti region. As a leading figure of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition during the early 1990s he shared the views of Kumasi higher-level factions who expressed according to Herbst (1993: 87) similar sentiments in private. They claimed that

> **the PNDC was the most tribalized government Ghana had ever had and that the region [Ashanti] feels discriminated against.**

Another factor for the wait-and-see attitude of cocoa farmers regarding their support for the PNDC regime is the fact that significant income gains for the rural areas only materialized slowly. For the profit of newly planted cocoa trees cannot be harvested quickly. As a result, the support for the PNDC's steps to reform Ghana's economic institutions from (intended) beneficiaries did not materilise immediately.

Overall the PNDC's neo-iberal economic reforms dismantled Ghana's "old fiscal paradigm" (Hutchful 2002a: 168) epitomising an overtaxation of the rural areas to finance urban factions' consumption. The redistributive effects of Ghana's adjusted economic institutions to the benefit of rural areas therefore structurally changed Ghana's institutionalized constellation of power right up to the current day. Yet, the decision to implement the neo-liberal reforms had led to the decay of the PNDC's initial ruling coaltion amongst higher-level factions and coupled with the reforms' open discrimination against urban factions, the PNDC had also lost crucial parts of its original support base.

> **[The economic reforms] represented a disturbance of the political status quo. The ERP/SAP has caused a serious erosion in the PNDC's original support base […] and has not yet produced a viable alternative support base to replace the old one […] (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 328 & 333).**

The remaining PNDC ruling higher-level factions needed to re-anchor themselves amongst Ghana's lower-level factions. In this process the regime had to re-build a new ruling coalition amongst higher and lower-level factions which was going to be in sync with the new distributional effects of the country's formal institutions. But it faced the challenge of a time-lag between the introduction of reforms and the response from beneficiaries of adjusted institutions (Roemer 1984). Before we turn to

shedding some light on how the PNDC managed the task of reconfiguring its ruling coaltion, we briefly need to address the issue of how the PNDC asserted itself in power facing a crumbling urban support base.

While one crucial pillar of the PNDC's capability to hold on to power rested on its skill of continuous adaptability and co-option of various societal factions, equally important to understand the regime's survival during the above mentioned time-lag was its authoritarian character. A proliferation of para-military and security organizations (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 334) institutionalised the PNDC's national security apparatus which played a vital role in PNDC rule. While there were 13 coups attempts between 1981 and 1985, at least seven were made between 1985 and 1986 alone (Akonor 2012: 90-91; 2004). In addition to various assassination attempts, PNDC higher-level factions were convinced that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had increased its activities in Ghana during the mid-1980s to cause the downfall of the regime (Akonor 2012: 91-92; 2004).

While the security apparatus was used on the one hand to solidify the regime's position in power and ability to push through reforms, the PNDC leadership was very much aware that security threats could also arise from within the security forces. To address this issue, the regime relied increasingly on Ewe officers and troops and established the 64th bataillon ostensibly to protect the new regime and Rawlings in particular (Handley and Mills 2001: 21; Hutchful 1997a: 258). Furthermore, the PNDC applied the strategy of rapid rotation of key commands and postings (Hutchful 1997a: 258). Again co-optation not only in form of allocation of political posts, but also in the form of resources, became a proven strategy.

The importance of the security apparatus under the PNDC is also reflected in Ghana's public defence expenditures at the time (Fosu 1993: 51). During the period of 1982-86 Ghana's military expenditure increased in real terms by 103.8% per year. In fact, PNDC's military expenditure was growing faster than expenditure on agriculture, one of the intended prime beneficiaries of the regime's economic reforms (ibid.). Interesting to note is that despite the IMF's general demand for cutting government spending, it did not include military expenditure in its conditionalities. As Fosu (1993: 75) quotes an IMF seminar paper:

> **[…] the Fund has taken the position that the question of military spending is so inherently political in nature that it could not be appropriately made the subject of conditionality.**

Thus, the IFIs not only acknowledged that the social change entailed in their prescribed economic reforms could pose challenges to reforming states' political stability, but also accepted the authoritarian trait of reforming states like Ghana to ward off resulting threats and to implement IFIs' envisaged economic reforms (Ibhawoh 1999: 160-1; Ake 1989: 62). In fact, some neo-liberal writers believed authoritarian politics were necessary to secure the adoption of reforms (Gibbion et al. 1992: 11). Deepak Lal (1983: 33), an influential figure in the Research Department of the World Bank, wrote in an influential pamphlet at the time:

> **a courageous, ruthless and perhaps undemocratic government is required to ride roughshod over these newly created special interest groups (Toye 1992: 109).**

While at the end of the 1980s the international community began to tie the provision of loans to economic reforms *and* political liberalisation (Ibhawoh 1999: 161), during the early 1980s the thinking of IFIs was to financially support reform-oriented autocratic regimes to assist them to overcome the short-term domestic pressures expected from aggrieved urban factions (Toye 1992; Beckham 1992; Gibbon et al. 1992). A situation which happened to be advantageous timing for Ghana and Rawlings.

In the context of Ghana, the neo-liberal economic reforms implemented by Rawlings' military regime provoked internal opposition which produced numerous attempted countercoups (Toye 1992: 114). The national security complex played its part in warding off these immediate security threats facing the PNDC. Yet, it also played a central role in the regime's repression, intimidation, arrest and detention of individual Ghanaians (Hansen 1987). For the regime also maintained tight control over Ghana's cultural sphere by controlling the press and broadcasting media (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 140). Over time these authoritarian traits of the PNDC transformed Ghana's once politically vocal cultural sphere into one characterized by fear. The result of the prolonged political repression was a depoliticization of many political issues and the rise of a "culture of silence" (see Boahen 1989).

6.1.3 Reconfiguration of the ruling coalition & political institutions

The turn of the PNDC to implement neo-liberal economic reforms did not only entail a structural shift in the constellation of power between Ghana's lower-level factions. It also demanded a reconfiguration of the PNDC's ruling coalition and corresponding reforms of Ghana's formal political institutions which enabled

the regime to reanchor itself amongst those lower-level faction benefiting from the new distributional effects of the country's formal economic institutions. Both steps allowed members of the previously excluded faction to set foot again into the political sphere.

After the young northern radical faction had been dislocated from the ruling forces, significant shifts occurred in the composition of the PNDC's higher-level factions. To consolidate the PNDC's position in power, the ruling coalition was realigned in several ways. First of all, Rawlings adjusted the composition of the PNDC's higher-level factions by turning to the officer corps of the military, to the traditional rulers and other parts of the right-wing faction.

While Rawlings was initially regarded by the officers as somebody directing the upsetting of the military hierarchy (Akonor 2012: 75); by March 1983 Rawlings began to distance himself from the ranks (Oquaye 2004: 121; Hutchful 2002a: 46-48; Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 127 & 141). Instead he began to embrace the officers by restoring unified command structures (Hutchful 1997a: 256) and co-opting them into the ruling coalition through e.g. cabinet posts, leadership positions in state-owned entreprises, and diplomatic assignments (Akonor 2012: 75). A regular dialogue between the PNDC and the armed forces about the reform process created furthermore an "informed consent" which was crucial for the PNDC's political survival (Hutchful 2002a: 48).

The same strategy – to a lesser extent – was applied to the police forces (Kraus 1991: 149). However not only serving, but also retired security personnel soon held high positions in various state linked institutions and establishments including e.g. the State Fishing Corporation, Ghana Airways Corporation and the Black Star Line (Oquaye 2004: 117). These developments allowed them to join Ghana's political and – due to their access to the state soon also – the country's economic higher-level factions.

The co-opting of significant parts of the military and police leadership was vital to "contain coup threats and re-establish order" (Akonor 2012: 75). In the past the fragmentation of the security forces had repetitively allowed civilian opposition higher-level factions to forge ad-hoc alliances with disaffected security factions to challenge the ruling coaltion. Oquaye (2004: 117) underlines the significance of the security factions for the regime's stability by stating:

When the [Ghanaian] military sneezed, the whole nation caught instant cold.

Besides the co-option of the leadership of security forces, the reconfiguartion of the ruling coaltion re-included parts of the right-wing faction (Hutchful 2002: 123) such as chiefs and prominent members of Ghana's bourgeoisie (Kraus 1991: 149). As P.V. Obeng, PNDC member and Chairman of the Committee of Secretaries noted in 1989:

> **[…] we have co-opted the traditional authorities some way into the [political] structure so that the cultural aspect of our nationhood is maintained and that they are involved in the process of development (Owusu 1996: 337).**

In contrast to the P/WDCs, the new CDRs soon allowed all lower-level factions to participate if they were prepared to uphold and defend the basic objectives of the revolution. So it did not take long for the Asantehene, Ghana's most powerful traditional leader, to become an honorary member (ibid.). The rapprochement of the PNDC and chiefs clearly manifested itself when the Asantehene called Rawlings "my son" and thereby publicly embraced the Head of State to express his support for the 31st December Revolution (Owusu 1996: 337).

The PNDC on its part appointed a number of traditional leaders to key positions: Nandom Na, Polkuu Konkuu Chiiri VI, became PNDC member and Secretary for Defence; Nana Akuoku Sarpong took on the role as Secretary for Health; and Emmanual G. Tanoh became Secretary for Chieftaincy Affairs and acting Attorney-General (ibid.). Furthermore, the PNDC had also passed several legal instruments which ensured the role of traditional leaders in the evolving new political settlement. These included e.g. the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Laws in 1982 and 1985 and the Regions of Ghana (Amendment) Law in 1983, which created two new regions – Upper West and Upper East – along with their Houses of Chiefs (Owusu 1996: 337).

Traditional leaders might have regarded the PNDC's opening towards them as a chance to return to a constellation of power in which chiefs per se do not regard central authority as their adversary, but as a partner (Owusu 1996: 335). In contrast significant parts of the excluded modern political higher-level factions coalescing around the Danquah-Busia-Dumbo and Nkrumah tradition, members of societal organizations like the TUC, NUGS, ARPB, GBA and the churches, remained in strong opposition to the regime. In fact, some deplored that Rawlings was using his wife's family ties to the Asante royal family to co-opt traditional rulers more easily (Owusu 1996: 337).

The real challenge facing the PNDC was however to re-ground itself firmly amongst the lower-level factions. A first step towards that direction had been taken by the integration of traditional leaders. The regime had to ensure the political support of those societal groups benefitting from the re-distributional effect of adjusted economic institutions in order to form a more stable historic bloc. At the same time the regime had to avoid putting off too many lower-level factions which might trigger a formation of an ethno-regional alliance against itself.

The PNDC was very much aware of the uneven impact of the ERP/SAP programme on the country's different regions (Langer 2010: 181-82) and thus on ethnic groups' share of resources from the state. The rehabilitation of the export sector benefitted primarily the cocoa, timber, and mineral producing areas and therefore the regions of Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Western and the port cities of Tema, Takoradi and Accra (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 139). Besides its harsh repercussions for urban wage-earners, the SAP-induced austerity measures, including the introduction of user fees for certain social services, impacted heavily on the historically economic marginalized areas like the Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions (ibid.). Some studies suggest a relationship between the austerity programme and the drop in hospital attendance, enrolment in primary and middle schools and even a link between the introduction of user fees on potable water with the outbreak of the guinea worm epidemic in Northern Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 139).

To compensate the negative social effects of the SAP and its induced visible deterioration of government services (Gibbon 1992: 157), the PNDC implemented in 1988 the Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). Under PAMSCAD, which breached the conditionalities imposed by IFIs, the PNDC implemented community projects in health, education, housing and sanitation, particularly in the Northern regions (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999: 140). In addition, the regime undertook investment projects in these areas to mitigate the impact of economic reforms (Langer 2010: 182). While Nugent (1995: 174) and others have pointed out that PAMSCAD was far from alleviating poverty in those areas, politically it more than likely played an appeasing role. In fact, Callaghy (1990: 284) points out that domestic as well as external actors pursued political objectives with the implementation of PAMSCAD: While the PNDC intended

the high visable programme to ensure political (electoral) support, external actors aimed at increased sustainability of reforms (see 6.2.3).

The wider challenge for the regime was however to align the political institutions with the new distributional effects of the country's formal institutions to ensure a new support base amongst the lower-level factions. By 1984 the PNDC had identified the rural areas and in particular the farmers as the people it sought to empower. The PNDC's Rural Manifesto stated:

> **[…] the masses of Ghana and indeed of Africa live in the rural areas. There is no doubt that a portion of the masses live in the urban areas - described mainly as the urban poor. The organised urban workers, because they are articulate […] claim to speak for the working classes. That claim is grossly erroneous since the majority of the working classes who happen to live in the rural areas have little or no say in the cities where negotiations for salaries, wages, prices of commodities and other social benefits are carried out between government, management and the organised urban working classes. As a group, the urban rich and poor have exploited the majority in the rural areas for a long time […] (Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperatives 1982:1).**

The need for a new support base amongst lower-level factions coupled with mounting domestic demands for a return to democratic civilian rule, led the PNDC to rejuvenate the idea of local government. In 1987 the PNDC published a report called District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections which became popularly known as the Blue Book (Ahwoi 2010: 40). It paved the way for the establishment of 110 District Assemblies as new local government bodies (Owusu 1996: 37; Nugent 1995: 165). The planned new political institutions ought to ensure the proclaimed "true democracy" and to give "power to the people" (Asamoah 2014: 303; Ahwoi 2010: 41). At the same time it was also an attempt to win rural support for the regime, since it claimed to address the rural-urban imbalance and to politically empower the rural areas (Nugent 1995: 176; Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 336). A government document stated:

> **Each of our constitutional experiments failed because the type of representational system we adopted on each occasion made governments remote and distant from the primary communities that were alleged to have elected them. Consequently, governments remained in the hands of a few, and above all represented the interest of the economically powerful who had access to these resources (National Commission for Democracy in Herbst 1993: 80).**

This process of decentralization was regarded by some observers as a practical demonstration and fulfilment of the PNDC's slogan of giving "power to the people" (Ayee 1993: 114; Ahwoi 2010: 41). Thus, the regime continued to direct change from above under a cloak of rhetoric providing for an appearance of revolutionary continuity to its domestic audience.

The establishment of the four-tier local government structure – consisting of Regional Co-ordinating Councils (RCC), District Assemblies (DA), Town/Area Councils and Unit Committees within each of the ten regions – enabled the PNDC to penetrate the countryside. While local government structures were nothing revolutionary per se,[85] the step allowed the regime to establish, in a controlled manner, a political presence across the length and breadth of the country (Nugent 1995: 44). None of Ghana's political parties had been able to entrench a permanent presence across the state. Rather they had set up branches ad-hoc ahead of polls, most of which slowly disappeared again once the electoral contests were over (ibid.). The only exception represented Nkrumah's CPP, which had relied on their tight grip on local government structures to penetrate every community.[86]

Even though it had never been explicitly stated, the PNDC seemed to emulate the CPP's strategy, since the reformed political institutions were primarily a devolution of central administration to the local level rather than of any political power (Haynes 1991: 290). The regime created 110 District Assemblies. Between December 1988 and February 1989 (officially) non-partisan elections were held in the communities to directly elect 2/3 of the members for each District Assembly. 1/3 of its members were however appointed by the PNDC. Since District Secretaries who occupied a leading role in the new political institutions were all PNDC-appointees and with RCCs de facto numerically dominated by the PNDC, the regime retained a very firm grip on the proclaimed shift of power to the people (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 338). Moreover, this structure allowed the PNDC to find a place for members of the CDRs, even though the regime avoided packing the new District Assemblies only with its own stalwarts (Nugent 1995: 117). About 1/5 of the appointees were chiefs and many individuals from the professions and workers' union were included, even though some of them were known as firm PNDC opponents (ibid.). Through these steps the regime strengthened its ruling coalition with factions of the right and gave regime opponents the opportunity to set their foot again into the political area in a manner strongly controlled by the regime itself.

[85] For an overview of the historical development of local government in Ghana compare Haynes (1991) and Ahwoi (2010).
[86] In fact, attempting to break the power of the CPP at local level in the late 1960s, the NLC had reduced the number of administrative districts from 185 to 40 (Haynes 1991: 284).

According to Gyimah-Boadi (1990: 338) the local government reforms and the non-partisan elections generated much enthusiasm in the countryside. The high voter turnout in the rural areas (table 6.2) can be read as a sign of the rural population endorsing the decentralized new political structures (Herbst 1993: 90).

Table 6.10 Comparative voter turnout in Ghana (in percentages)

Region	1988/89 District Assembly	1979 Parliamentary	1978 Council
Western	55.3	34.04	20.6
Central	59.3	33.34	22.2
Eastern	60.8	35.95	16.6
Volta	59.4	33.65	15.3
Ashanti	60.8	41.99	24.9
Brong/Ahafo	60.2	33.16	18.7
Northern	60.6	32.09	18.2
Upper[a]	65.7	32.82	16.1
Greater Accra	44.3	35.59	10.2
National level	59.0	35.25	18.4

[a] The PNDC had divided the Upper Region into Upper East and Upper West in September 1987. The results from these two regions are combined here so that they can still be compared to previous elections.

Source: Herbst (1993: 90)

At the same time Herbst (1993: 90) and Gyimah-Boadi (1990: 343) both hint at an element of gratitude towards the PNDC as reason for the high rural voter turnout:

> **[…] the high turnout in rural areas and newly created districts can be attributed to effective PNDC propaganda for District Assemblies as powerful vehicles for local development. New districts took the elections as a serious opportunity to catch up with old districts (Herbst (1993: 90) quoting Kojo T-Vieta).**
>
> **An element of cajolery cannot be ruled out as factor in the generally high voter turnout. Gratitude to government may account for the high voter turnout in the newly created districts (Gyimah-Boadi 1990: 343).**

In contrast, the lowest voter turnout was recorded in (urban) Greater Accra (table 6.2).

In preparation for the District Assembly elections, the PNDC strove to abolish previous obstacles to the participation of lower-level factions in the decision making process (Ahwoi 2010: 42-43). It removed the legislative requirement of all candidates for local government to be literate in English which had ruled out about 50% of the rural population from running as candidates for local government in the past (ibid.). The elections were state-sponsored to eliminate pressures of financing political campaigns. Moreover, prospective assembly members had to be ordinary residents in the electoral area to prevent

> **urban dwellers to contest local government elections in villages where they 'hailed from' and [to use, JR] […] their monies to get elected, only for them to return to the cities and forget about the problems and the needs of the villagers (Ahwoi 2010: 43).**

According to Ahwoi (2010: 42) the steps taken by the PNDC removed previous impediments for ordinary citizens to run, which was

> **reflected in the kind of people who filed to contest the first District Assembly elections held in 1988/89 (ibid.).**

He illustrates his point by citing the elections to the Shama-Ahanta East Metropolitan Assembly as an example in which a conservancy labourer defeated a renowned lawyer (Ahwoi 2010: 45).

According to Ahwoi (ibid.) the reform of Ghana's political institutions opened up space for lower-level factions to join the local political leadership. Nugent (1995: 176), on the other hand, claims that the same local notables who had hitherto dominated the Town/Village Development Committees had been elected to the DAs. However he also states (1995: 260) that many genuinely new faces had been elected as MPs on behalf of the NDC in 1992 and that the DAs had provided an alternative route into national politics. The contradicting evaluations of Ahwoi and Nugent might derive from their own standpoints and thus impact their perception. This diverging perception however strengthens the narrative of incremental structural change which claims that established forces continued to play a role, while institutional change also opened up space for movement between higher and lower-level factions. Even though this space initially only opened up at the local level, in the following years this was going to have an impact on the composition of Ghana's higher-level factions represented as MPs in Accra (see section 6.2).

Overall the district elections gained Rawlings' military regime some legitimacy and enabled it to present its political reforms as a first step towards democratization (Nugent 1995: 178). This was particularly important, since domestic calls for a return to democracy – fanned by strikes and street protests in neigbouring authoritarian states like Benin and Burkina Faso – grew louder during the late 1980s (Nugent 1995: 186; Bratton and Van de Walle 1992: 419). Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall set the scene for IFIs and Western donors to introduce the concept of good governance into the aid discourse and to tie a continued granting of financial loans not only to economic reforms but also to political liberalization (Nugent 2012: 187 & 381; Haynes 1991: 283). Interestingly the PNDC's initial revolutionary rhetoric of "participatory democracy" and its local government reforms eventually overlapped with donors' expectations. The con-

gruence of PNDC's interests and the internationally dominant neo-liberal development and governance paradigm allowed the PNDC to further direct social change from above and to set the first steps for its own transformation. Due to the fact that Ghana evinced relative successful macroeconomic recovery in comparison with other African states (Gibbon 1992: 156) and the fact that it was amongst the first African states to decentralize, IFIs and donors could continue to frame Ghana as a role model legitimizing the international community's own reform policies (see Crawford 2009: 58).

6.2 Ghana's process of democratization – next step in the revolution from above

The local government elections in 1988/89 represented a first step of the PNDC to anchor itself amongst those lower-level factions benefiting from the redistributional effects of Ghana's adjusted economic institutions. The next sections will outline how the following (re-)democratization process further altered Ghana's constellation of power, in particular amongst higher-level factions (vertical and horizontal expansion), but also between its higher- and lower-level ones. This process beginning in the 1990s continues to have significant reverberations today as seen in the 2012 elections (see chapter four). Besides an unspoken and previously non-existing elite consenus on a liberal economic trajectory for Ghana, continuous incremental structural change of its electoral framework enabled Ghana's higher-level factions to agree on the rules of granting access to power again as seen in 2012. This eventually allowed for a reinclusion of previously excluded higher-level factions into the political sphere. In addition, the re-established political imperative of winning elections brought back competitive clientelism which strengthened in relative terms the position of lower-level factions towards higher-level ones, a third feature which continues to the 2012 elections and within the new settlement. At the same time it will be pointed out how the need of an African success story to legitimise (neo-)liberal reform policies prescribed by the international community has led to Ghana's exceptional, or prefential, treatment by donors. In fact, a continuous inflow of foreign capital provided in particular by the IFIs until today helps to sustain the financial viability of Ghana's current political settlement.

6.2.1 General elections & vertical expansion of higher-level factions

The outcome of the local elections in 1988/89 reassured the PNDC leadership that it had nothing to fear from the reintroduction of competitive politics. Moreover, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of the Berlin Wall the international setting had changed by the early 1990s. This set the scene for IFIs and Western donors to tie continued financial support not only to economic reforms, but also to political liberalisation. Rawlings stated in an interview:

> **By that point the IMF and the World Bank were supporting us financially to build new roads, providing water etc. So to be quite honest, they were not going to wait for us to come out with an appropriate formula of how to sustain that new culture of [populist grassroots] democracy in our people. The US State Department also exerted pressure to go multiparty (Bitar & Lowenthal 2015: 127).**

In this situation the regime opted for steering a continuing political reform process from above and embarked on a transformation process by holding general elections in 1992. Following the endorsement of a new constitution through a national referendum in April 1992, political parties were allowed to reform a month later (Frempong 2012: 46; Fordwor 2010: 187). The New Patriotic Party (NPP) emerged out of the Danquah-Busia Memorial Club and chose Professor Adu Boahen, member of the Danquah faction within the NPP, as its presidential candidate (Bob-Millar 2012: 579-80). The Nkrumahist forces splintered into various parties (see Frempong 2012: 47) which worked in favour of the PNDC (Nugent 1995: 243) who exploited the legacy to its own advantage. As National Democratic Congress (NDC), the transformed regime forged an electoral alliance with the NCP and Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE) party (ibid.). Kow Nkensen Arkahh, member of the NCP and chief of Senya Breku in Ghana's Eastern region, became Rawlings running mate in the 1992 presidential elections.

During the electoral campaign – and in fact thereafter – there was no serious disagreement over the PNDC's economic policy (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 55; Nugent 1995: 272-80). Rather, the NPP argued that the PNDC had just implemented the economic policies of the Busia government. Thus, the NPP not only failed to present a radical alternative to the regime's economic policies, but also released it from answering tricky questions about retrenchment and the divestiture of state enterprises (Nugent 1995: 244). In fact, the NPP was not prepared to come to power by opposing the ERP/SAP risking potential curtailment of external financial assistance (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 55). As a result, by the early 1990s an unspoken and previously non-existing elite consensus had emerged embracing (neo-)liberal

economic policies as Ghana's economic trajectory (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 57), an outcome which still has considerable effects now.

Since the NPP supported the PNDC's economic policies, it was betting on denouncing the regime's human rights abuses to gain electoral support. However, this issue mainly appealed to a small and predominantly urban faction and seemed rather remote from the concerns of the rural majority (Nugent 1995: 244). Moreover, neither increased personal attacks on Rawlings by the NPP's campaign nor the exposure of local societal cleavages and attempts to use them for electoral gains, helped the main opposition party to gain grounds (Nugent 1995: 245-47). In November 1992 Rawlings was thus elected with 58.4% of the national vote as the first president of Ghana's Fourth Republic (table 6.5). Adu Boahen, the NPP's presidential candidate, came in second with 30,3% of the vote and a national voter turnout of 48.3% (ibid.).

Table 6.11 Overall results of Ghana's 1992 presidential elections

Candidate	Party/Coalition	Vote (%)
Jerry J. Rawlings	NDC/PA	58.4
Adu Boahen	NPP	30.3
Hilla Limann	PNC	6.7
Kwabena Darko	NIP	2.8
Emmanuel A. Erskine	PHP	1.8

Source: Frempomg (2012: 49)

Table 6.12 Results of Ghana's 1992 presidential elections by region (in %)

Region	Rawlings (NDC/PA)	Boahen (NPP)	Limann (PNC)	Darko (NIP)	Erskine (PHP)
Ashanti	32.9	60.5	2.5	3.6	0.6
Brong-Ahafo	61.9	29.5	5.3	2.3	1.0
Central	66.5	26.0	1.9	3.5	2.2
Eastern	57.3	37.7	1.9	2.3	0.7
Greater Accra	53.4	37.0	4.3	4.1	1.3
Northern	63.0	16.3	32.5	1.5	8.3
Upper East	54.0	10.5	32.5	1.4	1.7
Upper West	51.0	8.9	37.1	1.8	1.2
Volta	93.2	3.6	1.6	0.7	0.9
Western	60.7	22.8	22.8	5.6	2.4
National	58.4	30.3	6.7	2.8	1.8

Source: Frempong (2012: 49)

Rawlings won a clear majority in all regions with the exception of Ashanti (table 6.6). He even substantively won the majority of cast votes in Brong-Ahafo which had been a stronghold of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo faction in previous elections. If that were not enough, he also secured the majority of votes in the region of Greater Accra, which had been the centre of attacks on the regime by the broad anti-PNDC coalition. However, Rawlings performed less well in urban wage earning areas (Nugent 1995: 233). A closer look at the constituency level reveals that he lost to Boahen – albeit mostly closely – in constituencies in which the wage earning faction was statistically significant (ibid.). These results demonstrate how the support of urban wage earners had faded for the PNDC since the days of the revolution (Nugent 1995: 234). In contrast, already the District Assembly elections had hinted at the fact that the PNDC was capable of making the rural areas a major partner in its new ruling coalition. Gyimah-Boadi (1990: 339) argued that

> **with a strong rural political machine, the PNDC could revolutionize Ghanaian politics […].**

While several international observer groups, including the Commonwealth Observer Group, the Carter Center and a mission of the Organisation of African Unity, endorsed the election results, the four opposition parties and their supporters fiercely contested the declared results (Frempong 2012: 49). They claimed that factors like an uneven playing field due to over-exploitation of incumbency, pro-government election authorities (Interim National Election Commission (INEC)) and a bloated and not updated voter register ensured Rawlings' victory (Ayee 1998: 35). Many citizens who had opposed the PNDC had not registered for the District Assembly elections. Since this offered the PNDC a perceived advantage the same register was used for the 1992 polls, claimed the opposition forces (Frempong 2012: 60). The declaration of results set off a surge of post-election violence: four bombs detonated in different parts of Accra plotted by a group called Alliance for Democratic Forces; the NDC Western Regional Chairman was burnt to death and rioting took place in many larger cities including Kumasi. Thereupon the regime imposed a curfew and state of emergency (Frempong 2012: 50; Nugent 1995: 234). It was claimed that even though the electoral process did indicate irregularities and therefore left room for improvement, the results did reflect the will of the people (see Jeffries & Thomas 1993).

Ahead of the parliamentary polls which were scheduled to follow the presidential race, the four opposition parties demanded reforms whose implementation they declared as prerequisite for their participation in the subsequent parliamentary polls. These included an interim government to oversee the remaining part of the transition process, the compiling of a new voter register and a new Electoral Commission to include representatives of the opposition forces (Frempong 2012: 50; Nugent 1995: 248). Mediating efforts by traditional and religious leaders between the regime and opposition forces did however not succeed.

The parliamentary elections were postponed twice, but polls were finally held on the 29th of December 1992 with a boycott by the opposition parties. As a result the NDC secured the vast majority of the 200 parliamentary seats in a race with an historically low voter turnout of 29% (Frempong 2012: 50). While the old forces had been allowed to participate in the political sphere under the rules dictated by the regime, the excluded factions had not yet been re-incorporated into the political sphere at national level at this time. The boycott of the parliamentary race was some kind of self-exclusion by the opposition higher-level forces from the key formal political institution. While the self-succeeding democratic transformation of the PNDC ensured continued external legitimacy, the boycott of the opposition forces strained the internal legitimacy of the new regime. This situation in turn could not be completely ignored by international actors.

Another significant outcome of the 1992 parliamentary elections had been that many individuals who had entered the national political scene as new MPs most likely would not have joined Ghana's higher-level factions if it had not been for the Rawlings' decade (Nugent 1995: 260). Only two of the NDC Members of Parliament had a conventional professional background (professors, lawyers, doctors etc.); Kwabena Adjei (Biakoye constituency) and Alex Ababio (South Dayi constituency) (ibid.). Both had previously held positions within the PNDC. Nugent (ibid.) illustrates with recourse to the Volta region that plenty of the NDC's parliamentary candidates had emerged through the District Assemblies including Pat Pomary for Hohoe North; Kosi Kedem for Hohoe South; Densi Boafo for Nkwanta and Modestus Ahiable for Ketu North (see Ninsin 1996: 27-28). The new MP for Krachi, Francis Gyefour represented farming interests while Kofi Attoh, who had been the CDR regional organizing assistant, was elected as MP for Ho Central (ibid.). Emil Brantuo, a chop bar owner and

PNDC District Secretary was elected as MP in Buem while Commodore Steve Obimpeh and Dan Abodakpi, who had both been involved in PNDC's mobilization activities, represented the constituencies of North Dayi and Keta respectively in the new parliament. In addition to Obimpeh, another two MPs in the Volta region had military backgrounds: Squadron Leader C.K. Sowu (Anlo) and Lt-Col. E.K.D. Tsede (Ho West) (Nugent 1995: 260).

The detailed example of the Volta region illustrates that the regime – apart from earlier selective elite co-option – tried to keep its distance from members of the established higher-level factions. As a result, through its nominees for the 1992 parliamentary race, the regime represented truly new individuals on the electoral scene (Nugent 1995: 260). With several having secured their candidacy through their membership of District Assemblies and the 31st December Women's Movement, a number of new MPs had "entered the political arena from below" (ibid.; see also Frempong (2003); Ninsin 1996: 27-28). While Nugent (1995: 260) points out that the NDC's candidates were rarely characteristic of the population at large, neither did the majority of the NDC's new MPs belong to Ghana's previously established higher-level factions. As a result, the composition of Ghana's higher-level factions in the Fourth Republic had been altered vertically through the rule of the PNDC. Most likely it was enhanced by the opposition's boycott allowing for some social mobility.

6.2.2 Towards an elite consensus on the process of granting access to power

After the 1992 polls Ghana's political system was a "de facto one party system through the ballot box" (Frempong 2012: 55). At first the NPP published "The Stolen Verdict" in which it documented alleged electoral fraud and malpractices in 100 out of 200 constituencies during the 1992 electoral process (NPP 1993). Thereby the main opposition party demonstrated to a domestic and international audience that it vehemently disagreed with the process which had granted political power to the NDC. However, the main opposition force neither limited itself to public outcry nor did its self-exclusion from parliament mean it relinquished further political struggle. Reflecting on its strengths in judiciary matters, the NPP turned the Supreme Court into an arena to mediate political issues that would

have normally been dealt with in parliament and achieved some rulings in its favour (Frempong 2012: 58).[87]

Eventually, the NPP leadership floated the idea of "doing business" with the government (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 56) and began to engage in direct talks with the NDC to underline its willingness to settle differences through negotiations rather than confrontation (Frempong 2012: 58). Most rank and file supporters of the NPP severely critiqued the step (Frempong 2012: 59; Boafo-Arthur 1999: 56). While it is difficult to determine what led to the decision of the NPP leadership to take a step towards the NDC, a statement by Nyaho-Tamakloe, Chairman of the NPP's sector committee on health and social services, lets one interpret the move as a strategic measure of confidence-building aimed at both domestic but in particular international actors:

> **We just want to prove to the western nations who have put so much money into P/NDC ERP/SAP that when we are given the chance we will do better than Rawlings and his people. We want them to have confidence in us (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 56).**

At the same time the NPP, whose aim it was to be fully re-included into Ghana's political sphere, needed to work towards ensuring a process which would allow it to do so. Both parties began to discuss issues related to the electoral framework such as the controversial voter register and the opposition's demand for unconditional amnesty for exiled Ghanaians (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 56). Soon however the inter-party dialogue collapsed (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 57). Despite this failure, the talks became the precursor of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) which was established in 1994 by a newly inaugurated Electoral Commission (EC).

Since the new EC was led by Afari-Gyan and Kanga, both leading members of the defunct and largely discredited INEC, the opposition questioned that the election authority was going to be an independent and impartial arbiter (Frempong 2012: 62). However, endowed with donor assistance the EC followed a recommendation by the Commonwealth Observer Group to refer to an institutionalized process of dialogue and consultation as building block for democratic consolidation (Frempong 2008: 191). In May 1994 IPAC was formed which allowed the EC to draw opposition parties and the ruling NDC into an institutionalized process discussing reforms of the electoral framework. IPAC provided a space for Ghana's political elite to bargain over the rules of the game granting access to state power and thus elite succession in the new Republic. Despite its

[87] For more details see Kotey (1995).

initial hiccups, the opposition forces achieved – mediated through the EC and the platform provided by IPAC – some compromises reforming Ghana's electoral framework ahead of the next general elections in 1996. One key target for electoral reform was – just like in preparation for the 2012 elections – the voter register which was overhauled with party agents actively involved as observers in the registration exercise. Moreover, a single day was set for both parliamentary and presidential elections; parties agreed on the use of transparent ballot boxes; the introduction of photo ID cards for voter identification and approved observation by party agents on voting day (Frempong 2012: 63 & 69).

Even though a consensus amongst Ghana's higher-level factions on electoral reforms had been achieved, it does not imply that all differences of opinion had tranquilly been discussed. Rather, bitter conflicts and disagreements between the opposing parties characterized especially the first years of IPAC (Frempong 2012: 84). Despite all differences Ghana's political parties agreed on the above outlined electoral reforms and even though IPAC's discussions were not legally binding for the EC, they were given serious attention. By doing so, IPAC – over time – became an institutionalised platform for building trust and confidence amongst the higher-level factions in the EC itself and the electoral process. The EC became a vital mediator in building an elite consensus on electoral reforms and hence designing formal political institutions granting access to power in Ghana's Fourth Republic as was seen in 2012.

A high voter turnout of 78% during the 1996 polls compared to 29% in 1992 reflected the increased confidence in the electoral process (Frempong 2012: 71). Rawlings, as before, won the presidential elections in nine regions. John A. Kufuor, the candidate of the NPP/Great Alliance, came in second with 39.6% of the votes, and Edward N. Mahama,[88] the presidential candidate of the PNC, secured 3.1% (ibid.). The opposition parties secured a sizable representation in parliament – about 40% – and with the NDC and NPP together controlling 97% of the presidential votes and seats in parliament, the results indicated an emerging two-party system.[89]

[88] Edward N. Mahama and John D. Mahama are not related. They are both Northerners, but John D. Is a Gonja from Bole while Edward N. Mahama is a Mampurisi from Nalgerigu.
[89] For more details on Ghana's 1992 election results see Electoral Commission of Ghana (1992).

In contrast to the transitional polls in 1992 the contesting parties accepted the declared results due to the consensual electoral reforms. In fact, defeated presidential candidates attended the inaugural ceremony, shoock hands with Rawlings as re-elected president, and Kufuor conceded that the NDC had become a "potent third force in Ghanaian politics" (Frempong 2012: 73). The outcome of the 1996 elections represented a first step towards re-inclusion of previously excluded higher-level factions to the political sphere at national level. However, it took a significant amount of financial support from donors to keep Ghana's democratic transition through electoral reforms and support of civil society on track a situation which continues to 2012 and today. Besides loans, the international community has also supported Ghanademocratic transition by funding electoral administration reforms. For example in 1994, the NPP threatened to boycott the 1996 election because it did not agree with the voter registration procedures. The issue was resolved by the US embassy by paying for improved vote ridentification cards (Bitar and Lowenthal 2015: 135). Ghana's reliance on continued international support poses the question of sustainability in case of external funding drying up (Frempong 2012: 77).

Ahead of the 2000 elections, IPAC remained the main body for discussing continued electoral reform between the higher-level factions. The body was also replicated at regional and district levels (Frempong 2012: 83). In preparation for the upcoming polls, opposition forces were pushing once again for further electoral reforms. A new voter registration exercise was conducted to improve its quality; the EC initiated the Political Parties Act of 2000 and intended to only allow photo voter ID cards for the identification of eligible voters in the 2000 polls. This plan was however firmly opposed by the NDC who feared that an incomplete coverage of the conversation exercise, in particular in the rural areas, would turn to its disadvantage. A Supreme Court decision ruled that both could be used, leading almost to opposition violence and boycott (Frempong 2012: 84).

By 2000 Ghana's higher-level factions had agreed on the process of granting access to power. Remarkable not only in light of Ghana's own history, but also in regional comparision was the fact that Rawlings complied with the constitutional two-term limit in office, so that Atta Mills became the NDC's presidential candidate. In the end, John A. Kufuor won the presidential-run off for the NPP with the help of united opposition forces (table 6.7; Frempong 2012: 93)

and secured, albeit marginally, the majority in parliament (Frempong 2012: 90). This time the NPP had managed to forge a broad societal alliance with the smaller opposition forces such as the PNC, CPP (previously PCP) and United Ghana Movement (UGM). The smaller parties acted as "king-makers" and were rewarded for their lower-level factions' support with a number of influential political positions (Frempong 2012: 96): The defeated CPP parliamentary candidate Kwesi Ndoum e.g. became Minister of Economic Planning. Mallam Issah from the PNC, which had performed well in the Northern regions during the first round, became the Youth and Sports Minister, while Charles Wereko-Brobby, the UGM's presidential candidate – and nephew of Victor Owusu – was assigned Head of the Volta River Authority (VRA). Also all three independent MPs were co-opted into the alliance by becoming deputy ministers in Kufuor's government (ibid.).[90]

The NDC had been aware of the fact that it was not particularly popular in the urban areas where structural adjustment policies had left deep cuts. However, it also knew that the elections would be decided in the rural areas where it tried to hold its ground (Nugent 2001: 410). Yet, the NDC failed in its objective for several reasons. The resource base for its campaign had been significantly eroded, since decreased international prices of Ghana's primary exports had negative effects on both foreign-exchange earnings and government's revenue (Nugent 2001: 419). Besides the international price for oil had increased sharply which further contributed to diminishing the NDC's capacity to strategically channel resources to the electorate as a crucial pillar of its campaign strategy. In this context, the opposition forces capitalised on emphazising the contrast in lifestyle between lower-level factions and the "NDC's nouveau riches" (ibid.). Moreover, the NPP succeeded in its strategic move to mobilize the support of the demographically decisive faction of young voters who felt neglected by the by now established NDC and had no memory of the revolution with which Rawlings was trying to score electoral points (Nugent 2001: 419-20).

While the old high-level political factions have gradually worked their way back into the political sphere since the end of the 1980s, the polls in 2000 and resuting alteration in power denoted their complete re-inclusion. In fact, in 2000

[90] For further examples of NPP's successful co-option of smaller factions in 2000 see Frempong (2012: 96).

the NDC became the first party in Ghana to lose power through the ballot box (Frempong 2012: 95).

Table 6.13 Results of presidential run-off in 2000 (in %)

Region	Kufuor (NPP)	Change in % from round 1	Mills (NDC)	Change in % from round 1
Ashanti	79.89	+4.16	20.11	-2.38
Brong Ahafo	58.30	+7.73	41.70	-2.92
Central	60.31	+10.63	39.69	-4.04
Eastern	62.41	+7.44	37.59	-3.75
Greater Accra	59.95	+7.43	40.05	-2.63
Northern	48.90	+19.34	51.10	+0.41
Upper East	42.83	+21.37	57.17	+5.10
Upper West	38.03	+22.52	61.97	-0.32
Volta	11.53	+3.05	88.47	+2.29
Western	60.90	+10.36	39.10	-4.83
National	**56.90**	**+8.73**	**43.10**	**-1.44**

Source: Frempong (2012: 93)

Electoral reform continued also in preparation for the 2004 polls and once more incrementally altered Ghana's electoral framework. As in all previous election reform efforts since 1992, a new voter registration exercise was conducted (Frempong 2012: 104). While the EC facilitated the steady improvements of the voters' list, it also began to assert its independence from the NPP and NDC. In late 2003 the NPP government had planned a re-demarcation exercise of constituencies and the establishment of a government procurement committee for purchasing all election-related material (Frempong 2012: 103). The NPP's venture encountered fierce resistance from the NDC who perceived it as a ploy to rig the elections. However, the plan was also strongly resisted by the EC with support from CSOs and even the lower ranks of the NPP who believed the move would tarnish the party's prospective electoral victory (ibid.). In the end, the NPP had to allow the EC to constitute its own procurement committee which included government representatives, but was dominated by EC members (Frempong 2012: 104).

The continuous quarrel between higher-level factions over electoral reform reflects a power struggle to change the formal institutions embedded in and determining the formal relations of power in Ghana's polity continuing through to 2012. As a key part of and actor in Ghana's electoral framework the EC takes part in this power struggle as much as it is subject to it. Attempts by the ruling and opposition forces to win the EC in various conflicts over to their sides have sorely tested its independence and credibility. By increasingly guarding its inde-

pendent role the EC – similar to the Supreme Court – acts by now more as arbiter in this power struggle which has gained its trust and legitimacy amongst higher- and lower-level factions (figure 4.5).

Figure 6.3 Trust of Ghanaians in their Electoral Commission



Source: Afrobarometer 2012

Another example illustrating this point is the re-demarcation exercise in preparation for the 2004 elections. In November 2003 the EC gave notice to increase the 200 constituencies to 230 based on the 2000 population census initiated by the NPP government (Frempong 2012: 104). The NDC however claimed the increase in the number of parliamentary seats was a gimmick by the EC to help the ruling NPP to hold on to power. While the NDC went to the Supreme Court to ensure the new constituencies would not be used until 2008, the EC stuck to its plan. The Supreme Court's ruling had backed the position of the EC so that the number of parliamentary seats for the 2004 polls was increased (ibid.).

The results of 2004 confirmed Kufuor (NPP) – who had secured 52.45 percent of the votes in the first round – in office for another term, ahead of Atta Mills (NDC) coming second with 44.64 percent (Frempong 2012: 109). With another relatively peaceful turnover of power in the subsequent general election in 2008 – this time from the NPP (Nana Akufo Addo) to the NDC (Atta Mills) – Ghana's higher-level factions had also arrived at an elite consensus on the process of granting access to power which had been achieved and sustained by continuous incremental structural changes to the formal electoral framework.[91]

[91] See Frempong (2012) and Gyekye-Jandon (2006) for a detailed analysis of Ghana's sutained electoral reforms.

Regarding the composition of Ghana's higher-level factions one needs to address as well the stepping back of the military. As a major pillar of the PNDC regime, members of the security forces had established themselves amongst Ghana's political higher-level factions (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 9). The 1992 Constitution had provided the impetus for further reform of the security sector with the aim of bringing it more under parliamentary or at least civilian oversight (BICC n.d: 1). In fact, a series of reforms was initiated by Rawlings during the 1990s to professionalise the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) (BICC n.d.: 2) and to subordinate them to ministerial authority (Hutchful 1997a: 258). This helped to mitigate military intrusiveness in politics even though segments of the military remained strong and visible throughout Rawlings' rule (Agyeman-Duah 2002: 10).

A vital factor which curtailed the GAF's role in the political sphere was its increased involvement in several UN peacekeeping operations since the early 1990s (Handley and Mills 2001: 23-24; Hutchful 1997a: 258). The missions had re-engaged the soldiers in their main field of operation, brought some of the forces outside the country and offered valuable training and experience for the military. Moreover, the missions provided a lucrative way for government to subsidize the GAF which allowed the PNDC regime to scale back military spending to levels lower than ever before without provoking serious discontent (Hutchful 1997a: 258). Also the NPP government under Kufuor took similar measures to ensure that the military would not disrupt democratic processes. In an interview Kufuor stated

> **[…] what we did to get them to stay in the barrack is we treated them well. For example, Ghana has participated in UN peace missions all over the world for a long time. The allowance for going on peace missions was low: $32 a day. At the time my government came in, soldiers were given only half of that, about $15 or $16 a day. My government raised the allowance to $27 because the soldiers were risking their lives going on these missions. They appreciated that. We ensured their upkeep […] (Bitar & Lowenthal 2015: 130).**

Another step to re-adjust the role of the military was taken by the NPP directly after coming to power by strengthening the police and thereby emphasizing its leading role in ensuring internal security (Handley and Mills 2001: 26). Nevertheless, Ghana's last coup attempt occurred only about a decade ago in 2004 and might have reinforced amongst some civilian higher-level factions the perception of the military as "enemy from within" (Aning and Lartey 2009: 14). Even though civilian control over the military has been reasserted – primarily in the form of executive control rather than parliamentary oversight – (Handley and

Mills 2001: 29), excessive secrecy in national security matters and lingering suspicion between political and security higher-level factions, tend to continue (Aning and Lartey 2009: 10 & 29).

By the late 2000's both dominant civilian higher-level factions, with their bases amongst the lower-level ones, were forming together a new historic bloc. The constant slight re-alignments of factions into ruling coaltions among higher-level factions is one vital pillar ensuring Ghana's current resilience and hence stability of the new political settlement.

6.2.3 Impact of Ghana's political liberalization on lower-levels' position of power

The liberalization of Ghana's political sphere did not only impact on the constellation of power between Ghana's higher-level factions. The changes within the international sphere enabled "good governance" to become the new hegemonic paradigm. This in turn also strengthened the position of lower-level towards higher-level ones. Societal groups in Ghana's cultural sphere regained in strength compared to previous times under PNDC rule. The P/NDC loosened its monopoly on the media scene (Frempong 2012: 88) so that private media outlets in particular in the form of FM stations grew (Frempong 2012: 105) reflected in the open political space in 2012. The expanded space was used by various societal groups to engage e.g. in political activities like peace campaigns, voter education and domestic election observation through CSOs as IDEG, CODEO and the Christian Council. At least part of the loosening of the P/NDC's grip on the cultural sphere can be understood by policy rents of international donors for the regime (Boafo-Arthur 1999: 64).

Only 6 months after the transitional polls international donors pledged $2.1 billion in assistance for 1993/94 to Ghana at a meeting in Paris chaired by the World Bank. This exceeded by far the needed amount of $1.7 billion estimated by the World Bank (ibid.). As one Ghanaian official stated in an interview with Callaghy (1990: 283), Ghana was strongly depending on the inflow of external capital:

> **We need two legs to walk – a strong and effective state and a strong private sector; we have neither and are not likely to have either anytime soon. We are like a cripple I saw recently with no legs […] surviving only by begging and trying to look sympathetic to the potential alms giver (Callaghy 1990: 283).**

As much as Ghana required external capital injections, the IFIs and donor community were in need of an African success story (Gyimah-Boadi 1997: 314) legitimizing their neoliberal reform policies. The decision by the donor communi-

ty to pledge more financial assistance to Ghana than demanded might have been influenced by the dramatic collapse of Zambia's ERP which left Ghana as one of the last remaining African "success stories" (Callaghy 1990: 284). In fact, until 1987 Ghana was heavily depending on loans from the IMF and World Bank, since major Western donors hestitated to support Ghana with substantial financial resources (Callaghy 1990: 283-4). A senior World Bank official for Africa stated with Ghana in mind:

> **The alternative – a series of failed programs in Africa – is not worth thinking about, and not only because of the human suffering. […] The basic idea of moving to a market economy, shifting policies out of grandiosity to step-by-step solid progress will be discredited, and we can't afford to have those ideas discredited. If they fail in a series of countries […] then it is a failure of our approach to the economy […] So we have a very, very big stake in this (Callaghy 1990: 283).**

Ghana's dependency on the inflow of external capital coupled with aid conditionality illustrates the issue of externalization of political accountability states in the Global South like Ghana are facing. However, the statement by the World Bank official demonstrates that states in the Global South have their own impact on the hegemonic position at least on ideas shaping policies at the international level. With Ghana being labeled as success story (Ofosu-Asare 2011), its experience ought to serve as a model for development. As a consequence, the case of Ghana has acquired an importance that has transcended the country's national boundaries, since it has become in some respects a measure legitimising the policy recommendations of the IMF and World Bank (Tanoh 1992). Also Rawlings stated in an interview the following:

> **After the PNDC regime, Western powers and the media kept whitewashing the government's image because Ghana had become a so-called star of democracy, and especially when Jon Kufuor and the New Patriotic Party came in, it is like the West needed a country that could be projected to the rest of Africa and the world as a success story. So, in spite of all the corrupt things going on, the Western media kept whitewashing Kufuor's government & image. Things are not quite what people outside are made to believe (Bitar & Lowenthal 2015: 130).**

The international community anticipated that the increased financial support would allow the regime to continue and broaden its structural adjustment efforts (Callaghy 1990: 284). In 1988 Ghana received with $40 per capita in foreign aid twice the average as the rest of Africa (Brooke 1989). Ghana's exceptional or preferential treatment by the donor community (Gibbon 1992: 161) is underlined by the fact that it tops the ranking – together with Côte d'Ivoire – of African states that received structural adjustment loans between 1980-1999 from the IMF and World Bank (table 6.6). In addition to the relative-

ly high levels of funding provided by the donor community, the sustained financial support to Ghana despite regular non-compliance with IFIs' conditionalities adds to Ghana's exceptional treatment. Non-compliance with IMF conditionality occurred when the political survival of a regime was at stake (Akonor 2004). This happened notably prior to elections and periods of elite conflict (ibid.). Thus, when the regime needed to muster domestic support to stay in power, it enacted schemes like PAMSCAD breaching the consitionalities of the IFIs to mitigate the effects of structural change on cost bearers. This was either silently accepted by the donor community or eventually, as in the case of PAMSCAD, even financially supported (Callaghy 1990: 284).

Table 6.6 African states that were in the world's top twenty of SAP loans received beween 1980-1999

State	Number of IMF & World Bank adjustment loans between 1980-1999
Côte d'Ivoire	26
Ghana	26
Senegal	21
Uganda	20
Kenya	19
Malawi	18
Zambia	18
Madagascar	17
Mauretania	16
Mali	15
Togo	15
Niger	14

Source: Easterly (2007: 59)

At the same time Ghanaian higher-level factions in the Fourth Republic have helped to nurture the international framing of Ghana as a success story to use the resulting leverage for their own purpose (Addai 1991). In the course of political liberalization the NDC was less and less able to resort to coercive measures to ensure the implementation of economic reforms and its own hold on to power. The new context of a liberal polity re-established the political imperative of winning elections and thereby also brought back competitive clientelism (Whitfield 2011). Since developing countries have in general a rather small tax base, tax cuts do not enhance broad electoral support. Therefore election-oriented policy-making in the Global South tends to occur in the form of government expenditure

increases, rather than tax reductions (Schuhknecht 1996: 159; see also Block 2002). Data on Ghana's budget deficit since its transition in 1992 shows clear evidence for expansionary fiscal policies to ensure electoral support for incumbent governments (figure 6.8 & 6.9).[92] The fiscal laxity emerges as electoral fiscal cycles in states of the Global South just like so-called political business cycles do in industrialized countries (Schuhknecht 1996: 155).

Figure 6.4 Ghana's budget deficit from 1983-2002 (% GDP, inverted scale)



Source: Killick (2010: 406 & 410)

Figure 6.5 Ghana's budget deficit from 2003-2012 (% GDP, inverted scale)



Source: World Bank (2013) & Bawumia (2013)

[92] For a more detailed analysis of Ghana's electoral fiscal cycles see Akonor (2012: 104-106; 2004) and Killick (2010: 410-413).

While some authors argue that elections promoted non-compliance of Ghanaian regimes with IFI's conditionalities (Akonor 2004), one can also interpret the electoral fiscal cycles in Ghana as a manifestation of various Ghanaian governments managing the precarious balance between externalized political accountability – meeting conditionalities to ensure continued external financial assistance – and responding to demands of lower-level factions (internal accountability). In that regard the liberalization process has strengthened the position of Ghana's lower-level factions towards their higher-level ones. This is particularly so, even if limited to election times, since the highly fragmented nature of Ghanaian society with its constant coalitional shifts does not allow higher-level factions to take any support from lower-level factions for granted. Data by Fosu and Aryetee (2013: 52 & 54) suggest that Ghana has been relying more and more on external sources to fund its domestic and external deficits. Thus, the continuous inflow of foreign capital provided in particular by the IMF and World Bank until today aids Ghana's current political settlement to stay afloat.

While the figures above clearly indicate recurring increased government expenditures in accordance with general elections since 1992, they also prove governments' efforts to reverse this trend during post-election times (1993/94; 1998/99; 2001/02; 2011). On the one hand these counter measures are necessary to appease international donors who occasionally suspended payments or succession of programmes (Killick 2010: 411). On the other hand Ghanaian higher-level factions are now also very much aware that increased government expenditure – financed through domestic borrowing, causes monetary expansion, leading to increased inflationary pressure – will eventually be felt by the entire electorate. As Ghanaian history has proven, in the worst case severe macroeconomic instability caused by lax fiscal policy can lead to high rotations amongst higher-level factions. Therefore, Ghanaian ruling coalitions have found various ways and strategies to rebalance cyclical overspending by raising state revenue in post-election years.

The NDC was able for example to cover the main part of the 1992 electorally driven deficit through privatization of SOEs (Killick 2010: 411). In fact, a programme of state divestiture and privatization gained momentum between 1993-1999 (Killick 2010: 412). In particular the sale of government's shares in Ashanti Goldfields – 35% in 1994 – three state-owned banks and Ghana Telecom

helped to absorb inflationary deficit financing after the 1992 polls (Killick 2010: 412 & 463; Opoku 2010: 151). The era of the NPP provides another example of how higher-level factions have dealt with domestic demands and higher-level factions competition for electoral support on the one hand, and ensuring macro-economic stability and fulfilment of donors' conditionality on the other. When the NPP came to power in 2001, it had fully comprehended that the P/NDC had been rather successful in gathering electoral support by resorting to a political formula already adopted by Nkrumah: community-oriented developmental patrimonialism (as described in chapter four). Ahead of the 2000 elections, the NPP had campaigned successfully on the abolition of the "cash and carry" health care system promising the introduction of a National Health Insurance Scheme (Blanchet et al. 2012). Facing increasing debts, the NPP government decided to join the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. By joining HIPC, qualifying countries were awarded with debt relief, if they met predetermined criteria and were expected to use the freed up resources for social spending and poverty reduction in particular (IMF 2014: 2). In that regard donors' expectations and needs of Ghana's higher-level factions were easy to accommodate. The allocation of HIPC funds occurred in Ghana – at least during GPRS I – based on population size, rather than needs (Abdulai and Hulme 2014: 11). This practice and the high visibility of HIPC-public goods and -services, which were associated with the NPP, played its part in mobilizing electoral support for the party's re-election in 2004.

During the first term of the NPP, HIPC funds were used as a carrot and stick instrument for electoral purposes allocating resources disproportionally to regions known as NPP strongholds (e.g. Ashanti) and the main home of swing voters such as Greater Accra, Western and Central region. In contrast, at the end of the NPP's second term, the party moved to target particularly oppositions' strongholds with HIPC funds to widen its potential electoral support base ahead of the 2008 polls (Abdulai and Hulme 2014: 14 &19). It remains to be seen what impact Ghana's oil production as new source of state revenue will have on distributive electoral politics.[93]

However, Ghanaian higher-level factions did not merely rely on external sources to bolster state revenues as potential sources of financing highly compet-

[93] For a basic overview of Ghana's emerging oil industry see Kastning (2011).

itive electoral races. Encouraged by donors, tax reforms with the aim to boost state revenues have been implemented (Assibey-Mensah 1999: 77). This further alternation of Ghana's formal institutions complemented the incremental structural change spurred by economic reforms. For it changed who carried the main burden of financing the Ghanaian state and therefore mirrored the structural change in relations of power among lower-level factions. Since independence the Ghanaian state's main source of revenue was based on an overreliance on general tariffs and export duties which were levied on single commodities such as cocoa (table 6.10; Osei 2000: 258; Assibey-Mensah 1999: 78). Prior to ERP reforms in the 1980s over 33 percent of total revenue was collected from export duties on cocoa produced by rural areas and other primary commodities such as minerals and timber (Assibey-Mensah 1999: 80). Faced with the need to reduce the budget deficit, the NDC attempted in the 1995 pre-election year to switch from a system of sales tax to one based on Value Added Tax (VAT) (Osei 2000: 255). The aim of the tax reform was to shift from an over-dependent tax system on a few goods (from production), towards one which allowed expanding and diversifying the state's tax base to share its burden (Assibey-Mensah 1999: 78). With VAT being a general consumption tax on goods and services, the reform allowed coverage of the retail and service sector rather than focusing predominantely on agriculture (rural areas).

The redistributive effect of the burden sharing provoked massive public outcry especially in urban areas (Osei 2000: 266). Severe street protests a year ahead of another general election pushed the NDC to withdraw its VAT law. However, the NDC simply postponed its implementation till 1998, a non-immediate pre-election year (Osei 2000: 272). Since then VAT has been continuously increased by NPP and NDC regimes (Daily Graphic 2014c) and helped to alter Ghana's tax structure (figures 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9). Since the mid-2000s Ghana's tax base has significantly widened and has moved from one primarily relying on taxing rural production towards sharing the burden of tax with urban consumers and formal wage earners (individual income tax) and businesses (corporate income tax).[94]

Despite this structural shift in the state's main revenue source, throughout the early and mid-2000s grants increased as vital source of state income, indi-

[94] Interestingly property tax still does not seem to play a significant role in the Ghanaian state's revenue.

cating Ghana's growing dependency on aid and continuous inflow of external capital (Whitfield and Jones 2007: 4; Kpakol 1988). In fact, external grants from Official Development Assistance (ODA) have helped to dampen Ghana's growing budget deficits since the reintroduction of competitative party politics. In 2003 for example Ghana's budget deficit exclusive of grants was 6.8% whereas it was only 0.6% inclusive of grants (see figure 3.10). This suggests that the continous inflow of external capital is vital to uphold Ghana's macroeconomic stability and hence also for maintaining its current political settlement.

Figure 6.6 Main pillars of Ghana's revenue structure 1972-1983 (in millions Cedi)



Source: IMF (2013) / IMF GFS Historical (2006)

Figure 6.7 Main pillars of Ghana's revenue structure 1984-1989 (in millions Cedi)



Source: IMF (2013) / IMF GFS Historical (2006)

Figure 6.8 Main pillars of Ghana's revenue structure 1990-1993 (in millions Cedi)



Source: IMF (2013) / IMF GFS Historical (2006)

Figure 6.9 Main pillars of Ghana's revenue structure 2001-2011 (in millions Cedi)



Source: IMF (2013) / IMF GFS Historical (2006)

Figure 6.10 Ghana's internal balance, 1984-2003



Source: Fosu & Aryeetey (2013: 53)

6.3 Chapter summary

The internationally propagated neo-liberal reforms of Ghana's economic institutions with its inherent redistribution of benefits have significantly altered the relations of power amongst Ghana's lower-level factions. With the open bias of ERP/SAP in favour of production and hence the rural areas, Ghana's cocoa farmers were major beneficiaries of economic reforms. The severe hardship which resulted from the neo-liberal reform packages prescribed from above they have reversed the old fiscal paradigm with its power relations of an "urbanized vampire state" (chapter three). However, rural areas as main producer of export products no longer carry the main burden of taxation and the fact that numbers translate into political power not only enabled the countryside to become, but now also ensure rural factions to be, a major partner in any national ruling coalition (Harding 2015). Despite rapid and increasing urbanization – more Ghanaians are now living in urban settings rather than rural ones (GSS 2012: 4) – both dominant higher level factions are highly dependent on strong rural support to gain political power through the ballot box (Harding 2015a; 2012). The recouped relative strength of rural areas compared to the urban ones is also reflected in the country's political setup in which the uneven sizes of constituencies tends to be biased towards the rural/low populated areas (chapter four).

Besides the structural changes in relations of power amongst Ghana's lower-level factions, the (neo-)liberal economic and political reforms had a vital impact on the reconstruction process of Ghana's state-society relations. They changed the power dynamics between lower and higher-level factions. The crisis of accumulation which the Ghanaian state faced at the end of the 1980s dissolved Ghana's productive social contract (Nugent 2010: 57-63) which had been upheld by the provision of community-oriented developmental patrimonialism. The re-establishment of the material base of the Ghanaian state enabled the P/NDC to revive this political formula. With the re-liberalization of Ghana's polity – regular elections since 1992 – and a highly fragmented society along the country's main social fissure, higher-level factions have now to compete again for lower-level factions' electoral support. This manifests itself in ongoing competitive electoral clientelism. Even if mainly limited to electoral time periods, the responsiveness of Ghana's higher-level factions to demands of the electorate is an indication of the lower levels' regained strength towards higher-level ones. Or as Herbst (1993: 79) might put it, Ghana seems to have

> **[…] succeeded in establishing a political system in which numbers translate into political power.**

Moreover, Ghana's current higher-level factions seem to be very much aware of the fact that macroeconomic stability allowing for community-oriented developmental patrimonialism is vital for their own political survival and the persistence of the current political settlement.

Another change in the constellation of power has occurred amongst Ghana's higher-level factions. By the 1990s the basis was laid for an unspoken ideological elite consensus on Ghana's economic institutions which has been reinforced by the macroeconomic recovery under PNDC rule. Much later an elite consensus has also been achieved on the process of granting access to state power through continuous incremental structural change of Ghana's electoral framework – which is still ongoing (continuous adaptability as source of resilience). The District Assembly elections in 1988/89 and following transitional national elections in 1992 enabled incremental shifts in the composition of Ghana's higher-level factions. The establishment of genuinely new faces amongst Ghana's political elite indicates some form of social mobility and hence a vertical expansion of Ghana's higher-level faction. The elite concensus on the process of granting access to state power eventually allowed for Ghana's first electoral turnover of power in

2000. It has marked the complete re-inclusion of old and previously excluded higher-level factions since the PNDC seized power. Furthermore, with the re-establishment of civilian oversight over the military, the previous dominance of military authority in the political sphere has been replaced.

This chapter has outlined the (neo-)liberal economic and political processes which led to the environment and settlement underpinning the 2012 elections. The incremental structural shifts, implying a re-distribution of benefits to societal groups allocated by formal institutions, were partially achieved through autocratic rule overtly accepted by IFIs and skilfully used by the PNDC. Moreover, the donor community who needed a sustained success story to legitimise its policy reform recommendations, aided implementing this structural change through an exceptional treatment of Ghana in terms of continuous and comparatively high levels of funding. Ghana's labelling as African "success story" based on the country's macroeconomic recovery and its return to a multi-party system with turnovers in power, evokes however a distorted idea of a resilient liberal state. The sustainability of Ghana's current settlement characterised by electoral competitive clientelism and mounting debts depends on a continued inflow of foreign capital. So far the mutually beneficial interest of portraying Ghana as a resilient state and hence success story by its elites and international donors ensures the flow of needed international financial assistance to maintain the current settlement. Despite unambiguous elements of continuity, it is nonetheless remarkable that this process of social change has been achieved. This chapter has endeavoured to analyse this process of change which has led to the current dispensation as reflected in the 2012 elections.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS & REFLECTIONS

During the late 1970s Ghana was described as a collapsed and failed state. In contrast, today the country is hailed internationally as a beacon of democracy and stability in West Africa. In light of this drastic image change from a fragile and even collapsed polity towards a resilient Ghanaian state, this thesis aimed to contribute to the statebuilding debate by exploring whether the Ghanaian state has in fact undergone any fundamental structural change and, if applicable, how this structural change has been achieved. While much research on Sub-Saharan Africa over the last decades has highlighted patterns of continuity on the continent, the thesis strove to focus on social change actually having occurred. To be able to provide a critical and nuanced analysis doing justice to these processes in Ghana, a critical theory approach has been opted for this endeavour.

The Gramscian inspired theoretical framework of political settlement developed in chapter two, allowed for a differentiated analysis of social change. It permitted the scrutiny (1) of the workings of the Ghanaian state, and (2) of the constellation of power between contending social forces within the Ghanaian state in historical perspective. By comprising structures (institutions), ideology, and actors within different spheres at various levels as reference points guiding the analysis, the framework of political settlement also allowed for more complexity suiting the subject matter.

Based on this theoretical lens, chapter three outlined Ghana's post-independence settlement, its collapse and the Ghanaian state's re-constitution. It has demonstrated that the workings of the immediate post-independent state were neopatrimonial in character, and that internal power constellations were marked by highly fragmented and fluctuating ruling elites with no ideological consensus on Ghana's economic and political trajectory. Moreover, Ghana's post-independence political settlement was characterized by an over-taxation of rural productive entrepreneurs in favour of urban masses' consumption. This institutionalized "urban vampire state" eventually eroded the country's economic base and led to its fiscal and economic breakdown. The accompanying neopatrimonial crisis eventually unravelled the hegemony of the ruling forces and resulted in the collapse of Ghana's post-independence settlement. In contrast, the last section of chapter three highlighted Ghana's more recent historical developments which provide the building blocks for the currently dominant narrative of Ghana's image

as “African success story”. The country’s remarkable macroeconomic recovery coupled with its (re-)democratization process make it stand out in regional comparison and suggest that it has arrived at a profoundly different place. Whether Ghana has arrived indeed at a new and stronger political settlement formed the discussion in chapter four to six.

To present a sophisticated analysis of social change in Ghana, chapter four zoomed in on Ghana’s 2012 elections which served as an empirical basis and lens to observe the country’s current settlement outlined in chapter five. This approach enabled a fine grained within-case comparison with Ghana’s collapsed post-independent settlement. The analysis of Ghana’s competitive 2012 electoral clientelistic politics demonstrated the continued neopatrimonial character of the Ghanaian state. Nevertheless, the thesis also argued that while there has been no transformation *of* the Ghanaian state, there has been continuous incremental structural change *within* it. The constellation of power within the Ghanaian state has changed in three dimensions:

(1) the relationship between Ghana’s higher level factions has been altered, reflected in a horizontal and vertical expansion of Ghana’s elite, and an ideological elite consensus has emerged with regard to the form of the state’s economic and political institutions;

(2) the relationship between Ghana’s higher and lower level factions has changed in a way that lower level factions have gained relative strength in relation to higher level factions in previous times; and

(3) the constellation of power between lower level factions has changed in the sense that rural areas have gained relative strength compared to urban ones.[95]

Chapter six, as the last substantial part of the thesis, was devoted to illustrating how this incremental structural change has been achieved. The specific case of Ghana has shown that alterations of its economic institutions resulted in a redistribution of resources shifting the constellation of powers amongst Ghana’s lower-level faction which demanded also an adaptation of the political institutions. These institutional reforms and implied change of power relations was enabled, pushed for and carried through due to a specific combination of external and internal conditions. The most significant ones amongst them were the fact that:

[95] For a more detailed outline see chapter five.

1) the (neo-)liberal paradigm had become hegemonic at the global level resulting in demands to liberalize economic and political institutions in return for financial assistance;

2) Ghana's economic fragility and position within the post-bipolar global system which made the Ghanaian state, and in particular its ruling elite, dependent on conditionalized external funding for its reconstitution;

3) the military ruling elite implementing the institutional change leading to incremental structural social changes relied on suppression to curb certain demands of social forces on the state, and demonstrated an incredible capability to readapt and skilfully play the two level game: manoeuvring the challenge of maintaining external and internal credibility and legitimacy; and

4) a continuous evolution of politics (incremental structural shifts in power relations) and usage of outsiders through to the 2012 elections.

While the thesis – and hence these concluding remarks – has been stressing accomplished social change within the Ghanaian polity, it should not be misunderstood as a contribution simply joining the existing chorus praising Ghana as a pure success story. Agreeing with Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's view that there is a danger of presenting a single story (see Ngozi Adichie 2009) be it either one-sidedly negative or positive – or in the particular case of Ghana telling an oversimplified narrative – some comment on Ghana's remaining fragility seems necessary.

After Ghana's economy had collapsed in the late 1970s early 1980s, Rawlings' self-branded revolutionary, progressive PNDC regime – pushed by the International Financial Institutions – embarked on retrieving and revitalizing a rather orthodox order. Based on the structural adjustment programme the PNDC recovered the previous imbalance of the orthodox order which however in turn enabled or even demanded incremental shifts in the constellation of power within the Ghanaian state. The thereby regained economic basis of the Ghanaian state, as well as the maintenance of a certain level of macroeconomic stability, form a crucial pillar of the current resilience of Ghana's polity since the early 1990s. Although there now exists an elite awareness of and consensus on the need for ensuring a minimum level of macroeconomic stability in Ghana (see chapter six), reoccurring electoral cycles of increased budget deficits as a result of competitive (electoral) clientelism have led to ballooning debts. This not only highlights the macroeconomic costs of elections and hence democracy for

states in the Global South, but also alludes to the risk of (further) macroeconomic instability in Ghana.

Following the country's 2012 election, increased inflation led to a significant rise in prices of daily goods and hence increased cost of living. In July 2014 this accumulated in a larger societal alliance led by the non-partisan civil society group Concerned Ghanaians for Responsible Governance (CGRG), professionals, trade unionists and traders joining in regular so called Red Friday demonstrations against worsening economic conditions (Concerned Ghanaians for Responsible Governance 2014; Africa Confidential 2014). Protesters were wearing items of red cloth each Friday such as t-shirts, dresses, wristbands and head ties to express and underline their discontent with the government and shouted sarcastic slogans such as "Somalia's shilling is doing better than Ghana's Cedi" (Africa Confidential 2014). While the mounting protests in no way posed any severe threat to Ghana's political stability, they do indicate the need for a sustained minimum of macroeconomic stability to ensure the continued resilience of the Ghanaian state (see also chapter two).

Over the past few decades the Ghanaian elite has been able to address the challenge posed by macroeconomic costs of elections both economically and politically rather well: either through the privatization of state-owned enterprises bringing money into the coffers of the state while at the same time providing economic opportunities for themselves (see section 5.1.3); or by signing up to the HIPC initiative which again helped to address the issue of increasing budget deficits, but also released funds to meet electorates' expectations of providing goods during election times (see section 6.2.3). So far sustained financial support from the international community, in particular the IMF and World Bank, has enabled Ghanaian elites to significantly buffer budget deficits (see figure 6.10). This arrangement keeps the challenge of the country's remaining twin deficit for the time being at bay. The inflow of external capital – coupled with domestic debts (see Fosu and Aryeetey 2013: 52) – ensures maintaining a minimum of macroeconomic stability and thereby contributes to upholding the resilience of the current system. That this mechanism is still in place is demonstrated by the fact that following the Red Friday demonstrations, Ghana applied to the IMF for a new financial assistance programme by the end of 2014 (ibid.). A new IMF loan of USD918 million was approved in April 2015 and the World

Bank has offered another USD700 million guarantee for the implementation of energy projects (see IMF 2015; Africa Confidential 2015). This bolstering of state finances comes just in time for Ghana's next big election campaign cycle with general elections being held at the end of 2016. In addition to the most recent IMF loan and World Bank guarantee, Ghanaian media report that Ghana – in accordance with World Bank parameters – has been officially classified again as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) in September 2015, since its debt has now reached 71% of its GDP (Myjoyonline 2015). While Ghanaian politicians rhetorically refuse to go back to a HIPC status – Bawumia, NPP vice-presidential candidate in 2012, stresses Ghana should be classified as Highly Indebted Middle-Income Country (HIMIC) – one might speculate, if another HIPC or "HIMIC" debt-relief might soon be envisioned to provide Ghana with some more fiscal breathing space (see Appiah 2015; Myjoyonline 2015a). Overall Ghana's high dependence on continued easy access to and flow of international financial assistance in order to sustain a minimum of macroeconomic stability and ease macroeconomic pressures, hints at Ghana's remaining vulnerability and fragility. For it is questionable whether Ghana's horizontal and vertical pact is economically viable over time with its high dependence on the inflow of external funding (see chapter two). However, so far the mutually beneficial interest of portraying Ghana as a resilient state by its elites and donors ensures the flow of needed financial assistance to preserve the current settlement.

Another vital pillar contributing to the current resilience of the Ghanaian state is based on the sustained adaptability of the electoral framework since the 1990s ensuring elite consensus on access to, and power over, the state. However also with regards to this pillar Ghana might be facing some changes challenges. In June 2015 Charlotte Osei replaced Kwadjo Afari-Gyan as Chairperson of Ghana's Electoral Commission (Asmah 2015). Afari-Gyan has played a vital role in administering all of Ghana's election since the countries re-democratization in 1992. While electoral reforms, in particular of the country's voters' register, have been common practice since Ghana's re-democratization in 1992, the EC under Osei has stated a categorical no in response to recent demands of the opposition party NPP for a new register in preparation for the 2016 polls (Essel 2015). It remains to be seen what impact a closure of this valve, which has up to now allowed for incremental structural changes in the

country's formal political institutions, might have on the continued elite consensus and hence resilience of the Ghanaian state.

While addressing the issue of remaining fragility of Ghana's political settlement, one needs to acknowledge however, that changes to Ghana's electoral framework represent just one avenue to alter the country's formal political institutions. Another option to maintain the adaptability of Ghana's political settlement could be pursued by political actors "turning another screw". It is conceivable for example that political actors set on the agenda and push for the implementation of directly electing District Chief Executives (DCEs) who have been so far appointed by the President. This idea of political reform had already been proposed in the constitutional review process initiated under former President Atta Mills (see Ghana Constitution Review Commission 2012). The current practice structurally assigns the office of the President a rather large neopatrimonial capacity. Reforms along these lines could therefore, in the specific case of Ghana, shift power away from the political power centre and, if linked to real scope of governance at local level (issue of fiscal decentralization/control over resources and its allocation), open opportunities for opposition forces. For "the-winner-takes-it-all" set up would be undermined, and opposition forces could have the chance for political point-scoring through enhanced governance and development performances at the local level. This in turn could provide them with a platform to challenge the incumbent party more effectively at the national level throughout the next general elections. Even though there are other pathways to ensure continued adaptability of Ghana's political settlement, plenty of conceivable fundamental changes to Ghana's political system would require constitutional reform, which seems to be a rather long process. As a result, one might wonder how far this avenue could be a viable alternative pathway for ensuring continued adaptability of Ghana's settlement in light of looming general elections in 2016.

The issue of incremental structural change of Ghana's formal political institutions coming to a halt might even assume more weight in a context in which another unwritten "elite arrangement" between the two main power blocks seems likely to be no longer valid: Since Ghana's re-democratization polls, the two main parties have been rotating power between themselves in two-term cycles, almost resembling the rotation of ascension to chieftaincy stools between different

groups in some parts of Ghana. However, with Mahama having replaced the deceased Atta Mills as the NDC's presidential candidate in 2012 and running again for the NDC in 2016, his party might benefit once more from its incumbency. This could end the hitherto routine rotation in power after two-terms between the NDC and NPP. In addition to potentially side-lining the NPP, who believe it is their turn to rule again, another NDC victory could also imply a passing of Akufo-Addo and hence the Akyem faction within the NPP. For Akufo-Addo's third attempt of seizing power seems to be the last chance for the Akyem faction before the sceptre is likely to swing back to the Asante power block within the NPP. Given this political context, Ghana's upcoming 2016 general elections might put the degree of Ghana's resilience to the test.

One last point remains to be emphasized with reference to Ghana. The thesis has demonstrated that incremental structural change has taken place in Ghana over the last few decades. It has acknowledged in particular Ghana's accomplishment of having managed its recent process of social change with limited bloodshed, despite the severe social ramifications implied in the process of social change. However, in spite of this recognition, the present analysis should on no account be misunderstood as simply an example of "successful" externally prescribed economic and political liberalization in Africa. A substantial amount of coercive military force was necessary to implement neo-liberal economic reforms, which had been demanded by international financial institutions in return for providing large amounts of capital inflow. Moreover, considerable political dexterity and compromise have featured in the ensuing years. Overall this inflow of capital in return for liberal reforms allowed the re-establishment of an "old economic order", which had previously become unbalanced, making the Ghanaian system more compatible again with the prevailing international structure of global capitalism.

The thesis has also underlined that Ghana's "liberal democracy" – in contrast to expectations of externally prescribed political liberalization – functions completely different from liberal democracies in industrialised societies. Institutions work differently in different settings because of context specific and historically grown constellations of power amongst social forces. Hence the Ghanaian, and in fact African state, while pushed to mimic and hence resembling on paper the OECD-prototype, functions fundamentally differently, due to its

unique constellation of powers, as well as its place within the global arena. In the case of Ghana, the country's unique constellations of power currently result in a system characterized by competitive clientelism which ensures some degree of community-oriented developmental patrimonialism (see chapter four) along electoral cycles. It remains to be seen if this form of state might be able to provide a path to long-term political stability and economic prosperity.

After having recapped the thesis' main argument and having addressed issues around the Ghanaian state's remaining fragility, I would like to conclude by reflecting on the contributions of the thesis, with an emphasis on theoretical ones. Besides shedding light on Ghana's 2012 electoral politics, the development and application of a Gramscian inspired political settlement analysis to the case of Ghana has proven to be able to do justice to processes of social change actually taking place in Africa today. Some people might argue however, that the distinction between change *of* and change *within* a state simply shifts the problem of understanding social change, yet does not provide a satisfying answer. The question remains how much change amongst social forces is actually necessary for the workings of a state (in the global South) to transform? While the thesis is not able to provide a straight forward and empirically based answer to this question – above all since the Ghanaian state has not (yet) undergone a transformation of its working– the presented analysis has evinced that alterations in the relationship between the political and economic sphere and the hegemonic actors within it, are key for such a process to unfold.

Closely linked to this is also the issue of the conceptual relationship between "state" and "political settlement" which tend to be used almost synonymously within the thesis. While they are not exactly the same, the two concepts are very strongly related and interlinked. For the political settlement approach – as developed in this thesis based on the thought of Gramsci – allows for more complexity and captures the power constellations amongst social forces within the state which are also embedded and reflected in the political and economic institutions forming the state and determining its working. In this regard, the thesis engages with one of the fundamental challenges of social research, namely how actors and structures influence and shape each other. Even though the thesis is not able to perfectly resolve this challenge – which it also did not aspire

to –, it has provided an analysis demonstrating that actors and institutions are equally important and how they mutually shape each other in an African context.

In addition, following on from the early realizations within the academic discourse on statebuilding that "institutions matter" (see Paris 2004) for state performance, and within the field of development theory that "politics matter" (see Whitfield and Burr 2014) for policy outcomes; a theoretical quintessence of this thesis is that institutions work differently in different settings because of context specific and historically grown constellations of power amongst social forces. Hence the "African state", while resembling on paper the OECD-prototype state, functions fundamentally differently, due to its unique constellation of powers, as well as its place within the global arena. This phenomenon is also embodied in the fact that academics and practitioners have struggled with using certain concepts such as "state", "civil society" or "middle class" in African contexts.[96] For all of these concepts are heavily normatively loaded based on the historical experiences of societies in the global North. There exists an underlying assumption that "the state", "civil society" and "middle class" have to work in a specific way, namely the way how they do in the OECD-world. The most vivid example of this is the concept of "middle class". The thesis tried to underline this point by consciously using the term "middling class" in the Ghanaian context, for it will not fulfil the same function as the "middle class" in industrialized states of the global North. The mere fact that the middle class in the global North arose in course of an industrialization process relatively independent from states, which is not the case for the emerging middling class in societies of the global South, results in different constellations of powers and hence workings of the state in the global North and South respectively. Some people might reproach the thesis as being inconsequential, since it – with the exception of applying the term "middling class" rather than "middle class" – generally continues to rely on these commonly used concepts such as "state" and "civil society". While an analysis and description without relying on any established concepts seemed intangible, the work at hand strove to make a conscious effort to move away from focusing on what African states are not or what they might be lacking, moving towards understanding better how they function and why they function as they do.

[96] See titles such as "African civil society or civil society in Africa" (Orvis 2001).

Hence the continued use of certain commonly used concepts does not automatically imply the same understanding of them.

Reflecting on implications stemming from this thesis, there is a continued need for future research to identify opportunities for – incremental, adapting, "organic" – social change within African states and societies. This need is founded on two main insights: (1) the dominant discourse focusing on shortcomings of African states in comparison to liberal states in the Global North has so far not been able to reveal pathways of actual change for African societies. And (2) the experience of external interventions in conflict-ridden states over the last few decades has shown that their impact on social constellations of power within states is limited in time, due to the foreseeable withdrawal of international actors in the long-term. To explore opportunities for sustainable structural social change in African contexts, states like Zambia and Benin could represent interesting case studies. Both countries have – like Ghana – had their experiences of political instability in their past, but are today regarded as amongst the continents' most stable polities. Further in-depth case studies could in turn lay the basis for potential future comparative investigations on how power constellations have changed within states in Africa and what role external actors have played within these processes.

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IX. ANNEX

9.1 Coded list of primary qualitative data collected during fieldwork

The primary qualitative data collected during fieldwork can be roughly broken down into the following four categories:

A) face-to-face semi-structured interviews;
B) personal communications;
C) sources of written primary qualitative data; and
D) unstructured observations.

Interviews are classified as formally arranged meetings/conversations with previously chosen interlocutors which latest 30 minutes or longer. Personal communications on the other hand include all conversations which occurred during fieldwork without prior planning and provided some relevant information for the research project. Sources of written primary qualitative data mainly cover Ghanaian newspapers in print and online during the time of fieldwork and are mentioned here for the sake of completeness of primary qualitative sources. Unstructured observations span first and foremost events, but also TV and radio broadcasts which allowed gathering of further impressions and insights helpful to understanding electoral politics and the workings of the Ghanaian state as an outsider. Even though the research topic covered by the thesis is not per se a sensitive one, since anonymity had been promised to most interlocutors prior to conversations, qualitative data stemming from interviews, personal communications and unstructured observations is referred to only in a coded way in the thesis. The following sections therefore present the coded lists of the various sources of qualitative primary data as used in this thesis. Sources of written primary qualitative data are listed in detail in the bibliography, since coding was not necessary.

A) Face-to-face semi-structured interviews

Code	Function of interviewee	Location and date
A1	Representative of the Hanns Seidel Foundation	Accra, 8 November 2011
A2	Representatives of Presbyterian Church of Ghana (two interlocutors)	Accra, 9 November 2011
A3	Representative of Presbyterian Church of Ghana	Accra, 14 November 2011
A4	Representative of the German Embassy	Accra, 15 November 2011
A5	Chief Superintendent and Superintendent based at Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)	Accra, 16 November 2011

Code	Function of interviewee	Location and date
A6	Representative of Presbyterian Church of Ghana working for the Interfaith Committee and running peace workshops for Ghanaian Youths ahead of election times	Haatso, 18 November 2011
A7	Representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation	Accra, 21 November 2011
A8	Representative of Ghanaian-German Economic Association (GGEA)	Accra, 24 November 2011
A9	Representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation	Accra, 28 November 2011
A10	Representative of Friedrich Naumann Foundation	Accra, 28 November 2011
A11	Professor in Political Sciences at the University of Ghana in Legon	Accra, 30 November 2011
A12	Representative of GIZ in Ghana working on Good Financial Governance (GFG)	Accra, 5 December 2011
A13	Representative of NPP Youth	Accra, 7 November 2012
A14	Representative of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)	Accra, 8 November 2012
A15	Representatives of youth oriented non-governmental organization (3 interlocutors)	Accra, Osu, 16 November 2012
A16	Representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation	Accra, 19 November 2012
A17	Representatives of NDC Youth (3 interlocutors)	Accra, FES conference, November 2012
A18	Representative of Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association (GIBA)	Accra, 23 November 2012
A19	Representative of Media Foundation for West Africa (MfWA)	Accra, 23 November 2012
A20	Journalist for radio station based in Accra	Accra, 27 November 2012
A21	Journalist for radio station in Eastern region	Accra, 27 November 2012
A22	Representative of Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association (GIBA)	Accra, 27 November 2012 and 5 December 2012
A23	Representatives of the ARK Foundation	Haatso, 28 November 2012
A24	Representative of Legal Resource Centre (LRC)	Accra, 29 November 2012
A25	Polling station assistant/verification officer 2012	Accra, 2 December 2012
A26	EC polling agent 2012	Accra, 2 December 2012 and 4 December 2012
A27	NPP supporter involved in campaigning	Accra, 2 December 2012
A28	Representative of the German Embassy	Accra, 3 December 2012
A29	Journalist (Daily Guide)	Accra, 4 December 2012
A30	Journalist (Statesman)	Accra, 4 December 2012
A31	Representative of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)	Accra, 11 December 2012

Code	Function of interviewee	Location and date
A32	Representative of the Commonwealth Election Observer Group 2012	Accra, 12 December 2012
A33	Representatives of the EU Commission (2 interlocutors)	Accra, 14 December 2012
A34	Lecturer in Political Sciences at the University of Ghana in Legon	Legon, 14 December 2012
A35	Professor for Political Sciences at the University of Ghana in Legon	Legon, 14 December 2012
A36	Representative of the National Catholic Secretariat for Ghana Catholic Bishop's Conference	Accra, 17 December 2012
A37	Representatives of the EU expert team observing the 2012 Ghanaian elections (2 interlocutors)	Accra, 17 December 2012
A38	Representatives of the Danquah Institute (3 interlocutors)	Accra, 18 December 2012
A39	Representative of UNDP/Ghana Office working on Ghana's National Peace Architecture in partnership with the National Peace Council	Accra, 20 December 2012
A40	Representative of the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG)	Accra, 20 December 2012
A41	Several interviews with representative of Ghana's Foreign Service	Mainly in Europe throughout the summer in 2013

B) Personal communications

Code	Interlocutors	Location and date
B1	Candidate running as MP in Greater Accra in 2012	Accra, 23 November 2011
B2	Son of high ranking NPP politician working in construction business	Accra, 24 October 2012
B3	Former MP candidate for 1996 elections	Legon, 19 November 2012
B4	Various guests of the Kokomlemle Guesthouse	Accra, before, during and after the elections 2012
B5	Several taxi drivers and co-travelers in trotros while traveling through the country before and after the elections	Mainly Accra[97], before, during and after the elections 2012
B6	Market women	Before, during and after the elections 2012
B7	Regular conversations with owner of a newsstand in proximity to NDC headquarter	Accra, 2 - 28 December 2012
B8	Several visits of party headquarters (NDC and NPP) and election campaign offices	First week of December

[97] Several conversations occured as well while traveling through Ghana, meeting and visiting citizens in *Agona Swedru, Akosombo, Cape Coast & Elmina, Kumasi, Korfuridua, Madina, and Tema.*

Code	Interlocutors	Location and date
B9	Former member of the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ)	Accra, 9 December 2012
B10	Party supporters at rallies of NPP and NDC	Accra, 4 and 5 December 2012
B11	Nephew of a presidential candidate 2012	Accra, 7 and 8 December 2012
B12	Voters on election days	Accra, 7 and 8 December 2012
B13	Party supporters of NDC victory celebrations in front of NDC headquarter in Accra	Accra, night of 9 th of December
B14	NDC member based in Switzerland	5 December 2012
B15	Security personnel during the 2012 elections	7 and 8 December 2012
B16	NPP supporters at NPP demonstrations against election results	11 December 2012
B17	Ghanaians living and working in Europe	Throughout different phases of the research project (2010-2014)

D) Unstructured observation

Code	Events attended/participated in	Location and date
D1	Sessions of parliament budget for 2012	Accra, 16 November 2011
D2	IDEG forum – speaker: Okyenhene Osagyefuo Amoatia Ofori Panin II on "Environment, Sustainable Development and Peace"	East Legon, 17 October 2012
D3	National Human Rights Lectures / Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Theme of event: "Ensuring good governance: protecting the citizens' right to vote" – speakers: Dr. Kwesi Aning, Dr. Ken Ahorsu and Dr. Afari Gyan	Accra, 23 October 2012
D4	The Centre for Freedom and Accuracy (CFA), Address by H.E. Jerry John Rawlings, former President of the Republic of Ghana	Accra, 24 October 2012
D5	Ga North District Society of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, GANDS/ICAG lecture on the theme: "Professional and peaceful elections" – speaker: Rev. Prof. Emmanuel Asante, Chairman of the National Peace Council	Accra, 15 November 2012
D6	Alumni Lecture at University of Legon speaker: H.E. Rupiah Banda, former President of the Republic of Zambia	Legon, 15 November 2012
D7	Hon. Lady Chief Justice of the Republic of Ghana, Mrs. Georgina Theodora Wood, "Consensus and Nation Building: Getting It Right from the Foundations", Alumni lecture	Legon, University of Ghana, 15 November 2012

Code	Events attended/participated in	Location and date
D8	Media Foundation for West Africa (MfWA), forum on the theme: “Radio, hate speech and election-related violence in Africa” – presentation of findings monitoring language use on Ghanaian radio ahead of the 2012 polls	Accra, 16 November 2012
D9	GIBA, Forum on responsible reportage for elections 2012/Southern Sector – speaker: Kabral Blay-Amihere, Chairman of the National Media Commission	Accra, 27 November 2012
D10	NPP meeting on voter education	Santa Maria/Accra, 2 December 2012
D11	Press Conference Dr Sakara, CPP headquarter	Asylum Down/Accra, 3 December 2012
D12	Press Conference of Commonwealth Observer Group at Golden Tulip Hotel	Accra, 4 December 2012
D13	Early voting observed at polling station around the area of Santa Maria	Accra, 4 December 2012
D14	NPP Rally in Santa Maria, with NPP MP candidate Shirley Ayorkor Botchway and NPP presidential candidate Nana Addo Akuffo	4 December 2012
D15	2012 Elections NDC Final Rally	Trade Fair Centre Accra, 5 December 2012
D16	Several radio broadcasts (such as Uniiq 95.7 FM Breakfast Drive special edition, Host: Cecil Nii Obodai-Wentum)	Accra, 7 December 2012
D17	Presidential and Parliamentary Elections – Visit of 7 polling stations in the constituency of Ayawaso Central, begin at 7am at Accra Technical Training Centre, others at Youngster’s International School, Star Avenue, School close to N.K.G.H. – Observed the voting period, closure of polling stations, counting and announcements of results at 4 polling stations – Visit of coalition centre of Ayawaso central: Kotobabi Police Station to observe the tabulation process – Development leading to the official declaration of results	7- 9 December 2012
D18	Coalition of Domestic Election Observers’ (CODEO) final press conference at KAIPTC	Accra, 9 December 2012
D19	Interparty Youth Committee, FES, Coconut Groove Hotel	Accra, FES conference, November 2012
D20	NPP demonstration against election results	Accra, 11 December 2012
D21	Several Ghanaian TV programmes throughout the period of fieldwork in 2012	Accra, October - December 2012

In addition to the above listed sources, further primary qualitative data was obtained by following the Ghanaian media, including print but also radio programmes of stations such as Joy FM, Unique or Peace FM and television broadcasts related to the elections. These included amongst others the IEA Presidential (2x) and Vice Presidential (1x) Debates held in October and November 2012 and news programmes on Metro TV, VIASAT and GTV.

9.2 Tables and figures referred to in chapters

Figure 9.2.1 Factors determining the sharing formula of the DACF

Factor	Description
Equality	Percentage of the DACF allocation which is to be distributed evenly between all districts / percentage of base amount for each district
Needs	The more developed a district is, the less of the Fund the Assembly receives. The development status of the district is measured by the number of schools, the ration of teachers to pupils per class, the number of health facilities and the ration of doctors per population, the availability of electricity, telecommunications and postal services, the presence of banking and other financial institutions – all information provided by the relevant sectors
Service Pressure	The greater the population of a district, the more of the Fund the Assembly will receive. It is argued that the more people are covered by a district, the more pressure there will be on the facilities provided by the Assembly. The calculation of the service pressure factor is determined based on the latest population census as recorded by the Statistical Service.
Responsiveness (Incentive)	An increase in locally mobilized revenue in real terms to a given base year in a district results in an increase in allocation, whilst a no-increase or a decrease results in a zero per cent allocation

Source: Ahwoi (2010: 178-79) and Banful (2007:7)

Figure 9.2.2 List of new constituencies 2012

Region	Constituency
Western (4)	Kwesimintsim Mpohor Bodi Bia East
Central (4)	Cape Coast North Gomoa Central Awutu Senya Assin Central
Greater Accra (7)	Bortianor – Ngleshie Amanfro Anyaa/Sowutuom Trobu Ayawaso North Okaikwei Central Ablekuma West Tema Central
Volta (4)	Akatsi North Adaklu North Dayi Krachi Nchumuru
Eastern (5)	Akuapim South Asene/Akroso/Monso Achiase Atiwa East Fanteakwa South
Ashanti (8)	Obuasi East Manso Edubia Atwima Nwabiagya North Manhyia North Juaben Asante Akim North Sekyere Afram Plains Ahafo Ana South East
Brong-Ahafo (5)	Berekum West Dormaa West Banda Pru West Sene East
Northern (5)	Daboya Kparibato Tatale Sagnarigu East Yunyoo
Upper East (2)	Bolgatanga East Tempene
Upper West (1)	Nandom

Source: EC of Ghana (2012c)

Figure 9.2.3 Representation of Northerners in Mahama's government

Mahama's Northern Ministers	▪ Akwasi Oppong Fosu (Minister of Local Government) ▪ Inusah Fuseini (Minister of Land and Natural Resources) ▪ Amidu Sulemama (Minister of Roads and Highways) ▪ Mahama Ayariga (Minister of Information) ▪ Benjamin Bewa-Nyog Kunbuor (Minister in Charge of Government Business in Parliament) ▪ Emmanuel Armarh Kofi Buah (Minister of Energy and Petroleum) ▪ Dr Henry Seidu Daannaa (Minister of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs) ▪ Mark Woyongo (Minister of Defence) ▪ Haruna Iddrissu (Minister of Trade and Industry) ▪ Nayon Bilijo (Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development)
Mahama's Northern Deputy Ministers	▪ Dr Tia Sugri (Deputy Minister of Health) ▪ James Agalga (Deputy Minister of Interior) ▪ Dr Alhassan Ahmed Yakubu (Deputy Minister of Food and Agriculture) ▪ John Abdulai Jinapor (Deputy Minister of Energy and Petroleum) ▪ Benjamin Dagadu (Deputy Minister of Energy and Petroleum) ▪ Ibrahim Murtala Muhammed (Deputy Minister of Information and Media Relations) ▪ Dr Musheibu Mohammed-Alfa (Deputy Minister of Environment, Science, Tech and Innovation) ▪ Joyce Bawa-Mogtari (Deputy Minister of Transport)
Mahama's Northern appointees (Senior advisors, ministers of state and appointees to presidential priority projects)	▪ Dr Sulley Gariba (Senior Policy Co-ordinator in the Office of the President) ▪ Dr Yaymond Akongburo Atuguba (Executive Secretary to the President) ▪ Abdul Rashid Hassan (Minister of State at the Presidency in charge of Public-private Partnership); ▪ Alhassan Azong (Minister of State at the Presidency in charge of Public Sector Reform) ▪ Alhaji Mustapha Ahmed (Minister of State at the Presidency in charge of development Authorities) ▪ Alhaji Limuna Mohammed Muniru (Minister of State at the Presidency in charge of Human resource development and Scholarship) ▪ Alban Bagbin (presidential priority projects) ▪ Cletus Avoka (presidential priority projects)
Mahama's Northern appointees with influence on the energy and petroleum portfolio and the security forces	▪ Moses Asaga (Chief Executive Officer of the National Petroleum Authority) ▪ Abdulai John Jinapor (Deputy Minister of Energy and Petroleum) ▪ Benjamin Dagadu (Deputy Ministry of Energy and Petroleum) ▪ Mark Owen Woyongo (Minister for Defence) ▪ Mohammed Ahmed Alhassan (Inspector General of Police) ▪ Alhaji Mohammed Suraji (Director of the Community Police Unit) ▪ Dominic Akuritinga Ayine (Deputy Ministry of Justice and Attorney-General's Department) ▪ Alhaji Nasiru Isahaku (2nd Deputy Governor of the Bank of Ghana)

Source: Peacefmonline (2013)

Figure 9.2.4 Organized social groups as members of CODEO in 2012

- Ghana Registered Midwives Association
- Ghana Federation of the Disabled
- Legal Resources Centre
- Ghana National Association of Teachers
- Ghana Trades Union Congress
- International Association for the Advancement of Women in Africa
- Ghana Bar Association
- Christian Council of Ghana
- Ghana Integrity Initiative
- The Ghana Muslim Mission
- Islamic Council for Development and Humanitarian Services
- National Association of Graduate Teachers
- Federation of Muslim Councils
- National Network of Local Civic Union
- Amnesty International
- Hedge Ghana
- WILDAF Ghana
- FIDA Ghana
- Ghana Pentecostal and Charismatic Council
- Centre for the Development of People
- National Union of Ghana Students
- Centre For Human Rights and Advanced Legal Research
- Office of the National Chief Imam
- Ghana Muslim Academy
- Ghana Journalists Association
- Regional Council for Islamic Education Unit
- Ghana Medical Association
- Youth Bridge Foundation
- Junior Chamber International-Dansoman
- Ghana Registered Nurses Association
- Ghana Institution of Surveyors Council of Independent Churches
- University Teachers Association of Ghana
- Association of Ghana Industries
- Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission
- Ghana Civil and Local Government Staff Association of Ghana
- Muslim Dialogue and Humanitarian Organization
- Eanfoworld
- ABANTU for Development

Figure 9.2.5 Projects funded buy STAR Ghana in 2012

NGO	Title of funded project
Blogging Ghana	Social media support for elections 2012
IDEG	Sustaining credible and peaceful elections and national cohesion in 2012
IEA	The IEA prisoner education and code of conduct enforcement body programme and the IEA Presidential Debates
Legal Resource Centre	Strengthening the judiciary to deal with human rights abuses during election 2012
National Catholic Secretariat for Ghana Catholic Bishop's Conference	Civic agenda for smooth political transition; focus on biometric system, voting and transition law for Ghana's 2012 elections
ARK Foundation	The Nuisance project – Young women speak peace to power
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding	Transforming the culture of political violence
Media Foundation for West Africa	Using media to promote decent language, issue-based campaigning for peaceful, free and fair elections in Ghana in 2012
Christian Council of Ghana	Eminent persons group (pre/post elections)
Ghana's Independent Broadcasters Association	Developing code of ethics preventing inflammatory language during elections

Figure 9.2.6 Composition of Ghana's GDP according to sectors, 1965- 2011



Source: World Bank, Africa Development Indicator, (2013)

Table 9.2.1 Results of Ghana's 2008 presidential elections

Presidential elections 2008	1st round (total votes)	1st round (%)	2nd round (total votes)	2nd round (%)
Akufo-Addo (NPP)	4,159,439	49.13%	4,480,446	49.77%
Atta Mills (NDC)	4,056,634	47.92%	4,521,032	50.23%
Margins between two main parties	102,805		40,586	

Source: EC of Ghana (2008)

Table 9.2.2 Regional overview of rejected ballots in Ghanaian presidential elections as % of total votes, 1992-2012

Region	1992	1996	2000	2000 run-off	2004	2008	2008 run-off	2012
Western	2.39	1.66	1.79	1.09	2.78	3.18	1.12	2.51
Central	3.33	2.16	2.59	1.40	2.26	3.24	1.45	2.71
Greater Accra	2.24	0.57	0.36	0.58	1.17	1.06	0.52	1.03
Volta	1.97	0.50	1.16	1.61	1.68	2.12	0.94	2.73
Eastern	2.74	0.26	1.76	0.92	2.02	2.25	1.10	2.20
Ashanti	4.56	0.95	1.09	0.54	1.42	1.65	0.63	1.34
Brong-Ahafo	2.65	1.54	0.38	1.20	2.16	2.60	1.13	2.70
Northern	4.18	2.86	5.64	2.37	3.88	3.57	1.17	3.45
Upper East	4.15	6.27	0.43	2.71	3.66	4.17	1.98	4.54
Upper West	4.43	5.22	1.61	3.08	5.60	5.05	2.10	4.74
National Total	**3.03**	**1.53**	**1.58**	**1.20**	**2.13**	**2.32**	**1.00**	**2.24**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012); Frempong (2012); FES (2010); African Elections database (2012)

Table 9.2.3 List of constituencies with high percentage of invalid votes

Constituency	Region	% invalid votes
Jomoro	Western	4,93
Bia East	Western	4,92
Krachi East	Volta	4,60
Krachi Nchumru	Volta	5,00
Nkwanta South	Volta	6,91
Sekyere Afram Plains	Ashanti	5,80
Atebubu/Amantin	Brong Ahafo	4,85
Pru East	Brong Ahafo	4,87
Pru West	Brong Ahafo	4,52
Sene West	Brong Ahafo	4,90
Sene East	Brong Ahafo	5,42
Bole/Bamboi	Northern	4,91
Sawla Tuna Kalba	Northern	7,74
Tatale/SanguliI	Northern	5,33
Mion	Northern	5,01
Chereponi	Northern	4,61
Gushegu	Northern	4,53
Karaga	Northern	5,71
Walewale	Northern	4,96
Yagaba/Kubori	Northern	5,42
Bulisa South	Upper East	6,87
Bulisa North	Upper East	5,71
Bongo	Upper East	5,17
Talensi	Upper East	5,68
Zebilla	Upper East	4,53
Binduri	Upper East	4,88
Pusiga	Upper East	6,43
Garu	Upper East	5,06
Tempane	Upper East	6,61
Wa West	Upper West	7,60
Wa East	Upper West	5,10
Daffiama/Bussie/Issa	Upper West	5,57
Jirapa	Upper West	4,95
Lambussie-Karni	Upper West	5,60
Lawra	Upper West	5,06
Sissala West	Upper West	5,91
Sissala East	Upper West	4,59

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 9.2.4 Registered Voters by Constituency in Western Region

District name	Constituency name	Total voters
Jomoro	Jomoro	78,913
Ellembele	Ellembele	58,385
Nzema East Municipality	Evalue-Ajomoro-Gwira	41,097
Ahanta West	Ahanta West	63,792
Takoradi Sub	Takoradi	53,686
Effia- Kwesimintsim-Sub	Effia	45,702
Effia- Kwesimintsim-Sub	Kwesimintsim	43,748
Sekondi Sub	Sekondi	35,444
Essikadu-Ketan Sub	Essikadu-Ketan	56,198
Shama	Shama	49,329
Wassa East	Wassa East	43,104
Mpohor	Mpohor	23,301
Tarkwa Nsuaem	Tarkwa Nsuaem	98,748
Prestea/Huni-Valley	Prestea/Huni-Valley	100,915
Wassa Amenfi East	Amenfi East	67,093
Wassa Amenfi Central	Amenfi Central	51,015
Wassa Amenfi West	Amenfi West	60,067
Aowin	Aowin	71,468
Suaman	Suaman	20,891
Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai	Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai	74,128
Sefwi Wiawso	Sefwi Wiawso	72,128
Sefwi Akontombra	Sefwi Akontombra	38,237
Juaboso	Juaboso	50,433
Bodi	Bodi	35,119
Bia West	Bia West	64,404
Bia East	Bia East	27,813
Total Western Region		**1,425,158**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 9.2.5 Registered Voters by Constituency in Central Region

District name	Constituency name	Total voters
Komenda/Edina/Eguaf/Abrem	Komenda/Edina/Eguaf/Abrem (Keea)	77,232
Cape Coast	Cape Coast South	50,410
Cape Coast	Cape Coast North	54,655
Abura/Asebu/Kwamankese	Abura/Asebu/Kwamankese	59,615
Mfantseman	Mfantseman	79,869
Ekumpfi	Ekumpfi	33,408
Ajumako Enyan Esiam	Ajumako Enyan Esiam	60,119
Gomoa West	Gomoa West	66,515
Gomoa East	Gomoa Central	36,633
Gomoa East	Gomoa East	48,509
Effutu	Effutu	47,048
Awutu Senya West	Awutu Senya West	63,203
Awutu Senya East	Awutu Senya East	81,665
Agona West	Agona West	72,745
Agona East	Agona East	50,422
Asikuma/Odoben/Brakwa	Asikuma/Odoben/Brakwa	59,292
Assin North	Assin Central	37,297
Assin North	Assin North	35,855
Assin South	Assin South	49,320
Twifo Ato Morkwaa	Twifo Ato Morkwaa	50,293
Hemang Lower Denkyira	Hemang Lower Denkyira	33,312
Upper Denkyira East	Upper Denkyira East	49,457
Upper Denkyira West	Upper Denkyira West	34,639
Total Central Region		**1,231,513**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 9.2.6 Registered Voters by Constituency in Greater Accra

District name	Constituency name	Total voters
Ga South	Bortianor-Ngleshie Amanfro	66,402
Ga South	Weija/Gbawe	78,885
Ga South	Domeabra/Obom	31,238
Ga South	Domeabra/Obom	31,238
Ga South	Domeabra/Obom	31,238
Ga Central	Anyaa/Sowutuom	105,150
Ga West	Trobu	100,056
Ga West	Amasaman	73,711
Ga East	Dome/Kwamenya	125,950
La-Nkwantanang/Madina Municipality	Madina	105,738
Ayawaso	Ayawaso East	53,523
Ayawaso	Ayawaso North	51,186
Ayawaso	Ayawaso Central	85,084
Ayawaso	Ayawaso Wst Wuogon	82,658
Okaikwei	Okaikwei South	89,646
Okaikwei	Okaikwei Central	61,981
Okaikwei	Okaikwei North	69,900
Ablekuma	Ablekuma North	113,497
Ablekuma	Ablekuma Central	122,009
Ablekuma	Ablekuma South	77,358
Ablekuma	Ablekuma West	80,541
Ashiedu Keteke	Odododiodioo	97,928
Osu Clottey	Korle Klottey	95,068
La	Dadekotopon	112,417
Ledzokuku Krowor	Ledzokuku	126,432
Ledzokuku Krowor	Krowor	87,918
Tema	Tema East	84,784
Tema	Tema Central	55,906
Tema	Tema West	103,968
Kpone Katamanso	Kpone Katamanso	79,442
Ashaiman	Ashaiman	125,358
Total Greater Accra Region		**2,792,576**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 9.2.7 Registered Voters by Constituency in Volta

District name	Constituency name	Total voters
Keta	Keta	46,607
Keta	Anlo	50,319
Ketu South	Ketu South	126,659
Ketu North	Ketu North	60,761
Akatsi South	Akatsi South	43,153
Akatsi North	Akatsi North	18,800
South Tongu	South Tongu	52,183
Central Tongu	Central Tongu	39,242
North Tongu	North Tongu	48,577
Adaklu	Adaklu	17,940
Agotime-Ziope	Agotime-Ziope	26,450
Ho Municipal	Ho Central	87,100
Ho West	Ho West	48,680
South Dayi	South Dayi	26,640
Kpando Muncipality	Kpando	32,567
North Dayi	North Dayi	24,162
Hohoe Municipality	Hohoe	67,615
Afadjato South	Afadjato South	34,183
Jasikan	Buem	37,125
Biakoye	Biakoye	40,136
Kadjebi	Akan	38,553
Krachi West	Krach East	40,647
Krach West	Krach West	22,768
Krachi Nchumuru	Krachi Nchumuru	28,957
Nkwanta South	Nkwanta South	52,363
Nkwanta North	Nkwanta North	44,553
Total Volta Region		**1,156,740**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 9.2.8 Registered Voters by Constituency in Eastern Region

District name	Constituency name	Total voters
Asuogyaman	Asuogyaman	51,164
Lower Manya Krobo	Lower Manya Krobo	60,674
Upper Manya Krobo	Upper Manya Krobo	35,602
Yilo Krobo	Yilo Krobo	55,597
New Juaben Municipality	New Juaben South	77,987
New Juaben Municipality	New Juaben North	34,903
Akwapim North	Akwapim North	55,392
Akwapim North	Okere	30,018
Akuapem South	Akuapem South	32,114
Nsawam/Adoagyiri	Nsawam/Adoagyiri	58,564
Suhum	Suhum	60,217
Ayensuano	Ayensuano	46,900
West Akim Muncipality	Lower West Akim	57,271
Upper West Akim	Upper West Akim	44,552
Birim Central	Akim Oda	37,399
Birim Central	Asene/Akroso/Manso	38,489
Birim South	Akim Swedru	19,035
Birim South	Achiase	28,554
Akyemansa	Ofoase/Ayirebi	43,647
Kwaebibirem	Kade	62,679
Denkyembuo	Akwatia	46,978
Birim North	Abirem	39,266
East Akim	Abuakwa South	46,138
East Akim	Abuakwa South	38,226
Atwia	Atwai West	27,485
Atwia	Atwia East	28,231
Fanteakwa	Fanteakwa South	24,363
Fanteakwa	Fanteakwa North	29,770
Kwahu West Municipality	Nkawkaw	65,061
Kwahu South	Mpraeso	41,593
Kwahu East	Abetifi	41,503
Afram Plains North	Afram Plains North	37,431
Afram Plains South	Afram Plains South	32,879
Total Eastern Region		**1,429,682**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 9.2.9 Registered Voters by Constituency in Ashanti Region

District name	Constituency name	Total voters
Adansi South	New Edubiase	40,108
Adansi South	Akrofuom	22,010
Adansi North	Fomena	24,012
Adansi North	Adansi Asokwa	37,046
Obuasi Municipal (Obusasi)	Obuasi West	59,118
Obuasi Municipal (Obusasi)	Obuasi East	49,635
Bekwai Municipal	Bekwai	65,480
Bosome Freho	Bosome Freho	29,888
Amansie Central	Odotobiri	41,633
Amansie West	Manso Nkwanta	45,336
Amansie West	Manso Adubia	43,712
Atwima Nwabiagya	Atwima Nwabiagya South	64,617
Atwima Nwabiagya	Atwima Nwabiagya North	53,404
Atwima Mponua	Atwima Mponua	71,564
Bosomtwe	Bosomtwe	59,586
Atwima Kwanwoma	Atwima Kwanwoma	69,450
Bantama	Bantama	68,271
Kwadaso	Kwadaso	79,256
Nhyiaeso	Nhyiaeso	70,233
Manhyia	Manhyia South	49,592
Manhyia	Manhyia North	62,429
Old Tafo	Old Tafo	67,627
Suame	Suame	90,305
Subin	Subin	78,479
Asokwa	Asokwa	79,228
Oforikrom	Oforikrom	109,597
Asokore Mampong	Asawase	94,813
Kwabre East	Kwabre East	95,424
Afigya Kwabre	Afigya Kwabre South	66,096
Afigya Kwabre	Afigya Kwabre North	29,575
Ejisu Juaben Municipal	Juaben	34,040
Ejisu Juaben Municipal	Ejisu	74,948
Asante Akim South	Asante Akim South	61,084
Asante Akim Central Muncipality	Asante Akim Central	41,660
Asante Akim North	Asante Akim North	40,204
Sekyere East	Effiduase/Asokore	34,055
Sekyere Kumawu	KUMAWU	30,977
Sekyere Afram Plains	Sekyere Afram Plains	12,082
Sekyere Central	Nsuta/Kwamang/Beposo	36,051
Mampong Municipal	Mampong	55,443
Ejura Sekyedumase	Ejura Sekyedumase	54,695
Sekyere South	Afigya Sekyere East	56,965
Offinso Muncipal	Offinso South	60,571
Offinso North	Offinso North	42,264
Ahafo Ano South	Ahafo Ano South West	36,422
Ahafo Ano South	Ahafo Ano South East	22,859
Ahafo Ano North	Ahafo Ano North	45,278
Total Ashanti Region		**2,557,122**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 9.2.10 Registered Voters by Constituency in Brong-Ahafo Region

District name	Constituency name	Total voters
Asunafo South	Asunafo South	46,822
Asunafo North	Asunafo North	67,078
Asutifi South	Asutifi South	34,193
Asufiti North	Asufiti North	34,957
Tano South	Tano South	44,233
Tano North	Tano North	41,339
Sunyani Municipal	Sunyani East	89,477
Sunyani West	Sunyani West	59,185
Dormaa West	Dormaa West	19,417
Dormaa Municipal	Dormaa Central	52,580
Dormaa east	Dormaa East	29,226
Berekum Municipal	Berekum West	22,757
Berekum Municipal	Berekum East	50,494
Jaman South	Jaman South	50,834
Jaman North	Jaman North	40,216
Banda	Banda	13,439
Tain	Tain	42,055
Wenchi	Wenchi	53,015
Techniman Muncipal	Techiman South	94,336
Kintampo North	Kintampo North	53,087
Kintampo South	Kintampo South	35,829
Nkoranza North	Nkoranza North	25,676
Nkoranza South	Nkoranza South	53,427
Atebubu/Amantin	Atebubu/Amantin	46,662
Pru	Pru West	25,955
Pru	Pru East	36,273
Sene West	Sene West	25,899
Sene East	Sene East	20,265
Techiman North	Techiman North	37,228
Total Brong-Ahafo Region		**1,245,954**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 9.2.11 Registered Voters by Constituency in Northern Region

District name	Constituency name	Total voters
Bole	Bole/Bamboi	34,582
Sawla/Tuna/Kalba	Sawla/Tuna/Kalba	40,696
West Gonja	Damongo	21,142
North Gonja	Daboya/Mankarigu	20,396
Central Gonja	Yapei-Kusawgu	48,254
East Gonja	Salaga South	43,547
East Gonja	Salaga North	13,274
Kpandai	Kpandai	46,711
Nanumba North	Bimbilla	66,625
Nanumba South	Wulensi	36,444
Zabzugu	Zabzugu	30,109
Tatale/Sanguli	Tatale/Sanguli	27,108
Yendi	Yendi	59,148
Mion	Mion	32,160
Saboba	Saboba	30,121
Chereponi	Chereponi	26,844
Gushegu	Gushegu	44,477
Karaga	Karaga	38,135
Savelugu/Nanton	Savelugu	44,022
Savelugu /Nanton	Nanton	22,190
Tamale	Tamale South	91,380
Tamale	Tamale Central	80,753
Tamale	Tamale North	38,123
Sagnarigu	Sagnarigu	49,667
Tolon	Tolon	48,340
Kumbungu	Kumbungu	39,478
West Mamprusi	Walewale	56,236
Mamprugu/Moagduri	Yagaba/Kubori	20,298
East Mamprusi	Nalerigu/Gamgaba	58,160
Bunkpurugu/Yunyoo	Bunkpurugu	35,923
Bunkpurugu/Yunyoo	Yunyoo	19,119
Total Northern Region		**1,263,462**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 9.2.12 Registered Voters by Constituency in Upper East Region

District name	Constituency name	Total voters
Builsa South	Builsa South	16,757
Builsa North	Builsa North	27,730
Kassena/Nankana East	Navrongo Central	44,935
Kassena/Nakana West	Chiana/Paga	46,017
Bolga	Bolgatanga Central	61,470
Bolga	Bolgantanga East	17,883
Bongo	Bongo	49,078
Talensi`	Talensi	38,183
Nabdam	Nabdam	18,940
Bawku West	Zelliba	52,718
Bawku Munipical	Binduri	31,987
Bawku Municipal	Bawku Central	58,925
Pusiga	Pusiga	35,856
Garu-Tempane	Garu	27,507
Garu-Tempane	Tempane	37,111
Total Upper East Region		**565,097**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)

Table 9.2.13 Registered Voters by Constituency in Upper West Region

District name	Constituency name	Total voters
Wa Municipal	Wa Central	75,130
Wa West	Wa West	40,841
Wa East	Wa East	32,824
Nadowli/Kaleo	Nadowli/Kaleo	35,684
Daffiama/Bussie/Issa	Daffiama/Bussie/Issa	17,177
Jirapa	Jirapa	35,581
Lambussie-Karni	Lambussie-Karni	20,571
Lawra	Lawra	25,327
Nandom	Nandom	24,236
Sissala West	Sissala West	27,085
Sissala East	Sissala East	30,033
Total Upper West Region		**364,489**
Grand Total		**14,031,793**

Source: EC of Ghana (2012)